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For Benjamin,  
 
 
Whose example has taught me the art of disclosing one’s phobias 
with wit, ideal timing, and pleasure  
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Infectious Affect: The Phobic Imagination in American Literature begins with this 
question: by what literary pathways did the -phobia suffix come to shape U.S. politics so 
profoundly? In current political discourse, Americans rely on phobia as a concept to 
describe conditions of social inequality. People and policies that negatively impact 
communities based on sexual orientation, gender identification, ethnicity, race, or religion 
are understood to be homophobic, transphobic, xenophobic, or Islamophobic. However 
implicitly, these terms also aspire to a widely accepted hypothesis: in short, that systemic 
inequality begins with and is sustained by a nucleus of fear, on the part of those wielding 
the greatest political power. Taking part in the new philological turn in literary studies, 
my dissertation shows that the –phobia suffix first began to be adapted from medical 
literature to explain sociopolitical phenomena in the late 1700s, then went on to catch on 
rapidly in the antebellum period. At the same time, in tracing this history we discover that 
phobia’s proliferation as a political category did not go uncontested. I take less interest, 
then, in those who played by the rules of a consolidating phobic imagination than I do in 
writers who repurposed it to counterintuitive ends. In telling the backstory of activist 
phobias, Infectious Affect explores the rise of a phobic imagination in medical, literary, 
and political contexts alike, proposing that phobia activated a new dynamism between 
disparate modes of knowledge production. 
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THE PHOBIC IMAGINATION IN AMERICAN LITERATURE, 1765-1885: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The press of my foot to the earth springs a hundred affections, 
They scorn the best I can do to relate them. 
 
- Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” (1855) 
 
 
 
What would it mean to apprehend phobias historically? Not in the sense of a 
patient’s history, à la Freud’s Little Hans or Watson’s Little Albert, nor as mere social 
construct, but rather as an epistemological advent, contingent upon discursive shifts in 
literary, medical, and political thought? In all of its familiar forms—as emotion, 
psychological illness, and social hermeneutic—phobia tends to conjure something nearly 
para- or counter-historical, a feeling whose power inheres in the suddenness of its 
interruption of other continuities. Nevertheless, against this claim to immediacy, 
Infectious Affect contends that phobia’s rise as a diagnosis, cultural touchstone, and 
sociopolitical analytic commenced in U.S. print culture in a highly particular context. 
Phobia’s medicalization, its versatility as a suffix, even its visceral impulsivity coalesced 
within a network of social and epistemological cues, which began to reach a threshold of 
coherence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the crucible these 
discourses forged, phobia began to emerge as a distinct affective locus simultaneous with 
the founding of the early republic, went on to proliferate quickly in the antebellum 
period, and consolidated from a nascent, unwieldy structure of feeling into something 
more standardized in the postbellum era. In recollecting this history, Infectious Affect 
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goes beyond the narrow purview of documenting phobia’s etymology and history as an 
idea, strange and instructive as these subjects are on their own terms. This dissertation 
maintains that we cannot understand important elements of American literature, 
aesthetics, politics, and medicine in its first hundred years without also understanding the 
contingencies, now alien to us, that prompted the rise of a phobic imagination in the U.S. 
public sphere. It maintains that nineteenth-century subjects as diverse as mental 
disability, contagion, theories of racial difference, sexual science, political satire, 
sentimental reform, an evolving gothic aesthetic, and the affective repertoire of early 
Americans depended on a phobic imagination and that we stand to gain significant 
insights once the story of phobia’s evolution has been told.  
 Today the idea that phobia underlies the most heated battles over civil rights in 
the U.S. is not just taken for granted, it has become widely integrated into the 
terminology by which grand-scale social movements petition for recognition and stake 
claims to justice. Homophobia, transphobia, Islamophobia, and xenophobia occupy a 
notable ubiquity. Through social media, on the airwaves, and in print, they have 
tremendous cultural capital and rhetorical purchase. The first proposition of “Infectious 
Affect” is that this enduring popularity of the –phobia suffix reflects, in part, an implicit 
set of assumptions connected to what Wendy Brown has called “tolerance talk” in her 
book Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (2006). A 
concept hailed internationally as “a beacon of multicultural justice and civic peace,” 
tolerance offers a way of interpreting political impasses between groups as matters of 
inexplicable aversion (Brown 2). In the strategy it provides for managing these aversions, 
tolerance prophesies a modest utopia where prejudices are imaginatively converted into a 
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kind of passive coexistence. Imbricated in this logic, the –phobia suffix invites its users to 
imagine a primordial field of social dread in order to advance an alternative pluralist 
civility. At the same time, the –phobia suffix has also consistently imported into tolerance 
discourse a still greater emphasis on the individual as a site of subjective wrong-
headedness, driven by the occluded workings of a pathological fear. Along these lines, 
our ever expanding –phobia arsenal speaks to a shared sensibility, by which an array of 
anti-discriminatory movements have come to presume the same psychological 
hypothesis: in short, that structural inequality originates in and is sustained by a 
debilitating experience of fear, on the parts of those wielding the greatest political power. 
As Amanda Hess observes in an article for the New York Times,1 just as the –phobia 
suffix has secured a curious cultural dominance “as the activist’s most trusted term of art 
for pinning prejudice on an opponent,” so then has its rhetoric premised on eradicating 
“mental illness,” as a kind of original sin, from democratic society. Hess notes further, 
“Any blowhard who spews bigotry against a marginalized group—or any journalist who 
pens an article perceived as insufficiently sensitive—risks being called out for an 
irrational anxiety over one Other or another.” However, the most significant effect of this 
convention, this dissertation will argue, has been the apologies phobia implicitly 
safeguards: phobia describes an affective liminality, wherein hypocrisies of U.S. 
democracy have been repeatedly naturalized as hang-ups of the human psyche, matters of 
individual taste, or the base instincts of a biological constitution hardwired for survival.  
 One of the most compelling attributes of phobia’s discursive authority has been its 
crossover appeal in academic discourse. While this is true of a number of fields of inquiry 
                                                
1 See: “How ‘-Phobic’ Became a Weapon in the Identity Wars.” The New York Times (26 
Jan. 2016). 
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(including critical race theory, feminism, and postcolonial critique), the history of its 
analytical purchase in queer theory has been the most intimate and enduring. Indeed, 
turning to the early pages of Epistemology of the Closet (1990), we find that Eve 
Sedgwick begins that text—one of the most influential scholarly monographs in the 
quarter of a century since—with a noteworthy qualification. The “only imperative” the 
book will “treat as categorical,” Sedgwick explains, “is the very broad one of pursuing an 
antihomophobic inquiry” (14). With this objective, Sedgwick embarks on assembling a 
now familiar methodological toolkit, capable of facilitating “certain specific kinds of 
readings and interrogations, perhaps new, available in a heuristically powerful, 
productive, and significant form for other readers to perform on literary and social texts 
with, ideally, other results” (14). Yet Epistemology of the Closet does not characterize 
these readings and interrogations with the qualifier one might expect—which is to say, 
queer. Written just before the consolidation of “queer theory” into a field of study, 
Epistemology of the Closet organizes these readings and interrogations under the banner 
of a nascent field Sedgwick dubs, instead, “antihomophobic theory.” In so doing, the 
book takes as its target a term that had not been around long: a social peril called 
homophobia, coined by New York psychiatrist George Weinberg in his 1972 book 
Society and the Healthy Homosexual, defined by Weinberg as a “disease” characterized 
by a “dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals,” or “in the case of homosexuals 
themselves, self-loathing” (4).2 By the time of her next book Tendencies (1993), 
                                                
2 The question of whether homophobia is meant to indicate a pathological state of mind, 
or is merely euphemistic for prejudice, yields interesting results when one does the 
research. When the Associated Press banned the words homophobia and Islamophobia 
from its stylebook in 2012, it was with the explanation that phobia implies 
“uncontrollable fear, often a form of mental illness” and that its usage “in political or 
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Sedgwick was embracing, with characteristic virtuosity, in the turn of a cultural tide 
toward queer, invoking antihomophobic as a modifier only a handful of times. 
Homophobia, however, had become a permanent feature of a corresponding disciplinary 
landscape: a foundational impetus to and dialectical reference point for a rapidly evolving 
queer analytic.  
Phobia’s unwavering prominence as a queer analytic in the decades since begs the 
question: what have been the consequences of homophobia’s hegemony? To describe it 
as hegemonic is justifiable in the Gramscian sense: homophobia dominates thought, 
intellectual and cultural, as a hermeneutic for understanding the ongoing persecution of 
sexual minorities. The elisions wrought by this dominance have provoked dissent in 
recent years. A collection of essays titled Homophobias: Lust and Loathing across Time 
and Space (2009), edited by David A. B. Murray, addresses the term’s limitations in the 
field of anthropology. In his introduction to the volume, Murray contends that one 
important drawback to homophobia’s omnipresent usage has been its tendency to situate 
prejudice against gays and lesbians within a “psychological, individualized framework,” 
which is to say as a “fear or hatred that resides in an individual’s psyche” (3). Against 
this implication, Murray contends that discrimination has at its disposal “a range of 
attitudes: from indifference to dismissal, ‘scientific’ logic, ‘tolerance,’ or even a carefully 
delimited embrace (as in ‘love the sinner, not the sin’).” We might describe this equally 
                                                                                                                                            
social contexts” should therefore be discouraged (Byers). Plenty of critics resisted the 
simplistic association. However, others defended its accuracy on these same grounds, 
such as Patrick Strudwick whose article for The Guardian on the AP ban insisted that 
homophobia speaks to a psychological state of both fear and repression. Anti-gay bigotry, 
Strudwick explained, feeds ultimately on a “fear of what lurks repressed and 
unacknowledged in the homophobe.” One instructive outcome of the AP ban on political 
phobias was that it revealed how split public opinion is when it comes to homophobia’s 
denotative intent.   
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as an affective heterogeneity, and multiplicity, by which prejudice and stigma become 
naturalized within and foundational to public life. By focusing primarily on fear, 
homophobia and transphobia alike, as international rallying points of LGBT liberation, 
have failed to do justice to the nature of the structural violence queer persons face in both 
the most ephemeral and enduring of contexts, which far beyond hate speech have a 
history of including everything from pathologization and criminalization to the denial of 
civil rights, socially sanctioned violence in schools, workplace discrimination, police 
brutality, compromised access to or total alienation from healthcare, targeted 
incarceration, and, within these contexts and others, murder without legal recourse—all 
of which, moreover, have continued well into the present. Simultaneously, phobia’s 
rhetorical dominance has produced a veneer of causation, by which advancements in 
LGBT progressivism have been caricatured as reducible to a gradual erosion of an 
organic, intuitive repugnance.  
References to homophobia as well as transphobia in queer scholarship offer two 
instructive examples. Yet, as noted above, prominent critical theorists have long made 
use of the suffix for a range of political interventions. We might consider Frantz Fanon’s 
analysis of Negrophobia in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Adrienne Rich’s turn to 
gynephobia as a cross-racial phenomenon in her essay “Disloyal to Civilization” (1979), 
Elaine Showalter’s interrogation of a divisive matriphobia among feminists in Toward a 
Feminist Poetics (1979), or Edward Said’s provocative comparison of Islamophobia with 
anti-Semitism in his famous defense, “Orientalism Reconsidered” (1985). In the twenty-
first century, use of the phobia suffix has continued to enjoy shared, even, we might say, 
symbiotic approval in critical theory and the popular press. What have been the effects of 
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our uninterrogated, ahistorical allegiance to this idea? And how has the history of this 
usage over the last two centuries shaped our experience of progressive politics in U.S. 
contexts? In order to answer these questions and parse the discursive baggage of phobia’s 
rhetorical durability, this dissertation argues for unearthing its history: a history 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American and transatlantic print media show to be 
elaborate, contingent, and unexpected, but also dynamic, inspiring, and instructive. 
Focusing on writings by a range of figures, including John Adams, Benjamin Rush, 
Frederick Douglass, Samuel Cornish, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Victor Hugo, William 
Lloyd Garrison, Lydia Maria Child, John Neal, George Lippard, Edgar Allan Poe, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr., Oscar Wilde, Aubrey Beardsley, Mark Twain, and Zora Neale 
Hurston, I argue that one thing they all had in common was the interest they showed, 
whether fleeting or prolonged, in phobia’s evolving explanatory power. Across different 
contexts, these writers assisted in establishing the grounds on which phobia’s analytical 
appeal was tested, debated, and made commonplace. 
To put it more succinctly, the germ of a question motivating this study is, by what 
literary pathways did the –phobia suffix come to shape U.S. politics so profoundly? By 
what literary means and reasoning, that is, did the default availability of the –phobia 
suffix as a frame for understanding civil discord become not merely standardized, but 
fully integral to public perceptions of what it means to be a disenfranchised political 
subject, and what must happen for those conditions to change? Taken as a whole, the 
dissertation argues that answering these questions requires that we turn to phobia’s 
discursive emergence at the intersection of multiple, variegated scenes of knowledge 
production and spheres of early American and nineteenth-century print culture. In the 
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past, scholars and journalists have proposed historical thresholds for the origins of 
phobia’s cultural interest having to do with gay liberation, modernist aesthetics engaged 
in psychoanalysis, or the hotbed of diagnostic speculation fostered by Victorian 
neurology. Without a doubt, all of these developments mark important moments in the 
evolution of phobia as a cultural framework. However, to comprehend the historical 
phenomena that prompted phobia’s ascendancy as a hermeneutic, we must turn first to 
literature of the late 1700s. Starting here, this study tells the literary history of phobia’s 
evolution as a scientific object, feeling, and political metaphor, focusing on three 
interrelated fields of historical inquiry: (1) the consolidation of a psychiatric discipline in 
the history of medicine, (2) the history of emotions in the U.S. public sphere, and (3) 
queer philology as a method for rethinking the evolving relationship between political 
language, emotion, print media, and literary aesthetics. 
 
“IF I WERE A DOG, I SHOULD BE SHOT AS A MAD ONE”: 
PHOBIA’S ORIGINAL SIN, IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 
 
Phobia’s incipient legibility as an emotion was inseparable from its emergence as 
an object of medical science. It is worth mentioning that the history of fear as a subject of 
science has attracted increasing attention in recent years. In Fear across the Disciplines 
(2012), to name one example, editors Benjamin Lazier and Jan Plamper offer a collection 
of essays exploring the study of fear across an array of fields. To answer the question of 
how fear began to be taken up by biologists and in the social sciences, Ruth Leys’ 
contribution to the volume, titled “How Did Fear Become a Scientific Object and What 
Kind of Object Is It?”, traces analyses of fear from Paul Ekman through the affect theory 
of Silvan Tomkins and, finally, back to Charles Darwin’s contributions in The Expression 
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of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Nevertheless, Darwin remains the earliest 
ground Leys treads. Here and elsewhere, phobia’s emergence as a human affect deserving 
scientific scrutiny, diagnosis, and treatment, in the late 1700s and early 1800s, has yet to 
be adequately explored. 
The rise of a phobic imagination in American print media commenced with a 
series of developments in the history of medicine, in which one rather notorious phobia 
began to prompt the coinage of others, by way of analogy. To get a sense of how this fear 
struck early Americans, what it signified symptomatically and what kind of terror it 
conjured, we might begin by encountering one of the most widely circulated instances 
reported in newspapers in either century, on both sides of the Atlantic. On the night of 
August 26, 1819, it is said that the recently appointed Governor General of British North 
America, Charles Lennox, 4th Duke of Richmond, began to feel somewhat strange. 
Accompanied by friends, he had spent the day traversing the backwoods of the Ottawa 
River, with the goal of establishing a new township named Richmondville in his honor. 
At last, the group decided to set up camp and sit down to dinner. What followed was a 
“very convivial evening,” sources would later attest (C.G. Lennox 4). But as the party 
began to disperse, it became evident the Duke was unwell. Turning to his friend Colonel 
Cockburn, he is said to have remarked, holding a glass of claret in his hand, “I don’t 
know how it is, Cockburn, but I cannot relish my wine to-night as usual; and I feel that if 
I were a dog I should be shot as a mad one” (4-5). It was advised the Duke should get 
some rest, but by morning the condition had deteriorated. Soon he became incapable of 
swallowing fluids entirely. By the morning of August 28, friends found that his terror of 
liquids had become so general` he could not bathe. When it was agreed he should try to 
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get to Montreal by canoe, to seek medical attention, he could barely bring himself to 
approach the river’s edge. Mere proximity induced physical spasms. Finding within 
himself a “desperate resolution,” the Governor General is said to have shouted aloud, 
“Charles Lennox never yet was afraid of anything!” (5). He climbed into the boat. Within 
a few seconds, however, the horror returned, and the Duke demanded he be returned to 
land. On finding the shore near enough, he jumped onto the bank and darted for the 
woods. When his companions caught up with him, they ushered him to a farmhouse 
nearby, but even the sound of the river, audible from that location, was too much. They 
carried him to a barn behind the house and laid him down on a bed of straw. Within 
moments Charles Lennox was dead.  
The cause of the Duke’s death was immediately apparent to family and friends, 
and would have been obvious to strangers as well. Clearly enough, Lennox had fallen 
prey to the deadly disease of hydrophobia, the dominant name for rabies until the late 
nineteenth century. Taken from the Greek word φόβος (phóbos), phobia originally 
entered the English language, as early as the fourteenth century, when writers 
transliterated the Greek word for rabies, spelled “ὑδροφοβία.” For centuries, while other 
names such as “canine madness” and the Latin “rabies canina” circulated, hydrophobia 
continued to serve as the primary name for rabies because the disease was known for 
being characterized by an intense fear of water, incited by an inability to swallow liquids 
(Figure 1).3 It became widely acknowledged over time that this fear of imbibing water 
gradually intensified, to the extent that accounts of hydrophobia reported everything from 
                                                
3 When first transliterated into Late Middle English, it appears to have been spelled 
“idroforbia.” In Old English, the equivalent was spelled “wæterfyrhtness” (Online 
Etymology Dictionary). 
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a dread of imbibing fluids to a terror of touching, seeing, hearing, or even audible 
reference to water, as demonstrated above. In the Duke’s case, competing rumors 
immediately began to spread to explain how the Duke had become infected. Some 
recalled he had sustained a bite from a rabid fox a couple of months earlier, while 
separating it from a scuffle with a hound. Still others believed that he contracted the 
disease from his own dog, Blucher, whom he famously adored and allowed to sleep in his 
bed at night. According to this version of events, a dog stricken with hydrophobia 
attacked Blucher at the neck one ill-fated afternoon. Overwhelmed with “compassion,” 
Lennox “caught” Blucher “in his arms, and applied his own lips to the part bitten” 
(Silliman 295). Through a miniscule split in his lip, he “imbibed the poison” and later 
succumbed to the madness himself. Yet perhaps the most telling element in the story is 
how faithfully Lennox’s case met the expectations of the disease’s popular appellation 
and favorite symptom. The Governor General’s suffering was understood to have 
occurred over a sequence of ever-intensifying associations, wherein an initial phobia of 
swallowing fluids swelled into an obscene and humiliating totality. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, through a transatlantic dialogue circulating by 
way of medical dissertations, pamphlets, and case studies, hydrophobia became a major 
reference point in the Atlantic world for determining the potency of fear over the human 
body (Fig. 1). Lennox’s case, though it occurred in 1819, was in keeping with earlier 
eighteenth-century rabies narratives, which had begun to consolidate noticeably around 
the 1760s. Literature on hydrophobia began to blossom at mid-century, during a period 
known for its influx of “nosologies,” or disease classification schemes. The most 
important of these schemes, published in Europe, were penned by major physicians such 
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as François Boissier de Sauvages de Lacroix, Carl Linnaeus, Rudolf Augustin Vogel, and 
William Cullen. With these figures as interlocutors, debates around the cause of 
hydrophobia, its contagious properties, and its relation to environmental factors began to 
proliferate. By consequence, the state of dread hydrophobia indexed became 
acknowledged increasingly as a condition necessitating study and treatment. Thus, phobia 
began to enter what we might best describe as a vague interim, during which pathological 
fear solicited increasing attention, for being a potent physiological force, while the phobia 
suffix remained essentially tethered to rabies as a taxonomical unit. Indeed, while 
Sauvages actually included within his classification scheme two additional phobias—
aerophobia, meaning an aversion to drafts of air, and pantophobia, indicating a dread of 
everything—these appeared only in relation to hydrophobia itself, as comorbid symptoms 
that might likewise follow from rabid infection. A phobic sensibility was budding, but 
only in keeping with the parameters of an affiliated rabid symptomatology.  
One of the best literary examples to register this evolving phobic sensibility in the 
mid-eighteenth century is John Adams’ essay, “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal 
Law” (1765). Written in response to the Stamp Act passed that same year, despised for 
the direct tax it imposed on the colonies as well as its requirement that printed materials 
use paper made and embossed in London, the essay advocates retaliation in print.4 
Embedded in the call to action is an affective imperative to fight the inclination toward a 
silent passivity nurtured by fear. Adams implores readers, “Be not intimidated, therefore, 
                                                
4 Many consider this Adams’ best piece of writing. As observed by the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, in their digital edition of his works, “From a strictly literary point of 
view…the ‘Dissertation,’ written as it was in clear, concise, ringing tones, was the most 
satisfying of Adams' published works.” It represents, in addition, his “first effort to 
determine the significance of New England in American history and his initial 
contribution to the literature of the American Revolution.” 
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by any terrors, from publishing with the utmost freedom, whatever can be warranted by 
the laws of your country; nor suffer yourselves to be wheedled out of your liberty by any 
pretences of politeness, delicacy, or decency.” Lambasting the “cowardice” many had 
shown in shying away from public dissent, Adams moves to invoke the essay’s primary 
figure of speech, an analogy to hydrophobia activated by the material transatlanticism 
with which he is more literally concerned. Admonishing readers not to be “discouraged 
by any pretences that malignants on this side the water will represent your paper as 
factious and seditious, or that the great on the other side the water will take offence at 
them,” Adams emphasizes that this “dread of representation” has too long had in the 
colonies “effects very similar to what the physicians call a hydrophobia, or dread of 
water.” He explains further, “It has made us delirious; and we have rushed headlong into 
the water, till we are almost drowned, out of simple or phrensical fear of it.” A 
comparison Adams uses as a pivot point for the essay as a whole, the hydrophobia 
comparison sutures his opposition to the Stamp Act to an affective hypothesis—in 
essence, that a fear of misrepresentation was fashioning a kind of protective barrier 
against open dialogue, thus ensuring the colonies’ ongoing subordination.  
Most interesting for our purposes here is the way Adams flirts with coining a new 
phobic register, a “dread of representation,” in an effort to correct the cowardice of 
readers. As Jason Frank notes in his reading of the passage, “The revolutionary and 
postrevolutionary American context,” in which “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal 
Law” was written, “was charged with a heightened political awareness and suspicion of 
representational claims” (14). Frank suggests that Adams thus taps into a sense of 
“wariness” colonists felt toward “nearly all forms of representation” (85). Frank’s larger 
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point about representation is well taken, and important to discerning the context for the 
piece, and yet it begs noticing that Adams invokes a state of mind more precise, 
medicalized, and debilitating than “wariness” quite encapsulates. A state riddled with 
“terrors”; characterized by “phrensical fear”; stricken, as Adams later states, with 
“pusillanimity”; and consisting in a “timidity,” which is “the true source of our 
sufferings,” the “dread of representation” the analogy targets is by definition beyond 
reason and unsparingly damaging. While the artfulness of the comparison lies partly in 
Adams’ play with the imagery of transoceanic submission (to rush “headlong into the 
water” is to cower to an imperial seat literally an ocean away), the essay also pioneers an 
emergent emotional sensibility. In appealing to phobia as a medicalized state, Adams 
reads his fellow colonists as pathological in the resilience of their dread, with the evident 
intention of soliciting a sense of shame and disillusionment in order to goad readers 
toward a more healthful emotional response.   
Still, Adams only goes so far, resisting, consciously or subconsciously, the next 
step of forging a taxonomic expression—representophobia, or some prettier portmanteau. 
It is this subtle space of hesitation I mean to signpost in parenthesizing phobia’s vague 
interim, prior to its first concrete proliferation. The suffix had not yet run away from 
home; still, it is evident in Adams’ “Dissertation” and elsewhere that hydrophobia’s 
elaboration in eighteenth-century nosology was beginning to cultivate interest in a 
distinct, relatively unexplored form fear might take. Michel Foucault famously writes of 
this period in medicine that an almost fetishistic obsession with disease classification was 
taking root. For Foucault, this surge in the print circulation of disease taxonomies, 
occurring in advance of the rise of an “anatamo-clinical method,” also had a curious 
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liberating effect on medical knowledge production. “Paradoxically,” he contends, “never 
was the space of configuration of disease more free, more independent of its space of 
localization” than with the rise of a “classificatory medicine” that announced into 
existence its own ubiquitous authority (4). This independence of thought appears to have 
facilitated a kind of literary, perhaps even formal-critical approach to writing and 
conceptualizing pathology itself. As Foucault explains further, nosology allowed 
physicians and lay readers to picture disease as “a space in which analogies define 
essences” (7). The descriptions or “pictures” of disease provided in a given taxonomy 
might “resemble things,” yet in the imagined pathological community they conjured, 
diseases depended equally on apparent kinships with “one another” at the level of 
symptom and immediate manifestation. This figurative intimacy made possible an 
elaboration of new forms by “degree[s]” of “resemblance.” It was in the context of this 
taxonomical intimacy that phobia began to acquire a nascent relation of adjacency to 
rabid hydrophobia. The analogy, their structure of kinship, remained vital; however, a 
new and variable category of pathology began to fester. To borrow the binary offered by 
Foucault’s influential professor Georges Canguilhem, a new and generative fissure was 
beginning to spread between the “normal” and the “pathological.”   
Eighteenth-century hydrophobia differed from other understandings of fear 
(philosophical, theological, or otherwise) in that it signaled, or at least invoked the 
epistemological parameters of, a diagnosable state. That is, it inhered in a discourse 
governed by nomenclature, as a means of classifying a particular iteration of fear as a 
state of interior, ontological defect. At last, in the 1780s and 1790s, these connotations of 
the –phobia suffix began to make a break from rabies, attaching to new objects, 
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situations, and ideas. Infectious Affect will refer to this break as phobia’s “first 
proliferation.” Yet what we find in tracking this inaugural period of variation and 
adaptation is that it occurred within an ambiguously demarcated space between medical 
literature and popular print entertainment. In this inaugural ambiguity, we encounter a 
genealogy with evident parallels to phobia’s usage today. As subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate in depth, phobia’s diagnostic connotations would begin to exceed the 
production of strict medical knowledge. That is, phobia’s lexical independence began to 
be tested in popular print venues, not just to speculate on psychological pathology, but for 
the sake of social commentary and political satire as well. In this emergent relation, 
across the antebellum period especially, phobia would find an epistemologically fraught, 
but also reliable niche between seemingly distinct spheres of print consumption.  
In popular magazines and newspapers, these novel appropriations frequently 
come off as playful, as demonstrated in an illustration titled “Kunophobia—The Church 
in Danger,” published in British poet W. H. Harrison’s The Humorist in 1831 (Fig. 2). 
Picturing a rector running from a mad dog, who in turn flees a mob of pitchfork-wielding 
congregants, the illustration appears next to a poem, whose opening stanzas read:  
‘Mad dog! mad dog!’ see there he flies, 
Of learning no respecter; 
  If no one shoot or brain the brute,  
   He’ll surely bite the Rector. 
 
  ‘Mad dog! mad dog!’ how fast he runs! 
   With hundreds at his tail, 
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  Each with some murd’rous weapon arm’d, 
   Club, pitchfork, spade, or flail. (258) 
Evidently, phobia’s usage in this poem serves as a shortcut to extended wordplay. A 
comical interpretation of the scene described by the speaker—in which congregants chase 
the mad dog, who in turn pursues the Rector—the caption “Kunophobia—the Church in 
Danger” takes gratuitous pleasure in imagining that human and nonhuman miscreants 
have staged a mad, allied coup against church leadership. Yet phobia’s popular 
appropriation could also carry significant weight. Consider, for instance, a spate of 
newspaper articles and military histories following the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-
1842), which debated over several decades whether the war (a famously disastrous loss 
for the British, resulting in somewhere between 24,000 and 28,000 casualties) had been 
incited by a misplaced “Russophobia” on the part of the English, or rather an aggressive 
Anglophobia displayed by Russia.5 In such a context, the stakes of phobia’s analytical 
purchase could not have been higher. Nowhere would these serious valences of phobia’s 
usage be put to the test more than in the context of U.S. antislavery. As this dissertation 
will demonstrate, beginning in the 1830s abolitionists developed the most robust 
repurposing of the suffix in the antebellum period, cultivating a transatlantic rhetorical 
trend of citing “colorphobia” and “Negrophobia” as pathologies integral to slavery’s 
                                                
5 See, for example, the following sources: “Our Eastern Relations.”  The Monthly 
Chronicle; a National Journal of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art 4 (July-Dec. 
1839): 60-68; “Review: Narrative of a Journey from Heraut to Khiva, Moscow, and St. 
Petersburg during the Late Invasion of Khiva; with some Account of the Court of Khiva 
and the Kingdom of Khaurism, By Captain James Abbott.”  Campbell’s Foreign Semi-
Monthly Magazine, or Select Miscellany of European Literature and Art 4 (Sep. 1, 1843): 
51-54; Mackinnon, Daniel Henry.  Military Service and Adventures in the Far East: 
Including Sketches of the Campaigns against the Afghans in 1839, and the Sikhs in 1845-
6.  London: John Ollivier, 1849. 
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endurance. By the end of the Civil War, hundreds of articles addressing racial phobia in 
these terms were circulated on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the most remarkable 
aspects of this initial proliferation of the –phobia suffix is that even as such phobias 
gained new rhetorical traction, they continued to depend heavily on an analogy to 
hydrophobia for their legibility. One of the primary arguments of Infectious Affect, 
accordingly, is that, in the context of phobia’s proliferation in the late 1700s and early 
nineteenth century, the analogy between new phobias and a hydrophobic 
symptomatology remained a defining feature of phobia’s signifying potential for far-
flung publics. 
In the concluding chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate that only in the 
context of postbellum neurology, sexology, and microbiology, in the late 1800s, did the 
lexical kinship between rabies and phobia at last began to attenuate. Two European 
influences played especially important roles: the work of German psychiatrist Carl 
Friedrich Otto Westphal beginning in the late 1860s and early 1870s, and the advent of 
Louis Pasteur’s rabies vaccine in 1885, known for its contribution to establishing the 
germ theory of disease. Westphal’s introduction of the concept of agoraphobia, in 1871, 
became responsible for prompting a multilingual, transatlantic enumeration of new 
phobias requiring diagnosis, especially with regard to space and social interaction. In his 
short collection, The Uses of Phobia: Essays on Literature and Film (2010), David 
Trotter refers to this development as “the invention of agoraphobia,” suggesting that at 
this juncture phobia began to solicit new attention. Covering phobia’s subsequent 
evolution, Trotter dubs the last few decades of the 1800s “phobia’s belle époque.” 
However, Trotter never accounts for what came before, or the nature of the shift 
  19 
agoraphobia introduced. Thus, it remains to be considered how an ensuing influx of 
taxonomies of phobia on both sides of the Atlantic torqued the category’s epistemological 
standing. Finally, physicians began to identify, classify, and treat new phobias, without 
there being any evident analogy to hydrophobia as a founding concept associated with 
pathological fear. Shortly after, with the introduction and dissemination of Pasteur’s 
hydrophobia vaccine in 1885, medical understandings of hydrophobia changed as well. 
As historians of medicine have long noted, the hydrophobia vaccine became integral to 
one of the great medical revolutions in modern history: the birth and validation of 
microbiology as a science. Yet this event in the history of science was equally a 
philological catalyst. Once rabies was understood to be a microbial agent, susceptible to 
physical manipulation, hydrophobia, as a legitimate name for the disease, began to fall 
into decline. Taking this dissolving lexical kinship as its horizon, “Infectious Affect” 
assumes for its timeline phobia’s symbiotic relationship with rabies, as it waxed and 
waned from the 1760s to the 1880s, and as it began to deteriorate in the decades 
immediately following.  
 
A FEELING “BEDAWBED” “WITH SLIME”: 
THE HYDROPHOBIA ANALOGY IN THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS 
 
 In pursuing the origins of phobia’s cultural traction as an epistemological 
framework, this dissertation builds on the work of historians of emotions who have 
proposed that instead of looking to emotions as transhistorical indices of human 
perception and experience we should regard them as contingent historical objects, which 
change in meaning, consequence, and social value over time. This is not to propose the 
extreme claim that emotions are only linguistic, or that they have a biological basis only 
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secondarily. Nor is it to deny that continuities of feeling might be shared by different 
epochs. Nevertheless, it is to suggest that when emotions achieve shared recognition 
through language and material texts they become social and historical, exceeding the 
stuff of interior, private phenomena. Moreover, as emotions attract greater attention 
within imagined communities, they solicit competing theories and incommensurable 
itinerancies. On the one hand, depression as it is felt and known in the twenty-first 
century belongs to a different set of affective coordinates than melancholia, as the disease 
was felt and understood two hundred and fifty years ago, even as their conditions possess 
evident parallels. However, it is important to acknowledge that depression in the present 
and melancholia in earlier periods represent sites of contestation themselves, at any given 
moment. Whatever the terms or context, the phenomena we call “emotion” comprises an 
array of affective scripts that sometimes aspire to consensus, yet which also tend toward 
an efflorescence of connotations, rebelling against disciplinary, therapeutic, and 
otherwise normative parameters. The conditions of phobia’s materialization as a legible, 
widely variable affect in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century U.S. offer an 
illustrative example. Thus, this dissertation explores the consolidation of phobia as an 
object of medical study and cultural adaptation, attending to the contingencies of its 
production as both a way of knowing and something to be known, while also exploring 
its variability, with the goal of showing that its ascendancy as a category of social and 
psychological analysis did not progress without hesitation. On the contrary, early 
American, antebellum, and nineteenth century phobias possessed a motley collection of 
meanings, some incompatible with one another, many of which have since slipped out of 
historical memory.  
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This dissertation at once engages with and offers alternatives to dominant modes 
familiar to historians of emotions. In the 1980s, Carol and Peter Stearns famously called 
upon scholars to attend to the emotionology underwriting their archives, a term they used 
to refer to “the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, 
maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression” (813). It is not 
difficult to think of neighboring concepts that intersect with this approach to sociality: 
imagined communities, transnational networks, ideologies, and cosmologies all depend 
on webs of affection too often neglected in criticism, stigmatized either outright or 
euphemistically as effeminate, hence superficial, or sequestered to the cerebral acrobatics 
of a caricatured psychoanalysis. The difference is that seeking out emotionologies, 
characteristic of different geographies at different historical junctures, foreground the 
function of emotions and emotive speech acts. In short, historians of emotion insist that 
neither sociality nor politics is thinkable without the shifting affective networks that 
sustain bonds within groups.  
One of the most common approaches to tracking the history of emotions has been 
to explore their treatment in major works of philosophy.6 The implicit relation to a 
shared, public affective milieu is either that such works distill something pervasive about 
a moment, or at least represent a valuable intellectual hybridity, in which the history of 
ideas and shared networks of feeling intertwine. In thinking through the evolution of fear 
as an object of study, we might be inclined along these lines to explore phobia’s affinities 
with or deviations from what Thomas Hobbes called “Aversion” as distinguished from 
“Appetite” in the Leviathan (1651). Classed as an “interior beginning of voluntary 
                                                
6 The “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” has an especially elaborate section 
comparing approaches in the history of emotions.  
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motion,” aversion represents for Hobbes a broadly construed inclination to “turn away 
from”: a basic “endeavor,” which might take shape as anything from fear or “PANIC 
TERROR” (an unreasoning dread spread via mob mentality) to courage or anger, the 
latter of which Hobbes defines as “sudden courage” (24). Much closer to the historical 
starting point of this dissertation, Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) famously cites incapacitating 
fear as integral to aesthetic appreciation. Observing that “astonishment” is the “effect of 
the sublime in its highest degree,” Burke asserts that terror and the sublime possess a 
special affinity. Insofar as “[n]o passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of 
acting and reasoning as fear,” Burke specifies: “Whatever therefore is terrible, with 
regard to sight, is sublime too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of 
dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, 
that may be dangerous.” Thus while Hobbes seems to get at phobia’s attachment to 
things, or rather its function as a cathexis premised upon dread, Burke seems to presage 
phobia’s ideal totality, an immediacy of terror deprived of a mitigating rationalism.  
Evocative as these connections are, Infectious Affect will insist on a rather anal 
commitment to the specificities of phobia as a precise lexical index. Whatever 
multiplicity of feelings phobia began to comprise over time, it did so for decades while 
tethered to the figurative dimension of the canine madness analogy. Thus, we run into 
one of the quandaries at the heart of this dissertation: what should we make of phobia’s 
figurative properties, when attempting also to track its evolving cultural value as a 
category of analysis? The paragraphs that follow sketch six areas in which phobia’s status 
as an emotion caught in the prism of analogy infused its social legibility with substantive 
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coordinates. In tracking these evolving parameters at the advent of phobia’s embryonic 
lexicality, Infectious Affect takes seriously not just the loose coherence these associations 
helped foster, but equally the rhetorical contestations they enacted, which tore phobia’s 
meaning into divergent, meandering directions early on. By insisting on coherence and 
contestation in tandem, I adapt a concept famously termed structures of feeling by 
Raymond Williams. When Williams introduced the concept in 1977, it was to get at the 
phenomenon of how unprecedented affective registers materialize for sociocultural 
purposes. To foreground the idea, Williams explained that the “strongest barrier” to the 
analysis of “human cultural activity” is the “immediate and regular conversion of 
experience into finished products,” or “formed wholes rather than forming and formative 
processes” (128). The problem with this imaginative terminality is that social feelings on 
the precipice of cohering, in the moment of their becoming, have often eluded scholarly 
attention. Distinguishing how a phobic imagination emerged in the early republic thus 
requires that we see it as a structure or shared nexus of sociality, on the one hand, but also 
as a discursive resource awash with anarchic energies. For Williams, aesthetic objects 
hold value, in this respect, as vessels through which transformative structures of feeling 
are tested without yet having ossified. These structures remain distinct from consolidated 
“forms and institutions…in that although they are emergent or pre-emergent, they do not 
have to await definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable 
pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action” (131-2). This section 
outlines a constellation of six formal coordinates, in which phobia’s meaning began to 
achieve a nascent, but also impactful constellation. 
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(1) Pathology. Unlike Hobbesian aversion or Burkean terror, phobia’s meaning 
inhered largely in its status as pathology, and not just pathology, but its status as available 
nomenclature. As a unit of diagnosis carrying international familiarity, hydrophobia 
represented a form of disease known primarily for its psychological manifestations, 
which contributed to an eighteenth-century separation of emotion into normal and 
pathological types. In advance of the consolidation of psychiatry as an independent 
branch of medicine in the late nineteenth century, hydrophobia represented a form of 
mental (if also physiological) illness with which one could be diagnosed; which required 
medical attention and treatment; and for which, depending on the onset, discovery, and 
duration of symptoms, one could be hospitalized. One of the best-documented examples 
of eighteenth-century institutionalization and treatment appears in a long treatise by 
British physician and member of the Royal College of Physicians Thomas Arnold, titled 
A Case of Hydrophobia, Commonly Called Canine Madness, published in 1793. Here 
Arnold tells of a ten-year-old girl named Hannah Springthorpe who was brought to the 
Leicester Infirmary the previous year when, after being attacked by a mad dog, she began 
to report a “distressing train of symptoms” (1). According to witnesses, the dog, whose 
fury had been roused in an altercation with other dogs nearby, flew up at Hannah, bit her 
once in the chest “two inches above the nipple”; “bedawbed” the hand she used to protect 
herself “with slime from his mouth”; then, at last, managed to break the skin on her 
forefinger, before scattering away from the scene. A little over a week later, a flurry of 
symptoms, including hallucinations and, most troublingly, signs of an emergent dread of 
water, led the family to take Hannah to the Leicester Infirmary for further observation 
and treatment.  
  25 
During her stay, Hannah’s condition deteriorated steadily. She began to fantasize 
that dogs and cats were closing in to attack her, would descend regularly into “fits” in 
which she would snap her jaws at people around her, went back and forth between 
maniacal laughing and weeping without warning, and descended repeatedly into 
spasmodic convulsions. However, the most alarming and telltale symptom to show itself 
before the doctor was a rapidly worsening hydrophobia. Upon hearing a basin of water 
poured out early on in her stay, she expressed discomfort. During another instance, when 
coerced into swallowing a glass of water, we learn that “Instantly, her face, and whole 
body, became convulsed; she turned suddenly around, being then sitting up in bed, and, 
clapping her hands to her face, threw herself upon her face upon the pillow” (31). Still, 
nothing appears to have bothered the girl more than the sound of liquids in her vicinity. 
Details of her reliable dread thus return throughout her case history almost like a refrain. 
“[T]he pain from the noise of water was very evident,” Arnold writes. In another 
instance, he explains, “The nurse happening to pour out some mint tea incautiously, 
[Hannah] cried out that it hurt her much, and begged her immediately to desist” (58). By 
virtue of this dread, above all other symptoms, Arnold discerned he was beholding a case 
of hydrophobia. 
One of the most interesting elements of hydrophobia, as physicians of the 
eighteenth century understood it, was that it combined instinctual aversion—the classic 
telltale scene being a patient dashing a vessel of water against a wall or to the ground—
with intellectual and even abstract manifestations of the same fear, to the extent that a 
number of cases report a sense of terror at hearing even the word “water” spoken aloud. 
Indeed, in another remarkable narrative detailing a case of hydrophobia by a woman 
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named Elizabeth Bryant, documented by Edmund Burke’s own father-in-law, physician 
Christopher Nugent, we learn the patient dreamed repeatedly of “falling into deep Pools 
of Water and being forcibly kept in” (7). Without a doubt, it would be interesting to 
explore how Nugent’s work on hydrophobia may have influenced his son-in-law’s 
conception of the sublime. Most important to the connotations I want to pursue presently, 
however, is how, across an array of rabies cases, the central driving element revolved 
around meeting the expectations of the disease’s appellation and best-known symptom. 
Forged within these associations, phobia would continue in subsequent decades to signify 
a form of irrational fear steadily exacerbated to the point of a physically debilitating, 
potentially lethal pathology. 
(2)  Lag time. Even as phobia’s medicalization in the context of rabies oriented 
the emotion within an intricate network of disease classification, hydrophobia signified a 
unique temporality of disease progression. The onset of this temporality, following the 
bite of a potentially mad animal, involved a period of uncertain anticipation. In the space 
of this lag time, in which one might (or might not) be on the verge of succumbing 
internally to the cruel work of mad saliva, victims experienced a maddening anxiety. A 
range of remedies might be tried: cauterization, cutting out the flesh around the wound, 
deer musk, herbal antidotes, bloodletting, mad stones, ant the list could go on 
indefinitely. At the same time, it was widely known that these remedies were hardly 
foolproof—last-ditch efforts, which some promoted in desperate optimism, yet others 
dismissed as ineffective. Sometimes called a virus, yet in a context where virus denoted 
the concept of a “poison” (as opposed to something microbial, as the term would be 
altered to mean in the 1890s), the infectious agent consisting within a mad animal’s 
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saliva was notoriously deadly. Thus, the question revolved around whether the animal 
behind the attack was mad or merely irritable, or perhaps sick with an altogether different 
disease. The period of anticipation generated by this uncertainty reliably produced an 
interior break in one’s experience of time—something queer, even, evocative of what 
twenty-first century theorists have termed “queer time.” Perhaps no critic has theorized 
such phenomena better than Elizabeth Freeman, whose interest in intersections between a 
queer sensibility of time and chronic illness gets at the way sustained or terminal disease 
effectively works one out of any normative experience of social life. Freeman describes 
this as a failure to meet the expectations of “chrononormativity,” defined as “the use of 
time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity.” The 
distinguishing element of queer time in early American and transatlantic rabies narratives 
is that the experience of chronic pathology in everyday life commences not with the 
reveal of self-evident infection, but rather much earlier, following the animal attack itself. 
Moreover, this lag time could last indefinitely. While several weeks of incubation was 
common, physicians regularly reported several months, while still others suggested an 
interim of years was possible. In 1768, a physician by the name of John Schmid went so 
far as to report a case where twenty years separated an eight-day death spiral of a woman 
by the surname Richter and an old dog bite, which the physician took to have caused it. 
This experience of chronic dread became a touchstone of rabies narratives and, as this 
dissertation will show, had a lasting influence on the temporality other phobias conjured.  
(3) Contagion. One of the most complex riddles facing historians of medicine in 
earlier periods—though some have been more inclined to meet the nuances of its mystery 
more directly than others—is what physicians and laypersons understood about the 
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contagious nature of certain diseases prior to the germ theory of disease, or the advent of 
microbiology. As a very old disease stretching back to antiquity, the history of rabies 
offers an especially curious node, across disparate periods, in that it has long been known 
that the bite of a mad dog has the potential to communicate a deadly madness to its 
recipient. Rabies stands out as an ancient human reference point, to put it another way, 
for the evolution of what Priscilla Wald has called outbreak narratives. Speaking of its 
post-microbiological, twentieth- and twenty-first-century iterations, Wald describes the 
outbreak narrative as a “formulaic plot that begins with the identification of an emerging 
infection, includes discussion of the global networks throughout which it travels, and 
chronicles the epidemiological work that ends with its containment.” For early 
Americans, though the germ theory of disease was not operative, contagion a much 
different concept, and epidemiology an unformed discipline, rabies narratives drew upon 
a related plot structure. The dog bite made the problem of communicability a paramount 
concern. The major difference, as noted above, is that the infectious agent of hydrophobia 
was conceptualized as a poison, analogous to something like snake venom. Yet, just as 
Wald takes interest in the social ramifications of microbial contagion as a concept—
namely that “Disease emergence dramatizes the dilemma that inspires the most basic 
human narratives: the necessity and danger of human contact”—so did hydrophobia 
provide a pattern of communicability, which became a valuable metaphor in diverse 
social contexts. Most important to my argument here, hydrophobia filled out a more 
capacious phobic sensibility (as well as an understanding of other sundry affects) with the 
threat of infectivity and the possibility of epidemic dissemination. That is, hydrophobia 
became an important template for conceptualizing the contagion of human emotion 
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broadly—what Teresa Brennan has called the “transmission of affect” (5). As the coinage 
of new phobias accelerated across the nineteenth century, this threat of infectivity—the 
plausibility, moreover, of an emotion’s lurking, swelling social ubiquity—continued to 
evolve as a defining aspect of phobia’s signification.  
 (4) Zoonosis. Today, rabies is known for being a kind of zoonosis or, as the OED 
defines the term, “A disease which can be transmitted naturally from animals to humans.” 
This aspect of hydrophobia was self-evident to early Americans as well. As such, 
hydrophobia represented an emotion that threw into question the fantasy of human 
difference and the hermetic integrity of the species. Succumbing to hydrophobia signified 
the shame not just of losing one’s sanity and faculties of perception, but, moreover, of 
becoming beastly. In some of the best rabies scholarship written in recent decades, 
Kathleen Kete explores this facet of nineteenth-century hydrophobia in French contexts. 
In a virtuosic essay titled, “La Rage and the Bourgeoisie,” Kete observes that the specter 
of canine-to-human transmission in French accounts made the disease an apt site for 
interrogating modern distinctions between nature and culture. In short, if “Rabies 
transformed man into beast, wild, uncontrollable, and dangerous” (91), the implication 
seemed to be that those qualities lie just below the surface of civilization, always 
awaiting activation. Kete suggests that anxieties surrounding hydrophobia thus formed a 
special repository for a general sense of precariousness at the heart of bourgeois 
subjectivity. “Fear of rabies,” she explains, “is revealing of the implosive nature of the 
bourgeois interior”—the possibility, that is, that “its demolition” could come “not from 
without but from within” (90). Wherever hydrophobia touched down, demolition was, 
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indeed, swift. Pulling from an impressive array of case reports, Kete illustrates her 
argument with breathtaking detail,   
Beastly impulses, emptied systematically out of domestic life, slipped 
back in to fill the interstices between phantasmagoria with devastating 
effect. In the haven that was home, insults, blasphemies, shrieks—
‘horrifying howls’—issued forth from the sickroom. Biting and hitting, the 
sick family member overturned everything within reach, shattering the 
bric-a-brac of predictability. Exhibiting prodigious strength, the patient 
could easily break the most secure restraint. Defying gravity, he bounced 
about the room; ‘leaping, skipping, bounding distances with stunning 
dexterity,’ he would drop just as suddenly, ‘like a rock,’ into death. The 
rabid fit was the denouement of the narrative pathology of the disease, ‘the 
moving spectacle of a fit,’ those scenes of ‘the last hour’ that, as played by 
contemporaries, ‘leave such a profound impression that it is impossible for 
witnesses to free themselves from its recall.’ (91-2) 
Emphasizing the effect this had on perceptions of private interiority for French subjects, 
Kete concludes, convincingly, “The bourgeois imagination routinely became entangled in 
this aspect of rabies, and the impression that so disturbed the nineteenth century was the 
image of a bourgeois self out of control” (92). In short, hydrophobia indicated that 
bourgeois civility might be nothing more than the playacting of unseemly creatures, for 
whom rabidity was more the rule than the exception.  
 Nowhere did this theme come through with more terrifying force than in accounts 
where hydrophobia was reported to have spread via human-on-human attacks. Perhaps no 
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better case exemplifies this perceived threat of human-to-human transmission than one 
reported in The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal in 1832. Reported by a Reverend 
William Case, the article explains that in 1807, an eleven-year-old boy referred to as 
W.C. “was bitten and wounded by a mad dog” (2). As W.C. grew up without symptoms, 
it was assumed that he somehow escaped the attack without becoming rabid himself. But 
fifteen years later the disease appeared to surface. “During the progress of the disease,” 
the reverend explains, “he gnashed his teeth, discharged large quantities of saliva, had 
distressing spasms, and was set on biting every body and every thing.” At the same time, 
this drive to bite appeared not entirely automatic. “He watched for opportunities to bite 
persons,” readers learn, “and if he could bite any one it seemed to afford him pleasure, 
and was followed by laughing.” W.C. died fifteen days later, on September 1, 1822, but 
not before successfully attacking three persons. 
 The article reports that all three of W.C.’s victims later developed symptoms and 
died. A man referred to as L.T.C. appeared to succumb to the disease four years later. 
Again, the sickness lasted around two weeks before he perished, involved a dread of 
“water” and “drinks,” and brought on a strong inclination for biting other people. In one 
instance, he bit a person attending to him, then immediately apologized, explaining, 
“Now I have hurt you, and I am sorry; but I could not avoid it; I must either die myself or 
bite you” (3). A witness recalled, “If he had not been confined…I have no doubt he 
would have bitten every person in the room.” The second of W.C.’s victims died the 
following year. So great was this individual’s dread of water he implored a friend to keep 
him at a distance from a nearby lake, believing it “would kill him.” The third victim to 
fall ill was W.C.’s own brother, referred to as C.C., who developed symptoms the 
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following year. During an interval of rational consciousness, C.C. is said to have warned 
his wife, “I wish you to keep away from me when I have these turns; I know not why it 
is, but I want to bite, and I fear I shall bite you” (4). On another incident, C.C. welcomed 
a visiting neighbor, saying, “‘How do you do, Mr. B—? I am glad to see you. Come here; 
I want to shake hands with you.’” No sooner did the neighbor extend his hand that C.C. 
“seized it instantly, and with a convulsive spring rose from the lying posture and drew it 
to his mouth” (4). Most disturbing about the anecdote is how smoothly the disease could 
assume a guise of cognitive normality. Despite this sustained ability to converse with 
bystanders, C.C., like the others, soon died. This tendency toward hostility, accompanied 
by the danger of human-to-human transmission, made hydrophobia a favorite example 
for the communicability of emotion in myriad contexts. Representing not only a basic 
risk of contagion, the disease demonstrated the possibility for infection, by and as 
emotion, to be staged over the dissolution of common civility.7 In the worst-case 
scenarios, citizens might find themselves pitted against other citizens beyond their self-
control. As the hydrophobia analogy began to permeate antebellum debate pertaining to 
racial, religious, and ethnic prejudice, the threat of humans tearing at one another, in the 
                                                
7 For other instances in which hydrophobia was used as a metaphor in these terms, see a 
string of articles and accompanying illustrations published in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated 
Newspaper in the 1860s (Figs. 3 & 4). The first depicts a scene in which a potential thief 
accosted a wealthy gentleman in Manhattan one day, biting his possessions and claiming 
to be hydrophobic. On suspicion it was merely a ruse, a bystander escorted the potentially 
rabid stranger to the police. In a second image titled “A Rabid Woman,” we discover an 
Irish woman named Martha Connelly who, after being arrested for public drunkenness 
during a parade one afternoon, swiftly bit the police officer on his hand. Subsequently, in 
court, Mary explained to the judge she wished she had been rabid, so that she might 
“have been the cause of the officer’s death.” In each story, the writer for Frank Leslie’s 
uses the alarm of an apparently performative hydrophobic attack to sensationalize 
otherwise relatively mundane events. In each case, the strongest theme appears to be 
economic, indicating that to be of a lower-class status is tantamount to being more 
susceptible to a sudden descent into animal savagery.  
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manner of rabid dogs, would constitute one of the most compelling metaphorical 
referents undergirding phobia’s rhetorical charge.8  
 (5) Parable. As Wald emphasizes in her analysis of the outbreak narrative, it is 
valuable to acknowledge that the logic of communicability always implies, rather vitally, 
a converse, optimistic scenario: the possibility of impeding further infection through 
human cooperation. On the one hand, narratives of human hydrophobia disturbed this 
mandate, insofar as they insisted on a caveat—the possibility that a disease or emotion 
might have, as one of its basic symptoms, an agential inclination toward the deliberate 
infection of neighboring bodies. Nevertheless, the spectacular communicability of 
hydrophobia made the possibility of prevention obvious and urgent, long before the mid-
nineteenth-century emergence of epidemiology on a grand scale. This optimism became 
crucial to phobia’s evolving popularity as a suffix too. Case histories of hydrophobia lent 
themselves easily to parables dealing with violence, lurking malice, and the importance 
of overcoming one’s worst fears. Children’s books provide quick insight into this facet of 
phobia’s lexical traction. Consider, for instance, a story titled “Poor Bessy,” published in 
Peabody & Co.’s The Infants’ Annual, Or, A Mother’s Offering in 1832 (Fig. 5). The 
story begins with a young girl, Annette, asking her mother why she recently let a tear fall 
at the mention of a vague loved one named “Bessy.” At last, the mother explains that 
Bessy was the name of a late pet dog who had saved Annette’s life when she was just a 
                                                
8 It is important to acknowledge that many physicians would have likely rejected the 
string of cases, ascribing them to a malady other than hydrophobia. Anticipating such 
doubts, the author of the article concludes with a postscript, noting, “An intelligent 
medical man, who has heard the above statements, and conversed largely with witnesses, 
believes these cases to have been hydrophobia.” No matter the article’s proximity to 
prevailing opinion, however, its publication in a respected medical and surgical journal 
offers a valuable sense of how hydrophobia became associated with a particularly 
devastating descent into madness. 
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year old. In brief, a stray dog who had been roaming the neighborhood suddenly lunged 
at Annette one afternoon. “[M]y unconscious innocent!” the mother recalls as the feelings 
rush back. “[Y]our destruction seemed certain,” the mother goes on. Right on cue, 
however, the family’s loyal dog Bessy steps in. “Bessy, whom I had not before observed 
darted between you and the destroyer, and seized him by the throat.” Annette’s life was 
saved, but Bessy was “torn in the struggle.” Rather than narrate the mercy killing that 
ensued, the mother tells her child, “[D]o not ask any more, my love, poor Bessy died that 
night!” (29-30). On cue, Annette falls sobbing “on her mother’s bosom.” She asks to be 
reminded, whenever she is discovered being “bad,” of Bessy’s sacrifice. From here the 
children’s story turns theological rather abruptly: Bessy is sanctified as a Christ figure, 
whose memory should be taken as a sign of sacrifice and God’s generous providence in 
tandem. Yet the story also dramatizes how rabies narratives possessed a range of 
archetypal cues from which aphorisms could be smoothly derived. After all, Bessy’s 
intervention represents equally the courage necessary to protect loved ones from evil 
interlopers, as well as the terrible precarity in engaging evil so directly, as if by the throat. 
Indeed, it is Bessy’s willful proximity that facilitates her own subsequent demise—what 
Annette’s mother calls “the dreadful distemper” that tends toward cruel multiplication in 
the climax of the mad dog’s bite. Through the interplay of these resonances, phobia 
attained value as a framework for interpreting fear’s surreptitious movement through the 
public sphere.  
 (6) Negation. The last element of phobia’s early signification needing emphasis is 
its status as a negative emotion premised, paradoxically enough, on a visceral and lasting 
cathexis to the object or quality feared. By negative, I mean to invoke a broad category of 
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emotion comparable to Sianne Ngai’s use of the word “negative” as a near synonym for 
what she means by “ugly” in Ugly Feelings (2005). For Ngai, negative might signify an 
array of affective relationalities: “dysphoric or experiential[]” emotions, meaning those 
that correspond to “pain” or “displeasure”; “semantic” negativity, in the sense that they 
elicit social disapproval or even “stigmatiz[ation]”; as well as, a broader sense of formal 
or “syntactical[]” negativity, in the sense of conjuring a state of “repulsion rather than 
attraction, by phobic strivings ‘away from’ rather than philic strivings ‘toward’” (11). All 
of these definitions fit phobia’s early signification self-evidently enough. Nevertheless, 
the form of negativity I want to accentuate most is the formal quality, which Ngai even 
takes to be fundamentally “phobic” in structure. On the one hand, one of the most 
evocative elements of phobia’s status as an emotion inhering primarily in the linguistic 
function of a suffix, is that to describe its movement merely as a striving “away from” is 
to miss the point. Phobia’s pulling away cannot finally be extricated from the irony of its 
enduring attachment—the urgency of its push toward—a cathexis phobias distill in the 
very bipartite structure of their names. Indeed, no phobia conveys this irony better than 
hydrophobia itself—a dread deeply disturbing because it betrays our necessary draw 
toward that very chemical compound, the source of all life. Yet, the negativity phobia 
conjures is striking in still another way, in that historically its negativity has a long 
tradition of eliciting a counter-negativity among early Americans—an imperative to 
answer its constitutive repugnance with another repugnancy, fashioned from the other 
side.  
Nowhere in early American and antebellum literature does this doubling effect 
come through better than in phobia’s cooptation by social satire. As noted above, one of 
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the most important shifts in phobia’s meaning in the late eighteenth century occurred at 
an intersection of proto-psychiatric speculation and social commentary, in which 
experimentation with phobia as variable pathology intersected perpetually with wordplay 
and pun-making. In the context of this speculative satire, one of the first stable qualities 
of phobia’s affective value was its implicit reference to a dialectic, in which phobia 
became something to be uprooted from civil society. Phobia’s reference became 
enmeshed equally with what we might call an anti-phobic imagination, in which the 
imperative to combat phobia’s social side effects garnered a political consensus of its 
own. Perhaps nothing demonstrates the rhetorical familiarity of this dialectical relation 
better than a piece of ephemera published in New York in 1839, which may have very 
well had abolitionism’s burgeoning discourse on racial phobia in mind. Titled “The 
Diaria of Freedom; Or, The Anti-Hydrophobian Thunderbolt,” the document imitates an 
inaugural publication for a startup newspaper. Subtitled “A Weakly [sic] Bulletin, 
published every half hour, or oftener, as occasion may demand,” the paper devolves 
swiftly into gags and quips (some clever, others “weakly” indeed), all under the banner of 
a new “Anti-Hydrophobia” party ticket, supported by the likes of “Hydrogen & Co.” and 
“Saveall, Lockup, & Co.” Addressed to the party’s “Most Grandificatibillatorious 
Members!!” the paper summarizes their mission, as formed in December 1838: “WE 
made manifestatiously apparent OUR intentional purposes to continue to advocate the 
glorious causes of intentional purposes to continue to advocate the glorious causes of 
ANTI-HYDROPHOBINARIANISM, Freedom, and universal resurrection from the 
gauling and double-copperhead-bottled chain cables of common reason, and spurious 
cents.” Most interesting is that in its absurdist, apparently indiscriminate approach to 
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social parody, the Thunderbolt takes as its object of critique newspaper appeals to 
political anxiety as a more capacious genre: a veritable “diarrhea” of rhetoric, aimed less 
at coherent content than reliable affective cues. Erring on the side of on-the-nose one 
liners, the party mission concludes: “Fellow Members! WE know every thing, and you 
know more than WE do!!!” The implicit riddle of the document seems to be this: is 
political panic organic (hence inevitable) or imagined and made viral through print 
media? For important reasons, the question was weighing on people’s minds in the late 
1830s, as Jessica Lepler’s The Many Panics of 1837 and other works on the 1837 
financial crisis have capably demonstrated. Still, it is worth acknowledging the precise 
figurative register through which fear and fear-mongering are here invoked: the 
hydrophobia analogy, which the editor of the Anti-Hydrophobian Thunderbolt (with too 
much time on his or her hands, admittedly) found pithy, self-explanatory, and witty 
enough to invoke for an extended laugh. Whatever the intended referent (abolitionism or 
something else), what stands out as most useful in the piece is its attention to phobia’s 
doubling effect: its status not just as negation (in this case hydrophobia as a metaphor for 
political angst), but, moreover, its solicitation of a contrary negation (i.e. an anti-
hydrophobian platform). By 1839, it was possible for the joke to be made that wherever 
political fear and fearmongering might be found lurking, so too could an organized, anti-
phobic effort to isolate that barbarism for treatment. By the late 1700s, this compounded 
negation had already started to emerge as an important feature of phobia’s vernacular 
cachet. Across the nineteenth century, an emergent dialectic between phobic and anti-
phobic imaginaries continued to adapt alongside phobia’s evolving sensibility, in each of 
the literary contexts this dissertation will explore.  
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PHOBIA, MANIA, PHILIA:  
RETHINKING EMOTIONS HISTORY AS QUEER PHILOLOGY 
 
 The six coordinates elaborated above reappear in different forms across this 
dissertation. While the chapters will only rarely touch on actual cases of infectious 
hydrophobia, the spheres of print circulation considered repeatedly draw upon a 
corresponding symptomatology at the level of analogy, in their experimentation with the 
analytical potential of a wider phobic imagination. This ongoing correspondence gestures 
to an additional area of inquiry I have yet to touch upon adequately: the relationship 
between emotion and language. Phobia’s proliferation as an analytic unfolded not just at 
the level of immediate feeling, but as an idea intimately bound up with a prefatory, 
genealogical referent. In this relationship, the contingencies of phobia’s appearance in 
early American and antebellum writing speak to a quandary historians of emotion have 
long taken up. Does emotion precede language and thus beckon our description? Or does 
language shape emotion in a much more fundamental way, setting parameters on what 
feelings can be expressed, recognized, and shared within imagined communities? In the 
case of an emotion understood to lie at the heart of democracy’s interior maneuverings, 
these questions turn out to have profound implications regarding how political energies 
move and acquire legibility. Adding to the questions posed above, we might inquire 
further: is human emotion primordial in its forms, kinds, and intensities, constituting the 
stuff with which diverse governmentalities must always grapple? Or do rhetorics of 
governmentality concretely shape the affective repertoires of political subjects, 
determining through language the kinds of feelings available to recognize, sanction, and 
perform civic belonging?  
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In pursuing ambiguities of emotional experience at the center of these inquiries, 
this dissertation attempts to track and discover the role played by language, emphasizing, 
moreover, the interest early American and antebellum writers took in this same idea: the 
material imbrication of language within phenomenologies of feeling. In terms of tracking 
such relationships, I want to use this final section to propose a method comparable to 
what Jeffrey Masten has termed “queer philology,” in his 2016 book by the same name. 
Far from being limited to early modern terminologies pertaining to gender, sexuality, and 
the body, the queerness of Masten’s philology gestures to the possibility of a greater sea 
change in the discipline, in which the study of the history of language, writ large, might 
be re-conceptualized in terms of the queer attractions, compulsions, and intimacies that 
make language possible. Masten notes that the discipline of philology has long depended 
on the rather limited metaphor of the nuclear, heterosexual family to get at the way words 
enter into partnerships, produce and foster the maturation of younger lexicons, and cohere 
in normative microcosms, like so many families clustered in a map of etymological 
suburbs. Against these facile comparisons, Queer Philologies asks: what would it mean 
to “denaturalize these powerful rhetorics” (20)? As Masten writes further, “there is rarely 
philology without sex,” “rarely…an analysis of language and textual transmission, 
contamination, and correction that does not draw upon or intersect with terms from the 
lexicons of sex, gender, reproduction, the body, and the family” (20). Yet, as Masten goes 
on to note, when we look closely at the way words interact, we discover, moreover, that 
these transmissions, contaminations, and corrections err toward queer meanderings, 
vagrancies, and polyphonies, so much so that the queerness of language appears to be the 
rule rather than the exception.  
  40 
Such a view of language illuminates the strange contingencies by which phobia 
first entered and began to solicit interest in the early American public sphere. As noted 
above, phobia’s early signification as a –suffix on the cusp of versatility found validation 
by way of analogy, as though a parasite at once devoted to its host and eager to infect 
neighboring bodies. Yet phobia’s relationality would prove queerer still in the context of 
an affective triad that became equally vital to its signification in nineteenth-century 
writing. In this triad, phobia’s meaning became more firmly established by its 
differentiation from two other pathologies of attraction familiar in early American print 
media: the suffixes –mania, meaning a totalizing madness characterized by an obsession 
with a person, object, or idea, and –philia, signifying a more precise pathology of 
hyperbolic love. For every coinage of a new phobia in Anglophone letters, manic and 
philic obsessions could be conjured as intuitive counterparts. Thus, as abolitionists 
developed a discourse around colorphobia and Negrophobia in antislavery writing, so did 
proslavery advocates soon return the charge with reference to “Negromania” and 
“Negrophilism” as diseases of the mind endemic to the North. As subsequent chapters 
will show, so intrinsic was this inclination toward tripartite wordplay—in the context of 
serious political rebuttal, as well as in lighter pieces debating, for instance, the cultural 
merits of “polkaphobia” and “polkamania”—that phobia’s meaning cannot be theorized 
adequately apart from these neighboring cathexes. In each entity lay the trinity, 
potentially if not explicitly. 
Nevertheless, to conceptualize this triad only or even primarily as polyamory 
would be to neglect the ambivalence of the relationality of these terms. Clearly enough, 
the longevity of their attachment to one another had to do with their very linguistic status 
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as diverse forms of attachment—a function their promiscuity as suffixes repeatedly made 
visible in print. Yet their divergent claims to attachment, which is to say the stark 
differentiation of their particular inclination toward or away from persons, objects, and 
ideas, meant that the triad became familiar to early Americans as a collective of 
mismatched orientations. The wordplay phobias, manias, and philias fostered reveled in 
spaces of incompatibility and discord. Doing a history of phobia from the perspective of 
queer philology makes it possible to take all of these tendencies, ambivalences, and 
disinclinations into account, as constitutive of an experimental word family open to 
deviant permutations. Like one fond of the leash, phobia remained fixed to the 
hydrophobia analogy, yet also became, in the vicinity of mania and philia, one of three 
nodes by which early Americans conceptualized their vulnerability to the most irrational 
and recidivistic of outward orientations.  
 Philology is itself a term that circulated in the vicinity of these emotive 
coordinates across the nineteenth century, of course. Though introducing rather than 
concluding the word, the philo- of philology conjures a discipline unremitting in its love 
of logos. As the OED puts it, philology represents “Love of learning and literature; the 
branch of knowledge that deals with the historical, linguistic, interpretative, and critical 
aspects of literature; literary or classical scholarship.” In this sense, it becomes necessary 
to stipulate that philology describes a discipline of which any authentic history of phobias 
will also have to maintain a healthy skepticism. Indeed, logocentric as this dissertation’s 
obsession with the history of a word’s political action may seem, Infectious Affect also 
borrows some of its orientation from the term under scrutiny—specifically, the element 
of negation, referred to above, by which phobia has consistently been positioned as a 
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political feeling necessitating isolation, critique, and dialectical anxiety among American 
progressives. To the extent that Infectious Affect endeavors to tell a particular history of 
liberalism—the stakes of my analysis, however focused and historical, being cathected to 
a horizon of critical theory and queer activism of the present—the most compelling early 
American and antebellum texts I explore partake of a comparable skepticism. From U.S. 
antislavery to postbellum sexology, we discover repeatedly that the same figures who 
witnessed and sometimes participated in phobia’s steady entrenchment in American 
politics often also resisted the imperative to position fear, unequivocally, as democracy’s 
antithetical other. Persisting in this tradition, Infectious Affect pursues a queer philology 
that is just as much, if not more so, a logophobia, a queer anxiety about the tendency of 
words to become cemented in discourses of progressivism, to lose their dynamism, and to 
become objects of an unquestioned love. This dissertation goes so far as to suggest that 
the logophobia integral to the phobic imagination in American literature has a long 
history of being the defining feature of a corresponding phobic aesthetic. Through this 
aesthetic, the paradox of an anxiety constituting both one’s investment in and skepticism 
of politics shaped a remarkable, multifaceted tradition in U.S. fiction, poetry, visual 
media, and other forms of print exchange, which this dissertation will aim to recover.  
 
THE CHAPTERS 
  
 In the introduction to Regulating Aversion, Wendy Brown observes that the 
concept of tolerance in philosophy and ethics has been conceptualized as “an individual 
virtue, issuing from and respecting the value of moral autonomy, and acting as a sharp 
rein on the impulse to legislate against morally or religiously repugnant beliefs and 
behaviors” (8-9). Brown explains further that, in Western history, tolerance has been 
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regarded as “the offspring of classical liberalism and, more precisely, as a product of the 
bloody early modern religious authority that initiated the prising apart of political and 
religious authority and the carving out of a space of individual autonomy from both” (9). 
Yet, in becoming so sutured to liberalism, tolerance has also become imbricated with 
power in complex ways. To the extent that tolerance talk pervades politics and has 
become manifest as a “moral-political practice of governmentality,” Brown argues that 
“tolerance has significant cultural, social, and political effects that exceed its surface 
operations of reducing conflict” and “its formal foals and self-representation” and may 
even be said to participate, at times, in propping up “homophobia,” “ethnic hatreds,” and 
“racist state violence” (9). At the same time, the point of Brown’s study is not that 
tolerance has become uniformly destructive, but rather that it has become “protean in 
meaning,” which is to say “historically and geographically variable in purpose contents, 
agents, and objects” (4). Building on Brown’s work, Infectious Affect observes that in 
tandem with tolerance phobia has become, over time, a default expression for flagging 
unenlightened “repugnances” to social difference. Like Brown, I read the rhetoric around 
phobia as protean, unwieldy, and, at times, complicit in the persistence of structural 
violence against the same communities on whose behalf it has been fashioned. However, 
this book argues further for the necessity of historicizing the effects of a phobic 
imagination on the public sphere, not just as a set of rhetorical tropes and maneuvers, but, 
more comprehensively, as an affective regime in the making. That is, in addition to 
inquiring into how progressives speak or have spoken, Infectious Affect is also about the 
importance of understanding the affective contingencies by which political communities 
  44 
have been imagined and sustained, and what kinds of political feelings have been exiled 
in the process.   
Indeed, the chapters of this dissertation take less interest in writers who played by 
the slowly consolidating rules of a phobic imagination than it does with those who 
contested its hegemony or took it down counterintuitive pathways. The writing was on 
the wall: phobia represented a new way of comprehending the failures of democracy. The 
most remarkable works to confront its rise as a category of analysis did so by repurposing 
it against the grain. My first chapter, “Hydrophobia’s Doppelgänger: The Specter of 
Spontaneity in Early American Rabies Narratives” begins by exploring in greater depth 
how medical debates around hydrophobia contributed to forming a modern definition of 
phobia as a psychological disease. Looking to medical literature of the 1700s and early 
1800s, I show how outbreaks in the Americas—in Haiti in 1783, Jamaica in 1784, and 
Peru in 1803/04—began to be cited as proof that rabies could erupt without any 
catalyzing bite, a subspecies of the disease known as “spontaneous hydrophobia.” In 
turning to John Neal’s short story “The Haunted Man” at the end of the chapter, however, 
I argue that Neal uses the story to theorize the power of a transatlantic, hemispheric 
medical print culture not merely to circulate knowledge about disease, but also, and more 
disconcertingly, to spread new psychological states in unsuspecting reading publics. 
My second chapter, “Satire Distilled: Negrophobia Vs. Negro-Equality Phobia, in 
the Newspapers of Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison, and Lydia Maria Child” 
shows how abolitionists developed a rhetorical tradition premised on colorphobia and 
Negrophobia to posit an affective basis for race prejudice and the persistence of slavery. 
As noted above, the terms thrived on an increasingly familiar analogy to rabies in the 
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madness, aggression, and specter of contagion the disease was known to foment. At the 
same time, the terms’ early satirical uses quickly gave way to a polyphony of adaptations. 
At times, colorphobia was invoked in a clearly figurative vein, to portray bigotry as 
comparable to the temperament of a rabid dog. At other times, the concept was used to 
frame racial phobia as a genuinely pathological state of mind. In still other contexts, as 
the terms evolved, they began to be taken up as synonymous with race prejudice—
readymade neologisms in which the tie to medical nomenclature appeared implicit or 
beside the point. Rather than seeing these uses as divisible from one another, I argue that 
they coalesced in a dynamic assemblage. More precisely, color-phobia’s literal, 
figurative, and euphemistic connotations combined to form a hybrid genre I describe as a 
diagnostic parable. 
My third chapter “Revulsion, for Stowe: The Goblin Growth of Analogy in Dred: 
A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp” explores how a number of abolitionists nevertheless 
began to challenge colorphobia’s analytical purchase. One of the strongest reservations 
among critics targeted the pity embedded in colorphobia’s diagnostic connotations. To 
depict slavery as diseased, certain writers suggested, was nearly to exculpate the 
slaveholding South and its political allies as victims of anxiety. Alongside this critique, 
still others resisted colorphobia as a category of analysis because it foretold a public 
sphere reduced to psychological pseudo-diagnostics, where progressives would have as 
their first responsibility an eradication of mental illness from civil society. It was in 
dialogue with this rhetorical climate, I argue, that Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote her 
second novel Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp (1856). A novel that makes use of 
the hydrophobia analogy to various ends, it nevertheless resists the rhetoric of racial 
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phobia. Far from pathologizing fear, Stowe uses the novel to reinvent and repurpose 
“dread,” phobia’s closes antebellum synonym, as a political feeling. Most explicitly, 
Stowe stages this recuperation homonymically in the black outlaw protagonist Dred 
himself, whose militant resistance in the North Carolina swamplands positions a swelling 
sense of dread, among proslavery supporters, as the affective key to slave revolt.  
 The last two chapters of the project focus on how phobia and rabies began at last 
to decouple in the last decades of the century. In the fourth chapter, “Before 
Homophobia: Horror Feminae and Early Sexual Conversion Therapy, after Westphal's 
Konträre Sexualempfindung}, I observe that the rise of sexology (in which Westphal, 
inventor of agoraphobia, was likewise an influential thinker) contributed simultaneously 
to a new vocabulary around morbid fears. The chapter shows how the idea of horror 
feminae, or a dread of intercourse with women, became integral to the way figures 
including Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis understood homosexuality and 
other neighboring sexual deviations. During these same years, New York neurologist 
George Miller Beard included in his taxonomy of morbid fears a condition he called 
“Gynephobia” [sic], defined as a dread of women. Inspired by Beard’s concept, Harvard 
Professor of Medicine and Fireside poet Oliver Wendell Holmes organized the plot of his 
final novel A Mortal Antipathy (1885) around a patient history of gynophobia. Moving to 
an analysis of A Mortal Antipathy, I show how the novel conducts imaginative 
experiments in what we would today identify as sexual conversion therapy. However, I 
emphasize simultaneously that the novel clarifies how homosexuality’s association with a 
phobic sensibility initially allowed it a more seamless proximity to asexuality and other 
forms of deviance contrary to normative imperatives to romantic attachment. In essence, 
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it was only by slightly adapting the logic of compulsory heterosexuality, to imagine 
another kind of stable orientation, that homosexuality at last became legible and a 
category unto itself. 
In the epilogue to “Infectious Affect,” I demonstrate that the dissolution of 
phobia’s allegorical connotations was soon after accelerated by the introduction of 
Pasteur’s rabies vaccine. A medical breakthrough remembered for its contribution to the 
birth of microbiology, it dramatically altered the way physicians understood hydrophobia 
as a disease. The consequence was that the phobic imagination in which rabies had 
played a pivotal role was driven to shed its allegorical association. In this final chapter, I 
observe briefly how Silas Weir Mitchell, Sigmund Freud, and Zora Neale Hurston 
variously registered this shift by engaging with a dread of micro-contaminations, or what 
had begun to be known in the late 1800s as mysophobia. To demonstrate how phobia and 
rabies were effectively decoupled in this context, I conclude by noting that while cultural 
appropriations of phobia persisted in the twentieth century, they did so without the 
symbolic sensibility that had first given the suffix traction. Two inoculations, one 
clinical, the other lexical, joined forces. The spectacular assemblage hydrophobia 
represented—of fear and aggression, of phenomenological isolation and social 
contagion—began to simplify into a sterilized analytical frame. 
What was lost at this juncture is a question largely beyond the frame of this 
project. However, the writings explored in the following chapters offer some indication. 
As a contested structure of feeling, uniting satire with a will to know the concealed 
machinations of civil society, an early American phobic imagination was largely about 
sacrificing rhetorical familiarity, the terms and ideas that had been tried before, for 
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structures of feeling that could not be swallowed easily. Moreover, as antebellum uses of 
phobia began to fashion a new, formally complex aesthetic, the objective for the most 
discerning figures I consider was less to land upon a default, habitual liberal theory of 
emotion, than to reckon with the potential uses of fear in engaging political impasses. 
Taking this counterintuitive stance invited risks, without a doubt. Yet the writings 
explored in this dissertation demonstrate that this reckoning, the embrace of a phobic 
imagination, made it possible to pioneer alternative political communities as well—to 
create in the context of a shared precariousness relational modes designed to repurpose 
the very emotions wrought by and through systematic inequality and violence. Phobia’s 
burgeoning lexicality in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century print media took shape in 
the lacunae between these impulses of resistance and embrace. The legacy of these 
contestations rolls off the tongue presently. Through a practice of slow etymology, the 
protracted cathexis of a queer logophobia, Infectious Affect reencounters scenes of an 
earlier grappling, a constellation of alien contingencies, in which we are likely to find 
ourselves unfamiliar, and less certain of what to feel.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
HYDROPHOBIA’S DOPPELGÄNGER: 
THE SPECTER OF SPONTANEITY IN EARLY AMERICAN RABIES 
NARRATIVES 
 
 
Infection in the sentence breeds 
We may inhale Despair 
At distances of Centuries 
From the Malaria — 
 
- Emily Dickinson, poem 1261 
 
 
As noted in the introduction, competing theories spread to explain how Charles 
Lennox, 4th Duke of Richmond, fell prey to hydrophobia the night of August 26, 1819. 
Some claimed he had received the fatal injury after separating a rabid fox from a 
wounded hound; others claimed the Governor General had been infected by his own 
beloved dog, Blucher. However, this chapter introduces another mystery, which 
repeatedly compromised the idea that hydrophobia was always a signifier of some 
previous rabid transmission. In fact, one of the most peculiar assumptions about 
hydrophobia, popular from the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, is that neither 
account of infection would have been necessary to Lennox’s diagnosis. Prior to theories 
of contagion affiliated with the germ theory of disease, which would not gain notable 
traction till the mid-1800s, it was common for physicians to attribute hydrophobia to a 
diverse array of causes. While communicability by a mad animal’s bite was certainly the 
most well-known explanation, other narratives of infection were understood to hold water 
too. During these decades, debates over hydrophobia’s potential detours into human 
consciousness became a profoundly influential touchstone for early American 
conceptions of phobia as a more general form of mental illness.  
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Consider, for instance, a series of cases reported by a physician named Christian 
Frederic Selcg in 1762, in which hydrophobia seized patients who could not recall ever 
having been bitten. For one of his examples, Selcg cites the mysterious case of a 
“shoemaker’s wife, who had been to wash an hide at the river” (102). The doctor explains 
that when her companions departed as night fell, the woman was seized with a sudden 
panic at having been left alone, which evolved over the next few days into an ever-
worsening hydrophobia. “[F]rom that time she could no more swallow liquids,” Selcg 
explains, “and when anything of that kind was brought before her, she seemed to be in 
danger of suffocation.” By the end not even “the sight of fluids” was tolerable, and on the 
eighth day of the malady she “expired.” Nearly a century later, in 1850, Dr. David 
Francis Condie of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia reports a similar case. 
Condie tells of a shipyard overseer named Willets, thirty-five years old, who awoke one 
morning with severe neck pain. “Feeling thirsty,” Condie explains, “[Willets] took a 
tumbler of water in his hand, but on attempting to swallow some, was seized with a most 
painful sense of suffocation, followed instantly by a general spasm” (Case 456). 
Symptoms worsened, but Willets remained conscious of his surroundings. Condie notes 
Willets could even display the malady on command: “To show me the manner in which it 
affected him, he seized a glass of water which stood upon the bureau in his room, and by 
a sudden jerking motion, brought it to his lips; on attempting to swallow a few drops, he 
became violently convulsed; threw his limbs about in a wild, agitated manner; his eyes 
staring wildly open; his face assuming a dark hue, and his whole chest heaving as of one 
in the agony of suffocation” (Condie 457). Nevertheless, while the condition seemed 
obvious, Willets insisted he had not in the last eighteen years received any bite or wound 
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from an animal. After close inspection, his doctor confirmed no trace of a prior attack 
could be detected. Even so, after three days of suffering Willets died. Strange as these 
conditions seemed, both Selcg and Condie had a name for the malady they witnessed: as 
Condie wrote in his account, “It was unquestionably a case of spontaneous hydrophobia” 
(486). 
This chapter contextualizes phobia’s emergence as a broader subject of medical 
study by reconstructing and reencountering the riddle posed by the shoemaker’s wife, 
Willets, and others like them. By the mid-to-late eighteenth century, a large number of 
the most influential physicians in Europe and the Americas considered the condition 
Selcg and Condie identify as “spontaneous hydrophobia”—defined as a form untraceable 
to a bite, scratch, or comparable means of transmission—to be a serious phenomenon. As 
Neil Pemberton and Michael Worboys note briefly in their history of rabies in Britain, 
physicians and “lay ‘experts’” alike began pursuing the idea that hydrophobia could seize 
subjects as a purely “mental disease” (2).9 However, the extent of this phenomenon’s 
influence has yet to be acknowledged. This chapter proposes that attempts to explain the 
phenomenon of spontaneous hydrophobia in the 1700s and early 1800s not only 
influenced interpretations of rabies, but also played the greatest role in developing phobia 
into a legible concept and category of psychological study. As the belief that hydrophobia 
could strike by means other than infection became common, the classification came to 
signify the first widespread use of the -phobia suffix in the English language to designate 
a state of self-sufficing pathological fear. In the 1780s and 1790s, as -phobia began to be 
                                                
9 See also Bill Wasik and Monica Murphy’s Rabid: A Cultural History of the World’s 
Most Diabolical Virus (2012), and Kathleen Kete’s “La Rage and the Bourgeoisie: The 
Cultural Context of Rabies in the Nineteenth Century.” Representations, vol. 22, Spring 
1988, pp. 89-107. 
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adapted as a versatile suffix capable of attaching to new objects and ideas, the concept’s 
origins in the literature on rabies would continue to play a profound role in shaping the 
discursive associations phobia accrued.  
To demonstrate the full significance of this etymological turn, this chapter 
continues the work begun in the introduction of integrating methods in the history of 
medicine with a growing field of scholarship known as the history of the emotions. As 
Susan Matt and Peter Stearns observe in Doing Emotions History (2013), scholarship in 
the history of emotions follows the provocation that, far from being consistent across 
different epochs and contexts, emotions should be understood as contingent historical 
objects that adapt to the cues and rhythms of disparate imagined communities.10 As noted 
previously, the history of fear has begun to attract new attention in these terms, yet this 
scholarship tends to go back only so far as the mid-nineteenth century.11 In short, the 
strange contingencies of phobia’s materialization as an emotion requiring scientific 
attention, diagnosis, and treatment, have yet to be adequately explored. In dialogue with 
the work of Eugenie Brinkema, this chapter argues that phobia’s early signification is 
best understood as an emergent emotive form, shaped within particular plot dynamics, 
tonal intensities, and genre affinities transmitted through rabies narratives. More 
specifically, I argue that one of the major developments in phobia’s early signification is 
that the concept became legible as an imitative mechanism, to the extent that phobia 
became a sort of competitor term for hypochondria. The familiar lag time between the 
                                                
10 See also Jan Plamper’s The History of Emotions (2015) and Barbara H. Rosenwein’s 
Generations of Feeling (2015).  
11 See, for instance, Benjamin Lazier and Jan Plamper’s edited collection Fear across the 
Disciplines (2012) and David Trotter’s The Uses of Phobia (2010). 
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bite of a dog and the onset of infectious rabies symptoms—then reported to last anywhere 
from several weeks to several years—was integral to this development. In certain cases of 
spontaneous hydrophobia, physicians began speculating that it was an antecedent fear of 
a looming hydrophobia, kindled by too great a familiarity with medical literature, that 
eventually brought the infamous dread of water into being. It became a widely accepted 
hypothesis, in other words, that in such cases a manifest hydrophobia was merely a 
doppelgänger of print representations of the disease feared, which, following a sudden 
irritation in the throat, fantasy of contamination, or some other non-infectious trigger, had 
held the mind captive for too long. Taking shape in this dynamic, phobia came to 
intimate a disturbingly protean feeling: a deadly cathexis underwritten by aversion, which 
could traverse the realms of cause and symptom imperceptibly. Thus, phobia’s 
phenomenology began to exceed the dread of water for which rabies was known, 
comprising further an anticipatory, irrational dread of the disease itself, which by virtue 
of a concealed intensity could produce an imitative pathology by its own means. 
Far from settling the matter of spontaneous rabies definitively, phobia’s protean 
status as cause and symptom opened up new riddles in conceptualizing the relationship 
between pathology, emotion, and the written word. Indeed, medical and lay literature on 
hydrophobia became a crucial nexus at which late colonial and early U.S. writers 
themselves debated and tested the historical contingency of emotions. As a feeling 
capable of generating doppelgänger states, phobia tapped into a debate that has continued 
to motivate contemporary historians of emotion: are emotions derived from biological 
instinct and predisposition, or do the dominant emotions circulated among imagined 
communities—legible across disparate geographies by their correspondence to words—
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come into being by and as language? In what measure should we understand emotion as 
intra-linguistic versus pre-linguistic?12 To return to the phenomena under consideration, 
the literature on hydrophobia was clearly succeeding in teaching distant reading publics, 
uninfected by rabies, how to become hydrophobic—so effectively (it was believed) that 
the learned emotion could be lethal. Yet, phobia’s causational status in these very cases 
of spontaneous origin—its ready activation of an imitative sequence, against which 
physicians earnestly cautioned—amounted to an anticipatory excess, which the logic of 
performativity could not quite contain. Phobia became an increasingly attractive analytic 
to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers for this reason: because it 
surfaced murkily at the intersection of organic immediacy and the imitation of language. 
To trace phobia’s early accumulation of these connotations, this chapter extends methods 
advocated in the medical humanities to understand medical print culture in terms of its 
formal conventions and philological attachments. 13 To explore how medical debate went 
on to foster literary experimentation in the antebellum period, I conclude by turning to a 
dramatization of spontaneous hydrophobia in a story published by John Neal in The 
Atlantic Souvenir in 1832 titled “The Haunted Man.” For Neal, phobia’s imitative 
function offered a readymade plotline for pursuing the historical contingency of emotion, 
in tension with the influence of a non-linguistic affective excess. Playing self-consciously 
with his fusion of medical inquiry and fiction, Neal emphasizes the infectious as well as 
healing capacities of print, dramatizing the material influence of the written word not 
                                                
12 For an introduction to this subject, see William Reddy’s The Navigation of Feeling 
(2001), especially the chapter “Emotional Expression as a Type of Speech Act.” 
13 See, for instance, Silva’s Miraculous Plagues: An Epidemiology of Early New England 
Narrative (2011); Pomata’s “The Medical Case Narrative: Distant Reading of an 
Epistemic Genre” (2014); and Wald’s Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak 
Narrative (2008).  
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merely over the content, but likewise over the form and endurance of a patient’s interior 
pathology. Following these analyses, I elaborate phobia’s nascent connotations further by 
turning to writings by George Lippard and Edgar Allan Poe as well.  
 
“AN ADVENTITIOUS AGENCY”:  
SPONTANEITY IN TRANSATLANTIC MEDICAL PRINT CULTURE 
 
 Prior to understanding the development of phobia’s imitative connotations, it is 
important to piece together a sense of how vast and widely known the literature on 
spontaneous hydrophobia became in the late 1700s. For physicians in the U.S., before, 
during, and immediately after the American Revolutionary War, the most authoritative 
classification of hydrophobia into rabid and spontaneous types came from the work of 
William Cullen. A revered professor at the Edinburgh School of Medicine, then the 
epicenter of medical education in the English-speaking world, Cullen trained a number of 
physicians who went on to work and teach on both sides of the Atlantic. By the year 
1800, a total of 117 Americans had obtained their medical degrees at Edinburgh, with 
many more having been educated at the school in some capacity. This number included 
the first six professors at the Medical School of the College of Philadelphia (the first 
medical school in North America, which would become part of the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1791), including John Morgan, William Shippen, Jr., Benjamin Rush, 
Adam Kuhn, Philip Syng Physick, and Casper Wistar. Five additional founding members 
of the College of Philadelphia had received some amount of training in Edinburgh, 
among them John Jones, George Glentworth, Thomas Parke, Benjamin Duffield, and 
Samuel Griffitts. Of these eleven professors and founding members, a total of six 
(Morgan, Glentworth, Shippen, Kuhn, Rush, and Parke) had studied under Cullen 
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specifically. John M. O’Donnell thus observes, “when we are talking about the American 
medical imagination…in the last half of the eighteenth century, the ideal images of 
medical education and organization held by most influential Americans were formed on 
Scottish soil and at a time when William Cullen’s influence was at its height” (235).14 
Conscious of this influence, Cullen would write Rush on October 16, 1784, sending his 
“respectful and affectionate compliments to all my old pupils at Philadelphia,” with the 
confession,  
I shall always hold it my highest honour that the founders of the Medical 
College of Philadelphia were all of them my Pupils and if it can be known 
I think it will be the most certain means of transmitting my name to a 
distant posterity for I believe that this School will one day or other be the 
greatest in the world.15  
Cullen’s former students reciprocated his sentiments. In a eulogy prepared after Cullen’s 
death in 1790, delivered to the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, Benjamin Rush 
                                                
14 A great number of American physicians chose Edinburgh for medical training because 
of the School’s prestige and association with the Scottish Enlightenment. (Cullen was 
both a friend of and physician to David Hume and Adam Smith.) While the Edinburgh 
School offered an ideal education, in this sense, still other connections helped establish a 
strong relationship between Edinburgh and the American colonies. As medical historian 
Francis Packard has noted, the benefactor secured by Benjamin Franklin for the 
Pennsylvania Hospital (the first hospital in the U.S.), a Quaker physician named John 
Fothergill, was also an alumnus of the Edinburgh School. Perhaps even more crucially, as 
Stanley Finger has documented, Franklin himself made a concerted effort to facilitate a 
Philadelphia-to-Edinburgh pipeline for aspiring physicians in the colonies. Finger 
explains that “within a year after visiting Scotland and making many friends there” in 
1759, “Franklin began to recommend training in Edinburgh to Philadelphia’s brightest 
medical students, and to write personal letters of recommendation on their behalf” (138). 
For Shippen, Morgan, and Rush, Franklin sent such letters of recommendation to Cullen 
directly.  
15 Cullen to Rush, Edinburgh, 16 October 1784, Rush MSS (Library Company of 
Philadelphia), XXIV, 56.  
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depicted his teacher’s influence on medicine in the Americas, saying, “although, like the 
sun, he shone in a distant hemisphere, yet many of the rays of his knowledge have fallen 
upon this quarter of the globe” (3), with the “blessings of his improvements in the 
principles and practice of medicine” having reached “every British settlement in the East 
and West Indies” and “every free State in America” (23). “While Astronomy claims a 
Newton, and Electricity a Franklin,” Rush went on, “Medicine has been equally honoured 
by having employed the genius of a Cullen” (26).  
 A major figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, despite being overshadowed by 
David Hume and Adam Smith in popular memory today, Cullen made his greatest 
impression on medicine through his popularization of nosology, the Enlightenment term 
meaning “disease classification,” as a foundation for the production and dissemination of 
medical knowledge. Building on the work of earlier nosologists, including English 
physician Thomas Sydenham, whose Observationes Medicae (1676) inaugurated disease 
classification in the West; French physician François Boissier de Sauvages, whose 
Nosologia Methodica (1763) more completely established nosology as a practice; as well 
as Carl Linnaeus and Rudolph Vogel, who followed Sauvages in turn,16 Cullen published 
his system under the title Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae in 1769. Written in Latin, 
Cullen’s nosology accounted for human diseases across four classes, nineteen orders, and 
132 genera. This classificatory scheme quickly became one of the most widely 
influential, serving as a model for other important works such as French physician 
Philippe Pinel’s momentous Nosographie Philosophique ou Méthode de l'Analyse 
                                                
16 Another important predecessor was Herman Boerhaave, whose Institutiones Medicae 
(1708) became one of the most important textbooks for eighteenth-century students of 
medicine.  
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Appliquée à la Médecine (1798). While the system drawn up by Sauvages would likewise 
make a significant impact on medicine in the Americas, Cullen, as Robert E. Kendell 
notes, would become “the most distinguished and influential physician” among late 
eighteenth-century nosologists. “[H]is reputation as a teacher, and that of the Edinburgh 
Medical School…endowed his nosology with considerable influence and prestige, 
particularly in Britain and America” (Kendell 220). While the nature of medical authority 
and consensus underwent dramatic changes during the period, Cullen’s nosology thus 
provides a useful starting point for determining how spontaneous hydrophobia acquired 
consensus as a valuable diagnosis among Anglo-American physicians, in the context of a 
transatlantic print culture where relevant case histories, theories, and debates became 
increasingly accessible.  
Building on the work of earlier nosologists, Cullen published his system under the 
title Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae in the 1760s, a system that soon became the most 
influential among U.S. readers. For his classification of hydrophobia, Cullen accounted 
for two possible forms: hydrophobia vulgaris, communicated from the bite of a rabid 
animal, and hydrophobia spontanea, occurring by means other than “contagium” (357). 
Recorded in Latin, the entry reads: 
Species sunt,  
1. Hydrophobia (rabiosa) cum mordendi cupiditate ex morsu 
animalis rabidi. 
Hydrophobia vulgaris, S. sp. 1.  
2. Hydrophobia (simplex) sine rabie, vel mordendi cupiditate. 
Hydrophobia spontanea, S. sp. 2. (316) 
  59 
Most instructive here is that just as origins for rabid and spontaneous hydrophobia differ, 
so too do their symptoms—the rabid form entailing an inclination for biting (mordendi 
cupiditate), the latter occurring without (sine) any such desire. The former is 
distinguished, moreover, by an intrinsic method for perpetual contagion—biting serving 
as both symptom and cause (mordendi, being a future participle conjugated from the 
infinitive mordere, meaning “to bite,” and morsu being the singular, ablative case of 
morsus, the noun form meaning “bite”). The latter species materializes spontaneously in 
that the disease occurs without any such cause or inclination and, therefore, without 
recourse on either side to self-evident sequence.17  
 The delineation of rabid and spontaneous subspecies of hydrophobia caught on 
widely in medical literature of the late 1700s and 1800s. At the same time, what 
physicians meant by “spontaneous” was a complicated matter. In Cullen’s Synopsis 
Nosologiae Methodicae, spontaneous appears synonymous with the term idiopathic, or in 
Latin idiopathica, meaning simply that the disease can seize its victim without being 
traceable to an evident cause. Cullen thus accounts in the same work for cholera 
spontanea, dysenteria benigna spontanea, and other conditions of uncertain derivation. 
Rather than being devoid of cause, these spontaneous diseases were understood to be 
diagnosable wherever a disease became manifest, yet narrative explanations of their 
origin and progression remained obscured. At the same time, the idea that diseases might 
strike spontaneously shared a certain analogy to other controversial phenomena of the 
period, such as spontaneous combustion, as well as the doctrine of spontaneous 
                                                
17 Physicians held divergent perspectives on this question of whether spontaneous 
hydrophobia induced a desire to attack others or not. As demonstrated below, many 
believed spontaneous hydrophobia did, in fact, produce an infectious saliva, and believed 
moreover that it drove individuals to pass it on by biting others.  
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generation, traceable to Aristotle, which held that living organisms could spring from 
inanimate matter.18 While spontaneous hydrophobia, as a diagnosis, was a separate 
matter, since rabies was not presumed to be a life form, it was widely believed that 
diseases could likewise generate spontaneously. Spontaneity represented in this context a 
hybrid ground, between narrative murkiness and an immaculate conception of the worst 
kind. 
Attributions of hydrophobia to climate comprised much of the early evidence 
used to argue that the disease could emerge spontaneously. To understand what 
spontaneous hydrophobia originally signified to U.S. physicians, it thus becomes 
necessary to show how a multiplicity of exchanges—transatlantic, transnational, and 
multilingual—amassed an ever-growing body of knowledge irreducible to the parameters 
of any single nation state. Indeed, the medical imagination formed by these print 
exchanges offers one provocative testing ground for what Wai Chee Dimock has called a 
“through other continents” approach to American studies. “Rather than being a discrete 
identity,” Dimock writes, “[American literature] is better seen as a crisscrossing set of 
pathways, open-ended and ever multiplying, weaving in and out of other geographies, 
other languages and cultures” (3). She specifies further, “These are input channels, 
kinship networks, routes of transit, and forms of attachment—connective tissues binding 
America to the rest of the world.” For American physicians increasingly concerned with 
pinpointing etiologies for disease outbreaks, geographical borders needed to be crossed 
and transnational dialogues forged. These pursuits in disease travel required, moreover, 
                                                
18 While hotly contested, spontaneous generation continued to find support in the work of 
eighteenth-century figures like Erasmus Darwin, who advocated a revised theory of 
“spontaneous vitality” in The Temple of Nature. See, for instance, “Remarks on Darwin’s 
Temple of Nature,” published in The Literary Magazine, and American Register in 1804.  
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that the routes of European colonialism be retraced, to account for the appearance of 
illness over space and time.  
Sudden appearances of the disease in the Americas in the late eighteenth century 
became some of the most widely cited evidence on both sides of the Atlantic for the idea 
that hydrophobia could emerge spontaneously. Across North America, South America, 
and the West Indies, outbreaks began to emerge where no cases had been documented 
previously. A British physician named Benjamin Moseley, who served at the Royal 
Military Hospital at Chelsea, observed such instances in a treatise titled On Hydrophobia, 
Its Prevention and Cure. Maintaining that hydrophobia did not exist in the Caribbean 
before 1783, Moseley states that it appeared first that year on the island of Hispaniola and 
in 1784 was discovered in Jamaica. Moseley portrays this development as a consequence 
of climate, at the root of a spontaneous etiology. “The common notion,” he writes, “that 
this disease among Dogs can only proceed from the poison of an external bite…has 
excluded the idea of spontaneous madness, arising from some peculiar influence in the 
air. But this influence of the air generated the Canine Madness in the year 1783, in the 
West Indies” (26). Enumerating multiple cases in which dogs, the enslaved, slaveholders 
and livestock in and around Kingston succumbed to the disease, Moseley insists that 
while rabid attacks soon played a part in how rapidly the epidemic spread, it began 
among dogs who “had no communication with others.”19  
                                                
19 It is important to note that while a majority of physicians of the period entertained the 
possibility of spontaneous hydrophobia, some staunchly opposed the idea. The most 
frequently referenced of these detractors was James Bardsley, a graduate of Edinburgh 
who held a post at the Manchester Infirmary. Taking the outbreaks in Jamaica and St. 
Domingo as examples, Bardsley contends that hydrophobia could not logically be 
attributed to the climate of the islands for one simple reason: “Simple heat will not create 
the disease, as [hydrophobia] is not more common in tropical regions” than in Europe or 
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The most commonly observed example in support of spontaneous origin in the 
Americas was an epidemic that erupted in Peru in 1803, in which animals began falling 
prey to hydrophobia in droves without there being any self-explanatory way for the 
disease to have arrived. The difficulty of explaining its arrival had to do with Peru’s 
renowned geographical isolation, by the Pacific to the west and the Andes to the east. 
Details first spread to physicians in Europe and North America in the form of a treatise 
written by Peruvian physician José Hipólito Unanúe titled Observaciones sobre el Clima 
de Lima, published in Lima in 1806 and in Madrid in 1815. In the Observaciones, 
Unanúe records how the “enfermedad” known as “hidrofóbia” first appeared on the 
northern coast of Peru as “una rábia espontánea nacida del aumento del calor, que hubo 
en los años de 803 y 804,” or a spontaneous rabies born from heightened temperatures, 
from 1803 to 1804 (67). Many physicians translated and retold the ensuing catastrophe in 
turn. U.S. Navy Surgeon Richard K. Hoffman wrote to acquaintances of how the disease, 
prompted by “excessive heat,” soon “became general among quadrupeds, attacking them 
indiscriminately” (Qtd. in Pascalis 139). Hoffman characterizes the scene that followed in 
gruesome detail: 
[D]ogs walked with their tails between their legs, discharged much saliva, 
concealed themselves from men, howled loudly, and soon fell dead…[;] 
cats ran with their hair erect…[;] horses and asses were enraged against 
each other…threw themselves and wallowed on the earth…[;] cattle 
evinced the same rage, by leaping furiously and engaging in hostile strife, 
                                                                                                                                            
elsewhere (499). While Bardsley won some converts to this line of reasoning, others held 
fast to the idea of sudden onset. 
  63 
in which they often broke their horns, and soon expired in the act of 
bellowing. (139)  
Only after this initial eruption was the disease “subsequently propagated by specific 
contagions.” By 1807, the disease had reached the cities of Arequipa and Lima. But even 
as a number of people thus contracted the disease from having been bitten, still other 
persons appeared to acquire the condition autonomously, in the manner of the species 
where it first became manifest.20 The conclusion among physicians, as conveyed in the 
writings of Felix Pascalis, a physician from St. Domingo who fled to the U.S. following 
the Haitian Revolution, was that the outbreak in Peru proved firstly that “certain morbid 
causes self-engender the canine rabies” and secondly that “the same adventitious agency 
has produced hydrophobia and rabid diseases in human beings” (140). Even Charles 
Darwin would observe the case in his Journal of Researches into the Natural History and 
Geology of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of the H.M.S. Beagle Round the 
World (1846), noting “it is said,” regarding the hydrophobia outbreak in Arequipa in 
1807, that “some men there, who had not been bitten, were affected” (113). While 
Darwin has since been given much credit for overturning the logic of spontaneous 
generation through his theory of evolution, he muses in the journal, “In so strange a 
disease, some information might possibly be gained by considering the circumstances 
under which it originates in distant climates” where it seems “improbable that a dog 
already bitten should have been brought to these distant countries” (114).21 
                                                
20 Unanúe accounts for this phenomenon, explaining, “en los lugares donde el calor fué 
muy fuerte cayeron varios hombres enfermos con todo el aparato de la hidrofóbia sin 
haber sido mordidos” (68). 
21 For another account of this outbreak, see Archibald Smith’s Peru as It Is: A Residence 
in Lima and Other Parts of the Peruvian Republic, Comprising an Account of the Social 
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While climatological theories helped establish faith in spontaneous origin on a 
transatlantic scale, the literature on rabies soon opened onto a more nuanced interrogation 
of the disease’s potential psychological origins. In some cases, neighboring forms of 
mental illness such as mania and melancholia were presumed responsible. In still other 
cases, victims were observed suffering from cases of hydrophobia after being bitten by a 
dog, only to discover subsequently that the dog had never been rabid. Extending Cullen’s 
classification, a member of the Royal College of Physicians in London named Robert 
Hamilton thus concludes his book-length study Remarks on Hydrophobia, published in 
1798, by dividing spontaneous hydrophobia itself into subspecies: one proceeding “where 
strong imagination, or deep impressions of the mind from various other causes induce a 
train of symptoms apparently similar, and scarcely to be distinguished from the malady 
excited by rabid infection”; the other being preceded by the bite of an animal, yet “where 
terror only seemed to excite the succeeding disease” (249). Hamilton continues by 
enumerating examples of each form. Cases illustrating the first were often found to result 
from mental conditions like “hysteria, melancholy, mania, &c.,” in which resemblance to 
the disease was so strong (“convulsions on the touch of water” included) that cases could 
even “prove fatal.” An example taken from Dr. Raymond based in Marseilles tells of a 
twelve-year-old boy who developed hydrophobia with no record of having been bitten. 
                                                                                                                                            
and Physical Features of That Country, Vol. II (1839). Smith recalls that hydrophobia 
“arose spontaneously from the increased atmospherical temperature of the years 1803 and 
1804” (248). Smith goes onto explain how a debate transpired over “whether or not the 
malady was a legitimate hydrophobia,” to the extent that “very learned papers pro and 
con were written by the Doctors Rosas and Salvani,” to determine what part people’s 
imaginations had played in the unfurling epidemic (250). As late as 1872, by which time 
most physicians had abandoned theories of spontaneous hydrophobia, the British 
veterinarian George Fleming would cite the Peruvian epidemic as evidence of its 
existence, however rare (87). Fleming goes on to cite apparently spontaneous outbreaks 
in Algeria as well, occurring intermittently during the 1830s, ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s.  
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“In the height of the paroxysm,” Hamilton explains, “he was unruly, frantic, endeavored 
to bite, and had a dread of water.” Within two days, the boy perished (259).22 Cases of 
the latter tell of persons who developed symptoms after having sustained a bite, often in a 
matter of days, only to recover soon after, thus indicating that no actual infection had 
taken place. Among these, one of the most famous was a case reported by an Italian 
physician named Dr. Barbantini, which made it to the pages of the Boston Medical and 
Surgical Journal in 1828, telling of a dog who bit his owner and afterward absconded, 
presumably to die. “The disease made its appearance,” the journal reports, “and for four 
days the patient could neither swallow fluids nor liquids” (333). When nine days later the 
dog returned unexpectedly to “the bedchamber of its master, whom he caressed as usual,” 
the dread of water quickly “disappeared.” In these latter cases, it became apparent that a 
phenomenon of imitation had taken effect, by which individuals dreading a hydrophobic 
death, perceived to be inevitable, began impulsively to perform a corresponding train of 
symptoms. 
 
SPONTANEITY AND IMITATION;  
OR, BENJAMIN RUSH VS. NOSOLOGY 
 
Across the latter half of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, a 
number of interrelated explanations—climatological, psychological, and otherwise—thus 
pointed to the existence, and special threat, of a spontaneous form. As a multitude of 
idiopathic cases gradually appeared consistent across these categories, an array of 
                                                
22 Such cases accumulated rapidly on both sides of the Atlantic. An article published in 
The American Museum, or, Universal Magazine thus explains to readers in August 1790, 
“We have numerous and well attested instances on record, of [hydrophobia] being 
produced in persons, who have not been bitten by a mad animal; but in whom it was 
occasioned by excessive fatigue and labour; violent and depressing passions, chagrin, 
grief, anger, &c.—causes, which are evidently and powerfully debilitating” (68). 
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alternative etiologies became established throughout the Atlantic world, a handful of 
which I have elaborated upon here. These cases help explain why the logic of spontaneity 
gathered momentum. Nevertheless, they do not provide a full picture of a medical 
epistemology that made these explanations admissible. Two concepts integral to the 
diagnosis require further scrutiny: spontaneity and imitation. Beyond its connection to 
theories of spontaneous etiology, spontaneity, as a temporality characterizing certain 
experiences of disease, possessed an important affinity with understandings of disease 
classification, writ large, at the close of the eighteenth century. So too was the logic of 
imitation fostered by neighboring theories of disease origin, which made it possible to 
conceptualize an array of illnesses as essentially performative.  
As noted above, the perception of infectious and spontaneous hydrophobias as 
largely continuous at the level of disease manifestation, despite their distinct etiologies, 
stemmed in large part from a belief in the centrality of the nervous system to the 
production of disease. From this bird’s-eye view, while matters of causation certainly 
provided a conceptual riddle in terms of prevention, it nevertheless became possible to 
imagine the onset of the disease as somewhat irrelevant to a diversity of causes. In cases 
of infectious hydrophobia, as James Vaughan put it succinctly in his Cases and 
Observations on the Hydrophobia in 1778, it was understood that “the poison of the dog, 
or other mad animal, acts upon the nerves, by impairing and disturbing their influence; 
and this at length increases to so great a degree, as to speedily end in a total extinction of 
the vital principle” (52). By this logic, the rabid poison secreted in a dog’s saliva was 
perceived to be merely a catalyst to a subsequent fundamental process, which, in theory, 
some other catalyst could also trigger. In his 1753 Essay on the Hydrophobia, 
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Christopher Nugent (physician and father-in-law to Edmund Burke) well articulates the 
dilemma physicians thus faced with the following queries: (1) “If the natural and vital 
Action of the Nerves, and nervous Solids, in the human Body, solely consists in a regular 
Succession of alternate Contractions and Dilatations; and that the Use of this natural 
regular Action is, to propel, prepare, and distribute the Fluids, for the Secretions, and 
other necessary Purposes…must not the preternatural Action, or rather Passion, of these 
same Nerves and Solids, consist in irregular Emotions?” Following this logic, Nugent 
continues: (2) “Whatever the immediate cause of the natural and salutary Oscillations of 
the Solids may be; is not that of their disorderly spasmodic Emotions, on all hands, 
allowed to be, either some material Stimulus; or some affecting Thought?” (45-6; 47). 
While, interestingly enough, Nugent bring this relationship to the fore not to address the 
question of spontaneous hydrophobia, but rather to develop a perspective on the 
possibility of hydrophobia’s cure, Nugent’s formulations help us arrive at an 
understanding of why rabid saliva had begun to be conceptualized by a number of 
physicians as just one cause among many. It remained important to distinguish these 
divergent pathways of causation to a point; yet, it remained equally important that one 
imagine a more fundamental field of interior stimuli, by which “irregular emotions” and 
“affecting thoughts” threatened to disrupt the normal operations of the nervous system 
from within. In Zoonomia; Or, the Laws of Organic Life (1794), comparable concerns 
would lead Erasmus Darwin to describe rabid infection itself as a condition of 
“imitation.” Observing that the rabid poison communicated by a rabid dog “does not 
appear to enter the circulation,” Darwin proposes that somehow the saliva secreted by the 
bite of a mad dog, into the wound of its victim, triggers the “salivary glands” of the latter 
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into an “irritative sympathy,” so that new poisons are produced not by straightforward 
transmission, but instead by a process of remote imitation.   
Beyond these theories pertaining to the nervous system, still other factors played 
an important role. As this chapter is largely about taxonomy and its afterlives, we should 
observe that the function of language was just as important to the rise of spontaneous 
hydrophobia as a kind of doppelgänger diagnosis. Michel Foucault’s contributions to the 
history of medicine offer a particularly useful lens for discerning spontaneity’s adjectival 
role in disease classification. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault describes 
Enlightenment-era nosology as representing a two-dimensional spatiality where 
“families, genera, and species” came to serve as self-sustaining coordinates, irrespective 
of the physical bodies and narratives to which they might be applied. With an illustrative 
simile, Foucault explains, 
Just as the genealogical tree, at a lower level than the comparison that it 
involves and all its imaginary themes, presupposes a space in which 
kinship is formalizable, the nosological picture involves a figure of the 
diseases that is neither the chain of causes and effects nor the 
chronological series of events nor its visible trajectory in the human body. 
(4-5) 
In its purest sense, the nosological depiction of disease thus rested on what Foucault 
elsewhere describes as an imagined “essence,” which case histories could corroborate, 
yet were not intended to challenge. Foucault is careful to clarify that this is not the same 
as saying that physicians of the period considered causation irrelevant. Citing Cullen 
specifically, Foucault notes that the physician’s classificatory scheme was largely 
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founded on “the attribution of related causes” pertaining to the nerves (5). Even here, 
however, Foucault argues that causation remained tangential to a purity of identity. The 
form of medical knowledge nosology delineated consisted in “a sort of fundamental area 
in which perspectives are levelled off, and in which shifts of level are aligned”—a space 
where “an effect has the same status as its cause, the antecedent coincides with what 
follows it” (6). “In this homogeneous space,” Foucault continues, “series are broken and 
time abolished.” Returning to the logic of a spontaneous etiology, we might conclude that 
spontaneity became, in this sense, more the rule than the exception. For all practical 
purposes, eighteenth-century nosology had developed a tradition of treating the 
knowledge of diseases as a knowledge of a priori forms. Hydrophobia could follow the 
bite of rabid dog, but it could also materialize from within: what mattered was an identity 
of bodily manifestation with textual description. Foucault pictures these textual 
descriptions, as they became organized into authoritative taxonomies, as comprising a 
“flat surface of perpetual simultaneity” (6).  
 As other scholars have noted, Foucault’s writings on disease, madness, and the 
rise of a new medical authority in Europe do not always hold up when studied against 
archival particularities. Even so, as Jan Goldstein has observed, Foucault has a way of 
getting things right, even when wrong. Foucault’s portrayal of eighteenth-century 
nosology as a “flat surface of perpetual simultaneity” essentially unconcerned with actual 
bodies may be overly simplistic, then, yet we find in turning to the literature on 
hydrophobia that certain physicians of the period began taking issue with nosology on 
exactly these grounds. The increased authority of nosology’s two-dimensional system 
over medicine had indeed begun to infuse the nomenclature it housed with a conspicuous 
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power. The capacity to recognize a classification in practice, and thus to subsume that 
case back within a nosological scheme, had become an inextricable responsibility of 
medical care. This status of nosological authority produced a rather conspicuous 
confusion surrounding hydrophobia, in particular, since the disease had been named for a 
singular symptom—namely, the fear of water—which most of the time accompanied 
rabid infection, but sometimes did not. Dissatisfied with this imprecision, some began 
acknowledging the problem of hydrophobia’s nominal designation outright. One of the 
most significant critiques among U.S. physicians came from the pen of Benjamin Rush. 
In the fourth volume of his Medical Inquiries and Observations, published in 1798, Rush 
begins by conceding that the “dread of water” from which hydrophobia derives its name 
is indeed a common manifestation of the disease—a manifestation tending to pass 
through five stages, including (1) that water cannot be imbibed, (2) that it cannot be 
touched, (3) that its sound cannot be tolerated, (4) that its sight becomes unbearable, and 
(5) that “even the naming of it cannot be borne without exciting convulsions” (305).23 
However, he clarifies that the fear is not generalizable to all cases and that “hydrophobia” 
is, therefore, something of a misnomer, speaking to a tendency in nosology to allow a 
primary symptom of a disease to stand in as its name. “The imperfection of the present 
nomenclature of medicine,” Rush explains, “has become the subject of general 
complaint….The terms hydrophobia and canine madness, convey ideas of the symptoms 
of the disease only, and of such of them too as are by no means universal” (324-5). Rush 
                                                
23 This last symptom was often reported. See, for instance, the 1797 case of a six-year old 
attacked and bitten in the face by a dog belonging to his uncle. Not long after he began to 
succumb to the “canine madness,” it is reported that “even the mentioning of drink would 
produce similar agitations,” to those brought on by water itself, and thus “bring on a 
return of the fits” (Alden 52).   
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goes on in the essay to pursue a red herring. He proposes as an alternative that the disease 
in question is a kind of fever analogous to tetanus; that the “mortality of the disease from 
the bite of a rabid animal” has “increased” because it has been wrongly named (and 
therefore wrongly treated); and that the disease should be referred to instead as “the 
hydrophobic state of fever.” While this idea, that hydrophobia is a form of fever, would 
gain relatively few converts and eventually be discredited, the critique of nosology on 
which Rush premised his intervention went on to gather steam, introducing important 
consequences for the way spontaneous hydrophobia was interpreted afterward. 
Far beyond his theories on hydrophobia, Rush became known for having an axe to 
grind when it came to nosology’s tyranny. An anonymous manuscript poem from 1810, 
now residing in the Rush papers at the Library Company of Philadelphia, takes this 
resistance on Rush’s part for its muse. Likely written by one of Rush’s students or 
colleagues, the poem, titled “Lines on the Death of Nosology,” begins with a 
proclamation: “Beneath this chair with thousand errors dead/Nosology now rests her 
lifeless head!/Surround her tomb, ye pedant Quacks and mourn,/Your whole resource 
from medicine is torn.” Nosology’s greatest sin, the speaker asserts, is its faith in “Hard 
names,” which gather “fame for fools,” and in so doing obscure the real nature of 
illnesses underneath. Reaching its climax, the poem praises Rush for having vanquished 
the villain nosology at last, and thus having saved medicine from its dubious clutches. 
“But med’cine naked through the world shall rove,” the speaker promises. “The blind 
man see her, and the sick man love:/Great Rush’s name engrav’d upon her heart.” A 
condemnation of eighteenth-century systems echoed in Rush’s lecture manuscripts, the 
poem captures how the doctor eventually became known for distinguishing his practice 
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and thought from his training in Edinburgh. As Sari Altschuler has demonstrated, Rush 
conceived of human bodies not as “automatons” but as “dynamic living systems,” or 
“what he elsewhere would call ‘tremendous oscillatory mass[es] of matter’” (209). 
Likewise, Rush came to conceive of disease in a unified sense—more complex in its 
capacity for both interrelation and diversity than the discrete identities of nosology would 
imply. 
This distrust of classificatory language carried particular repercussions for 
definitions of hydrophobia: it allowed for a lexical disarticulation between names, thus 
prompting phobia’s signification to take new shape. Eugenie Brinkema has observed that 
affect theory generally emphasizes affect as extra-formal, as describing a pre-linguistic 
intensity, inhering in that which “cannot be written” (xii). The consequence has been a 
conspicuous negligence as to how the para-linguistic elements of emotion interact with 
and become shaped by cultural and textual forces. As Brinkema writes, “Critical 
positions that align affect” too starkly with a resistance to “structure, form, textuality, 
signification, legibility” betray a conspicuous investment in discovering a “transcendental 
signified,” a “fantasy of something that predates the linguistic turn and that evades the 
slow, hard tussle of reading texts closely” (xiv). In the literature on spontaneous rabies, 
we find that a rift between names, once characterized by classificatory equivalence, 
began to open up divergent pathways for encountering phobia as a state extricable from 
the disease associated with canine contagion. 
Concerning his 1798 writings on spontaneous hydrophobia specifically, it is 
worth noting that Rush’s perspective occupied some middle ground between Cullen’s 
nosology and something else. Ultimately, Rush admits that infectious and spontaneous 
  73 
hydrophobia can seize individuals as comparable states of disease (i.e. fever), even as he 
puts pressure on a facile classificatory method in which that continuity was presumed 
without question. Acknowledging the apparent facticity of spontaneous hydrophobia, 
Rush aims for an exhaustive account of its potential causes, including everything from 
cold night air, exposure to intense heat, and inflammation of the stomach, to the mundane 
inconvenience of “fall[ing] down.” As with many of the other diseases the physician 
treated, Rush prescribes generous bloodletting as a treatment in all variations. Regarding 
instances of spontaneous hydrophobia, specifically, Rush observes two cases, one treated 
by a Dr. Tilton of Delaware, the other by a Dr. Innes of an unspecified region, where 
bloodletting was practiced—with a total of 116 ounces being depleted in the latter case. 
Through this method of treatment, both cases were allegedly cured (319).24  
Yet even as Rush maintained a certain loyalty to this scheme, by which infectious 
and spontaneous hydrophobia could be treated as continuous, he made an important 
caveat. Just as rabid infection might progress without hydrophobia (as a symptom), Rush 
insisted that hydrophobic symptoms might emerge from other causes. For Rush, the 
greatest threat lay in the potency of human thought processes and emotion to produce an 
incapacitating dread of water independently. Such factors made it necessary for 
physicians to be able to interpret the psychological threads of case histories, as they 
might depart from familiar narratives of disease progression. While exploring a range of 
affective disturbances, Rush emphasizes the unmistakable role played by fear. “Where 
                                                
24 For a contemporary refutation of bloodletting in the treatment of hydrophobia, see 
Philadelphia physician James Mease’s “Observations on the Arguments of Professor 
Rush, in Favour of the Inflammatory Nature of the Disease Produced by the Mad Dog.”  
Philadelphia: Whitehall, 1801.  
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the interval between the time of being bitten, and the appearance of a dread of water 
exceeds five or six months,” Rush explains, 
it is probable it may be occasioned by a disease derived from another 
cause….The recollection of the poisonous wound he has received, and its 
usual consequences, is seldom absent from his mind for months or 
years….His fears are then let loose upon his system, and produce in a 
short time a dread of water which appears to be wholly unconnected with 
the bite of a rabid animal. Similar instances of the effects of fear upon the 
human body are to be met with in books of medicine. The pains produced 
by fear acting upon the imagination in supposed venereal infections, are as 
real and severe as they are in the worst state of that disease. (310-11) 
In this passage, Rush re-categorizes hydrophobia—now disentangled from the infectious 
disease associated with that symptom—as a state of fear, which might only be 
capitalizing on an antecedent fear that has long progressed unhindered, this being a fear 
of an impending confirmation of infection. It is important to note that Rush was hardly 
the first to tackle this etiological ruse. As early as 1788, British surgeon Jessé Foot 
observed that in certain cases perceived to be instances of rabid hydrophobia, from Bath 
to Barbados, symptoms had been merely psychological: “The mind of a person, who has 
been bitten by a dog, supposed to be mad, being constantly under the impression of so 
dreadful an attack, is open, and for a long time liable to the tyranny and sport of 
imaginary assaults” (27). The general phenomenon of imitating a known 
symptomatology out of fear had been hypothesized in respect to other disease outbreaks 
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as well, one of the best known being yellow fever.25 Yet Rush’s account stands out for 
being uniquely articulate about the connection between this performative phobia and fear, 
specifically. In effect, Rush redefines phobia as a state of mimicry, representing, at once, 
the continuation of an earlier state of fear, as well as a new imitation of the object with 
which that inaugural fear had been concerned. If instances of this spontaneous 
hydrophobia have been mistakenly equated with the disease transmitted by rabid dogs, 
Rush suggests this is precisely because phobia possesses a chameleon-like capacity to 
imitate a state as “real and severe” as the disease with which it is preoccupied. Here 
Rush’s critique of medical nomenclature admits a new reading: an identity of disease 
description and physiological manifestation might be entirely misleading when it comes 
to landing on a proper treatment. Symptoms may be deadly and performative at the same 
time: to treat them successfully, physicians must be prepared to discern the suffering 
subject’s condition holistically, including attention to that subject’s psychological history. 
 
THE WORD MADE FLESH:  
PHOBIA’S SPECTRAL TEXTUALITY IN JOHN NEAL’S “THE HAUNTED MAN” 
 
These developments in a phobic imagination facilitated through narratives of 
hydrophobia reached far and wide. An article titled “Mad Dogs” published in the Maine 
Farmer in 1849 shows how physicians practicing in more remote regions of the U.S. 
came to engage with, and found avenues for contributing to, debates over the nature of 
the disease as well. Published in the form of a letter written by a Dr. John S. Lynde of 
                                                
25 For an essay comparing the influence of fear on epidemics of hydrophobia and yellow 
fever, see Edward Miller’s “Remarks on the Importance of the Stomach as a Centre of 
Association” (1802). For a more capacious meditation on fear’s power to generate 
pathology, see William Buchan’s Domestic Medicine (1809, 1813). In terms of relevant 
scholarship, see also Marie-Hélène Huet’s The Culture of Disaster (2012). 
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Norridgewock, Maine, the article begins with the categorical conclusion that “There is no 
such disease as hydrophobia, rationally speaking, either in dogs or man” (2). The doctor 
proceeds to ascribe the disease, in nearly all of its alleged appearances, to fear: 
Let the person be under no influence of fear, and a thousand, and even ten 
thousand to one, he will not be poisoned. Fear, in most cases, is the great 
cause of the invasion. The person bitten must not live under the influence 
of fear; for fear brings on its whole train of symptoms. It is therefore, 
evident that the disease is generally imaginary. (2) 
Following these assertions, Lynde arrives at his special intervention. He explains that the 
disease, being “a popular scarecrow to frighten nervous and impressible people,” must 
actually be a remnant or new manifestation of “the lycanthropy of remote ages” (2). He 
reiterates: “Lycanthropy is the legitimate mother of human hydrophobia.” Just as “it was 
supposed” some “five centuries before the christian era” that “men possessed the power 
of converting themselves into wolves,” hydrophobia has “sprung up in a short period 
from a more enlightened superstition.” In this “enlightened” form, we find a fear of 
descending to a state of rabidity producing a performative fantasy of that very state. It is 
worth emphasizing that almost no one would have agreed with Lynde’s opinion that all 
instances of hydrophobia were reducible to a performative fear. Nevertheless, the article 
exemplifies well how the threat of spontaneous hydrophobia infused nineteenth-century 
conceptions of pathological fear with a highly particularized set of coordinates. In short, 
the primary analogy for a phobic imagination in the U.S. became a victim in the throes of 
an imaginative hydrophobia. Dr. Lynde demonstrates further how the lens of spontaneous 
hydrophobia offered a means of revisiting and re-interpreting old literary and 
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mythological traditions. Lynde uses the subspecies to adorn the werewolf of yore with a 
compelling psychological backstory.26  
Nevertheless, this matter of reading emotion for its textuality and form—as 
something filled out by plot, motif, and narrative expectation—needs further elaboration. 
What makes phobia especially compelling as a subject of the history of emotions is that, 
as a site of mystery, contestation, and (eventually) wordplay, phobia elicited new 
meditations on the material contingencies of emotive experience and expression. One of 
the most remarkable pieces of fiction to dramatize spontaneous hydrophobia for such 
purposes is a short story by John Neal titled “The Haunted Man,” published in the 
Atlantic Souvenir in 1832. In offering a reading of “The Haunted Man,” I want to argue 
that Neal not only echoes Rush’s interest in the power of phobia to imitate disease, but 
also experiments with something like a history-of-emotions methodology, to track the 
emergence of a phobic sensibility among contemporary readerships. “The Haunted Man” 
begins by depicting a church service in the southern part of England. During communion, 
an alarming episode transpires. The narrator hears behind him “a sort of smothered cry” 
accompanied by “a loud gasping for breath,” then turns just in time “to see one of the 
golden cups flung on the pavement” with “red wine running over the marble floor.” The 
stranger who has dashed the cup to the ground stands up “face to face, with the frightened 
preacher” before him, “the cup lying at his feet as if crushed and trampled on.” Chaos 
                                                
26 It is worth noting that the opposite theory—precisely that hydrophobia is responsible 
for various traditions in monster lore—has more recently been ventured. In The Werewolf 
Delusion (1979), Ian Woodward suggests possible connections between rabies and the 
origin of werewolf legends. Even more popular has been the theory, put forth by Spanish 
neurologist Juan Gómez-Alonso in 1998, that 18th century legends of vampires have their 
definitive origin in popular accounts of hydrophobia. Gómez-Alonso proposes that 
individuals who might have been mistaken for vampires were, in fact, “people or animals 
with unrecognized furious rabies” (858). 
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ensues: “the windows and doors suddenly darkened with a mass of human creatures 
trying to escape; and the communicants clinging to each other and recoiling in breathless 
terror.” When the commotion subsides, readers find the stranger lying prostrate on the 
floor, the church “deserted,” and the narrator in a stupor, clueless as to what has just 
happened. That Neal begins with this scene of communion is hardly coincidental: what 
follows is perhaps best described as a gothic-comic tale driven by an enigmatic affective 
transubstantiation.   
Fifteen months following the encounter, the narrator stumbles onto the stranger 
once again, this time while “loitering through the grounds at Versailles,” and they 
become friends. After enjoying “an intimacy of a whole month,” the narrator observes 
that his companion, who we learn goes by the alias “Mr. Smith,” becomes “suddenly 
pale—as pale as death” while passing a fountain. Anxious to recover a look of calm, 
Smith leads the narrator into a café and inquires whether the narrator has “ever observed 
anything strange in his behaviour.” When the narrator confesses that “every thing he did 
was strange,” his companion exclaims suddenly, “I am a haunted man!” and collapses 
into a fit of “uncontrollable laughter” (236). At last Smith collects himself and tells the 
narrator the history of his suffering. “About fourteen years ago,” he recalls, “I was bitten 
by a dog….A favourite animal of my mother’s, a water spaniel not bigger than a large 
cat” (238). Another fit of laughter here erupts, but Smith collects himself and proceeds: “I 
am a haunted man—haunted by strange human faces bowing to me, and firmly persuaded 
that one day or other I shall die of hydrophobia.” The narrator asks whether the dog who 
bit him was mad. Smith answers, “Ah, I had forgotten the best part of the whole 
story…ha ha ha—we never knew; she ate and drank well to the last: I was drinking at the 
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time she bit me—ha ha ha! But she sickened and died soon after, and we had reason to 
believe that a very decided case of hydrophobia occurred, among the hounds of a 
neighbor.” As the story concludes, the narrator races through a series of flashbacks, each 
an instance when Smith acted strangely in the presence of water. The episodes during 
communion and at Versailles, unfortunate settings for one stricken with a dread of 
liquids, begin to make sense. 
At this juncture, Neal arrives at the maddening crisis of the story: with Smith’s 
symptoms in such abundance, it seems his suspicions are well-grounded. “What could I 
say?” the narrator asks his reader (240). Then, as he inquires further into his friend’s 
condition, the narrator lands on a detail of particular import. When he suggests Smith 
read books on the topic, to improve his perception of his symptoms, Smith does not take 
kindly to the idea:   
‘The devil take your books,’ said he: ‘it was they and your infernal 
newspapers that first set me thinking of this frightful possibility. I read 
volumes and volumes in all the languages of Europe, and they left me 
more than half dead from their tenor. I met with cases well authenticated, 
beautifully authenticated, of symptoms appearing eighteen, twenty, and 
even thirty years after the bite, followed by death, sir, death. (240) 
With this rant, Smith seems at first to have the narrator stumped. The bite of a dog, 
potentially rabid, had successfully engendered, with the aid of the print media amassed to 
offer corresponding wisdom, a life consumed in uncertain anticipation. The riddle—does 
he have it, or doesn’t he?—seems unsolvable. Yet Smith’s dread of medical literature, 
circulated transatlantically and multilinguistically, introduces a new clue. Smith invokes 
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the “tenor” of this literature as an infectious agent on its own terms: an imperative to 
make and circulate medical knowledge, which has had the rather adverse effect of leaving 
him “half dead.” Whatever intelligence Smith has obtained from medical texts, it has 
imported into his physiology a peculiar excess—not just a wealth of information, but an 
interior formation—shaping and gradually intensifying a phenomenology of disease, in 
advance of its imagined confirmation. 
Ultimately, this clue and the narrator’s own familiarity with the medical literature 
on spontaneous hydrophobia combine to offer Smith a miraculous deliverance. “I 
trembled from head to foot,” the narrator recalls, “wondering, at the same time, why it 
had not struck me before; how could I be so stupid!” (242). The narrator explains to 
Smith that the symptoms with which he has become preoccupied “are not by any means 
confined to hydrophobia...the dread of water is not a conclusive symptom, any more than 
aerophobia, a dread of air, or pantiphobia, a dread of every thing” (244). He goes on: 
“Fear of itself, the mere apprehension of such a death, is now generally known to be 
capable of producing all the symptoms that you are afflicted with.” In short, Smith has 
developed nothing more than a case of spontaneous hydrophobia, analogous to any other 
irrational fear. The narrator begins listing examples: “John Hunter mentions a case, and 
Barbantini another.” Thrilled at hearing of these established cases, Smith decides this 
must indeed be the nature of his malady, and his anxieties are alleviated. The drama of 
the story thus rises and falls with the revelation of this triangulated relationship: two 
strangers who find a common comfort only after their dialogue has been mediated by a 
vast, already spectral medical print culture. This accumulation of medical knowledge 
turns out to be both the original offender, guilty for having first inflicted its special curse, 
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as well as Smith’s salvation. When, happily, the two depart—Smith allegedly freed of the 
disease for good—we are left not only with an intimate fraternity unburdened, but also 
faith in a glut of knowledge production, joyously restored. 
 Yet the phrase “Fear of itself,” by virtue of the ambiguity of that pronoun—the 
indeterminacy of its referent—also highlights the strange hybridity of the feeling under 
scrutiny. On the one hand, “itself” gestures back to the hydrophobia disclosed by Smith; 
however, “Fear of itself” also intimates a fear of fear itself, thus gesturing further to 
phobia’s smooth circularity and proclivity for inciting doppelgänger states. The lasting 
impression seems to be that a clandestine marriage, between an infectious genre of 
knowledge production and an anticipatory fear equipped for it, has effectively activated 
in Smith a new emotive register. While the narrator takes it for granted that fear “is now 
generally known” to be an emotion capable of mimicking lethal symptoms, the simplicity 
of the solution obscures a reciprocity intrinsic to Neal’s plot, by which it is precisely the 
“devil[ish]” books in which this “now” standardized knowledge appears that first 
communicated to Smith a recognizable phobic expression.27 In short, phobia’s imitative 
function cannot be extricated from the case studies that first set the terms for Smith’s 
dread to become manifest as such. To adapt Mel Chen’s approach to linguistics in 
Animacies (2012), such literature turns out to have animated phobia as a lexical nexus on 
two fronts: by organizing a phenomenology of disease progression into a recognizable 
                                                
27 It is not entirely clear why Neal decided to publish this story in The Atlantic Souvenir, 
an annual gift book. I speculate that, in part, it suits Neal’s sense of humor that there are 
nested “gifts” and “souvenirs” that come via reading in the story. Hydrophobia serves as 
Smith’s unwanted readerly souvenir (genuinely Atlantic, a la the circulating case studies 
invoked). At the same time, so is his cure gifted in print. As souvenir is also French for 
memory, the venue title dovetails nicely with Neal’s interest in the dangers of obsessive 
recollection as well. 
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affective category, and by outfitting that category with a lethal “tenor” and power over 
conceptions of the biological. While it may at first be tempting to see in “The Haunted 
Man” and the medical print culture it invokes a kind of triumph of psychological 
investigation, by which a transhistorical feeling became recognized and multiplied as a 
variable pathology necessitating analysis, this type of distant reading neglects the strange 
contingencies of phobia’s production as a legible state of mind.  
Indeed, as “The Haunted Man” concludes, these contingencies stick as if to 
reassert that the riddle they pose, far and above the benefits of fraternity, is the centripetal 
force of the story. The narrator concludes by noting that one year following their shared 
epiphany, he received a letter from Smith who wrote to confirm that he was now “the 
happiest fellow on the face of the earth, perfectly cured of everything in the world,” but 
for one thing: “the dread of water” itself, as “he had never been able, and was afraid he 
never should be able, to overcome his repugnance to that liquid” (246). The resilience of 
his dread sets Neal up for one last joke: stricken with a persistent hydrophobia, Smith 
confesses he has reliably made his substitute “the very best of old port wine, and plenty 
of it.” Yet the idea of a hydrophobic excess, a haunting that outlasts its disillusionment, 
also keeps Neal’s gothic enigma alive, foreclosing resolution. Smith’s dread, a 
disposition doubled and transmitted to him via print, cannot after all be so spontaneously 
reversed. Rather Smith discovers that his physiology has permanently absorbed the case 
studies he had earlier encountered. Reckoning with this perverse implantation, Smith 
acknowledges he has no choice but to keep performing, however reluctantly, phobia’s 
intractable mimicry.  
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“[M]Y FORM TORN BY CONVULSIONS”: 
COMPETING PLOTLINES IN GEORGE LIPPARD’S LEGENDS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 
 
The possibility of absorbing pathology by proxy became an important theme in 
gothic literature of the nineteenth century. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge 
that the rise of a phobic imagination belongs to a more capacious tradition in American 
fiction where dark interiorities, diverse in scope, create gothic moods and landscapes by 
indulging in the perspectival unreliability of compromised subjects. Emily Dickinson 
famously distills the appeal of the conceit when she writes: “One need not be a 
Chamber—to be Haunted—/One need not be a House—/The Brain has Corridors—
surpassing/Material Place—.” The enticing terror of Dickinson’s poem is that it unravels 
the fantasy one can encounter the gothic, while still enjoying the safe remove of one’s 
interpretive faculties. The brain appears as a dilapidated estate, where narrow “corridors,” 
paralleled in the syntactic lapses of Dickinson’s dashes, conceal villains from within. By 
the concluding stanza, these interior hauntings turn out to enjoy an alarming sovereignty 
over their host: “The Body—borrows a Revolver—/He bolts the Door—/O’erlooking a 
superior spectre—/Or More—.” Sensing imminent peril, Dickinson’s Body takes caution 
to arm itself and bar entrance to its house, yet, within these nested interiors of home and 
self, the Body has only made its vulnerability to a rogue unconscious all the more air-
tight. In the decades preceding Dickinson’s poem, interest in depicting gothic 
psychologies took myriad forms. In accounting for how early Americans began to 
recognize themselves as susceptible to phobia’s imitative tendencies, it thus remains to be 
shown how this newly cohering phobic imagination began to denote a more precise 
sensibility among early republic and antebellum readerships.  
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The idea that fear could generate disease independently of other etiologies was 
widespread in the early republic and antebellum period. This discourse intersected 
extensively with the literature on yellow fever, venereal disease, and other maladies. All 
such discussions of affective etiology dovetailed, moreover, with a major area of medical 
inquiry concerned with a disease known as hypochondriasis. Taking these intersecting 
discourses into account, the question thus surfaces: why should we consider the literature 
on spontaneous hydrophobia as somehow unique from these neighboring debates? One of 
the easiest answers, which also helps to explain why physicians considered it important to 
retain a nominal distinction between infectious and spontaneous types, is that in an era of 
medicine preceding the advents of epidemiology and microbiology, the bite of a mad dog 
represented perhaps the most self-evident condition of contagion known to physicians. 
The idea that rabies could happen spontaneously thus makes the literature on 
hydrophobia a remarkable site for testing early American conceptions of disease 
causation and the interplay of exterior stimuli with interior phenomena. Moreover, I want 
to suggest that thinking through spontaneous hydrophobia’s continuities with and 
departures from hypochondriasis may help us sharpen our understanding of phobia’s 
early connotative potential. Specifically, this section will argue that phobia came to 
function in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a kind of competitor term, at 
the level of medical nomenclature, for describing a condition on which hypochondria had 
long kept a conspicuous monopoly.  
One of the best pieces of evidence demonstrating this relationship is a spate of 
articles in the 1830s, which address a condition called “choleraphobia.” Physicians used 
this portmanteau to account for cases of a performative cholera, where dread alone 
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appeared to inspire an imitation of symptoms, which could themselves become fatal 
(Tellier). These articles echo comparable, contemporaneous writings on what Justine 
Murison has described compellingly as hypochondriacal “sympathy”—a dangerous 
feeling of kinship, by which one’s body is transformed into something otherwise exterior 
and foreign. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, phobia came to 
represent a comparable crisis, but with an important twist. If hypochondriasis may be said 
to have conveyed unchecked sympathies, phobia described, more precisely, an intimacy 
paradoxically underwritten by aversion, discord, and loathing. That is, phobia gestured to 
a particular enigma: the irony of an imitative cathexis premised on total revulsion. To 
adapt what Catherine Belling has described as an ontological “condition of doubt,” which 
makes hypochondria intrinsic and prerequisite to the production of medical knowledge, 
we might characterize antebellum phobia further as a precise offshoot of this skepticism: 
cleaving toward an all-consuming anticipatory dread, on one side, and an emulative 
fidelity to one’s worst hunches on the other. 
 Spontaneous hydrophobia attained value as a metaphor in the U.S. in these terms, 
not only through a widely circulating transatlantic medical print culture, but also in 
dialogue with democratic crises of the early republic and antebellum period—a 
phenomenon subsequent chapters will explore in depth. To understand these national 
valences, we need to get a still more nuanced picture of what phobia signified to early 
Americans in its allusive tethers to canine madness. The phobia defined in dialogue with 
rabies narratives described something beyond an imitative fear transmitted in print. 
Phobia took the more precise form of a temporality of dread: a state of anticipation, 
oriented toward a looming hydrophobic catastrophe, which people often tried to keep 
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concealed from friends and loved ones. As a temporality of concealed, irrational dread, 
phobia became familiar as a psychological state undermining social life surreptitiously: 
an affect driving one out of sync with exterior publics and toward a painful solipsism 
characterized by shame, secrecy, and terror. Understanding why phobia became such a 
powerful cultural and political reference point in the U.S. requires that we trace how this 
experience—of dreading hydrophobia, to the extent that this anticipatory dread became 
an incapacitating pathology in its own right—became a useful metaphor for re-
conceptualizing national anxieties, and their potential for cure. Some important context 
clues emerge in Neal’s story. Smith disrupts “communion,” literally and figuratively, 
because he has kept his internal crisis private out of embarrassment; thus, his symptoms, 
when they surface, strike neighbors as chaotic and illegible. Neal’s “The Haunted Man” 
thus offers a sense of how a particular social dynamic, between private pathology and 
public expression, prompted Neal to explore the possibility for intimate fraternity to bring 
psychological crises to the surface. This dynamic became a useful metaphor for exploring 
the hidden psychic dimensions of a national body politic as well. 
 Far beyond the hydrophobia metaphor, physicians on both sides of the Atlantic 
were beginning to take the psychological dimensions of national polities more seriously 
by the late eighteenth century. Much of this interest stemmed from a growing strain of 
medical optimism, consonant with what Foucault famously describes as the congealing 
power of a “clinical gaze.” In her groundbreaking study Console and Classify, Goldstein 
explores this congealing authority further to account for the rise of a French psychiatric 
profession. “By the closing decades of the eighteenth century,” Goldstein writes, “mere 
confinement of lunatics had come to seem insufficient. The state, in its new liaison with 
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science, began to entertain a more ambitious aim: cure of madness, the conversion of 
blighted insane subjects into sane healthy ones who could safely reenter ordinary society” 
(42). The “novel idea” at this moment, Goldstein clarifies, was not merely the “curability 
of insanity” but the “optimistic article of faith” that “with the diligent application of 
rational measures, the number of cures could be made to increase appreciably and 
perhaps indefinitely” (43). Moreover, governments held a duty to “promote such 
measures.”  
Both Foucault and Goldstein focus on how these shifts in medicine gathered 
momentum from the age of revolutions, emphasizing the French Revolution in particular. 
Foucault famously argues that, alongside attempts to democratize governmental 
authority, the duty of the physician was being translated to an imperative at the heart of 
the revolutionary project: “The first task of the doctor [was] political: the struggle against 
disease must begin with a war against bad government” (33). Along these lines, an 
increasing sovereignty of medical power became in large part legitimated by a perceived 
kinship between the fight against despotism and the promotion of national health. In 
exploring potential analogues in the early U.S. republic, Rush once again proves to be a 
useful coordinate. A 1788 essay titled “An Account of the Influence of the Military and 
Political Events of the American Revolution upon the Human Body” shows that Rush 
had likewise begun to conceptualize the health of the nation in terms of mental wellness. 
Most interesting in the essay is the way Rush endeavors to embrace a vast psychological 
diversity catalyzed in the time of war and in its wake. As one of the essay’s fundamental 
arguments, Rush asserts, “The scenes of war and government which [the revolution] 
introduced, were new to the greatest part of the inhabitants of the United States, and 
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operated with all the force of novelty upon the human mind.” Rather than corresponding 
to illness only, these “novel” forces run the gamut in terms of severity and type. Rush 
tells of one individual who died of “a violent emotion of political joy” upon hearing that 
Lord Cornwallis’s army had been captured. Elsewhere, Rush references a condition 
called “Protection Fever,” which, following the war, overwhelmed loyalists, who found 
themselves friendless in a new political order—many to the point of death. Later, Rush 
goes on to suggest that revolutionaries themselves have since exemplified a species of 
“insanity” he calls “Anarchia.” “The termination of the war by the peace in 1783, did not 
terminate the American revolution,” Rush writes. “The minds of the citizens of the 
United States were wholly unprepared for their new situation. The excess of the passion 
for liberty, inflamed by the successful issue of the war, produced, in many people, 
opinions and conduct which could not be removed by reason, nor restrained by 
government.” In exploring all of these conditions together, Rush concludes that the war 
had the unforeseen effect of producing an early republic replete with new and competing 
psychologies, which citizens had yet to reckon with. As demonstrated elsewhere in his 
well-known work on diseases of the mind, Rush believed the health of the young republic 
depended on recognizing and treating these emergent psychological states. 
 One of the most interesting elements of Rush’s essay is that, like Neal’s “The 
Haunted Man,” it shows us a kind of history-of-emotions methodology in the making. 
Rush and Neal both frame emotion as a dynamic entity, susceptible to mutation over 
time. Rather explicitly, Rush even cites as inspiration for his piece the idea that the 
“novelty” of historical forces on the human mind has effectively created unfamiliar forms 
emotion might take. The suggestion, moreover, is that these experimental forms, 
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obscured by virtue of their clandestine illegibility, have the potential to wreck the 
viability of a body politic when left unacknowledged. In exploring George Lippard’s 
pursuit of related themes in his 1847 memorialization of the war Legends of the American 
Revolution, 1776; Or, Washington and His Generals, I want to argue that it was within 
the broad context of such anxieties, over the relation between individual and national 
health, that the hydrophobia metaphor began trending across a range of writings. In its 
representation of a pathological temporality concealed from public recognition, yet 
equally inclined toward imitation, the phobic imagination that began to materialize in this 
moment compelled a number of writers to explore novel intersections between the 
psychological energies underlying fictional genres and their potential for deviant 
mutations in an American context. 
The use of competing psychological plotlines to meditate on national themes finds 
an especially compelling formulation in Lippard’s “The Ninth Hour,” found toward the 
end of Legends of the American Revolution. Before delving into “The Ninth Hour,” it will 
be useful to get a brief sense of what Lippard intended with the Legends as a whole. 
Lippard tends to be remembered, much like Neal, for being a contemporary of Edgar 
Allan Poe who likewise found success writing gothic fiction—the epitome of Lippard’s 
craft being his best-selling, sensationalist novel The Quaker City; Or, The Monks of 
Monk Hall (1845). However, Lippard became known for his dedication to the 
development of a genre he called “American Historical Romance” too, an interest 
reflected best in his published legends of the Revolutionary War. Before publishing the 
legends, which appeared first in serial form in Philadelphia’s Saturday Courier, Lippard 
wrote a letter to James Fenimore Cooper in 1844, in which he described an idea for a 
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semi-monthly magazine revolving around American historical fiction. Lippard begins the 
letter by confessing that he has already dedicated a story to Cooper titled “Herbert Tracy, 
a Romance of the Battle-of-Germantown,” despite the fact that they have not yet become 
acquainted. With characteristic effusiveness, Lippard admits the dedication betrays a 
certain presumptuousness on his part, but he insists that if Cooper knew “how many 
weary hours of pain, and wrong and orphanage” were alleviated “by the perusal of ‘The 
Pioneers,’ ‘The Last of the Mohicans,’ ‘The Prairie,’ ‘The Spy,’ or ‘The Red River,’” not 
to mention “how a yearning desire grew up within me to testify my enthusiastic 
veneration for your genius,” an “excuse” might be discerned, “for linking your name to 
my crude effort” (1). Only in a haphazard postscript does Lippard at last arrive at his 
motive for writing. He mentions, feigning sudden inspiration, his idea for a semi-monthly 
devoted to “American Historical Romance.” With characteristic ambition, Lippard goes 
on to explain, “In every two numbers an Original Novel, Romance, or Story, illustrative 
of some noted Revolutionary Battlefield will be published entire. Occasionally, a History 
of a Revolutionary Battle-field, embracing all the Fact, Tradition, and Legend connected 
with the occurrence, will be published, in place of the Novel, with a Map, etc.” (2-3). To 
get the project underway, he asks Cooper for a publishable letter of confidence, “stating 
briefly” his “favorable views” on the endeavor. The letter concludes with Lippard 
clarifying, “The title of the magazine will be (in accordance with the advice of my 
friends) Lippard’s Magazine of American Historical Romance”—a title he underlines 
three times for emphasis.  
No evidence indicates Cooper responded to Lippard’s request. Nor did Lippard’s 
Magazine of American Historical Romance ever get off the ground. Regardless, the letter 
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is interesting for the insight it provides into Lippard’s sense of his position in a national 
literary canon, at a point when he was beginning to develop a genre that would have its 
apex in Legends of the American Revolution. To return to the questions posed above, 
what is perhaps most interesting regarding how Lippard’s aspirations materialize in the 
collection itself is the way his narration toggles between gothic and romantic plots in 
order to balance recurring scenes of terror and suspense with moments of intimate 
resolution. Nowhere is this toggling better represented than in the story of his most 
sympathetic (and potentially rabid) character, General George Murray. In one trying 
moment, Murray is captured while on a mission across enemy lines and strapped to a keg 
of gunpowder. Upon being captured, Murray first attempts to feign loyalty to the king. To 
test his allegiance, the British soldiers demand he pass a trial:  
Do you see that keg o’ powder thar? We’ll attach a slow match to it—a 
match that’ll take three minutes to burn out! You will sit on that keg!—
Afore the three minutes is out we’ll return to the house, and see how you 
stand the trial! If there’s a drop of sweat on your forehead, or any sign of 
paleness on your cheek, we will conclude that you are a rebel and deserve 
to die! (498) 
For three excruciating minutes, the trial proceeds in this fashion. The narrator steadily 
watches Murray’s face, interspersing descriptions of his nonchalant demeanor with 
updates on the passage of time. “Not a motion—not a movement of the hand which holds 
his watch—not a tremor of the face!” the narrator explains (499). Shortly after, the prose 
continues, in the present tense: “Two minutes have expired.” Then, “The half-minute is 
gone.” Finally, “the match emits a sudden flame, sparkles, and cracks out,” at which 
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point, Murray cries to himself, “Nine years, nine days! At last, thank God, it is over!” 
The exclamation is given no context in the moment. Immediately after the line is 
delivered, the narrator reports calmly: “These were his last words, before the powder 
exploded. He folded his arms, closed his eyes, and gave his soul to God” (499).  
  This explosive ending turns out to be a hoax on the part of the narrator, who 
afterward explains the events that actually followed. The keg, it turns out, was not full of 
powder and did not therefore explode. In a series of fortunate turns, Murray eventually 
escapes the British as well. At last, in a rather abrupt segue into sentimentalism, the night 
Murray escapes turns out also to be the night of his wedding to his fiancé Isabel. At last 
readers discover that Murray’s precarious life in battle has coincided, unbeknownst to 
comrades, with a separate suspense of a psychological variety, independent of the war. 
The reveal commences during the wedding celebrations. Just as he is beginning to take a 
ceremonial sip from an ornate goblet of wine, something goes wrong. “He seized it,” the 
narrator explains, “as with the grasp of despair, or as a soldier precipitated from a fortress 
might clutch the naked blade of a sword, to stay his fall—his blue eyes dilating all the 
while he raised it to his lips.” Suddenly, the goblet falls. The narrator explains, “No 
words can picture the surprise, the horror, the awe of the wedding guests.” When Murray 
stands and exits the room with Isabel we are told that for all wedding guests what ensued 
was “an half hour of terrible suspense” (506). Only once the bride and groom have found 
privacy does Murray explain: “The thing which I feared has come upon me!”  
Murray proceeds to tell Isabel that as a child he had been bitten by a rabid dog 
named Wolfe. A local healer known for her ability to cure such injuries was summoned; 
however, she came only to deliver bad news, whispering in Murray’s ear that he “would 
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go mad on the ninth hour of the ninth day of the ninth year!” At the time of the wedding 
toast, Murray realized the day was at hand, with the ninth hour rapidly approaching. 
Murray goes on to characterize for Isabel the passage of time, from the day he was bitten 
to the present: 
Need I tell you how this popular superstition fastened on my mind until it 
became a prophecy? Perchance the poison, communicated by the fang of 
the dog, was already working in my veins, perchance—but why multiply 
words? This awful fear gradually poisoned my whole existence; it drove 
me from by books into the army. I began to thirst for death. I sought him 
in every battle; O, how terrible ‘to long for death that cometh not!’ For I 
was haunted by a fear—not merely the fear of going mad, but the fear of 
the ‘ninth day of the ninth year’—the fear of dying a death at once horrible 
and grotesque—dying like a venomous beast, my form torn by 
convulsions, my reason crushed, my last breath howling forth a yell of 
horrible laughter— (507) 
For the first time in the Legends, Murray discloses this lifetime spent in accumulating 
dread. Here, however, Isabel and the sentimental marriage plot she represents intervene. 
“[S]he had heard,” the narrator explains, “of great minds being haunted all their lives by a 
horrible fear. Some, the fear of being buried alive—some, the fear of going mad—some, 
the fear of dying of loathsome disease.” When the clock strikes nine, Isabel lunges for a 
glass of water, sitting on a mosaic table beside her, and drives it toward Murray’s face. 
“Drink, George,” she exclaims, “and fear not! If you love me drink!” The climax causes a 
“nervous shudder” to run through him, but then, just as it appears Murray will succumb, 
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the narrator exclaims, “He drinks!” Murray and Isabel safely embrace. The narrator 
describes the scene that follows: “So, spreading forth his arms—as the horror of years 
rushed upon his soul—he fell weeping on her bosom” (508). Here transpires the affective 
correlate to Murray’s liberation from the powder-keg episode: In a moment of 
psychological resolve, prompted by Isabel’s domestic injunction, Murray welcomes a 
promise of melodramatic, lachrymose relief. At this juncture, none other than General 
George Washington storms through the doors to witness the scene of the bridegroom 
weeping in his beloved’s arms, a moment Washington beholds with astonishment. 
Located in a section of the volume titled “Romance of the Revolution,” the legend seems 
the quintessential example of this overarching conceit. The resolution to Murray’s 
lifetime of private dread arrives neither with his delivery from British captivity, nor with 
his wedding, but rather with a psychological transformation from dread to tearful 
embrace under the approving gaze of his future president. 
 Most curious about this negotiation of plots is the way Lippard couches Murray’s 
psychological drama within the text’s overarching national romance. What makes 
Murray’s story compelling, in other words, has to do with a complexity of form, by 
which Lippard situates an unfolding gothic genre of feeling—a phobic anticipation of 
disease confirmation—within the romance of national unity, effected through a theatrical 
fusion of war and marriage. Conversely, the underlying threat of “The Ninth Hour” 
becomes the possibility that these competing genres might fail to be synthesized. 
Murray’s fear that he will find his “form torn by convulsions,” expressed in his 
monologue to Isabel, becomes a metaphor equally for the precariousness of Lippard’s 
literary form and the national trajectory it represents: the possibility that these dissonant 
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temporalities might splinter the nation irreparably into competing fragments. Indeed, if 
we turn to the original publication of Murray’s story in the Saturday Courier, we find 
that, in its earliest appearance, Lippard took care to depict these competing plots by 
publishing “The Ninth Hour” in two installments, along the edge of an unexpected fault 
line. When first published, Murray’s powder keg episode and the disclosure of his 
lifetime of hydrophobic dread transpired across two separate issues. As Lippard had done 
elsewhere, he used the division to orchestrate a cliffhanger, which would entice readers to 
return. Yet the intuitive cliffhanger, Murray sitting solemnly on the keg of gunpowder, 
does not actually transpire until the second half. Rather, Lippard chose for his unlikely 
cliffhanger Murray’s vague, unsettling reference to the “ninth hour, of the ninth day, of 
the ninth year”—the meaning of which is revealed only in the latter installment. At this 
break, Lippard leaves readers with the open threat that a partly concealed plotline of 
phobic dread will overwhelm the designs of his national romance. While the two plots 
become reconciled under Washington’s approval by the story’s end, there remains in the 
act of reading the alternate trajectory the second installment might have taken—one 
narrative tracking the successive dramas of warfare, subordinated to a solipsistic demise 
characterized by a debilitating, imitative dread.28  
 
 
 
                                                
28 Playing with serial fault lines is a familiar theme in Lippard. In an essay titled “Lippard 
in Part(s),” Christopher Looby has suggested that Lippard’s publication of The Quaker 
City in ten successive parts should not be taken as a matter of course editorial choice (1). 
Rather, the “dismembered form” in which it originally captivated its readership, Looby 
argues, serves both as “a material analog for other kinds of dismemberment within the 
novel and also an embodiment of the antinomy of publicity and secrecy” (2). A 
comparable reading might be applied to an effect Lippard achieved in publishing his 
Legends serially, as a string of successive tales. 
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{CODA I} 
 
 
IMP OF THE AVERSE: 
REENCOUNTERING THE IDÉE FIXE OF EDGAR ALLAN POE’S “BERENICE” 
 
 Neal and Lippard’s interest in phobia as a variable source of disease imitation 
indicates they may have been familiar with Rush’s writings on hydrophobia. In Neal, this 
becomes valuable as a way to figure the ironic threat of medical print culture as its 
capacity to produce emotive pathologies in naïve readerships. For Lippard, it offered a 
way to explore ways of reconciling individual pathology to a national temporality. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be shown how these reciprocal developments in medicine and 
literature gesture beyond understandings of hydrophobia, in particular, to phobia’s 
burgeoning lexical independence as an available suffix. Here, Rush again played a role. 
Rush’s turn to an etiology based in fear in Medical Inquiries and Observations 
recapitulated an earlier writing inspired by hydrophobia in an amusing piece titled “On 
the Different Species of Phobia,” published in The Columbian a decade earlier. Widely 
considered the earliest extensive taxonomy of phobias in Anglophone print culture, 
Rush’s “On the Different Species of Phobia” begins by explaining that while reading “a 
work by the celebrated Dr. Cullen, in which he has arranged diseases under distinct 
classes—orders—genera and species,” his “eye was caught with the word 
HYDROPHOBIA which our ingenious author subdivides into two different species,” the 
forms rabiosa (vulgaris) and simplex (spontanea). The article goes on, “Without 
detracting from the merit of Dr. Cullen, I cannot help thinking, that the genus of the 
disease which he has named Hydrophobia, should rather have been PHOBIA, and that the 
number and names of the species should have been taken from the names of the objects 
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of fear or aversion” (110). Rush names, among others Dirt Phobia, Church Phobia, Rat 
Phobia, Rum Phobia, Thunder Phobia, and Death Phobia.  
Rush’s essay would be reprinted multiple times, in the U.S. and England alike. By 
the end of the eighteenth century, new phobias were cropping up. We find Thomas 
Jefferson, for instance, lamenting American “Anglophobia” in a 1793 letter to James 
Madison. As I discuss in the next chapter, by the 1830s abolitionists would go on to 
develop the most robust repurposing of the suffix in the antebellum period, cultivating a 
transatlantic rhetorical trend of citing “colorphobia” and “Negrophobia” as pathologies 
integral to slavery’s endurance. In all of these cases, new phobias depended heavily on an 
analogy to hydrophobia in the social disposition they conjured. However, an important 
development commenced in phobia’s signification shortly after the appearance of Rush’s 
essay. While phobia continued to be considered a serious state of disease in the context of 
hydrophobia, its adaptability as a suffix began to occupy a vague middle ground between 
medicine and social satire. This coda attempts to flesh out a fuller picture of phobia’s 
queer philological attachments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by 
touching on phobia’s uncertain signification in these terms.  
The best example of phobia’s early straddling of satirical and medical valences in 
the late eighteenth century occurred among British writers, shortly after Rush’s essays on 
phobia and mania had been reprinted in London. Beginning in the 1790s, an array of 
British writers began speculating that one could develop an intimate phobia of one’s 
immediate domestic surroundings. Early experimentation with this idea appeared in an 
article titled “On the Domiphobia, or Dread of Home,” published by a physician in The 
Weekly Entertainer in 1796. As though presenting a riddle, the piece begins: “For the 
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amusement of your readers, I am induced to offer you a few remarks on a disorder that is 
very prevalent in the months of June and July, is at the height in August, begins to 
decline in September, and about the end of October generally disappears, though much 
will depend upon the weather” (221). Offering an additional clue, the author observes 
that the disorder, despite its ubiquity, has thus far “escaped the attention of Sauvages, 
Vogel, Cullen, and all our late nosologists.” After much appetite whetting, the condition 
is at last revealed. Readers discover it to be “the domiphobia, or dread of home”—a 
disease of the summer months, when families find themselves afflicted with a fervor for 
vacationing to spa towns and to the coasts. “The mother, a remarkably healthy-looking, 
and indeed very handsome woman, complains of a wasting of the flesh, want of appetite, 
listlessness, and dejection,” while the daughters “though possessed of the finest bloom of 
complexion, are inclined to consumption, have also lost their appetites, and are, to use 
their mother’s expression, in a very alarming situation” (221-2). The sons, in turn, 
complain of “shortness of breath”—an inconvenience belonging to the smoke saturating 
London. Somewhat predictably, the only agreeable cure is a “jaunt to a watering place” 
(222). The author suggests that domiphobia, in this respect, is equally a “hydro-mania.” 
This hybrid attraction to water and revulsion for home tends to attack in the context of 
groups. In such cases, those already afflicted with the disorder find within them “a desire 
of communicating the disease.” Thus inspired, they spew the “miasmata, or contagious 
particles, which will affect all present.” With tongue-in-cheek disappointment, the 
physician concludes, confessing, “in the curative part, I have failed” at discerning or 
dispensing “much information” (224). 
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The satirical literature on domiphobia would enjoy a curiously robust longevity. 
In 1815, a British writer by the name of Thomas Skinner Surr went so far as to publish a 
novel titled The Magic of Wealth organized around domiphobia as a central theme. As 
Arthur M. Axelrad has noted, the great antagonist of Surr’s novel is a banker named 
Flimflam who embarks on erecting a “watering-place,” or summer vacationing 
destination, “known as Flimflamton” (Axelrad 429). The third chapter of Surr’s novel 
places the fashion exemplified by Flimflamton in terms of a ruthless, ravaging 
domophobia (spelled this time with an “o”): “It was now ‘the season for watering-
places,’ or in other words, it was the period of the year, when that tormenting disease, 
peculiar to the climate of England, ‘the Domophobia,’ rages with all its violence” (Surr 
53). The “first symptoms,” Surr explains, differ “according to the life and habits of the 
persons affected,” since “no rank is free from the contagion” (54). But he emphasizes that 
the predominant sign of the disease is that the concept of “Home” is radically 
reconceived: 
‘Home’ appears, not only to have lost its attraction, but to have undergone 
a change that renders it quite horrible; the poor sufferers enduring nearly 
similar torments at the sight of ‘Home,’ which the appearance of water 
produces upon the subjects of hydrophobia. (56) 
The great mystery of the disease thus lies in how such a reversal first transpires. “It is 
still, however, very doubtful,” Surr continues, “…whether domophobia be the origin of 
watering places, or whether these said watering places at first created, or now encourage, 
the continuance of the malady” (56). The underlying enigma, in other words, is one of 
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willpower: does the mind simply adapt (or fail to adapt) to an available topography, or 
does the mind, by contrast, effectively make its world?  
Clearly enough, “On the Domiphobia” and The Magic of Wealth thrive on a strain 
of satire run amok. At the same time, we discover by way of neighboring appropriations 
of the diagnosis that its rhetorical purchase depended heavily on a close proximity to 
other established diseases of the mind. The counterintuitive conceit of making home 
“quite horrible,” for one, linked the literature around domiphobia to another established 
malady of the period: the disease known as nostalgia, referred to in popular parlance as 
“homesickness,” which had appeared across multiple major works of eighteenth-century 
nosology to account for the deleterious effects a distance from home could have on one’s 
health.29 Domiphobia imagined an alternate state of existence along these lines, where a 
combination of boredom and wealth created a restlessness for escape. With interest in this 
inversion, Robert Southey’s Letters from England, published under the pseudonym and 
guise of Spanish traveler Don Manuel Alvarez Espriella in 1808, takes up this connection 
between a dread of home and the disease of homesickness at length. Apparently 
unimpressed with domiphobia as a neologism, Southey coined his own word: a concept 
he called “oikophobia,” inspired by the Greek root oikos meaning home or household. In 
a section under the book’s thirtieth letter titled “Watering Places,” Southey begins by 
                                                
29 Coined by the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer in his Dissertation Medica de 
Nostalgia, published in 1688, nostalgia had been formed as a compound of the Greek 
words νόστος (nóstos), meaning homecoming, and ἄλγος (álgos), meaning pain or 
suffering. As Nicholas Dames notes in his study of the disease, nostalgia’s “usual haunt” 
in the eighteenth century had been the military. More precisely, Dames explains that “the 
‘ecological niche’” of nostalgia “seems to have been army camps and naval vessels, 
where mobility of an enforced and newly vast sort was common” (30). Such spaces 
consisted in socialities premised on sustained uprootedness, where the longing to return 
home became so great it could turn deadly. 
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asserting, “The English migrate as regularly as rooks” (346). He continues by noting how 
boldly the trend defies the logic internal to nostalgia: “Home-sickness is a disease which 
has no existence in a certain state of civilization or of luxury, and instead of it these 
islanders are subject to periodical fits of what I shall beg leave to call oikophobia, a 
disorder with which physicians are perfectly well acquainted, though it may not yet have 
been catalogued in the nomenclature of nosology” (346). Linking the craze for spa towns 
to coastal vacationing, the passage goes on: 
In old times, that is to say, two generations ago, mineral springs were the 
only places of resort. Now the Nereids have as many votaries as the 
Naiads, and the tribes of wealth and fashion swarm down to the sea coast 
as punctually as the land crabs in the West Indies march the same way. 
These people, who have unquestionably the best houses of any people in 
Europe, and more conveniences about them to render home comfortable, 
crowd themselves into the narrow apartments and dark streets of a little 
country town, just at that time of the year when instinct seems to make us, 
like the lark, desirous of as much sky-room as possible. (346-7) 
With an interest in the migration not merely of families but of larger groups, Southey 
depicts oikophobia as a pathology formed from shared animal instincts. As the chapter 
continues, the comedy surrounding the fad begins to wane slightly, giving way to genuine 
analysis. “In their haunts,” Southey’s Spanish narrator explains dubiously, “visitors are 
capricious,” quick to desert one coast for another. The only continuity proves to be “not 
the desirableness of the accommodations, not the convenience of the shore for their 
ostensible purpose, bathing,” but rather “the sake of seeing company” (347-8). He 
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concludes, “Wherever one of the queen bees of fashion alights, a whole swarm follows 
her” (8). Thus, while nostalgia disappears under certain conditions of luxury, such luxury 
should be understood to enjoy no intellectualism; rather, it is the extravagance of insects, 
or crustaceans, seeking patterns of social movement devoid of conscious reflection.  
Domiphobia’s reliance upon nostalgia as a kind of perfect opposite is interesting 
for its enactment of a makeshift bridge between medical taxonomy and social 
commentary, with one disease being satirical and the other a widely known threat. Yet 
domiphobia’s proximity to disease becomes even more curious by way of another 
relation—the analogy to hypochondriasis referenced previously. This relationship 
between phobia and hypochondriasis becomes clearest in two writings, published eleven 
years apart, in 1810 and 1821 respectively. In 1810, a doctor and member of the Royal 
College of Physicians of London named John Reid picked up the term for a piece in the 
Monthly Magazine. Like previous writings that had taken up the diagnosis as more or less 
facetious, Reid begins in a seemingly satirical mode. “The periodical propensity to 
migration,” he begins, “is beginning to shew itself amongst the more opulent inhabitants 
of London” (588). Playing with a similar conceit—that the disease represents the 
antithesis of the fear associated with rabies—he goes on, “This domiphobia may be 
opposed to the hydrophobia, inasmuch as a patient affected with the former complaint, so 
far from betraying any dread of water, is for the most part propelled by an almost 
irresistible impulse, to places of resort where that element is to be found in the greatest 
abundance.” Reid pictures the essential cause of the disease as an exchange of forces. 
London, “a nucleus for an accumulated population,” emanates a “force” that “drive[s] to 
a distance from it a large proportion of those inhabitants who are not fastened to the spot 
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upon which they live by the rivet of necessity.” While not as eloquent or clever as 
previous forays in the domiphobia corpus, Reid nevertheless appears, at first glance, to 
maintain a satirical tone. 
In following, however, we discover the physician’s worries may actually be more 
sincere than they first appear. Rather than slipping into a cheap exchange of puns, Reid 
turns abruptly to emphasize the importance of the human mind, as a stage for the 
interplay of London’s centripetal and centrifugal social pressures. We have neither 
“noxious” air nor the influence of “circumambient atoms” to blame, nor heightened 
“temperature[s],” he proceeds. On the contrary, we must attribute the foundation of 
domiphobic migrations to some “internal power of resistance in the mind, which, when 
roused into action, is in most instances sufficient to counteract the hostile agency of 
extraneous causes.” To understand the human and all of its motivations, the true 
physician must therefore take into account “the beating of the passions,” which he argues 
are ready objects for the “science of medicine.” Here the piece arrives at its central 
proverb: “He who in the study or the treatment of the human machinery, overlooks the 
intellectual part of it, cannot but entertain very incorrect notions of and fall into gross and 
sometimes fatal blunders in the means which he adopts for its regulation or repair.” When 
looking at a restless, enervated subject, one must be on alert for the “worm of mental 
malady,” so often discovered to be “gnawing inwardly and undetected at the root of the 
constitution.” Hovering between witty social critique and genuine anxiety over the social 
frenzy for the fad of waterside holidays, Reid’s article becomes striking in its tonal 
inconsistencies. The reason, it would seem, lies precisely in the competing connotations 
phobia had begun to navigate during this period on both sides of the Atlantic. This 
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tension becomes even clearer when we discover that later in his career, Reid would 
decide that what he had called domiphobia in the earlier essay was better conceptualized 
within the broader psychological category of the more capacious concept, 
hypochondriasis. By 1821, Reid would go on to adapt his piece on domiphobia for 
inclusion in a larger volume published in London titled, Essays on Hypochondriasis and 
Other Nervous Affections. Rather than work domiphobia into the larger category, the 
book drops the term domiphobia entirely, even while retaining the majority of the 
original text. Finding the alternate diagnosis to be the more compelling category, Reid 
funnels his earlier arguments toward an elaboration of the experience of hypochondriasis 
instead.  
Reid’s decision to make this edit provides insight into phobia’s shifting value as 
an analytic in the late 1700s and early 1800s. In tracking the early literature on phobia, 
we find that as the term began to compete with hypochondria to describe comparable 
phenomena, it went on to take a deviant trajectory in the antebellum period. Ultimately, 
the cholera-phobia example cited earlier stands out as fairly unique, in that it shows a 
case in which a new phobia made it successfully into the pages of medical literature. For 
the most part, beyond a handful of exceptions (others include “lepraphobia” and 
“syphilophobia”), the suffix would fail to achieve great prominence in medical 
taxonomies beyond its affiliation with hydrophobia, until the late 1860s and 1870s. 
Instead, phobia would find its greatest cultural traction by moving laterally from its 
origins in disease classification into the terrain of social satire. In this lateral move, 
phobia would continue to imitate the authority of medical nomenclature, drawing heavily 
on an analogy to hydrophobia well into the nineteenth century, yet its rhetorical purchase 
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became, in a sense, democratized. As a category of analysis, phobia became familiar as a 
social diagnosis any writer might adapt on behalf of a corresponding political appeal or 
movement. In these contexts, phobia’s imitative valences became more abstract. To be 
phobic of another person or social demographic was not to become that object of fear per 
se, yet it continued to signify a phenomenon of losing oneself, of surrendering one’s 
identity, to a rabid obsession with the community feared. Whether defined in terms of 
race, religion, or nation, social phobias repurposed the mimicry associated with 
spontaneous rabies by invoking this loss of self-mastery as an effect of a performative 
ideology, transmitted not by any literal breaking of the skin, but rather by a discursive 
contagion disseminated in and as language. 
In concluding this section, I want to suggest that this lateral move may help us 
understand how one other major contributors to antebellum letters, whom we might be 
inclined to remember for his philia of phobias, navigated the concept’s fluctuating 
connotations in his own writing. In tracking the rise of a phobic imagination in U.S. 
literature, one might be predisposed to look to the fiction of Edgar Allan Poe. Poe 
famously cathected to scenes of phobic debilitation repeatedly in his writing, the most 
persistent being the dread of premature burial, integral not just to the story actually titled 
“The Premature Burial,” but also to “The Cask of Amontillado,” “The Fall of the House 
of Usher,” “The Black Cat,” “The Tell-Tale Heart,” and “Berenice.” This fear has since 
been given the appellation “taphophobia,” taken from the Greek root “taphos” (τάφος), 
meaning “tomb.” What we might consider interesting about Poe’s exploration of these 
fears, however, is precisely that he resisted the use of the –phobia suffix, even as that 
term began to enter its first period of Anglophone proliferation, contemporaneous with 
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his career. One question this omission presents is this: why should the obvious candidate 
for the architect of a phobic imagination in American fiction have avoided –phobia’s 
availability for wordplay, at the same moment the term’s popularity was beginning to 
gain traction in other realms?  
Our best available answer is the widening gap between phobia’s associations with 
medicine, in the context of rabies, and its cultural capital as a weapon of satire. By the 
1830s, phobia’s affiliations with satire had begun to accumulate connotations of camp 
absurdity, making it suitable for comedy, pun-making, and social parody, but also 
increasingly ill-suited to evocations of horror. Perhaps the strongest example of this 
tendency toward a camp sensibility is a somewhat entertaining piece of slapstick short 
fiction by Joseph Holt Ingraham titled, “Spheeksphobia: Or, The Adventures of Abel 
Stingflyer, A.M.: A Tragic Tale,” published in the Southern Literary Messenger in 1837, 
just months after Poe concluded his editorial post at the same journal. Translating as a 
“dread of wasps,” “Spheekhsphobia” takes a form uncannily similar to Neal’s “The 
Haunted Man” (to such an extent it seems likely Ingraham’s story took inspiration from 
the earlier tale), with the distinction that the story is so deliberately ridiculous that it 
permits nothing like the empathy Neal orchestrates between narrator, Smith, and reader to 
drive his plot forward. At the same time, we find phobia’s imitative connotations in 
abundance. As the story begins, Abel Stingflyer, the unfortunate victim of the 
spheeksphobia under scrutiny, appears careening toward the narrator and his horse, as 
though in the manner of an insect. “His advance was not direct, but zig-zag,” the narrator 
explains, “now he would dart with velocity to the right, and now as swiftly to the left, 
anon plunging under the bushes lining the road-side, and then diving down, and 
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scrambling…as if charging at me, filling the air with his cries all the while” (585). Only 
subsequently, by way of a letter from Stingflyer, does the narrator learn the stranger had 
been desperately attempting to escape a wasp. Stingflyer explains: 
I am an unfortunate victim of Entomology: not of the science, but of every 
species of insect of which the science treateth; more especially the bee, 
wasp, and hornet, and all and singular of the iratible genus, besides the 
horn-bug, gad-fly, dragon-fly, and each and every of those loud-humming 
insects that buzz about at night—yea, verily the whole tribe of Europa, or 
insects, are my aversion, from which I stand in bodily terror. (585) 
In short, the story is about horror, aversion, and dread, but only in the most intellectual 
and comically distant sense of those terms. The evident goal of Ingraham’s style is to 
situate his readers’ affect in a preclusion of empathy—in other words, to appreciate a 
spectacle of a phobic cathexis so solipsistically contained, one can only take pleasure in 
being utterly outside it. By the end of the story, the narrator discovers Stingflyer living 
more or less peacefully, partnering with another man to buy and sell goods in Natchez, 
Mississippi, under the firm agreement that their store will never trade in sugar, molasses, 
or the like.  
In reading “Spheeksphobia,” which Poe would have no doubt encountered due to 
his continued affiliation with the Southern Literary Messenger, it is not difficult to see 
why Poe would have wished to steer clear of phobia’s shifting aesthetic sensibility. As 
the next two chapters will show, these new associations would eventually shape phobia’s 
availability for adaptation in generative ways. Nevertheless, for Poe, phobia appears to 
have fallen largely outside the mood he wanted to create for readers. In meditating briefly 
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on this incompatibility, it seems apparent that one element of phobia’s signification, more 
than all others, struck Poe as antithetical to his vision for delineating gothic affect. 
Specifically, this element had to do with phobia’s status as cathexis, which is to say, its 
particular manifestation as a pathological investment in a singular object. On the surface, 
as observed above, this seems to be one of the most permanent themes of Poe’s corpus. 
States of private obsession, unravelling one’s psyche to the point of insanity, collapse, 
murder, and self-sabotage, drive Poe’s work. Yet the monotone particularities of phobia’s 
signification—meaning the particularity of the affect it designates, but also, 
counterintuitively enough, the ascendance of a singular object, by way of a yet untested 
portmanteau, to the status of nomenclature—would have actually failed to meet Poe’s 
conditions for a genuine experience of horror. 
 Perhaps no story better delineates these specific parameters shaping Poe’s interest 
in pathological attentiveness than the story “Berenice,” wherein the operative object 
cathexis on the part of the narrator, Aegeus, resides in his fiancée Berenice’s teeth. As her 
body deteriorates from an evidently incurable disease, Berenice’s teeth remain white and 
uncompromised, as though operating with a life force unto themselves. The story follows 
the narrator’s obsession with Berenice’s teeth until the end of the story, when readers 
learn by means beyond the narrator’s control that he has buried his fiancée in her tomb 
prematurely, yet not before also removing each of her teeth and collecting them in a box, 
which spills onto the floor in a spectacular reveal as the story terminates. For the 
purposes of the present analysis, what stands out as most remarkable in the narrator’s 
unfolding insanity is that while the nature of his pathological obsession resides, self-
evidently enough, in the narrator’s over-investment in Berenice’s teeth, Poe takes care to 
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complicate this exchange of libidinal and murderous investments. The narrator explains 
his condition as “monomania,” a diagnosis that had successfully made it into nosological 
taxonomies on both sides of the Atlantic. “This monomania, if I must so term it,” the 
narrator writes, “consisted in a morbid irritability of those properties of the mind in 
metaphysical science termed the attentive”—“a nervous intensity of interest with which, 
in my case, the powers of meditation (not to speak technically) busied and buried 
themselves, in the contemplation of even the most ordinary objects of the universe.” 
Yet, as the narrator’s revelation proceeds, we discover that this monomania is not 
restricted solely to Berenice’s teeth. Rather, part of the terror Poe unfolds has to do with 
an ironic unselectiveness, wherein the history of the narrator’s deviant attentiveness 
juxtaposes Berenice’s teeth with the most mundane, daily fixations. “To muse for long 
unwearied hours,” Aegeus explains,  
with my attention riveted to some frivolous device on the margin, or in the 
typography of a book; to become absorbed, for the better part of a 
summer's day, in a quaint shadow falling aslant upon the tapestry or upon 
the floor; to lose myself, for an entire night, in watching the steady flame 
of a lamp, or the embers of a fire; to dream away whole days over the 
perfume of a flower; to repeat, monotonously, some common word, until 
the sound, by dint of frequent repetition, ceased to convey any idea 
whatever to the mind; to lose all sense of motion or physical existence, by 
means of absolute bodily quiescence long and obstinately persevered in: 
such were a few of the most common and least pernicious vagaries 
induced by a condition of the mental faculties, not, indeed, altogether 
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unparalleled, but certainly bidding defiance to anything like analysis or 
explanation. 
What is most interesting about the disease of monomania the narrator claims, then, is that 
it is only in a certain sense “mono-”: not reducible to a singular obsession, but rather 
characterized by a kind of inability to multitask. It is worth noting, moreover, that mania 
as an antebellum affect, and as Poe depicts it, was rather capacious—neither a form of –
phobia, nor –philia, but rather a state of derangement so complete, it nearly occluded 
affective particularity. The irony underlying the narrative reveals of “Berenice” lie in 
these lurking ambiguities of motive and intent. Toward the climax of the story, readers 
witness the narrator’s perceptive faculties worsening. “Then came the full fury of my 
monomania,” he explains, “and I struggled in vain against its strange and irresistible 
influence. In the multiplied objects of the external world I had no thoughts but for the 
teeth. For these I longed with a phrenzied desire.” While this confession might seem the 
necessary key for unlocking the drama of the story, it occludes much more than it reveals. 
By the end of the tale, when the box holding Berenice’s teeth falls to floor, at which point 
readers are left only with “a rattling sound,” accompanied by the visual of “some 
instruments of dental surgery, intermingled with thirty-two small, white and ivory-
looking substances” “scattered to and fro about the floor,” the psychological thread of the 
story remains as scattered and fragmented as the spilled contents. It is in the inscrutable 
machinations facilitated by a shape-shifting “monomania,” in other words, that Poe 
achieves his favorite effects.   
 In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, phobia’s accumulating satirical 
connotations had made anything remotely like this sincerity of terror an almost 
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impossible connotation—the one exception being the disease of hydrophobia itself. 
Moreover, the pleasure of coining new phobias—a pleasure monomania avoided in its 
abstract generality—meant an indulgence in unfolding, in the manner of the literature on 
domiphobia or the story “Spheeksphobia,” all the amusing tendrils of association that 
might stem from an aversive intimacy. In The Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva ventures 
a definition of phobia to which Poe might have found himself drawn by contrast. 
Defining her influential concept of “abjection,” as the unintelligible horror of 
encountering one’s mortal corporeality, facilitated by a disintegration of the distinction 
between one’s subjectivity and an exterior “other,” Kristeva offers this provocation: “The 
phobic has no other object than the abject” (6). Through this formulation, Kristeva’s 
point is not to eclipse our investments in exterior objects—the classic examples in her 
theory of abjection being blood, vomit, excrement, and the like—but rather to suggest 
that a phenomenology of phobia must derive its power from something beyond the clean 
relation implied by phobia’s penchant for collecting interchangeable attachments. Poe’s 
interest in fear aimed for something comparable, and it is perhaps in this distinction that 
he offers a useful alternative, teetering on the edge of a phobic imagination that had 
begun to gather new momentum alongside his unfolding literary celebrity. In certain 
ways, Poe theorized phobia as a familiar and quotidian phenomenology far better than 
most of his contemporaries; yet, part of his success in this regard involved avoiding the –
suffix as a means of denoting that very affective interest. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding this chapter, I want to return to Rush once more. Specifically, it is 
worth asking, before delving further into the origins of phobia’s international familiarity 
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as a tool of social satire in the late 1830s, what Rush intended in his 1786 taxonomy. In 
recent years, scholars have tended to read Rush’s essay, alongside a companion piece he 
wrote titled “The Different Species of Mania,” as instances of satire, rather than genuine 
psychological inquiry. In his groundbreaking work on early American magazine culture, 
for instance, Jared Gardner suggests that the essay on phobias is mostly “humorous and 
chiding.” In a compelling analysis of Rush’s medical and political thought, Sari 
Altschuler argues similarly that while Rush promoted ideals such as “circulation” and 
“sympathy” in his medical and political writings, he balanced these positive virtues with 
satirical interventions, an inclination we find evidenced in his essays on mania and 
phobia. Citing, in particular, his proposal of a condition called “Negro Mania,” in which 
he presents a mocking indictment of proslavery logic, Altschuler demonstrates brilliantly 
that Rush reliably ascribed to the following aphorism: “Sentimentality taught readers to 
sympathize correctly; satire rent useful fissures” (230). 
 That satire played a part in the essays on phobia and mania is undeniable. 
Moreover, Gardner and Altschuler attend to the rhetorical effects of Rush’s satirical tone 
in instructive ways. Nonetheless, to get at the nuances of what Rush intended with his 
essay on phobia, we must go back to the rest of his corpus and papers to look for clues. 
Lecture manuscripts from Rush’s teaching career suggest not only that he kept the pieces 
on phobia and mania in mind, but also that the professor proceeded to pull from the two 
essays when delving into the field of study he famously referred to as “diseases of the 
mind”—almost verbatim in certain instances. Explaining in one lecture that “Every 
inordinate pursuit of pleasure” is a “species of madness,” he offers a taxonomy of manias 
to illustrate what he means, with the vast majority coming from the earlier essay—among 
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them the monarchy mania, land mania, military mania, hunting mania, ecclesiastical 
mania, poetical mania, and mathematical mania, next to nine additional repeats. Rather 
than reading the original essays as either serious medical literature or mere satire, I 
suggest they are better interpreted as hybrid documents merging entertainment with novel 
speculation—an affective complexity discordant with modern sensibilities of disciplinary 
purity.  
Amidst continuities between the pieces in The Columbian and Rush’s lectures, the 
professor’s return to diseases premised on fear offer, in contrast to the passages on mania, 
both a sequence of repetitions and a curious shift. While some of the original essay has 
been adapted, Rush drops the phobia suffix from his lecture almost entirely. This may 
have been because the suffix, relatively unexplored when he wrote the original essay, had 
in the years since begun to occupy a vague network of contradictory uses, including, in 
addition to medicine, diverse political and social satires. Thus, the only place Rush 
maintains the suffix is in describing what he had originally called “Water Phobia,” used 
to designate a dread not of swallowing, but rather of crossing water by boat. As an 
example in both the lecture and The Columbian, Rush names Peter the Great, whose 
dread of crossing water was so intense he “commanded his servants to throw him into a 
boat when he had occasion to cross a river” (Lectures). Interestingly, Rush renames the 
condition in his lecture a variation of “hydrophobia,” and even appears to have worried 
over its naming, writing first “fear,” then striking it with a line, so that in the end it 
appears as: “A fear Hydrophobia, or dread of water.” Thus, it becomes clear that Rush 
took the study of strong psychological attachments and aversions seriously. He went onto 
include a substantial section on fear in his Diseases of the Mind. In his surviving papers, 
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we find moreover an undated, carefully drawn chart corresponding to the evolving 
spectrum of fear taken up in his writings (Fig. 6). Showing the “Virtues and Vices” 
springing from “Fear,” the spectrum takes the form of an affect-based thermometer, 
proposing that while fear may produce virtues such as a “forgiveness of one’s enemies,” 
it can also slip into pathological aversions, the most logical of these being death and pain, 
while others descend by degrees into an ever-intensifying irrationalism, from calumny (-
15) to thunder and lightning (-20), to ghosts (-25), and finally to darkness (-30). When we 
compare the spectrum with a companion graph on the “Virtues and Vices That Spring 
from Love,” we find, moreover, that Rush emphasizes there not any series of object 
cathexes, but rather qualitative shifts in feeling. Instead of choosing the wrong kind of 
object, as fear might, love devolves into jealousy, resentment, malice, and hatred, until, at 
-30 degrees, it ends in murder. Thus, we discover that even as Rush appears to have 
backed away from phobia as a variable suffix, he kept its central idea in play: the idea 
that pathologies of fear might reside, primarily, in isolated preoccupations, or the 
perversity of an object choice premised on aversion.  
I should close with a word on method. Across the medical literature and fiction 
explored above, this chapter has endeavored to encounter the history of emotions as a 
history of forms. At the same time, my focus has been particular, invested more in 
elaborating the conditions for phobia’s emergence as an affective category in U.S. culture 
than in determining a singular way for the history of emotions to be done. However, the 
methods pursued in this analysis have also been shaped by a deliberate ethic—one of 
defamiliarization, devoted to discovering the contingencies, far removed from us 
presently, integral to prompting newfound consensus around the value of an emotion, at 
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the juncture of intellectual and cultural thresholds. This ethic of defamiliarization 
emphasizes the evolving forms taken by emotions over time without re-investing, 
conversely, in an oversimplified search for origins. Similar to Bruno Latour’s approach to 
the nature of medical upheaval in The Pasteurization of France (another work interested 
partly in the influence of rabies on Western thought), I have aimed to avoid the trappings 
of medical hagiography, which would emphasize solitary genius at the expense of casting 
light on an array of strange, interrelated phenomena. Likewise, I have avoided treating 
phobia’s emergence, as a recognizable affect and pathology, as anything like the 
grandiose triumph of a Kuhnian revolution in the history of scientific ideas.30 Rather, I 
have pursued the curious pathways taken by spontaneity, as a category indicative of 
abnormal disease origin, as the term opened onto generative riddles of psychological 
possession. It is worth observing that within these enigmatic lacunae, opened up by 
inexplicable pathology, Rush assisted in establishing certain conventions for the 
expansion of a phobic sensibility, in the same decades that it started to become a 
recognizable social hermeneutic in U.S. culture. Nevertheless, hydrophobia, as a state of 
madness and threat disseminated in print, continued to elicit speculation and 
experimentation far beyond the control of any one figure. For decades, hydrophobia 
remained at the center of this burgeoning analytic, establishing an important template for 
the study of fear in its diseased state.  
In reading medical literature for it genre properties, formed according to shared 
narrative conventions, we find in studying late eighteenth century disease classification 
that a perceived homology between communicated and idiopathic symptoms participated 
                                                
30 See Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U of Chicago P, 1962). 
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in producing a recognizable type of medical narrative. This narrative was characterized 
by a formal adherence to the plotline implicit in the logic of spontaneous pathology, 
which repeatedly molded the way case studies were framed and told. At the same time, 
we discover that spontaneity, as a generic register, opened up pathways of its own in a 
burgeoning literature on hypochondriasis and the potency of fear over human physiology. 
These interlinked phenomena in medical knowledge production speak to the importance 
of reading medical narratives as literature, available for close reading, interpretation, and 
critique. Yet they also remind us that diseases and affective states of the past found 
expression through volatile, shape-shifting signifiers, operating in systems of knowledge 
incommensurable with our own. To understand the phenomenology their nomenclature 
conjured, we are compelled to resuscitate and reencounter the networks of meaning in 
which they traveled and first acquired legibility. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A METAPHOR DISTILLED: 
COLORPHOBIA’S SATIRICAL CASE FORM IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, CHARLES BENNETT RAY, LYDIA MARIA CHILD,  
AND WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 
 
 
Categories of analysis must look out for themselves, and I confess that I cannot arouse in 
myself a passionate interest in what happens to them. If not kept strictly in their place, 
they get above themselves and go masquerading as persons, mingling on equal terms with 
human beings and sometimes crowding them out altogether. When categories of analysis 
do that, they have forgotten their manners and need to be taken sharply in hand by their 
parents and reminded when it is appropriate and when inappropriate for children to be 
seen and heard. 
 
Barbara Jeanne Fields, “Categories of Analysis? Not in My Book” (1989) 
 
 
 
In the decades following Rush’s essay in The Columbian, phobia’s popularity as a 
suffix ripe for satire spread rapidly. National and religious phobias, especially, began to 
be coined on the fly across a range of publications, perspectives, and geographies. 
Nowhere, however, would this satirical trend succeed more than in the context of 
American abolitionism, where a concept known as “colorphobia” began to take off in the 
1830s. An article published in 1838 by New Hampshire abolitionist Nathaniel Peabody 
Rogers offers an example of its emergent connotations. “Our people have got it,” Rogers 
begins cryptically. “They have got it in the blue, collapse stage. Many of them have got it 
so bad, they can’t get well. They will die of it. It will be a mercy if the nation does not” 
(1). Defined as a pathological aversion to skin tone—or in Rogers’ words “hate of 
complexion”—the malady known as colorphobia conjured a vicious antagonist. “This 
color-phobia [sic] is making terrible havoc among our communities,” Rogers goes on. “It 
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is meaner in fact than the itch. It is worse to get rid of than the ‘seven years itch’ 
[scabies]. It is fouler than Old Testament leprosy.” Used in most accounts to designate a 
fear of blackness specifically, to the extent that the term became interchangeable with 
Negrophobia, colorphobia identified a psychological state integral to slavery’s survival. 
Rogers thus concludes by insisting on the urgency of its threat: “Time would fail us to tell 
of its extent and depth in this free country, or the deeds it has done. Anti-slavery must 
cure it, or it must die out like the incurable drunkards.”  
 This chapter traces the rise of colorphobia and Negrophobia as categories of 
analysis in the antebellum period, with an eye on their contribution to a deeper 
genealogy. The terms were the first major concepts to adopt –phobia as a suffix for 
sociopolitical purposes. Since their emergence, some two hundred years ago, this use of 
phobia has proliferated, bringing terms such as homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, 
and Islamophobia into global circulation.31 Phobia’s political uses have also been 
important to prominent critical theorists. In the context of contemporary critical race 
theory, for instance, Negrophobia will likely call to mind the work of Frantz Fanon who 
describes the condition in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) as foundational to a collective 
white unconscious: an “affect” with “a priority that defies all rational thinking” (120). For 
abolitionists, the turn to racial phobia marked the inception of a highly experimental 
hermeneutic, which conceptualized racial inequality as a phenomenon originating in 
                                                
31 To describe phobia’s cultural value, I follow David Trotter’s idea that, as a concept, 
phobia comprises an array of different “uses” in language. By this, Trotter means to 
suggest that phobia has been impactful not merely as a pathological state, but also as a 
“versatile moral, political, and aesthetic resource” (1). See Trotter’s book The Uses of 
Phobia, which explores variations on phobia from George Eliot and Ford Maddox Ford 
through film directors such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar. 
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phobic encounters with blackness.32 To recreate a sense of what racial phobia signified in 
this context, this chapter explores how the concept began trending across an array of 
newspapers, including Frederick Douglass’s North Star, Samuel Cornish and Charles 
Bennett Ray’s The Colored American, William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator, the Anti-
Slavery Standard edited by David and Lydia Maria Child, and a host of others. In 
tracking this circulation, I show how allusions to racial phobia became pervasive in the 
antebellum period, appearing in hundreds of antislavery editorials published in the U.S. 
and greater Atlantic world in the years leading up to and during the Civil War.33 
I devote the first part of this chapter to three provocations regarding antislavery 
affect. The first and most basic claim I will make is that abolitionists cultivated, in their 
collective recognition of a phobic sensibility in American politics, an inverse sentiment—
a kind of anti-phobia, characterized by an aversion to phobia itself. By this I mean that 
abolitionist texts set the terms for an affective dialectic, within which antislavery became 
defined partly by its position against phobia’s debilitating social and national effects. I 
begin with this argument, in part, to emphasize that while abolitionism comprised an 
                                                
32 Colorphobia, as a concept, tended to be interchangeable with Negrophobia. I have only 
been able to locate a few articles in which colorphobia was used explicitly in a broader 
capacity. One article, published in The Philanthropist in 1843, describes a situation in 
which a Hawaiian Chief, accredited as an ambassador from “the Sandwich islands” 
during the Tyler presidency, was prohibited from breakfasting with white passengers 
aboard a steamer from New York to New Haven. As a result, both the ambassador and a 
Reverend Richards accompanying him “took breakfast with the blacks and other servants 
of the boat” (2). Describing the captain and clerk responsible for the embarrassment, the 
author writes, “They are your true, democratic colorphobiacs. What care they for rank? 
That does not change a man’s color.” 
33 An editorial I wrote for The New Republic briefly contextualizes contemporary phobias 
in this earlier moment. (See “The Anti-Slavery Roots of Today’s Phobia Obsession,” 
published January 29, 2016.) The editorial responds to a piece published in The New York 
Times earlier that month, which traces our present “‘–phobia’ boom” to the coinage of 
“homophobia” among gay liberation activists in the 1960s and 1970s.  
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array of perspectives on racial difference, articles invoking colorphobia and Negrophobia 
gestured to possibilities of affective consensus, accentuating a common antagonism 
toward phobia as a flawed, yet ubiquitous social disposition. The rapid proliferation of 
this rhetoric, I argue, makes antiphobic sentiment an illustrative example of what 
Raymond Williams famously called “structures of feeling,” used to describe the potential 
for political communities to generate and experiment with new emotive modes. 
At the same time, understanding this shared aversion to phobia requires that we 
explore how and why it caught on in the antebellum period specifically. As a second 
point I argue that the rise of colorphobia as a concept marks a strange, yet important 
moment in the history of psychiatry, as the discipline began to consolidate and form an 
independent branch within the history of medicine. Far from building on any well-
established tradition in progressive lexicons, the rhetoric of racial phobia originated in a 
speculative etymological genealogy. As with Rush’s phobia taxonomy, colorphobia was 
first conceptualized in dialogue with medical discourse as a state of feeling analogous to 
hydrophobia. Playing on the dread of water associated with rabies, colorphobia first 
began to be tested in elaborate satirical editorials as a clever pun on hydrophobia, used to 
picture the slave system as a vicious beast holding the nation captive in its salivating 
jaws. An article appearing in The Colored American put the comparison plainly in 1839: 
“The word is first cousin to hydrophobia and so is the thing. It is a terrible insanity 
produced by the bite of slavery.”  
Infused with these medical valences, diagnoses of colorphobia and Negrophobia 
established a powerful counterpoint to the evolving discourse of scientific racism. As 
Katherine Bankole-Medina’s Slavery and Medicine (1998) and Marli Weiner and Mazie 
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Hough’s Sex, Sickness, and Slavery (2012) have shown, proslavery physicians soon 
deployed proto-psychiatric terms of their own, to classify persons of African descent as 
prone to unique mental illnesses.34 Accounts of colorphobia and Negrophobia had the 
collective effect of focusing a clinical nomenclature, instead, on the prejudice of white 
Americans. Despite this significance, for my third point I contend that even as 
colorphobia contributed to a growing discourse around possible psychiatric maladies its 
relation to mental illness grew increasingly complex. At times, the diagnosis of phobia 
was meant literally, with reference to genuine pathology. In other instances, phobia was 
invoked more as a figure of speech, through which race prejudice was portrayed as 
analogous to disease rather than pathological in the strong sense. Then, as colorphobia 
and Negrophobia began to gain traction on a transatlantic scale, they began to be used by 
a number of writers with clearer reference to moral rather than psychical defect. In these 
uses, appearing several decades before “racism” was coined, the terms became 
effectively synonymous with race prejudice, wherein the stakes of the contagion 
metaphor had less to do with madness than with a generalized sense of social injustice, 
spread within and beyond the slave system. Rather than treating these competing 
valences as divisible from one another, I contend that they coalesced in a dynamic 
                                                
34 Among the most widely cited examples of proslavery psychology is Samuel 
Cartwright’s “Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race,” published in 1851. A former 
student of Rush’s at the University of Pennsylvania (who rejected his professor’s 
antislavery allegiances), Cartwright claimed to have discovered a condition called 
“drapetomania,” a “disease causing negroes to run away.” Describing the nature of the 
disease, Cartwright wrote, “In noticing a disease not heretofore classed among the long 
list of maladies that man is subject to, it was necessary to have a new term to express it. 
The cause, in the most of cases, that induces the negro to runaway from service, is as 
much a disease of the mind as any other species of mental alienation.” A figure addressed 
at length in Bankole-Medina’s scholarship, Cartwright also provides the inspiration for a 
Natasha Trethewey poem, titled “Dr. Samuel Adolphus Cartwright on Dissecting the 
White Negro, 1851.” 
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assemblage, and are best interpreted together as lay experimentations with the cultural 
capital and vernacular adaptability of medical nomenclature. 
In the context of this dynamism, a subtle trajectory may nevertheless be traced as 
to colorphobia and Negrophobia’s evolving philological dimensions between the 1830s 
and 1860s. Specifically, I propose that while the hydrophobia analogy remained central to 
the terms’ rhetorical purchase up through the end of the Civil War, a competing usage 
became increasingly common: the terms’ consolidation into place-holding euphemisms 
for race prejudice broadly conceived, signposted in antislavery editorials with little 
elaboration, for the sake of expediency. To demonstrate the effects of this gradual 
etymological shift, I turn toward the end of this chapter to examples including an editorial 
titled “Humbug Sublimated,” published in Horace Greeley’s New-York Daily Tribune, as 
well as a commemorative speech on the anniversary of the Boston Massacre by the 
African American Reverend Charles Lennox Remond. Following my analysis of these 
writings, with the goal of further exploring the rhetorical work of euphemisms and 
epithets as philological strategies in antislavery and proslavery debates, I conclude by 
turning briefly to a related term that acquired some popularity contemporaneous with 
colorphobia’s ascendancy: a feeling antebellum writers conceived of as colorphobia’s 
other, known as negrophilia, used most often in the Americas as a kind of stigmatizing 
epithet. Referred to in Anglophone antebellum writing as negrophilism, by Hispanophone 
writers as negrófilo, and in Francophone texts as négrophilie, this index of an expressly 
political interracial love—used to suggest a preference, implicitly erotic, among white 
persons for blackness or people of African descent—became an occasion for practicing 
the use value of epithetical speech acts in discourse around race prejudice on a 
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transhemispheric scale. Covering a spectrum of negrophilia’s uses, from Jane Cazneau’s 
Eagle Pass, Or Life on the Border and Andrés Avelino de Orihuela’s Spanish translation 
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin to Victor Hugo’s Bug-Jargal, I suggest that such texts allow us to 
pass through a kind of affective looking glass, to consider the evolving philological 
relations between epithets, euphemisms, and racial politics in the antebellum period, as 
performed against and in tension with colorphobia’s generative wordplay.  
 
THE ANTI-PHOBIC SENTIMENT IN ANTISLAVERY PRINT CULTURE 
 
The earliest recorded utterance of either term in the U.S. appears to be the partial 
transcript of a congressional debate, which has since been referred to as the prelude to the 
Missouri Compromise, held February 17-19, 1819 (Johnson 47). During the debate, 
Kentucky Speaker of the House Henry Clay used the term Negrophobia first, accusing 
Northern Representatives of fighting the expansion of slavery with ulterior motives. 
According to Clay, the real reason Northern congressmen wanted slavery confined to the 
South was that they feared the migration of Africans westward or northward. While 
Clay’s speech appears paraphrased rather than transcribed, the original reply given by 
New York Representative John Taylor survives. “The gentleman from Kentucky…has 
charged us…with being under the influence of negrophobia,” Taylor replied. “Sir, he 
mistook his mark. I thank God that the disease mentioned by that gentleman is unknown 
to my constituents” (1223). Taylor continued by arguing that the disease was, instead, 
endemic to the South. “[T]he negrophobia does unhappily prevail in another section of 
this country…it haunts its subjects in their dreams, and disturbs their waking hours” 
(1223-4). Re-appropriating the term as an apt diagnosis of proslavery politics, Taylor 
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experimented with a rhetorical strategy that would begin to catch on widely in 
abolitionist print venues some fifteen years later. 
In order to determine what colorphobia and Negrophobia signified during this 
period, we first have to account for the rhetorical wordplay the –phobia suffix sparked as 
a loose but swiftly evolving structure of feeling. As noted elsewhere in this project, 
phobia’s nascent connotative dimensions in the Atlantic world depended heavily on a 
satirical trend rooted in the hydrophobia analogy. Brief reference to a specimen of British 
satire, published just before the rhetoric of colorphobia began to take off in antislavery 
newspapers, shows how the analogy was being appropriated in other circles. In 1834, 
piqued by growing tensions between English Bishops and their constituents over the act 
of tithing—a conflict with echoes in the Tithe War then sweeping Ireland—the comic 
newspaper Figaro in London published an article titled “Church Reformophobia.” The 
piece opens with an illustration, showing one dog with a human head, allegedly from 
Ireland, biting a bulldog used to represent English unrest (Fig. 7). Both dogs bark: “No 
Tithes!” (5). Behind them, three crudely drawn Bishops wring their hands and cry, “Mad 
Dogs! Mad Dogs!” Underneath, the article proceeds by explaining, “A new malady has 
lately sprung up among the Bishops, always full enough of ill, to which we shall give the 
name of Church-Reformophobia” (5). The author continues, 
This disease is characterised by the most alarming symptoms of rabid fury, 
and is always accompanied by a strong discharge of froth of a venomous 
quality from the mouth of the unhappy animal who chances to be suffering 
under the dreadful calamity. (5) 
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In the illustration, the disease is portrayed as pervading both sides, with those opposing 
the tithe pinpointed as the dogs responsible for the contagion. Ultimately, however, the 
author places greatest blame with the Bishops themselves. Having “rushed in a state of 
fury among the people, biting all they can,” the Bishops have betrayed the reason 
underlying their resistance to “Church Reform”—a concept identified as “the point so 
much dreaded by those who have long flourished on the abuses of the unreformed 
system.” The implication seems to be that it is only from the perspective of the Bishops 
themselves that protest against tithes is perceived as a cry among mad dogs. To see the 
world through the Bishops’ eyes is not merely to feel the affliction of phobia, that is; it 
requires that one read political unrest etiologically, as spreading social turmoil in the 
manner of rabid dogs spreading a disease. 
I elaborate this example at length because it offers a sense of the satirical tradition 
abolitionists would soon capitalize upon themselves. Clearly enough, “Church 
Reformophobia” revels in a murky, absurdist metaphorical frame, oriented around canine 
rabidity, for both its satirical and metaphorical payoff. This punning sensibility of phobia 
became commonplace in the early nineteenth century. When the rhetoric of racial phobia 
began to take root in antislavery print culture, it likewise took shape in dialogue with a 
medical discourse where hydrophobia served as a direct antecedent. An article titled “A 
New Kind of Phobia,” published in 1846, charts the genealogy at length. Accounting for 
a strain of proslavery rhetoric in which abolition was expected to unleash a “black 
deluge,” where former slaves would “squat among us, swear against us, crowd our 
children out of the schools, vote against us,” the writer of the article maintains that within 
these sentiments lie “symptoms of a malady deep-rooted, inveterate, and apt to prove 
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fatal to the moral man—a disease not mentioned by Doctors, though requiring treatment, 
of the most skillful and vigorous character—we mean negrophobia” (2). The author 
directs focus, in following, to where “symptoms” of Negrophobia and “those of 
hydrophobia” overlap: 
The victim of the latter cannot bear water. The sight of it inspires him with 
dread—makes him foam at the mouth—throws him sometimes into 
convulsions. The victim of the former cannot bear a dark complexion. He 
starts back from it with horror—it haunts him day and night—all his 
thoughts assume a somber aspect—and two or three dark faces together 
throws [sic] him into alarming spasms. (2) 
Aside from illustrating phobia’s metaphorical underpinnings, the article captures the 
complex and contradictory tones phobia comprised early on. Clearly, the author borrows 
the rabies metaphor, in part, because of its biting, satirical payoff. At the same time, the 
diagnostic rhetoric alters the metaphor’s stakes, laying claim to a sharp distinction 
between what Georges Canguilhem famously termed the normal and the pathological. In 
a puzzling caveat, the author proceeds to claim that Negrophobia’s portrayal as a kind of 
mental disease is meant with some sincerity. “We beg leave to be understood,” he writes, 
“neither in a Personal, nor Pickwickian, but in a Scientific sense.” Whether readers are 
meant to perceive the distinction as tongue-in-cheek or vaguely genuine is hard to parse. 
Nonetheless, the author takes care to protect the seriousness of his tone. At the 
conclusion, a final comparison is made: “Another feature they have in common. Both are 
apt to bite and tear their species, being filled with a most unnatural hate against them.”  
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 As the popularity of the terms grew, analyses of colorphobia asserted proximity to 
disease classification most consistently by adopting the language and mode of 
presentation used in reports of hydrophobia. Articles on hydrophobia frequently revolved 
around spectacular case studies, appropriating anecdotal accounts to supplement or 
challenge existing knowledge. Titles for such reports could read “Dreadful Case of the 
Hydrophobia,” “Remarkable Case of Hydrophobia,” “Case of Hydrophobia,” or simply 
“Hydrophobia.”35 Antislavery periodicals adopted the same convention. In 1839, to give 
an example, The Liberator published an essay titled “A Dreadful Case of Color-Phobia.” 
The following week, the journal published an article titled “Another Case of Color-
Phobia.” Sometimes these cases gestured broadly to situations rather than people; often, 
however, they specified individual sufferers. An article published in Frederick Douglass’s 
The North Star in 1849, written by Douglass’s printer John Dick, tells, for instance, of a 
newspaper editor from Westfield, Massachusetts, believed to be a “decided ‘case,’” 
stricken with “the malignant and dangerous malady known as colorphobia.” “The 
approach of a decidedly black man,” the article explains, “aroused him to a perfect 
paroxysm of terror,” out of which “friends” could never “reason” him. We should be 
careful not to miss the mocking tone of the article. And yet, Dick sustains a clinical 
epistemology throughout. Holding on to colorphobia as an apt “diagnosis” of the editor’s 
                                                
35 See, for respective examples, The Rural Magazine; or, Vermont Repository 1.1 (1795): 
26; Zion’s Herald 6.52 (1835): 206; The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 26.17 (Jun 
1842): 264; and Boston Recorder 2.15 (Apr 8, 1817): 59. 
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mental state, Dick warns: “In almost every town and city of the Union may be found 
many just such cases.”36 
 How, then, should we understand colorphobia’s early proximity to medical 
science? Evidently enough, abolitionists were interested in repurposing the epistemology 
of the medical case study. Gianna Pomata has argued for reading the case form as a type 
of epistemic genre. By “epistemic” Pomata means “those kinds of texts that develop in 
tandem with scientific practices,” such as “the treatise, the commentary, the textbook, the 
encyclopedia, but also the aphorism, the dialogue, the essay, the medical recipe, [and] 
case history”—in essence, texts that take as their purview “the practice of knowledge-
making” (2). While acknowledging that the value of case narratives change over time, 
Pomata contends that the case’s participation in knowledge production consistently relies 
on its ability to convey “a gloss that connects the canonical rule to a specific context, 
relating a medical (or moral and legal) principle to the hic et nunc, the here and now, of 
specific circumstances” (6). This does not mean all cases operate by conveying a stable, 
corroborative relationship with existing knowledge. Rather, as Monika Class has 
observed, case narratives generally fall somewhere in the vicinity of three “interrelated 
functions”: sometimes to organize empirical information in “preparation” for a not yet 
established “scientific model”; at other times, to fortify presumed relationships between 
“the particular and the universal”; and still in other contexts to introduce a disruptive 
anomaly, in contradistinction to preexisting knowledge about a disease and its alleged 
parameters. And yet, useful as it is to delineate these genre properties, documented cases 
                                                
36 For other articles treating phobia in these terms, see: “A Marked Case of 
Negrophobia.”  The Liberator 33.10 (Mar. 6, 1863): 38; and “An Alarming Case of 
Negrophobia.”  The Anti-Slavery Bugle 14.34 (Apr. 9, 1859): 1. 
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of colorphobia took these connotations down deviant pathways. On the one hand, like 
standard case studies, they gestured to a reciprocity in knowledge, by which the 
phenomenology of a singular subject or incident was used to enhance awareness of a 
systemic crisis. However, the popularity of the rhetoric had equally to do with the fact 
that here a hybrid, highly experimental genre was being tested—a satirical case form, 
which defiantly fused the best of both worlds: the special sovereignty of a medical gaze 
with the unbridled play of parody and metaphor.  
To be sure, ambiguities followed from this formal hybridity, yet these ambiguities 
tended to be generative rather than restrictive. One of the most important dimensions of 
colorphobia’s diagnostic metaphor was its capacity to account for the social 
communicability of race prejudice. Without a doubt, abolitionists wanted to investigate 
the means by which the transmission of proslavery was happening psychologically. 
Observing reports that Canada was becoming unfriendly to slaves who had escaped and 
fled north, one 1853 article published in The African Repository asserts with palpable 
shame, “Canadians have caught from us the contagion of negro-phobia” (79). An 1860 
article titled “Negrophobia Breaking Out in Ohio” conceptualizes the problem of 
affective contagion similarly. Yet, this rhetoric also buttressed phobia’s figurative 
dimension. Indeed, the matter of communicability reinforced the analogy to hydrophobia, 
specifically, in that it represented in a period prior to the rise of microbiology one of a 
few self-evidently transmittable diseases—the attack of a rabid animal being spectacular 
enough to make contagion obvious. One lively writer for Vermont’s The Voice of 
Freedom thus identifies “the United States” as the great “mad dog” at the root of the 
disease, maintaining that the species “is peculiar to the land of liberty—where they all get 
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bit by him, and the phobiac is indelible,” no more able to bear the sight of black persons 
than “a poor dog in the last stages of the rabies canis could bear the sound of Niagara 
falls” (4). A range of texts tap into phobia’s allegory in this way. Another curious 
instance shows up on an envelope hailing from New York, circulating sometime between 
1861 and 1865, featuring an illustration of Jefferson Davis as a “Mad Dog!,” terrorizing 
the nation with his rabid secessionism (Fig. 8). In such iterations, the generic conventions 
Pomata describes as epistemic, used to assert a reciprocity in knowledge between disease 
description and its materialization in citizens, opened equally onto allegorical terrain. For 
the Vermont author quoted above and the New York envelope alike, it is precisely the 
distance of the rabid dog as a representative figure (its utter disconnect from the intended 
referent, to invoke Paul de Man’s definition of allegory) that gives the comparison its 
playful rhetorical purchase.  
 This wordplay and formal hybridity enhanced what we might call colorphobia’s 
didactic, galvanizing function. The satirical case form functioned equally, for many 
abolitionists, as a kind of diagnostic parable, by which reference to a familiar metaphor 
(i.e. contagious disease) helped provide readers with a critical lens with which to interpret 
and navigate the public sphere. A piece Douglass wrote for The North Star in 1849 titled 
“Colorphobia in New York!” offers one of the period’s most virtuosic experiments in 
these terms. The article attempts to recapture the reactions of New Yorkers upon seeing, 
as Wilson J. Moses writes of the incident, Douglass “parade[] down Broadway” 
accompanied by two white Englishwomen, Julia and Eliza Griffiths, “one on each arm” 
(50). The verbal and physical harassment the trio received later inspired Douglass to don 
the rhetoric of racial phobia at length. “The fifth of May will long be remembered as the 
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most trying day ever experienced by the unfortunate victims of colophobia,” Douglass 
begins. The article then proceeds by emphasizing the ubiquity of the insanity he 
witnessed: 
The disease was never more malignant or general than on that day. The 
streets were literally crowded with persons of all classes afflicted with this 
terrible malady. Whole omnibus loads were attacked at the same moment, 
and their hideous and unearthly howls were truly distressing, excruciating. 
It will be impossible to describe, or give the reader any correct idea either 
of the extent of the disease or the agony it seemed to occasion. Like most 
epidemics, its chief havoc was among the baser sort. The suffering here 
was fearful and intense. If the genteel suffered from the plague, they 
managed to suppress and control their feelings better than what are called 
the ‘lower orders.’ But, even here, there could be no successful 
concealment. The strange plague defied all concealment, and would show 
itself in spite of veils, white pocket handkerchiefs, parasols, hats, bonnets 
and umbrellas. (141) 
Narrating what amounts to a complete breakdown between public behavior and private 
prejudice, across a dystopian New York landscape, Douglass invokes colorphobia as a 
plague no civilizing convention can keep contained. Objects of social etiquette—veils, 
handkerchiefs, parasols, hats, bonnets, and umbrellas—appear as flimsy shields, no 
longer capable of offering the pathology of white prejudice any privilege of discretion. At 
the same time, the centrality of Douglass’ perspective, not merely as diagnostician but as 
the subject of the colorphobia, radically mutates the formal conventions of the case study. 
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Instead of picturing a singular case of the disease under scrutiny, Douglass speaks from 
the positionality of what Fanon would later describe as a “phobogenic” referent: a 
“stimulus to anxiety,” reflecting onto white supremacy a constitutive “phobia”—a 
“latent” “affect” underlying its cohesion (117, 120). In speaking from this perspective, 
Douglass subjects onlookers to a progressive nomenclature in the making. At the same 
time, as authoritative witness, he also gives himself room to break with the diagnostic 
rhetoric, as soon as its usefulness expires. Toward the conclusion, his tone alters: “We, 
however, tire of this subject. This prejudice is so unjust, unnatural and irrational, that 
ridicule and indignation seem to be the only weapons with which to assail it” (142-3). 
Abruptly the narrative shifts from a prior metaphorical playfulness to plain-speaking 
critique. 
 For Douglass, the value of the analogy to rabies endured only as long as one could 
sustain its satirical bite. In other instances, however, there existed one other vital 
advantage to phobia’s play with medical formalism: the idea that ending slavery might be 
conceptualized in terms of cure. No piece demonstrates this facet of an antiphobic 
imagination better than Nathaniel Peabody Rogers’ article “Color-Phobia.” While Rogers 
begins by describing colorphobia as a deadly malady, he quickly turns to matter of 
transmission and remedy. Elaborating on the state of the afflicted, Rogers writes, “They 
don’t know that they have got it….But they were inoculated. It was injected into their 
veins and incided into their systems, by old doctor Slavery” (1). Turning afterward to 
matters of prescription, he continues, “The remedy and the preventive, if taken early, is a 
kine pock sort of matter, by the name of anti-slavery. It is a safe preventive, and a certain 
cure. None that have it, genuine, ever catch slavery…or the color-phobia.” With these 
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lines, the article seems to shift from a rhetorical mode approximating diagnosis to pure 
metaphorical abstraction. Personifying Slavery, Rogers allegorizes colorphobia’s 
contraction in terms of bad medicine—Slavery operating like a maniacal doctor on the 
American body politic, injecting it with foreign substances that will eventually destroy it. 
Yet more is going on here than may at first be apparent. When Rogers states that only the 
“antidote” of “antislavery” can cure colorphobia’s ailment, he cites William Lloyd 
Garrison’s the Liberator as a curative agent in particular. Looking to this clue, I would 
argue that Rogers here envisions antislavery print culture itself as a material therapy 
capable of counseling the nation to better health. While the “antidote” of “antislavery” 
may seem like a vague prescription, Rogers’ article actually parallels a shift in the formal 
organization of the Liberator itself, which occurred just prior to the article’s publication. 
A common front-page header, titled “SLAVERY,” generally following an opening 
section titled “REFUGE OF OPPRESSION,” was amended to “ANTI-SLAVERY” for 
the first time on June 1, 1838. The switch to “ANTI-SLAVERY” stuck thereafter. Rogers 
appears to have sensed in this rhetorical shift a prescriptive element, thus prompting his 
emphasis on the logic of a material textuality as cure. 
Even as figurative and diagnostic meditations of these sorts became 
commonplace, the link to rabies also grew more obscure in certain contexts. Increasingly, 
colorphobia and Negrophobia appear to have been conceptualized in moral terms as sins 
of the heart and mind. As the terms began to be deployed in this moral register, their 
ambiguities intensified: whether they kept or discarded their diagnostic or metaphorical 
connotations was left largely to the inclinations of readers. Nevertheless, the increasing 
use of colorphobia and Negrophobia in this fashion gives us added insight into the terms’ 
  134 
lexical parameters. Most importantly, they show us that even as the terms invited play 
(metaphorical and satirical), they could also be used with unmitigated gravity. That is, 
while in many instances we should be careful not to miss phobia’s joke (which is to say, 
the implicit provocation: what are you, phobic?), in other instances we should avoid 
reading a sense of humor where it is absent. One of the best examples of this usage is 
William Lloyd Garrison’s seminal essay “American Colorphobia,” published in the 
Liberator in 1847, which uses the term to distinguish theologies compatible with 
antislavery principles from proslavery’s manipulations of Biblical scripture. However, an 
even more remarkable example may be found in a sermon titled “Negrophobia” written 
by Tayler Lewis, a professor of “Oriental languages and literature” at Union College, in 
Schenectady, New York. Published in 1862, the piece makes the bold argument that 
when speaking of “negrophobia, negro-contempt, or, in other words, that contempt for a 
portion of our humanity, which is now becoming so rife among us,” “We say it is a worse 
thing than slavery” (6). The reason, Lewis asserts, is that Negrophobia describes a kind of 
malevolence without purpose. “[O]dious and deformed as the servile institution is,” he 
explains,  
there is now growing up in our midst something far more vile, far more 
insulting to humanity, far more offensive to God....It cannot shelter itself 
under the ethics, low and vile as it may be, of an utilitarian political 
economy....It cannot plead cotton; it has no inducement of interest, no 
temptation in the sense. It is a soul-sin, such as devils may commit, who 
have no earthly, sensual interests. It is pure, naked, disembodied, evil. (6)  
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While slavery might hide, “however falsely,” behind motives of general benevolence, 
Negrophobia cannot. The latter represents a purity of violence, conspicuously inhumane 
in its lack of purpose. Before concluding, Lewis goes so far as to call it a veritable 
“antichrist.” An unequivocally somber meditation, Lewis’s rendition of Negrophobia as 
sin demonstrates that even as Negrophobia’s figurative and diagnostic implications 
persisted, the terms became popular enough to enter the terrain of larger theological 
debates in which antislavery was being grounded and theorized.  
 
TOWARDS A EUPHEMISTIC EXPEDIENCY  
 
 As noted above, Lewis’s “Negrophobia” sermon shows us an instance of the term 
eschewing its otherwise diagnostic, satirical, and metaphorical valences. At the same 
time, while the piece well exemplifies racial phobia’s capacity to transcend these familiar 
implications, Lewis finds it necessary to elaborate Negrophobia’s meaning at length. 
Across the 1850s and 1860s, still other writers began making reference to colorphobia 
and Negrophobia in an almost offhand manner, using the terms essentially as shorthand 
for race prejudice, without feeling the need to spell out the stakes of their usage. Through 
this shift, colorphobia and Negrophobia began to play an important role in building up a 
transnational, antiracist lexicon. Emerging in print more than one-hundred years before 
the term “racism” (1932), and more than fifty years before the earlier “racialism” (1871), 
the terms have the distinction of being two of the earliest Anglophone neologisms of their 
kind: concepts used to address race prejudice as a precise form of bigotry, identifiable 
across multiple persons and contexts.37 At the same time, this significance attests further 
                                                
37 “Caste,” it is important to note, emerged in the English language long before 
Negrophobia. As Ania Loomba has noted, it is common for scholars to ignore the 
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to the terms’ ever-fluctuating dynamism as speech acts. Part of understanding their 
evolving value to the antislavery cause requires that we attend to this subsequent 
development, in which their satirical content, the raison-d’être inhering in their punning 
sensibility, began to distill into a euphemistic expediency.  
 One of the first signs that the rhetoric of colorphobia was beginning to facilitate a 
new expediency in antislavery rhetoric was that abolitionists began to document its 
instances numerically. As noted in the previous section, this first took shape as an 
accumulation of “cases.” Yet in terms of scale, racial phobia quickly began to 
accommodate a diverse array of metrics. An article published in the New-York Tribune in 
1858, titled “Atlas Cushing,” offers one instructive example. The article adopts the 
charge of Negrophobia to hold another journal, the Boston Courier, accountable for its 
uncritical support of House Representative Caleb Cushing, a famous opponent of 
abolitionism. In a detailed analysis of a Courier issue published on February 13 of that 
year, the author calls attention to “163” lines devoted to the “Defence of Mr. Cushing’s 
Negrophobia.” Locating this Negrophobia in Cushing’s refusal to “recognize[e] any, save 
white men, as human beings,” the author treats the article as a record of offenses, 
stressing not so much the congressman’s mental impairments, but rather his humanitarian 
failings in the form of a running tally (1). The added implication is that the Courier has 
                                                                                                                                            
importance of such terms in forming a European racial imaginary, the argument being 
that race, in its modern form, comes into being in the “crucible of Atlantic slavery” (502). 
Loomba calls this an “Atlantic exceptionalism” by which “precolonial and non-European 
ways of thinking” are excluded from the way we understand race in its modern 
formations (Loomba 503). “Caste,” the primary case of exclusion to which Loomba 
turns, which depended heavily on British contact with and perceptions of hierarchies in 
India, could be said to precede Negrophobia as a term indicative of race prejudice. I 
maintain, nevertheless, that Negrophobia is unique in the way it articulates race prejudice 
as a condition of subjectivity. 
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not just become complicit in Cushing’s Negrophobia, but has begun to serve a kind of 
multiplicative function in its dissemination of partisan misinformation (“Atlas Cushing” 
1). 
 Comparable examples of this accumulative function pervade antebellum and Civil 
War-era writings documenting racial phobia. Still, we should be careful not to assume 
that such moments equate automatically to an erasure of the hydrophobia metaphor. To 
give a contrary example, a piece published in Maria Weston Chapman’s famously 
cosmopolitan annual The Liberty Bell, by Friends of Freedom in 1848 likewise treats the 
problem of racial phobia statistically, yet the effect is notably different from “Atlas 
Cushing.” Written by Polish contributor Alexander Holinski, the essay, titled 
“Abolitionism in America,” observes that “out of eighteen hundred and odd newspapers 
which appear in the United States, there are about fifty only that are free from 
Negrophobia,” a “peculiar malady, the frightful intensity of which it is difficult for 
Europeans to imagine” (Holinski 266). Like the “Atlas Cushing” article, Holinski 
enumerates Negrophobia, yet without neglecting the analogy to rabies. By treating 
periodicals as case studies, Holinski takes the American press as an index of phobia’s 
unrelenting contagion. Once again, this discrepancy reminds us that parsing 
colorphobia’s ambiguities became the responsibility, largely, of antislavery readerships, 
whose divergent characteristics (class, education, geography, politics, etc.) played a role 
in shaping their encounter with a trend just beginning to cohere. Even so, distinctions 
may be drawn to determine phobia’s changing rhetorical landscape. Specifically, I want 
to suggest, by way of this comparison between Chapman’s Liberty Bell and the New-York 
Tribune article, that one of the starkest discrepancies, emerging largely in the 1850s and 
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1860s, occurred as the allusive scaffolding, by which colorphobia had first become a 
popular concept, began to drop out as a prerequisite of the term’s application. 
 This absented scaffolding becomes apparent across an array of antislavery 
writings, some flimsy and unmemorable, others impressively argued and well-
constructed. For our purposes here, we may be best off considering pieces otherwise 
remarkable, yet which make reference to the discourse of racial phobia only casually, in 
passing. Consider a piece titled “Humbug Sublimated,” published in the New-York Daily 
Tribune.38 Printed August 9, 1860, “Humbug Sublimated” explores the fallout following 
a rather infamous event in which Martin Delany, father of Black Nationalism, and 
Pennsylvania delegate George M. Dallas attended an International Statistical Congress 
meeting in London to which they had been separately invited. Upon seeing Delany and 
Dallas together at the meeting, Britain’s Lord Chancellor Henry Brougham is said to have 
made some passing remark out loud, regarding American race prejudice, to note publicly 
that no ill was coming of Dallas being in Delany’s vicinity. The story goes that Dallas 
stormed out of the meeting, and his embarrassment drew immediate transatlantic 
attention.  
Responding to the event and to the attempts of other American publications to 
defend Dallas’s actions, the author of “Humbug Sublimated” mounts an elaborate 
critique, taking the article as an opportunity to explore why Lord Brougham made the 
comment to begin with. “Let us consider the foregoing in the light of a few undeniable 
facts,” the author writes. From there, the article launches into a catalogue of the U.S. 
                                                
38 For other articles using Negrophobia or color-phobia in The New York Tribune during 
this period see, for example, “First of August in Lynn” (Aug. 12, 1846); “The Indiana 
State Convention—Negro-Phobia” (Jan. 30, 1851); “Country and City Politics” (Dec. 5, 
1855); and “Colored Regiments in New York” (Oct. 21, 1863).  
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government’s most egregious racially inflected relations. Organized by Roman numerals, 
I-V, the article lists everything from the refusal to recognize Haiti and Liberia as 
independent powers to the denial of passports to free African Americans, concluding 
each item with the repeat refrain: “—because they are negroes.”39 With these instances 
enumerated, the author comes to the conclusion that the Englishman’s joke was hardly 
unwarranted. Here, in reaching its conclusion, the article at last slips in reference to 
Negrophobia:  
                                                
39 To enumerate American foreign policy offences, “Humbug Sublimated” takes the 
structure of a pseudo-poetic epistrophe. Numbering I-V, the list reads:  
I. The Republic of Hayti is treated by every European State—even France, 
from whom she wrested her independence in fair fight—as an equal and 
independent power, whose good will she desires to conciliate and preserve, whose 
trade she seeks to secure. This country alone refuses to acknowledge the existence 
of and maintain diplomatic relations with our sister republic—the oldest, next to 
our own, in America—simply because her people are negroes. 
II. The Republic of Liberia was founded and is to-day mainly peopled and 
wholly governed by natives of an emigrants from this country. Its trade, like that 
of Hayti, is already valuable and steadily increasing; but it is compelled to desert 
our ports and those of Great Britain by the refusal of our Executive to 
acknowledge its independence and maintain diplomatic relations with its 
Government, because its people are negroes.  
III. Natives and Lifelong residents of our country who have education, 
culture, character, probity, fortune, and social consideration in other lands, ask our 
Government to give them passports enabling them to travel in foreign climes, and 
are flatly refused—because they are negroes. 
IV. They take passage in British steamships to cross the Atlantic, and are 
denied the common privileges of decently behaving human beings for which they 
have contracted and paid—not that the owners or managers of those vessels 
choose to make this odious and unjust discrimination—not that their British or 
other European passengers insist on it—but simply that the American passengers 
will have it—because these proscribed fellow-passengers are negroes.  
V. Everywhere it is insisted that negroes—no matter how educated, how 
intellectual, how distinguished for moral worth and good works—must be 
proscribed and hunted from all association on terms of equality with White 
Americans—because they are negroes. 
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Lord Brougham, seeing these two representatives in juxtaposition, and 
believing, with most enlightened Europeans, that our national negrophobia 
is a compound of prejudice and hypocrisy begotten by Slavery, could not 
resist the temptation to call Mr. Dallas’s attention to the fact that one of 
his fellow members was a negro. The allusion was of course jocular, and, 
if it stung, Slavery and American humbug, not Lord Brougham, gave it all 
its point. (4) 
While on the one hand “Humbug Sublimated” funnels the listed offenses into the 
dilemma of what he calls a “national negrophobia,” in order to paint Lord Brougham’s 
passing remark as humiliatingly appropriate, the concept of “national negrophobia” itself 
turns out to need no introduction. In stark contrast to other articles explored above, which 
revolve around the extravagant elaboration of a novel pun, here the lexical parameters of 
the allusion have shifted considerably. What once gathered traction as a pun here 
becomes shorthand for racial intolerance writ large. 
 An 1858 speech delivered by Reverend Charles Lennox Remond at Fanueil Hall, 
as part of a festival commemorating the 88th anniversary of the Boston Massacre, shows 
us a comparable usage.40 Once again, to give the full effect of Remond’s rhetoric, it is 
useful to have a sense of the speech as a whole. While the event heard from a number of 
major figures, including Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and Theodore Parker, it appears to 
have reached a poignant climax in Remond’s contributions. The reverend begins by 
echoing previous sentiments: “I wish to express my hearty concurrence in what has been 
                                                
40 Speeches delivered at the festival were transcribed and published in The Liberator as 
“The Boston Massacre, March 5, 1770: Commemorative Festival in Faneuil Hall” on 
March 12, 1858.  
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said by the preceding speakers with reference to the right of the colored people of this 
country to strike for their freedom, when the time shall come.” With this sympathy 
communicated, however, Remond moves to meditate on what it means for the antislavery 
cause to begin in a space of national remembrance. Distinguishing a black retrospective 
from a white one, Remond begins by remembering Crispus Attucks, the black soldier 
who became the first casualty of the Revolutionary War: “The white people of the United 
States point to their WASHINGTON. It is ours to point to ATTUCKS” (43). Remond 
proceeds by claiming as a comparable inaugural incident the famous Christiana Riot of 
Christiana, Pennsylvania, 1851, where former slave and abolitionist William Parker 
protected fugitive slaves from a Maryland slaveholder named Edward Gorsuch who had 
traveled North to retrieve them. When the conflict broke out on Parker’s property, shots 
were fired, and Gorsuch was killed. Hailing the heroism of Parker and others, Remond 
says to his audience,  
[W]e could, if we would, point to FREEMAN, and PARKER, and 
JACKSON of Christiana celebrity; for if WASHINGTON and ATTUCKS 
opened the Revolution of the past, PARKER, and JACKSON, and 
FREEMAN, opened up the Revolution of the present, when they shot 
down Gorsuch and his son at Christiana, some three years ago. What the 
former event was to the white men of this country the latter should be to 
us. (43) 
Having compared these historical events, Remond constructs a genealogy of revolution, 
the past finding itself, in the context of its commemoration, more accurately in a 
temporality of becoming. 
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 Immediately following this moment, however, Remond breaks with the analogy. 
“There was a time,” the Reverend clarifies, “when I took pride in the efforts, in the 
sacrifices, and in the blood that was shed by those identified with us in complexion, 
during the Revolutionary war, as well as in the war of 1812; and I have not unfrequently 
referred to my own grandfather as having taken part in the American Revolution.” But 
this identity, Remond suggests, has its limitations. “I have no disposition now to detract 
from those efforts,” he says, “further than to say they were misplaced. The patriotism of 
the colored man of ’76 has been repaid by the most base ingratitude on the part of the 
white people of this country, that the history of the world records” (43). The Civil War, 
he contends, is less continuous with the American Revolution than it is a reckoning with 
its failed realization. With this distinction foregrounded, Remond at lasts cites the specter 
of racial phobia in relation to the message he hopes to convey.  
I believe, my friends, that we have rights in this country, in spite of 
slavery and negrophobia, in spite of the American Constitution,—I believe 
we have rights against the world in argument, and believing this, I hold it 
to be our right and duty to defy the men and the bodies who shall, at this 
late hour, undertake still to crush us in the dust. [The text here signals a 
break for ‘Applause.’] The time is coming when this battle is to be fought. 
As I said before, let us resolve, in this Hall, that when the hour shall come, 
we shall be found I the foremost ranks, with our faces, not our backs, to 
the foe. (43) 
With the retrospective as a general frame, Remond engages a complex sequence of events 
to which racial phobia is made to seem at once crucial—which is to say, capacious as a 
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referent, exceeding slavery in the extent of its damage—yet also somehow banal enough 
to require no exposition. Rather than open onto satirical wordplay or an interrogation of 
America’s political unconscious, the word’s rhetorical posturing seems most evocative in 
its proximity to a revolutionary “spite.” Whatever its permutations, the concept remains 
valuable to Remond as a signifier of a disingenuous national mythology.   
 Counterintuitively, perhaps, I have used this section to explore articles that are 
actually rather phenomenal at the level of rhetoric, despite the casual appeals to 
Negrophobia in their conclusions. The New-York Daily Tribune article unfolds both a 
moving and scathing critique of U.S. foreign policy by sustaining the poetic device of 
epistrophe, reminding readers in each concluding segment of a particular policy’s crude 
and arbitrary racial basis. Meanwhile, Remond’s speech offers a competing historical 
retrospective on the American Revolution, reminding his audience that commemorating 
the death of Crispus Attucks can only be hypocritical, so long as the struggle for liberty 
and human rights is celebrated as complete, rather than a struggle underway and 
unfinished. However, it is precisely because colorphobia seems so unessential as an 
analytic in these writings that we should take note of the etymological shift they 
represent. On the one hand, they convey the familiarity of their writers with 
abolitionism’s lexical landscape, and thus continue the work of signposting political 
solidarity between author, reader, and listener. Nevertheless, they also beg a question that 
preceding antislavery pieces, premised on elaborating the concept as an extended 
allegory, took care to preempt: the classic editorial gadfly, what is this word doing for 
you exactly?  
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{CODA II} 
 
 
 
CRAZY, IN LOVE: NEGROPHILIA’S PARALLEL HEMISPHERIC HISTORY 
 
 In the next chapter, I will explore other important ways in which the rhetorical of 
racial phobia evolved across the late 1840s, 1850s and 1860s. Before digging deeper into 
this history, however, I want to step through a looking glass of sorts, to explore the 
complex temporality of certain neighboring concepts—specifically, Negromania and 
Negrophilia—which would eventually draw significance from the antislavery turn to 
racial phobia, yet which also preceded –phobia’s robust emergence in abolitionist 
newspapers elsewhere in the Atlantic world. These neighboring concepts would likewise 
straddle a shifting distance between satire and diagnosis. Exploring how these terms 
sometimes did, yet at other times did not, supplement phobia’s signification with 
rhetorical attachments (intimate, contentious, estranged, and otherwise) thus offers a new 
avenue for pursuing a queer philology of antebellum affect as well. If, as I have 
suggested, we may conceptualize rabies as a kind of self-germinating parent, from which 
phobia split into a variable suffix—a rebellious offshoot that, in turn, found a second 
home in abolitionist print networks of the U.S. North—so may we pursue related affects 
in American letters as an array of queer friends, acquaintances, and nemeses, from which 
colorphobia drew a composite sensibility. Rather than building genealogically, moreover, 
we find that to understand how antebellum emotions such as phobia, mania, and philia 
built upon and diverged from one another, we must be prepared to move not only forward 
into apparent avenues of descent, but also backwards, through disparate geographies, as 
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well as sideways in time, even as the continuity of that laterality may prove difficult to 
track in concrete terms.  
Proslavery newspapers in the U.S. South would eventually take note of the new 
fashion for the phobia metaphor and occasionally tried to undermine its popularity 
directly. One of the best illustrations of this return fire is a piece titled “Negromania,” 
published in Virginia’s Richmond Republican, which (against Benjamin Rush’s earlier 
use of the neologism to psychologize slaveholding) describes abolitionist circles as 
suffering from a mad obsession with color. “If ever a nation had reason to be sick and 
tired of a subject,” the piece begins, “this nation has cause to be nauseated to death with 
the negrophobia.” Soon it becomes evident the author means not race prejudice itself, but 
rather Negrophobia as a ubiquitous diagnosis. Comparing the obsession with 
Negrophobia to a “monomania” and “hypochondria,” the piece paints for readers the 
following scene: 
You open a Northern newspaper. Its articles are nearly all devoted to 
negroism. Its thoughts are as black as its type. You go to a political 
meeting.—The genius of universal emancipation is flapping his wings 
from the rostrum….You go home to bed, and your very dreams are of the 
same sombre color. From morn till night; from night till morn; all is black, 
black, black; and if the thoughts and sentiments could give a color to the 
skin, we should expect to see the whole nation of Yankeedom present to-
morrow [sic] the richest field imaginable for ‘charcoal sketches.’ 
No escape is possible, the author laments: so obsessed have abolitionists become, it is a 
wonder their skin has not yet fallen into rank and become as black as their “type” and 
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“thoughts.” The point of the thought experiment is to return the favor the of antislavery’s 
diagnosis. “Is not Abolition madness?” the author asks at another moment. Perhaps the 
most interesting effect of the piece is that the disease it describes, an epidemic called 
“black monomania,” has in a sense already been coopted by the rhetoric around 
colorphobia itself, which described not merely a fear, after all, but a dreadful kind of 
cathexis in its own right. That is, in its breathless exasperation, the article slips in spite of 
its protestations into its own kind of black monomania—an obsessive incredulousness at 
the growing interracial political faction being cultivated by abolitionists. By the end, the 
author’s rhetoric has devolved into apocalyptic foreshadowing: “Who can listen to the 
daily outpourings of negrophobia, without feeling that in the political Eden of this 
Republic the Spirit of Darkness is upon his walk, clothed in an angel’s robes of 
philanthropy, yet preaching up the same lessons of revolt and disobedience which first 
led to the downfall of our race?” At least one abolitionist newspaper appears to have 
found the assessment of racial phobia’s rhetorical force gratifying. So entertained by the 
complaint were editors Lydia Maria and David Child of the National Anti-Slavery 
Standard, they reprinted the article for their readers in full.  
 At the same time, the Richmond Republican article shows how the rhetoric of 
racialized psychologies had begun to straddle divergent impulses: the artful inhabitation 
of a satirical case formalism, and the fleeting satisfaction of epithetical dismissal. The 
author’s point, after all, is not merely to unfold abolitionism’s abuses, but to combat the 
Negrophobia neologism with Negromania as a kind of stigmatizing marker. This instinct 
to stigmatize by way of epithet would materialize more fully by way of still another 
coinage in antebellum writing—a category English-speaking Americans referred to as 
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“Negrophilism.” Unlike the short-lived mania moniker, Negrophilism became a widely 
referenced concept in Anglophone, Hispanophone, and Francophone literature alike in 
the early 1800s. In the U.S., the term’s commonest usage emerged in proslavery 
arguments for the sake of developing a counterpunch to the growing popularity of racial 
phobia as an abolitionist category of analysis. An article published in Putnam’s Monthly 
in 1854 went so far as to describe abolitionist Negrophilism as a condition of conscious 
malingering, whereby “Abolition Munchausens” were dedicating “their imaginations and 
their energies to the concoction and extensive circulation in the North of the grossest 
misrepresentations of the Southern people” (638). The term gained traction in the 
Caribbean too. Journalist Jane Cazneau takes note of the concept’s Spanish pronunciation 
in her autobiographical Eagle Pass; Or, Life on the Border (1852), referencing 
“negrophilo” as “a word the Cubans have lately coined” (Cazneau 26). Perhaps the most 
famous use of the concept in U.S. writing appears in Edgar Allan Poe’s 1845 review of 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s “Poems on Slavery.” Criticizing the volume, Poe 
concludes that the poems must have been written for “the especial use of those 
negrophilic old ladies of the north, who form so large a part of Mr. Longfellow’s 
friends.” A soundbite impressive in its ability to pack racism, sexism, and ageism into the 
space of a few words, its sting lay in Poe’s allusion to Negrophobia’s intuitive opposite: a 
pathology of love, clearly replete with erotic undertones. A term Poe has been credited 
with coining (Pollin 39), “negrophilic” attests all the more actively in its adjectival 
function to the growing popularity of the epithet as a tool for navigating political 
affiliation and dissent. In concluding this chapter, I want to suggest that our 
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understanding of colorphobia’s antebellum traction remains unfinished until 
Negrophilia’s uses have also been teased apart.41  
As Negrophilia’s popularity as an epithet spread in certain circles, so was it 
reclaimed by abolitionists in other accounts, not unlike queer and racial reclamations 
familiar to us today along the lines of what Michel Foucault famously called “reverse 
discourse.” In 1852, for example, Cuban abolitionist Andrés Avelino de Orihuela would 
proudly claim “negrófilo” in a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe, as a condition fitting for 
an “abolicionista”—a letter Orihuela went on to include as a prefatory document to his 
Spanish translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, La Cabaña del Tío Tom (Orihuela 2). At the 
same time, while U.S. interlocutors deployed Negrophilism in direct dialogue with the 
rhetoric of racial phobia, its etymology on a transatlantic scale had also developed with 
some independence, especially in earlier decades. Here, it becomes useful to go back in 
time a bit, to a moment when, in fact, the discourse around colorphobia had not quite 
begun to take off in U.S. political debate. Without question, the most evocative piece of 
fiction to thematize the discourse around Negrophilia at length in the antebellum period 
would appear in French and English alike just before the discourse around phobia began 
trending in U.S. newspapers in the mid-1830s. Published in French in 1826, and later in 
English by a Philadelphia press in 1833, Victor Hugo’s novel documenting the origins of 
the Haitian Revolution, Bug-Jargal, features as one of its main characters a villain the 
narrator refers to simply as “the Negrophile.” 
                                                
41 For other articles exploring Negrophilism in a U.S. context, see “British Philanthropy 
and American Slavery” authored by “a Southern lady” in Debow’s Review, vol. 14, 1853; 
and “Equality of the Races—Haytien and British Experiments,” published in Debow’s 
Review, vol. 25, 1858.  
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In its immediate anticipation of the phobia phenomenon in U.S. abolitionism, the 
English translation of Bug-Jargal published in Philadelphia in 1833 occupies a vague 
relation to the discourse discussed above—a relation I will speculate upon further below. 
Before getting to these questions, however, it will be worth considering the novel on its 
own terms, as American readers would have encountered its lexical experimentation. As 
scholars have noted, Bug-Jargal was penned by a young, politically conservative-royalist 
Hugo (just twenty-four years of age in 1826). Nonetheless, as Susan Gillman notes, “the 
novel can’t seem to make up its mind about the slave revolt it represents so self-
consciously” (377). Commencing toward the onset of the Bois Caïman uprising in 
August 1791, a common origin story for histories of the revolution, the novel puts on full 
display a sinister corruption on both sides of the conflict, missing no opportunity to 
expose the naïve, indulgent abuses of the slaveholding elite, while also situating the 
novel’s fiercest drama in sadistic revenge plots orchestrated by ex-slave revolutionaries. 
The only “good” characters—white protagonist, Léopold D’Auverney, and the African-
born king Pierrot, known to fellow revolutionaries as the fierce leader (a la Toussiant 
Louverture) named Bug-Jargal—turn out to be tragic heroes, who find ways to preserve 
interracial friendship and the promise of progress only to perish by the novel’s 
conclusion. External to their friendship, Hugo’s novel unfolds a chilling chaos of 
slaughter and betrayal.42 In documenting the multilinguality of the novel, which shifts 
                                                
42 Katherine M. Bonin has argued that Bug-Jargal is a deeply contradictory novel for 
important reasons. Published first as a short story in 1820, then expanded into a novel by 
1826, Bug-Jargal represents the shifting perspectives of its author across this time. As 
Bonin notes, “Hugo emphatically stated his opposition to revising his early works, on 
principle” (194). Specifically, it is known that during the 1820s and early 1830s, Hugo 
regularly made it known that he didn’t believe in altering previously published works in 
new or expanded editions. In short, Bonin explains, Hugo was beginning to view his 
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frequently from French into Spanish and Creole expressions (a plurality compounded 
further in English translations), Gillman has suggested that one of Bug-Jargal’s strongest 
themes is the interleaving of miscommunication across verbal exchanges. As Gillman 
puts it, “The novel thus registers the complex politics of transatlantic, interracial dialogue 
over this period and compresses France’s continuing engagement with the Haitian 
Revolution and Afro-Creole independence into the linguistic registers of the translational 
novel” (377). In short, the conflict of the revolution cannot finally be disentangled from 
the multi- and cross-lingual interactions by which it transpires as narrative. Gillman thus 
observes further that the “language politics of Hugo’s novel interject an unstable 
perspective on the history of race and the timeline of revolution in the Americas” (384). 
Yet while Bug-Jargal’s language has been given sustained attention in Gillman and 
elsewhere, critics have yet to tackle the philology behind one of Hugo’s most memorable 
characters, “the Negrophile,” whose very title (a neologism occasioned by abolitionist 
debate) speaks directly to this fluidity and fungibility of language in the making of race 
and interracial affiliations.  
As Chris Bongie notes in his 2004 English translation of Bug-Jargal, Hugo’s 
Negrophile character, referred to at other moments in the novel as “the citizen-general,” 
indexes Hugo’s familiarity with the writings of the French abolitionist Abbé Grégoire. In 
De la Littérature des Négres (1808), Grégoire observed of his proslavery opponents: 
                                                                                                                                            
“body of work” as an “æuvres completes,” which needed to maintain “its original form as 
a kind of public archive, possessing ‘cette sorte de valeur historique qui s'attache à tous 
les documents honnêtes où se retrouve la physionomie d'une époque.’” In light of Hugo’s 
authorial perspective, Bonin concludes of Bug-Jargal: “This painfully self- contradictory 
novel is better understood, not as a reflection of the author's putative monarchist or 
liberal, pro- or anti-slavery convictions, but rather as an exploration of the relationship 
between language and the exercise of power” (194). 
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“They have created the epithets of negrophile and blancophage [eater of whites] in the 
hope of sullying their opponents. Their assumption is that every friend of the Blacks is an 
enemy of the whites and of France, and in the pay of England” (72-3). Claiming 
affiliation with French philosophers and philanthropists of Grégoire’s political 
persuasion, Hugo’s Negrophile introduces himself toward the beginning of the novel by 
donning the appellation nonchalantly. However, in Hugo’s characterization, the 
Negrophile represents the worst kind of hypocrisy—posturing himself as a learned friend 
of the enslaved, while keeping five-hundred slaves himself and practicing the grossest 
violences and despotic strategies to quell insurrection on the horizon. Introducing himself 
at a General Assembly toward the beginning of the novel, the citizen advises fellow 
plantation owners, “Let us punish—not fight” (60). He proceeds to recount an incident 
earlier that year when, to curtail rebellion on his plantation, he beheaded fifty slaves and 
mounted their heads on palm trees along the avenue to his estate. The narrator tells us 
halfway through his remarks, “This execrable speech was heard with horror” (61). Yet 
Hugo casts the citizen-general in still a more disturbing light when the figure proceeds by 
defending his reputation with a mixture of name-dropping and twisted self-righteousness. 
As the other attendees cry out “Abominable!” and “Dreadful! dreadful!” in reply, the 
citizen-general continues: 
My character, surely, is above suspicion; for I am a zealous negrophile, 
and correspond with all the noblest spirits of the age: with Brissot and 
Pruneau de Pomme-Gouge in France; with Hans Sloane in England; with 
Magain in America; with Pezil in Germany; with Olivarus in Denmark 
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with Wadstrohm in Sweden; with Peter Paulus in Holland; with Avendano 
in Spain; and with the Abbe Pierre Tamburini in Italy! (61) 
Most notable in the speech, of course, is its stark non-sequitur: crudely, the citizen 
situates his empty claim to a political Negrophilia next to a vague list of correspondents, 
the implication being that the company he keeps is testament enough to his moral 
soundness. His vernacular familiarity with transnational dialogue on the subject of 
slavery, paired with a claim to be one of that dialogue’s distinguished participants, thus 
establishes the two fundamental nodes of his characterization. The narrator tells us, “The 
citizen-general seemed to rise in his self-esteem as he proceeded in the catalogue, and, 
when he had pronounced the last name, he added, with a sigh, ‘But here we have no 
philosophes!’” (61). Following this moment, the self-selected appellation sticks; in one of 
the novel’s most disturbing ironies, the citizen-general becomes “the Negrophile” for the 
duration of his appearance in Hugo’s narration.  
 Ultimately, Hugo uses this character to dramatize the novel’s most perfect and 
sensational reversal of power once the rebellion commences. We meet the character again 
when he has been captured and brought to the revolution’s clever and bloodthirsty 
Generalissimo Biassou. Immediately, the citizen-general devolves into spineless 
groveling. Biassou answers his captive, “Why, thou art an aristocrat” (119). The citizen 
assures Biassou of his ready allegiance in turn. “Oh no, indeed,” he explains, “I am…a 
fervent negrophile.” Catching the unfamiliar pseudonym Biassou cries back, 
“Negrophile! what is a negrophile?” The citizen replies hesitantly, “Why, it is—it is….a 
friend to the blacks.” Sensing what he is up to, Biassou moves to draw the citizen into a 
cat-and-mouse game of intimidation: 
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   ‘[S]o thou are not a friend to men of colour?’  
‘It is men of colour I meant to say,’ answered the negrophile 
submissively, ‘and in proof of that, I am connected with all the most 
famous partizans [sic] of the negroes and mulattoes—’ 
‘Negroes and mulattoes!’ exclaimed Biassou—‘Dost thou come 
here to insult us with these vile and odious names, which thy race has 
invented in token of contempt of ours? Know, sirrah, that we are men of 
colour, and blacks—do you understand, monsieur le colon?’ 
‘Pardon me, pardon me, monseignor; I did not mean to offend: it is 
merely a bad habit, contracted in childhood’…. 
‘Let alone thy monseignor—I repeat that I love not such 
aristocratic forms.’ (119-20) 
By the end of the exchange, the narrator explains, “The poor negrophile was at his wits’ 
end,” clueless as to how he should address this individual “who rejected…the language of 
the aristocrats and the patriots” (120). The citizen has met his oratorical match and then 
some: Biassou at once mirrors his captive’s penchant for semantic acrobatics and, in so 
doing, exposes the citizen’s favorite equivocations to be laughable when put to the test. It 
is subsequent to this moment, however, that we at last begin to get a sense of where Hugo 
is heading with the Négrophilie theme, in particular. The erotic undertones of the epithet 
surface as Biassou decides to see how far the citizen’s passivity will go. “So thou lovest 
the blacks and the mulattoes, dost thou!” Biassou shouts. “Love them! that I do,” the 
captive cries. Biassou tells the Negrophile he will let him live as long as he agrees to be 
his page—to ready his “pipe” whenever he requests it and to follow him at all times with 
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a “fan of peacock and parrot-feathers” (125). The sycophant readily submits “with a 
thousand demonstrations of gratitude and joy.” Yet here, at last, Biassou reveals he 
knows more than he has been letting on. He knows well who the Negrophile is, including 
the crimes the he has committed against the enslaved on his own estate. Having driven 
the Negrophile to this basest sort of docility, Biassou finally condemns the prisoner to 
death. 
 The dark comedy of Hugo’s scene rests upon the dramatic irony of the 
Negrophile’s fate. Yet, as multiple critics have noted regarding the novel as a whole, 
Bug-Jargal has much more going on than mere irony and cathartic indulgence. Another 
line Biassou delivers in his back-and-forth with the Negrophile may provide the best clue 
as to why Hugo chooses to identify one of his main characters with such a duplicitous 
moniker. As the citizen scrambles to find the right title for addressing Biassou early in 
their dialogue, he lands eventually on the reciprocal title “citizen” (120). At this, Biassou 
lashes out in an informative tirade. “Citizen! citizen!” he exclaims to the Negrophile. 
“what does the fellow mean? or for whom does he take me? Thy jacobinical jargon grates 
upon my ear still worse than thy aristocratic.” Biassou conveys a similar sentiment a 
couple of pages later. After urging the Negrophile to prove his loyalty by putting him in 
contact with wealthy merchants, he receives this reply: “Hero of humanity! it is not 
merchants with whom I am connected, it is with philanthropists, philosophers and 
negrophiles” (122-3). Biassou retorts, “[H]ere he comes again with his unintelligible 
words: speak plain, man” (123). In both scenes, the citizen fails to realize how hollow his 
rhetoric sounds in the direst of contexts. In trying to save himself from being executed, he 
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can only drop names his captors have never heard of and self-identify ad nauseam with 
his favorite trending slogan. 
 Undoubtedly, there is something that borders on anti-intellectualism in this 
caricature of philosophes and philanthropists as fools. Moreover, there is something 
disingenuous, on Hugo’s part, in the association of an epithet used primarily to demean 
abolitionism with such a morally bankrupt antagonist. Still, this suspicion should not 
prevent us from deriving an important critique from Hugo’s interrogation of the invention 
of fashionable political lexicons. Bongie has suggested that Hugo’s interrogation of 
“jargon” is at the very heart of Bug-Jargal. Offering an interpretation of Bug-Jargal’s 
title, Bongie riffs, “If the hyphenated (or, we might say, hybridized) word ‘Bug-Jargal’ 
initially appears to make no sense when taken as a whole, a certain sense can be gleaned 
from it if we begin by reading its two parts as separate words. It is not difficult, for 
instance, to recognize the presence of the word ‘jargon’ in the unrecognizable ‘Jargal’” 
(11). Bongie goes on to note that the word “jargon,” which appears seven times over the 
course of the novel, would have carried at least four connotations in Hugo’s day, each 
spelled out in Littré’s nineteenth-century French dictionary, including (1) “corrupted 
language”; (2) “a foreign language that one doesn’t understand”; (3) “a particular 
language adopted by certain people”; and (4) “language with a double meaning’” (qtd. in 
Bongie 12).43 Bongie pursues this theme to demonstrate, like Gillman, the “chaotic world 
                                                
43 Hugo’s interest in the linguistic function of jargon has been addressed by Heather Turo 
as well. Turo writes, “Of the many hypotheses that exist about the title, the one that is 
most salient, in terms of a language narrative, would be jargal, the false cognate to 
jargon” (170). Like other readers of Bug-Jargal, Turo uses this phonetic relation to open 
onto a reading of the novel’s multilinguality. Turo observes, “Whether or not Bug comes 
from the long vowel and velar plosive sounds found in Hugo—thus making the title 
Hugo-Jargon—does not matter so much in a language narrative as long as it is someone’s 
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of words-in-translation” that animates Bug-Jargal, contending that Hugo’s narration itself 
regularly loses control. I would argue that Hugo’s resistance to jargon, as channeled 
through Biassou, helps illuminate the Negrophile’s significance as well. The strongest 
theme tied to the Negrophile’s demise is not simply that words are cheap, but rather that 
language’s potential to demarcate political affiliation is never stable, but instead seismic, 
subject to quick reversals, and hazardous—even more so when that language begins to 
serve as an opaque shortcut to self-authored moral elevation. In such instances, a word 
that might elsewhere animate terms of critique slips easily into obscure, equivocating 
jargon. For the Negrophile, this failure to unfold his appellation into something tangible 
and accessible (not to mention authentic) becomes not just the sign of his villainy, but 
also the vehicle of his ruin.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In light of Negrophilia’s parallel history, I conclude this chapter with the 
following question: is there anything to be gleaned from Bug-Jargal to enhance our 
reading of the rhetorical turn to colorphobia in U.S. abolitionism? To pose the question 
another way, how should we understand the relationship between colorphobia—a 
category of analysis fashioned in the form of satirical diagnostic and metaphor, which 
only subsequently began to distill into a pithy euphemism—and Negrophilism, designed 
from the outset to function essentially as a dismissive epithet? What kinds of speech acts 
                                                                                                                                            
jargon, and in the case of this novel, we can interpret jargon as a reference to Haitian 
Creole, which serves as a linguistic springboard for a plethora of metaphors” (170). 
While interested in this relationship as well, I would argue that it is important not to 
equate Hugo’s “jargon” to multilinguality. In Biassou’s usage, the goal is clearly to 
critique jargon as an elevated form of language, designed to demarcate educated 
fraternities who traffic in highbrow ideals rather than concrete politics.  
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do they describe, and what are their separate (or mutual) relations to the philological 
terrain Hugo demarcates as “jargon”? In light of the hydrophobia analogy, which 
animated the phobia phenomenon as it began to capture the imagination of transatlantic 
reading publics, it would clearly be a mistake to dismiss the differences between these 
terms as merely ideological. Their differences are also formal, epistemological, aesthetic, 
and tonal, to name just a few parameters integral to understanding the antislavery 
archives explored above. But how then should we describe the interrelation between 
colorphobia and Negrophilia as speech acts, both formulated to intervene in slavery 
debates by inventing addictive linguistic indices to do political work at the level of 
affect?  
 In Excitable Speech (1997), Judith Butler unfolds a theory of language by 
pursuing a new take on the relation between forces J. L. Austin famously called 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The abridged version of Austin’s theory tends to go 
as follows: the illocutionary function of language occurs whenever speech achieves its 
purpose in and of itself (for instance, a warning, promise, or declaration), while the purest 
perlocutionary function occurs when a speech act effects some change or consequence 
beyond its immediate content. Yet, as Butler notes, this definition of the illocutionary as a 
self-sufficient identity between speech act and purpose is easily misconstrued when 
conceptualized in a vacuum. The caveat underlying the status of the illocutionary is that it 
can only occur so long as there exist agreed upon “conventions” capable of being 
discerned “at the moment” of a corresponding “utterance” (3). For Austin, these 
conventions exist within larger “ritual or ceremonial” structures. Thus, Butler explains, 
“As utterances, [illocutionary speech acts] work to the extent that they are given in the 
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form of a ritual, that is, repeated in time, and hence, maintain a sphere of operation that is 
not restricted to the moment of the utterance itself.” The “moment” in which speech act 
and purpose coincide is, more accurately, a “condensed historicity,” which “exceeds itself 
in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and 
escape the instance of utterance.” Perhaps the first relevance of Butler’s emphasis on 
historicity to the rhetorical phenomena discussed above will here become evident: 
antislavery print media in the Americas shows us a ritual in the making, fragmented 
among nascent connotations competing to become convention. Before turning directly to 
this application, however, it is worth thinking with Butler further. Most important to the 
temporal paradox she unfolds, regarding the definition of the illocutionary function as a 
phenomenon of immediacy, is that this immediacy is only tentatively propped up by a 
transmomentary excess, a kind of historical refuse, which at once underlies illocutionary 
potential and begs by virtue of its rituality to be effaced.   
 Butler opens up this problematic in Excitable Speech to expose the more specific 
concerns of what she calls the “fault lines” intrinsic to the illocutionary function of hate 
speech, a concept she refers to primarily as “injurious speech.” By fault lines, Butler 
means the chasms in signification opened by the illocutionary function’s equivocating 
appeal to immediacy. Here, Butler gives us a way to understand the linguistic work done 
by epithets, in particular. On the one hand, the fault lines characteristic of illocutionary 
acts help illuminate the damage to which injurious speech aspires. To the extent that 
injurious speech functions as a kind of ritual, without needing to give an account of its 
formation as such, Butler concludes, “To be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of 
context, that is, not to know where you are” (4). Butler explains further that what is 
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“[e]xposed” in such an interaction “is precisely the volatility of one’s ‘place’ within the 
community of speakers; one can be ‘put in one’s place’ by such speech, but such a place 
may be no place” (4). Yet if these fault lines, in fact, are what make injurious speech 
fathomable, they can also be a source of its undoing. If the immediate designs of 
injurious speech belong necessarily, paradoxically to a temporality in the making, so 
must they also be subject to the volatility they purport to inflict, or what Butler describes 
as a “discursive performativity that is not a discrete series of speech acts, but a ritual 
chain of resignifications whose origin and end remain unfixed and unfixable” (14). Butler 
contends that this space of antagonism between iteration and an accumulating context 
paves the way for contaminant etymologies to intervene. She writes, “Such a loosening of 
the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a 
kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link” (15). Thus 
the historicity of injurious speech, its dependence on an accumulation of context, 
becomes also the sign of an accumulating frailty. In the context of tracking colorphobia’s 
evolution as an antislavery analytic, specifically, Butler’s formulation reminds us that 
phobia’s satirical turn emerged in just such a context, finding an opportunity in the 
vicinity of an accumulation of proslavery speech acts to develop a counter-speech, one 
capable of breaking open slavery’s constitutive fissures. 
 Along similar lines, we might contend that, in a U.S. context, Negrophilism 
represents the failed attempt of proslavery periodicals to mitigate, and imitate, phobia’s 
infectious popularity. In Francophone texts, we find that Négrophilie emerged, by 
contrast, as a kind of hate speech largely untethered to phobia’s counter-punch. Even so, 
Hugo’s interrogation of jargon as a particular kind of political tactic implicates these 
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neologisms, transgeographically and translinguistically, in the same lexical camp. What 
links them, we might argue, is not their proximity to injury so much as their particular 
manifestation as speech, in their navigation of illocutionary and perlocutionary forces. In 
each case, as neologisms, such concepts assumed the basic illocutionary function of 
naming their political milieu. In other words, they not only framed debates over slavery 
as a contest of pathological affects, but did the work, moreover, of situating that affective 
context around embryonic lexical indices. In Hugo’s account, it is precisely this tactic 
that risks sounding esoteric, alienating, or even vapid when inserted for the sake of 
expediency. Words that would seem to gesture evidently enough to a desired 
perlocutionary effect (the fortification of political solidarity), take instead an aspect of 
flippant inscrutability, where naming threatens nearly to become an end in itself.  
 As documented above, the rhetoric around racial phobia was hardly fated to this 
illocutionary dead end. Rather, in creating a new convention, colorphobia’s rhetorical 
turn assumed an innovative formalism, transforming a punning sensibility into a dynamic 
satirical case genre, through which an affective metaphor could be summoned repeatedly, 
in ever-unfolding permutations. We arrive at a curious irony: the greatest attenuating 
force compromising phobia’s use value over time seems to have been its very success at 
becoming commonplace, which is to say its evolution into a euphemism needing no 
introduction. In discerning how phobia’s usage began to distill into a convenient 
placeholder, I want to conclude this chapter by observing an affinity between Butler’s 
perspective on the condensed historicity of illocutionary acts, and an antebellum writer 
who made some comparable formulations in 1844. In his influential essay “The Poet,” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson takes a moment to observe that the higher calling of the 
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etymologist lies in this purpose: to “find[] the deadest word to have been once a brilliant 
picture.” “Language is fossil poetry,” Emerson goes on to elaborate. “As the limestone of 
the continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so language is made 
up of images, or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us 
of their poetic origin.” One of the most remarkable qualities of the corpus I have aimed to 
uncover here is that it offers a sequence of apertures onto this phenomenon of 
sedimentation. Adapting Emerson, we might describe phobia’s antebellum uses as having 
first thrived on a gothic lyricism that has since become fossilized—a lyricism designed, 
in its purest form, to explore boundaries of human civility by satirizing the readiness of 
allegedly democratic publics to foam at the mouth. The loss of phobia’s figurative 
reverberations since this earlier dynamism, as a hybrid affect uniting irrational fear with 
canine rabidity, shows us a real-time unfolding of this process, described in Emerson as 
language’s preemptive decay into a sign of loss. This is not to say that phobia’s lexical 
sedimentation neared anything like completion by the end of the Civil War; rather, its 
divergent uses persisted in contest with one another. Yet, in this persistence, we discover 
one of the most significant tensions in an antebellum phobic imagination taking root—the 
tendency, on the one hand, for phobia to trend toward the status of jargon, and, on the 
other, to keep surfacing in public consciousness as an assemblage of divergent, 
allegorical elaborations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REVULSION, FOR STOWE: 
NEGROPHOBIA VS. NEGRO-EQUALITY-PHOBIA IN DRED:  
A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP 
 
 
There is no principle so awful through all nature as the principle of growth. It is 
a mysterious and dread condition of existence, which, place it under what 
impediment or disadvantage you will, is constantly forcing on; and when 
unnatural pressure hinders it, develops in forms portentous and astonishing.  
 
- Harriet Beecher Stowe, Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, Volume 2 
 
  
 
Following an analysis of Victor Hugo’s personification of a hypocritical 
Negrophilia in Bug-Jargal, an obvious question descends on this study: did the rise of a 
phobic imagination in U.S. abolition produce any corresponding aesthetic tradition unto 
itself, beyond the editorial conventions I have documented thus far? The following 
chapter will aim to answer this question. In fact, U.S. abolitionists created not just a 
rhetorical tradition around the analysis of race prejudice and slavery’s motivating 
pathologies, but also an aesthetic archive to match, including poetry, visual media, and 
fiction, all of which this chapter will explore in depth. At the same time, we find in 
navigating these aspects of antislavery print culture that the rhetoric surrounding 
colorphobia was not especially easy to transform into aesthetic production. Shorter 
modes, such as poetry and satirical cartoons prove to have been somewhat easier, likely 
because they required less of a sustained commitment on the part of an artist’s audience. 
These short forms capitalized, we might conclude, on what Edgar Allan Poe famously 
described in “The Philosophy of Composition” (1846) as a “unity of impression,” made 
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possible by the relative brevity of interaction they solicited from readers: they could 
excite the idea of phobia by way of some sudden, spectacular mechanism, then conclude 
just as quickly. Long fiction, it appears, presented a more difficult task, in that it required 
a nuanced synthesis of protracted, intermittent engagements (a perfect recipe, in Poe’s 
estimation, for the fragmentation of literary impression) with an affective register still 
very much in the making, as the previous chapter has endeavored to show in depth. While 
I have attended primarily to the matter of the linguistic parameters of colorphobia thus 
far, it will be the argument of this chapter that searching out U.S. antislavery’s best 
novelistic representation of a phobic aesthetic provides an opportunity, moreover, to 
consider the influence of racial phobia, as an identifiable social force, on the way 
abolitionists conceptualized emotion broadly as a political tool. 
Antislavery literature offers a couple of strong contenders in the way of novelistic 
representation. One is a novel William Lloyd Garrison would nominate himself, in one of 
the most widely circulated essays of his career, “The Infidelity of Abolitionism,” first 
printed in 1855. Seizing the first half of the essay as an opportunity to try his own hand at 
describing colorphobia’s sinister influence, Garrison begins by referencing a vague “It” 
across multiple paragraphs: 
[I]t has engendered and established a complexional caste…pervading all 
parts of the United States like a malaria-tainted atmosphere; in its 
development more malignant at the North than at the South; poisoning the 
life-blood of the most refined and the most depraved alike; and making the 
remotest connection with the colored race a leprous taint. (202) 
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A disease cultivated by slavery, yet which has spread north as well, Garrison’s “It” 
finally finds a name in the essay’s sixth paragraph: an “all-prevailing color-phobia, the 
dreadful consequence of chattel slavery.” In the midst of this rhetorical buildup, Garrison 
inserts a curious asterisk to signal a footnote. In the footnote, Garrison recommends a 
novel recently published by Maine writer and antislavery advocate Mary Hayden Pike. 
“For an unexaggerated picture” of colorphobia’s “natural operations” in the U.S., 
Garrison observes, “see the thrilling work entitled ‘Caste, A Story of Republican 
Equality” (202). With emphasis on the novel’s accuracy as well as its narrative merit, 
Garrison suggests that here, at last, a writer has produced a novel that does justice to the 
racial phobia abolitionist newspapers had been addressing for the last two decades. 
Interestingly, what we find in turning to Caste is that nowhere does Pike use the rhetoric 
of racial phobia outright. In searching for a clue to explain Garrison’s appraisal, the most 
likely reason appears to be Pike’s interest in depicting the psychological depths of 
proslavery. This interest comes through toward the conclusion of the novel in a passage 
where Pike compares the project of her novel to a legend passed down from the days of 
the Salem witch trials. Seized and “tossed with her broomstick in a blanket ‘seventy 
times as high as the moon,’” one witch was rumored to have “answered the hootings” of 
her “mob” with “a prophetic assurance that she would ‘sweep the cobwebs out of the 
sky’” (Pike 540). Identifying with the witch, Pike notes that while “children laugh at the 
joke and heed not the allegory,” the reader who “looks thoughtfully down the vista of the 
past can see how, one by one, the ideas that darkened the mental firmament have been 
torn away, and the closed nooks, where dust and cobwebs gather, laid open to the light of 
truth” (Pike’s emph.). In this final passage, Pike brings the allegorical and psychological 
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dimensions of her novel into this hybrid imaginative space. The “mental firmament” she 
intends to sweep and expose to the “light of truth” speaks to the psychological terrain 
Caste investigates more generally—terrain Garrison, in turn, took to be continuous with 
an interiority rooted in the pathology of racial phobia.  
 As for a more targeted novelistic engagement with phobia, there are still better 
candidates. The most tantalizing example is an excerpt from a novel that alludes to the 
discourse on phobia directly, yet which was never published in full, and may never have 
been completed. Accompanied by a tagline reading “Extract from an unpublished anti-
slavery work,” a piece carrying the title “American Colorphobia” appeared in The 
Liberator in 1859. A strange, conspicuously partial narrative, “American Colorphobia” 
describes a scene inside of a “saloon” on a steamer in which a light-skinned woman, 
accompanied by her two children, is discovered to be of African descent by fellow 
passengers, and thereafter ordered by the boat’s captain to remove herself from the room 
for the duration of the voyage. When the mother refuses, explaining to the captain that 
there is a storm outside and that she has “bought a right to the place I occupy,” the drama 
of the situation begins to escalate until, at last, a strange figure named “Major Landon” 
intervenes. A wild, potentially unstable passenger, Landon answers the threats of the 
white mob against the mother and her children first by calling for his dog “Trusty.” With 
sarcasm, Landon explains to his companion,  
I know you are not an Abolitionist, Trusty; you have too much regard for 
the credit and respectability of the whole doggish race to be an 
Abolitionist, but you have the feelings of honor and love, Trusty, in your 
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heart, and I commend to your watch-care this lady and her little ones. Let 
no man come within three feet of them, on the peril of life. (68) 
Obediently, Trusty turns his attention to the crowd of white passengers: “his eyes, like 
moving balls of fire, turned every way, to guard the avenues of approach.” When 
someone from the mob suggests they shoot Trusty, Major Landon himself begins to 
transform, as though mirroring the madness of the mob instinctually. The narrator 
explains that, standing firm, Landon “began to grit his teeth and roll his eyes in a very 
appalling manner. Every eye was now turned upon him, and the conclusion was readily 
arrived at in every mind, that the man was mad—a dangerous maniac” (68). Alarmed at 
Landon’s sudden mutations, the mob disperses. Most interesting in the story is the way 
the hydrophobia metaphor essentially travels from the mob to the boat’s resident, militant 
abolitionist, Major Landon. The author’s implication, readers are left to intuit, is that, 
faced with a rampant colorphobia, antislavery’s best option might be to fight rabidity 
through imitation—which is to say, to fight phobia with some other, alternative 
manifestation of a hydrophobic disposition. The provocation is this: what uses might 
abolition itself have for a phobic aesthetic?  
In taking this provocation seriously, the present chapter will argue that efforts to 
aestheticize a phobic imagination fostered in antislavery nonfiction consistently found it 
necessary to navigate two poles well represented by Pike’s Caste and the anonymously 
published “American Colorphobia.” Writers found that one of the dominant tensions in 
the rhetoric of racial phobia had to do with the question of whether the discourse 
represented another offshoot of sentimentalism—the affective tradition with which 
abolitionism has generally been treated as coterminous—or something else, wherein a 
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phobic imagination might be pursued as potentially generative and politically meaningful 
in its own right. By the late 1840s, this tension became manifest across antislavery 
editorials too. Despite the popularity of colorphobia and Negrophobia as categories of 
analysis, a number of abolitionists began to challenge the implicit hypothesis they 
harbored: in short, that slavery was first and foremost a product of private, interior fear. 
One of the most striking criticisms, along these lines, targeted the pity embedded in 
colorphobia’s medicalization. To portray proslavery as a disease, certain writers began to 
suggest, was to give slavery the benefit of the doubt—to imagine that slaveholders were 
not in proper control of their emotions, and that slavery was merely an outgrowth of this 
psychological crisis. As I will show below, many who contested this implication did so 
by reactivating a satirical sensibility long familiar to the phobia metaphor, ventriloquizing 
the now established rhetoric of phobia in order to expose its deepest inadequacies.  
Alongside this critique, still other abolitionists who resisted colorphobia as a 
concept speculated that it foreshadowed a public sphere reduced to psychological pseudo-
diagnostics, where politics would have as its first responsibility the eradication of mental 
illness. It will be my final argument that no work of antebellum literature interrogated the 
rise of a phobic imagination among abolitionists more adeptly in these terms than Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, published four years after 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1856. Far from sentimentalizing or pathologizing fear, Stowe 
attempts throughout Dred to recuperate loathing and revulsion as political feelings worth 
galvanizing. To put it another way, much like the excerpt “American Colorphobia,” Dred 
pursues something we might justifiably identify as a phobic aesthetic. Most explicitly, 
Stowe stages this recuperation homonymically in the black outlaw protagonist Dred 
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himself, whose militant resistance in the swamplands around the Virginia-North Carolina 
border positions a swelling sense of dread, among slaveholders and their allies, as an 
affect vital to slave revolt. 
 
“OUR PITY BECOMES MODIFIED, BY AN ADMIXTURE OF CONTEMPT”: 
RETHINKING SENTIMENTALISM THROUGH/AS ABOLITIONIST PARODY 
 
Linking the diagnostic, figurative, and euphemistic uses of colorphobia explored 
in my second chapter was a shared hermeneutic, which situated fear as the root cause of 
racial bigotry. Locating an affective foundation for slavery allowed abolitionists to 
theorize the psychology of systemic oppression as belonging to an identifiable subjective 
state, and thus to counsel a therapeutic model for healing a divided nation. Not all 
abolitionists were satisfied by this idea. Another piece written for The North Star by John 
Dick titled “Colorphobia—Who Are Its Victims?” conveys candid doubt. “It is difficult 
to know,” Dick observes, “whether those who are afflicted with this disorder, are most to 
be pitied or despised.” While their “sufferings” and “torments” are certainly real, he 
continues, “when we consider that this is the result of ignorance—ignorance of the most 
deplorable description, which they might, if they had chosen, have prevented—our pity 
becomes, in some degree, modified by an admixture of contempt.” Implicit throughout 
the article is a resistance to framing proponents of the slave system as a naïve coterie of 
“victims.” Debate over this rhetorical turn spoke further to the matter of whether pity, as 
a progressive strategy, had any legitimate object in the malady phobia described.   
Along the lines of “Colorphobia—Who Are Its Victims?” some abolitionists 
began to interpret the turn to phobia as an uncritical gesture of sympathy. A call to 
sympathy was, indeed, fundamental to many accounts. One of the articles mentioned in 
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the previous chapter, “A New Kind of Phobia,” thus concludes its comparison of 
Negrophobia with hydrophobia by highlighting an essential point of departure: “There is 
one difference, however—the hydrophobiac patient is sure to die; the negrophobiac may 
get well—so that there is yet hope for our neighbor” (2). Another writer describes the 
afflicted as a group of severely “affected” “sensitive souls” (148).44 The appeal of phobia 
lay partly in an effort to reach a hand across a widening political chasm.45 To others, 
however, these expressions of sympathy signaled a misleading disavowal of proslavery 
agency, through which portraits of a sickly nation were being used to dilute urgent 
ideological conflict. 
Thus, we arrive at an important dilemma at the heart of this chapter: how should 
the discourse around colorphobia supplement or alter our understanding not just of an 
evolving abolitionist lexicon in the U.S., but of abolitionist affect as well? In many ways, 
Dick’s article taps into a familiar critique of American antislavery. Abolitionist affect has 
                                                
44 Cunningham, E.B.  “A Guilty Nation.”  The Liberator 9.37 (Sep. 13, 1839): 148. 
45 As a major trend in abolitionist newspapers, the rhetoric of colorphobia carried 
connotations of consciousness raising as well. In an interesting, early elaboration of the 
hydrophobia analogy in 1836, one writer thus conjures the following hypothetical 
situation: “Suppose that the southern states were full of mad dogs which were beginning 
to bite the people, and suppose we of the north were quite asleep to the matter, confident 
of our safety though exposed to danger, having in our hands the means both of prevention 
and cure, but quite ignorant of hydrophobia, and careless of the fate of our neighbors. 
And supposed it were the object of a lecturer to stir us up to act for the relief of others 
and our own salvation; would it not prodigiously increase his power, if in the course of 
his lecture half a dozen men, bitten by mad dogs, and foaming with canine madness, 
should rush in among his audience? There would be proof positive, not only that 
hydrophobia was a dreadful disease, but that his northern hearers were endangered by it. 
Now, in regard to slavery….we know, and can effectually illustrate, the diabolical horrors 
of the system which crushes our colored brethren at the south, by the malicious, mean 
and murderous outrages upon their humble advocates at the north” (“The Duty of 
Abolitionists” 1). With this appeal to the value of forging an anti-slavery didacticism, the 
author conjures the imagery of something like a public service announcement, by which 
individuals naïve to slavery’s abuses might be counseled toward healthful 
disillusionment. 
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long held a privileged place in the history of a literary movement defined by its emotional 
engagements: in short, the transatlantic movement known as sentimentalism, generally 
understood to have reached its apogee (some would say its nadir) in Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin (1852). A novel remembered for being the best-selling novel of the antebellum 
period, as well as for the role it played in fomenting disillusionment with the cruelties of 
slavery in advance of the Civil War, Uncle Tom’s Cabin famously built on a deep 
tradition in fiction writing, in which an indulgence in the emotional solicitations of novels 
became a cultural index of shared virtues. Here lay the hallmark of the sentimentalist’s 
aesthetic, a tradition familiar far beyond Stowe, via novels educating young women 
against sexual vice (such as Susanna Rowson’s 1791 Charlotte Temple), as well as 
literature documenting poverty in the context of growing industrialization (for instance, 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s “The Cry of the Children,” or Charles Dickens’ Oliver 
Twist). In short, it is through the familiar overlap between antislavery and 
sentimentalism—to which the article “Colorphobia—Who Are Its Victims?” is partly 
addressed—that abolitionist affect has a long history of being sidelined by scholars as 
uncritically mawkish and monotone. 
However, to better understand the intersection of affect and abolition, we need to 
pursue a reconsideration of what sentimentalism entails, in both a critical and historical 
sense, when invoked as a mode of political engagement. On the one hand, it is evident 
enough that the sentimentalism associated with Uncle Tom’s Cabin has to do with a 
lachrymose expression of sympathy, sorrow, and, to some extent, guilt. That is, the first 
rule of interacting with the novel is that one should be ready, in the most literal sense of 
the idiom, to have a “good cry”: a cry that proceeds organically insofar as the events 
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related in a given narrative tap into a reader’s corresponding moral sense. To be sure, 
Robin Bernstein has shown us through her engagement with the material culture of 
antislavery just how “scripted” this expression of emotion was for antebellum readers. 
One of the objects to materialize in the vicinity of the novel, Bernstein demonstrates, was 
an Uncle-Tom-inspired handkerchief, with which readers were intended to dab their 
moistened eyes, without losing composure in the manner of a mucousy, handkerchief-
ruining sob. Even so, we should pause at the ready equation of sentimentalism as a 
literary mode with tearfulness as a particular materialization of sentiment, pivotal as it 
was. The question I want to ask here is this: if sentiment may be defined broadly, in the 
words of the OED, as “Personal experience, one’s own feelings,” why should 
sentimentalism, by virtue of its association with the novel, be equated primarily with the 
spectacle of crying? To frame the question from a slightly different angle, does the 
affective repertoire of what has been designated as sentimental abolitionism, in fact, 
warrant this narrow association?  
It is worth noting that the OED’s definition for “sentimentalism”—the 
elaboration, we might say, of sentiment into a mode or perspective—earns the subsequent 
term a host of suspicions pertaining to matters of “excess.” Sentimentalism’s opening 
entry reads: “The sentimental habit of mind; the disposition to attribute undue importance 
to sentimental considerations, or to be governed by sentiment in opposition to reason; the 
tendency to excessive indulgence in or insincere display of sentiment.” On the one hand, 
we should note that the OED does not, therefore, reduce skepticism to the particular 
example of tearful sympathy solicited by narrative. There is reason to wonder, 
accordingly, despite the familiar associations of Stowe’s novel, whether the 
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embarrassments of tearful pity are thus better understood as essentially metonymic for a 
grander stigmatization of feeling characteristic of Euro-American rationalisms. This 
argument finds a compelling articulation in Robert Solomon’s In Defense of 
Sentimentality, which characterizes the “prejudice against sentimentality” as “an 
extension of that all-too-familiar contempt for the passions in Western literature and 
philosophy” (4). “Our disdain for sentimentality,” Solomon contends, “is the rationalist’s 
discomfort with any display of emotion, warranted as well as unwarranted, appropriate as 
well as inappropriate.” For Solomon, the history of this skepticism may be traced 
ultimately to a moment contemporaneous with the timeline of the present dissertation: 
Immanuel Kant’s departure from the moral sentiments advocated in the writings of David 
Hume and Adam Smith. Here, “the status of ‘sentimentality’ went into decline [among 
intellectuals, at least] about the same time that the sentiments lost their status in moral 
philosophy” (6).46 Interestingly, Solomon suggests this Kantian move toward a reason at 
odds with “heartfelt feeling” followed unquestionably from sentimentalism’s unfolding, 
gender-laden associations with the novel as a historical formation—as Solomon puts it, 
“against the flood of popular women writers in Europe and America” who had published 
and would continue to cultivate a market for fiction equating “virtue and goodness with 
gushing sentiment” (6). Solomon takes for his gusher par excellence Stowe’s “much 
                                                
46 Solomon sees this Kantian perspective as essentially constitutive of contemporary 
cynicism regarding the virtues of sentimentalism. Ventriloquizing the perspective further, 
Solomon explains, “Rational principles are universal. Feelings are too often particular 
and personal. Rational principles are ‘objective’ and admit of argument and 
demonstration. Mere feelings ae wholly ‘subjective’…and (supposedly) not vulnerable to 
logic. Rational principles are (unlike love) truly forever, while feelings are capricious and 
come and go. Rationality is by its nature unemotional and disinterested. The sentiments 
as emotions are not only interested but absorbed, caught up in the circumstances and 
incapable of unbiased judgment” (5). These clumsy binaries comprise the misconceptions 
to which Solomon directs his “Defense of Sentimentality” (Oxford UP, 2004). 
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demeaned” Uncle Tom’s Cabin—potentially, he goes on to note, “the most politically 
influential book in postcolonial American history” (7). Yet even Solomon, in his 
manifesto against the distrust of sentiment writ large, shows awareness that the 
associations of sentimentalism have stuck steadfastly to certain affective forms and 
signifiers in particular. Stuck is, perhaps, the best word for the cluster of feelings I mean 
to denote—these are the stickier kinds, the saccharine and cloying indulgences of an 
identification at once heart-rending and, in its conspicuous predictabilities, overly sweet.  
Rather than repackaging Solomon’s full-scale recovery of sentimentalism, as a 
corrective to the cynicism he associates with modern scholarship, this chapter intends to 
question why we have associated the pinnacle of the tradition so consistently with Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, and whether this association has had the effect of occluding the 
complexities of abolitionist affect by way of caricature. In The Female Complaint: The 
Unfinished Business of Sentimentality (2008), Lauren Berlant articulates a trenchant 
critique of sentimentalism that may help us get at this question from both sides, which is 
to say via caricature, but then also with terms by which that caricature may be undone. 
On the one hand, citing Uncle Tom’s Cabin as the classic example of a tradition traceable 
from the twenty-first century to the 1830s, Berlant admits sentimentalism is a powerful 
mode. “[I]n its imaginary,” Berlant explains, “crises of the heart and of the body’s dignity 
produce events that can topple great nations and other patriarchal institutions if an 
effective and redemptive linkage can be constructed between the privileged and the 
socially abject” (40). Addressing Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in particular, Berlant observes 
further that the “novel’s very citation is a sign that an aesthetic work can be so powerful 
as to transform the privileged people who read it into identifying against the ways they 
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understand their own interests.” At the same time, Berlant makes it her main point that 
this counterintuitive work of “identifying” against one’s apparent “interests” does not go 
far enough. The problem The Female Complaint elaborates is that this power of 
sentimentalism does not guarantee, or even encourage, an actual transformation of 
positionalities. Rather, for Berlant, sentimentalism invites one to indulge in fantasies of 
redemptive identification, without paving any clear path for those fantasies to modify the 
present.  
My analysis of antislavery newspapers below will suggest, in part, that 
abolitionists began to perceive in the rhetoric around colorphobia something analogous to 
the fantasy of identification Berlant urges us to interrogate. Before turning to this 
resonant skepticism, however, I want to think through the apparent pitfalls of 
sentimentalism a bit further. One of the larger questions Berlant raises is why, and how, 
sentimentalism fails to follow through on its promises. One of the less self-evident 
elements of her argument is whether sentimentalism fails because it approaches politics 
by way of an emphasis on feeling, writ large, or because it emphasizes, rather, the wrong 
kinds of feeling. In one passage, Berlant explains that “the forces of distortion in the 
world of feeling politics that the citation of Uncle Tom puts into play are as likely to 
justify ongoing forms of domination as they are to give form and language to impulses 
toward resistance” (40-1). Here, Berlant seems to suggest a structural crisis intrinsic to 
the distortive effects of “feeling politics.” Elsewhere, however, Berlant gestures to 
possibilities of feeling differently. Berlant describes these alternative modes as 
“countersentimental,” defined as a “resistant strain within the sentimental domain,” by 
which texts “refus[e] to reproduce the sublimation of subaltern struggles into conventions 
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of emotional satisfaction and redemptive fantasy” (55). While somewhat resistant to 
specifying the affective valences facilitated by this strain, Berlant contends that 
“Countersentimental narratives are lacerated by ambivalence [my emph.]”—which is to 
say, a less certain, yet no less thoughtful exploration of where one’s political realities 
might intersect with possibilities of affective transformation.  
The historical question we might pose in light of Berlant’s distinction is where 
and how abolitionist networks may have endeavored to pursue a similar reversal, by 
which discourses of hegemonic sentimentality were confronted and unraveled by aberrant 
and experimental emotive modes. Recently, scholars have made efforts to redefine 
sentimentalism as a more capacious sphere of political interaction against the familiar 
clichés outlined above. Ramesh Mallipeddi’s Spectacular Suffering, for instance, 
observes that critiques of sentimentalism as a literary mode all too often take issue with 
the semantics of affective solicitation, without making room to acknowledge that for the 
enslaved and formerly enslaved, “sentimental melancholy,” whether expressed orally, in 
print, or otherwise, constituted a “historical counterknowledge” by which their suffering 
became known and shaped political action. To call attention to this neglect, Mallipeddi 
proposes that scholars need “to loosen the grip of ideological critique for us to engage 
more fully with sentimental mediations of slave suffering” (23). To dismiss cries for 
recognition as merely performative is to suspend the capacity to feel with the affective 
traces actively left by the disenfranchised and oppressed. Moreover, as the engagement 
with African American print culture below will show, quick dismissals of rhetorical 
scaffolding, sentimentalism included, obscure the intricacies that went into integrating 
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genuine affective experience into the politics of style, wordplay, and generic 
expectations. 
Still other scholars have taken steps to integrate the affective turn to “ugly” or 
otherwise disturbing feelings with more nuanced understandings of abolitionist rhetorical 
strategy. In an argument resonant with the revisionary portrait of abolitionist sentiment 
this chapter draws in following, Kevin Pelletier has proposed that one of the most telling 
omissions in scholarly depictions of antislavery sentimentalism is the failure to engage 
with the role “fear” played in connecting a rhetoric of compassion to theological visions 
inflected by faith in a coming apocalypse. While these ideas may seem at first 
antithetical, Pelletier shows that compassion and apocalypse became intimately linked in 
the context of antebellum sentimentalism. In reconstructing this intimacy, Pelletier 
contends that nineteenth-century cultures of sentiment were marked by a “passionate 
investment in fear as an indispensable engine of cultural and political transformation” (3). 
Moreover, Pelletier observes that when novelists “could not depend on love to produce a 
sympathetic response in readers, fear often served as an incentive to love, energizing 
love’s power and underwriting its potential to convert Americans from fallible sinners 
into moral beings.” While the present chapter of this dissertation will focus greater 
attention on abolitionism’s adaptation of medical nomenclature, rather than theological 
anticipations, I will also endeavor to develop further the argument advanced by Pelletier 
that, in ignoring fear and other less pleasurable affects, critiques of sentimentalism have 
tended to rely on erecting a conspicuously artless strawman. In short, the contingencies 
abolitionists acknowledged and mobilized in order to advocate a politics of compassion 
were not merely complex; they also drew readers well outside their spheres of comfort, 
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into modes of identification that were also painful, unnerving, even dread-inducing. In 
short, rethinking abolitionist affect requires that we get beyond the conflation of 
sentiment with familiar caricatures of armchair sympathies. In exploring abolitionist 
literature at odds with phobia’s burgeoning imbrication in a rhetoric of sympathy, we 
discover that the discourse around phobia provides a unique window into the question of 
how abolitionists understood the relationship between emotion and politics. Phobia 
signified not just a suspect means of intellectualizing, psychologizing, and naturalizing 
race prejudice. On the contrary, a renewed insistence on the satirical valences of phobia 
became, simultaneously, a familiar convention for cutting through these pitfalls.  
 
NEGROPHOBIA VS. NEGRO-EQUALITY-PHOBIA 
 
Interestingly, the satirical tone that had given phobia much of its early traction found new 
value at this juncture. For those who doubted phobia’s apparent compatibility with a 
politics of sympathy, satire provided an alternative means of borrowing and repurposing 
phobia’s cultural capital. An illustration by New York cartoonist Frank Bellew titled “A 
Consistent Negrophobist,” published in Harper’s Weekly on August 16, 1862 (Fig. 9), 
exemplifies this usage well through a parody of John Singleton Copley’s painting Watson 
and the Shark (1778). Based on a notorious shark attack off the coast of Havana, Cuba, in 
1749 (which claimed the right leg of the young British merchant, Brook Watson), 
Copley’s painting displays a nude Watson reaching gracefully for a rope held by a well-
dressed black sailor, while a toothy shark lunges toward Watson’s head (Fig. 10). 
Reconfiguring this scene of rescue, Bellew turns the open palm and sublime repose of the 
nude youth into the limp wrist and panicky countenance of a drowning “Negrophobist,” 
flailing underneath a muscular black man offering salvation by way of a dangling rope. 
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To accentuate the inversion, Bellew transfers the serene, classical posture of Copley’s 
Watson to the black protagonist in his illustration, using the latter’s outstretched arms, 
bent left leg, and flagged right foot to emphasize not any awful precariousness, but rather 
a vigorous athleticism.47 The essence of Bellew’s joke is clear: the dejected Negrophobist 
would rather die than come into proximity with the source of his fear, regardless of how 
kind and competent the hero appears. The rope gestures further toward a phallic 
dimension, implying that to receive help from a black savior would be too emasculating 
for the white man to endure. In making fun of the Negrophobist, however, the absurdity 
of the scene communicates a critique of Negrophobia, simultaneously, as an analytical 
frame. If the white gentleman indeed suffers from any such condition, Bellew indicates 
that the sufferer deserves what he gets. Bringing the humor of his demise into 
discomforting proximity with the shame of his ignorance, the satirical edge of Bellew’s 
image both capitalizes on and undermines Negrophobia’s explanatory power. 
In an analysis of black U.S. abolitionists who borrowed, reappropriated, and 
republished cartoons appearing in the British weekly Punch, Michael Chaney has 
                                                
47 In an important essay on Watson and the Shark, Jennifer Roberts observes that Copley 
revised a tabletop motif he had used many times before, translating it in his Caribbean 
context to the surface of the sea. However, Roberts emphasizes further that the painting 
thus disturbs what had once served as a stable bifurcation between the seen and the 
unseen. Roberts explains that in Watson and the Shark “every operation of reflective 
impression, sensory synthesis, and focal attention that was standardized in the tabletop 
paintings is retracted in the painting. Where there were once unruffled tabletops that 
announced their capacity for retaining and regenerating precise impressions of reflection, 
there is now (occupying an equivalent portion of the canvas) a choppy and eerily 
unreflective sea that offers only, at best, displaced and distorted formal echoes” (689). 
This radical effect of the sea as a surface providing a stage for the action, while also 
possessing and obscuring the drama represented, may have piqued Bellew’s interests 
further. Considering Negrophobia’s ongoing analogy to hydrophobia, it may be a 
deliberate pun, for instance, that the predicament facing the white Negrophobist is his 
total immersion in water.  
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suggested that these images helped Douglass and others perform a “transformative visual 
satire.” Chaney argues further that the cartoons came to “function pedagogically as 
lessons in allegorical seeing,” through which caricature and humor could be used to 
“inaugurate[] states of emancipation both metaphorical and literal” (59). Written satire 
revolving around colorphobia continued to serve similar ends in antislavery print culture. 
Yet the satire of the terms also became compounded: the initial pun on rabies, having 
passed into euphemistic ubiquity, solicited trenchant parodies of the basic affective 
premise at its core. One of the most remarkable satirical pieces to critique phobia 
appeared in The Liberator, under the title “Negro-Phobia Vs. Negro-Equality-Phobia” in 
July 1862. Originally published by Charles Swift in the Yarmouth Register that same 
year, following the U.S. Senate’s resistance to recognizing Haiti and Liberia as 
independent governments, the article admits that “at first sight” such hesitation may seem 
indicative of “Negro-phobia.” However, the writer continues to argue otherwise: 
If we consider the habits of these people [the dissenting Senators], we 
shall see that this cannot be the case. Why, sir, when these men were little 
babies, one-half of them were cared for by black women, and drew their 
sustenance from black breasts; their chosen companions were children 
from the negro quarters. When that spirit of despotism, which has 
produced the present rebellion, began to manifest itself, it was by mauling 
and knuckling negro boys. When the passions of young manhood began to 
fire their blood, they sought and found unholy gratification in overcoming 
the virtue of negro and mulatto girls….They have lived among negroes all 
their days. Their houses are full of them. They know not how to do 
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without them….Surely, these men cannot be afflicted with this disease. [] 
After some thought, I have concluded that their disease must be Negro-
equality-phobia. (Sheva 1) 
At the heart of the piece is a conviction that phobia cannot account for how slavery and 
American foreign policy operate materially. Far from betraying a debilitating phobia of 
color, slavery shows instead a system of violent intimacies. Dramatically collapsed in 
such intimacies are the distances phobia would appear to necessitate. And yet, rather than 
abandoning the concept, the author makes it new. The piece concludes that it would be 
more accurate to read prejudicial disregard for Haiti and Liberia as a phobia of equality 
itself—something akin, arguably, to a feeling Jacques Rancière has described as “hatred 
of democracy.” 
 As the article goes on, it becomes apparent that the author has become 
disenchanted with both the sympathy and the parabolical simplicity embedded in 
phobia’s diagnosis. “Negro-phobia must be an awful visitation,” the article goes on 
sardonically. 
Think of the condition of one of these afflicted ones, should he chance to 
meet a black man who weighed as many pounds, could run as fast, jump 
as high, fight as well, was as brave, dressed as well, was as rich, owned as 
many slaves, was as talented, as well educated, as refined, as moral, as 
high in office as himself. Poor man!....What is to be done?....Don’t you 
pity him? It is no use. There is no help for him. (1)  
Recasting the peril of Negrophobia through sarcasm, the passage shows that by the time 
of the war phobia had become a platform on which debates over sympathy were actively 
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and repeatedly staged. In picturing a white man facing his mirror image in a black man, 
the article tackles, moreover, the imaginative work phobia facilitated. Depicting phobia 
as a disingenuous parable of whiteness, where anti-black violence becomes legitimated 
by an insecurity at its core, the author exposes the apologies phobia was being used to 
serve. 
 A poem titled “Colorphobia” published under the alias “Hezekiah Humankind” by 
The Liberator in 1849 shows how dissatisfaction of the kind expressed in “Negro-Phobia 
Vs. Negro-Equality-Phobia” could become an occasion for extended literary meditation. 
To give the full effect of the poem, it will be worth quoting it in its entirety: 
I. 
The Colorphobia—what is that? 
  Does it infect the dog or cat? 
  Does the disease prove fatal ever? 
  Or is it but a skin deep fever? 
    II. 
  The turkey-cock, I’ve heard it said, 
  A deep aversion has to red; 
  O, stupid bird! O, silly biped! 
  OUR COUNTRY’S FLAG with red is striped! 
    III. 
  This Colorphobia—as they name it— 
  So mean that very few will claim it— 
  While it remains above the sod, 
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  Should never curse the ‘church of God’! 
    IV. 
‘Tis not the color gives offence; 
  They only say so for pretence;  
  Care they a fig how black the face? 
  No—if the ‘nigger’ ‘keep his place.’ 
    V. 
  Would ye be just? mind not complexion; 
  Black through the skin, ‘tis no objection; 
  Mind not the color, all else right; 
  A man’s a MAN, or black or white. 
     VI. 
  This is the thought that stirs their gall,— 
  That colored men are MEN at all; 
  And fix the thing the best you can,  
  ‘Tis not the color, but the MAN. (Fig. 11) 
What is perhaps most telling in the poem, is the way it at once commits to investigating 
the stranglehold of colorphobia, devoting the first stanza to a string of interrogatives, only 
to undermine the seriousness of the diagnosis simultaneously. Skepticism as to the 
accuracy of the diagnosis pervades the poem: like the turkey invoked by stanza two, the 
logic of colorphobia is deemed “silly” and “stupid”—a rhetorical turn that seems to offer 
little more than a clever “name,” which, of course, no sufferer is likely to “claim.” By the 
fourth stanza, the poet arrives at a full rebuttal of the state in question: “‘Tis not the color 
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gives offence;/They only say so for pretence.” The question arises: why should the poet 
pursue the subject at all, if his point is that colorphobia’s really a red herring? While the 
satirical turn motivating the poem may seem intuitive enough, we should note that, in 
fact, here and elsewhere a rather complex formulation is in play. In effect, the poem 
“Colorphobia” mobilizes a politics of affect by stringing together a sophisticated 
sequence of negations. While the first negation lies in the concept of colorphobia itself—
which is to say an affect driven by a negation of color—the author invokes this negation 
in the vein of an antiphobic corrective, for the sake of then casting doubt on the validity 
of the affective category as an assessment of white supremacy. Here, as in the article 
“Negro-Phobia Vs. Negro-Equality-Phobia,” this sequence of negative invocations brings 
Humankind’s reader to a critical problematic—the question of whether phobia, or even 
skin color as an agential force, can be said to play a great part in the maintenance of 
racial inequality. The poet’s conclusion is that phobia may be better understood as a 
decoy narrative, distracting from a concerted effort by white Americans to maintain 
social dominance by fabricating boundaries of humanness along racial lines.  
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that satirizations of 
colorphobia in the antebellum period emanated also from the term’s aspiration to a 
diagnostic sensibility. Thus, others who took issue with the rhetoric of colorphobia did so 
less because it imported pity into the equation than because it relied heavily on a 
vocabulary evocative of pathology, picturing one party as ill and the other salubriously 
self-aware. One of the most interesting articles to mediate on these grounds was a piece 
by Henry Ward Beecher titled “Parker-Phobia,” regarding escalating conflict over the 
radical abolitionism espoused by Theodore Parker, reverend of Boston’s 7,000-member 
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Congregational Society. With an interest in defusing anti-Parker hostility, Beecher 
insists, “Theodore Parker is not worth all the fuss that is made about him.” Attempting a 
more nuanced perspective, he contends that Parker’s integrity, or lack thereof, will be 
revealed in time: “Now if he be a hypocrite, he may well be troubled by the snarling and 
barking he causes,” whereas, “if he is a true worshiper of his trinity, Calumny cannot 
sting him nor personal defenses shelter him” (186). However, rather than pursuing this 
line of inquiry at length, Beecher turns to implicate the rhetoric of phobia itself, 
launching an attack on the political radicals Parker has been taken to represent:  
These men….detect glaring inconsistencies, hypocrisy, cant, slavery to 
usage, dogma and superstition. They study morbid anatomy. They exult 
when they have cut round and cut open, and brought to view a loathsome 
ulcer. They multiply words over it, and defile every healthful part with the 
pollutions of the local disease—and then cry out, Abomination! destroy! 
destroy!  
Beecher’s position seems to be that a form of critique has emerged that weds itself too 
readily to a privileged discourse of medical diagnosis—what Michel Foucault famously 
calls, in The Birth of the Clinic, the “sovereignty” of a “clinical gaze” (regard médical). 
Appropriating this diagnostic sovereignty in scenes of political debate, the demagogues 
Beecher conjures mandate that any disease of feeling they detect be exterminated. At the 
same time, Beecher’s title performs, however parodically, this same rhetorical move, 
framing the commotion around Parker as a highly particular, interpersonal phobia. 
Ultimately, by playing both sides, Beecher comes close to emptying phobia of any 
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analytical coherence whatsoever, treating the concept more like a shortcut to a familiar 
pun, as opposed to any genuine affect poisoning political debate.  
 
THE LIMITS OF PITY, THE GOBLIN GROWTH OF DREAD 
 
Satire was not the only way in, however. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel Dred: A 
Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp indicates that she too became skeptical of phobia’s 
ascendancy as a sociopolitical diagnostic. Yet Dred offers an intricately nuanced 
perspective, presenting to readers neither approval of a rhetorical convention, nor explicit 
disapproval, but rather an alternative take on fear’s value as a political feeling. The novel 
begins with the drama of a conventional marriage plot, sewing seeds of romantic interest 
between two white North Carolina slaveholders, Nina Gordon and Edward Clayton, who 
become enamored with one another, in part, due to their slowly deepening commitments 
to antislavery. However, as the narrative proceeds, this plot quickly unravels and a 
second erupts in its place: Nina dies of cholera, and a new protagonist, Dred, surfaces 
from the swamp. From here, Stowe launches an exercise in speculative history telling. 
The mysterious protagonist, readers discover, is the son of the historical black 
insurrectionist Denmark Vesey, famously tried and executed for plotting a slave rebellion 
in Charleston, South Carolina in 1822. As Robert Levine notes, Stowe presents Dred as 
an heir to this revolutionary vision, depicting “Vesey and his accomplices as patriots who 
were inspired by their reading of the Declaration of Independence and the Bible to enact 
their own revolution against despotic authority” (xxi).48 In the wake of his father’s death, 
Dred slays a plantation overseer in a brawl and takes refuge in the swamp. As soon as he 
                                                
48 Sarah Hartshorne suggests similarly that Dred personifies a “spirit of revenge,” 
comprising not just the possibility of slave revolt, but also “the certainty of the revenge of 
the Lord on a sinful people” (288). 
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is introduced in the novel, Dred swiftly overtakes all lingering plot lines. Lawrence Buell 
has perhaps described his presence best: “As a Mandingo shaman’s grandson gifted with 
second sight, as Denmark Vesey’s lost son and spiritual kin to Nat Turner,” as “a maroon 
chief of titanic strength, formidable intelligence, and irresistible eloquence who can bring 
a whole community…to its knees as an unseen voice prophesying judgment from the 
treetops,” Dred “is a southern white’s nightmare embodiment of black insurgency” (241). 
Though Dred dies tragically toward the novel’s conclusion, his prophecies endure, 
heralding imminent crisis. As Levine contends, Dred essentially “anticipates, promotes, 
and helps to supply the terms for understanding the bloodshed of the coming Civil War” 
(xxx).  
I will return to this “nightmarish” significance of Dred’s character momentarily. 
First, however, it is important to establish the nature of Stowe’s allusions to the rhetoric 
around racial phobia. Gail Smith has shown that Dred participates in “hermeneutic 
debates” of its day, investigating the means by which interpretive communities cohere 
(289, 90). This interest extends to the affective parameters erected by antislavery rhetoric, 
the rhetoric around colorphobia included. Nevertheless, when the novel shows signs of 
phobia, it does so circuitously, by way of brief comparisons between proslavery affect 
and rabies. In an early instance, Stowe uses the comparison to introduce readers to Tom 
Gordon, the novel’s primary villain. A foil to the fantasy of benevolent slavery, 
personified in Tom’s compassionate but naïve sister Nina, Tom returns to the family 
estate, left to both siblings by their deceased parents, with a snarling disposition. 
Described as “sitting down doggedly” and “spitting a quid of tobacco” at his aunt Miss 
Nesbit’s feet, he instills a sense of panic in everyone present for the homecoming (Vol. 1, 
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163). Miss Nesbit, readers learn, “sat with her feet drawn up on the sofa, as if he had been 
a mad dog.” Memories of “furious domestic hurricanes,” unleashed by Tom on previous 
occasions, return all at once to Nina and Miss Nesbit. Nina, in particular, recalls “the 
storms of oaths and curses that had terrified her when a child; the times that she had seen 
her father looking like death, leaning his head on his hand, and sighing as only those sigh 
who have an only son worse than dead” (Vol. 1, 163). Tom, the narrator implies, is a lost 
cause: a living casualty of the slave system, corrupted beyond repair.  
A second allusion is made via Edward Clayton, who, in the wake of Nina’s 
untimely death, develops more progressive abolitionist views. The moment finds Clayton 
in conversation with family following his decision to quit work as a lawyer, in order to 
devote more time to the antislavery cause. His mother asks whether “it would not have 
been better” to have “insinuated your opinions more gradually,” considering the 
“prejudice against abolitionists.” Once again, Stowe uses the rabies analogy to 
characterize proslavery affect. “I suspect,” Clayton explains, “there are multitudes now in 
every part of our state who are kept from expressing what they really think, and doing 
what they ought to do by this fear. Somebody must brave this mad-dog cry—somebody 
must be willing to be odious” (Vol. 2, 150). Here, rather than using the analogy to 
theorize racial bigotry, Stowe indicates that a prejudicial madness has selected for its 
target abolitionists themselves. If fear enters into the equation, it does so in conjunction 
with this anti-abolitionism, spreading through “multitudes” who might in a different 
context express solidarity with the antislavery cause.  
Only through a third allusion, however, do we begin to get a sense of what Stowe 
might have intended by avoiding phobia as a rhetorical touchstone. The moment finds 
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Frank Russell, another lawyer, warning Clayton that his abolitionism is earning him a 
great number of enemies. He explains, “You have made some remarks…that have started 
a mad-dog cry” (Vol. 2, 240). Russell then hands Clayton an article titled “Covert 
Abolitionism! Citizens, Beware!” It reads:  
We were present, a few evenings ago, at the closing speech delivered 
before the Washington Agricultural Society, in the course of which the 
speaker, Mr. Edward Clayton, gratuitously wandered away from his 
subject to make inflammatory and seditious comments on the state of the 
laws which regulate our negro population….This young man is supposed 
to be infected with the virus of Northern abolitionists. (Vol. 2, 240-1) 
Offering an imitation of proslavery editorials, Stowe depicts the rhetoric of viral infection 
as a protean conceit, capable of furnishing an array of contradictory arguments. In so 
doing, she draws on what had indeed become a robust strain of diagnostic rhetoric hurled 
from the South. Answering the rhetoric of Negrophobia, many cited the influence of a 
pervasive “Negrophilism” among abolitionists.49 An article published in Putnam’s 
Monthly in 1854 even describes this Negrophilism as a condition of conscious 
malingering, whereby “Abolition Munchausens” were dedicating “their imaginations and 
their energies to the concoction and extensive circulation in the North of the grossest 
misrepresentations of the Southern people” (638). Interestingly, Stowe’s use of the term 
“virus” suggests, all the more, that she means to convey a proslavery inversion of the 
                                                
49 For other examples see “Civil Liberty and Self-Government,” published in The 
Southern Quarterly Review in April 1854; “The Present Aspect of Abolitionism,” 
published in The Southern and Western Literary Messenger and Review, in July 1847; 
and “The Want of Laborers,” published in the American Artisan and Patent Record in 
June 1865. 
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hydrophobia analogy. A concept not yet associated with microbiology (as it would be 
after physicians discovered viruses to be a unique class of microscopic agents in the 
1890s), the word virus was cited in relation to just a handful diseases in the preceding 
decades. Among these was hydrophobia, in which case the term “virus” was used to 
designate vaguely infectious matter consisting in saliva that had become “venomous.” In 
translating the medical metaphor to proslavery, Stowe indicates that, whatever its 
intentions, vernacular imitations of medical nomenclature function not so much as a 
rhetorical mode through which diseased politics are isolated for treatment, but rather 
performative utterances of epistemological certainty, adaptable for any number of 
oppositional purposes.  
For Stowe, this ready adaptability revealed an inherent weakness in relying too 
heavily on a diagnostic lexicon for political critique. But the critique goes further still. 
Throughout Dred, Stowe indicates that something important gets lost when political 
movements begin to revolve around pathologization. As an alternative, Stowe allows 
something like a politics of partial insanity to fester in the eponymous character Dred. In 
a chapter titled “Life in the Swamps,” Stowe explains: “There is a twilight-ground 
between the boundaries of the sane and insane, which the old Greeks and Romans 
regarded with a peculiar veneration” (Vol. 2, 5). In the next paragraph, she continues, 
The hot and positive light of our modern materialism, which exhales from 
the growth of our existence every dewdrop, which searches out and dries 
every rivulet of romance, which sends an unsparing beam into every cool 
grotto of poetic possibility, withering the moss, and turning the dropping 
cave to a dusty den—this spirit, so remorseless, allows us no such 
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indefinite land. There are but two words in the whole department of 
modern anthropology—the sane and the insane; the latter dismissed from 
human reckoning almost with contempt. (Vol. 2, 5) 
In opposition to this spirit of contempt, Stowe opens up possibilities for abolitionism to 
run, at least partially, mad. Within this “twilight-ground,” Dred begins to prophesy 
insurrection. Crying out for divine intervention, he shouts, “Avenge the innocent blood! 
Cast forth thine arrows, and slay them! Shoot out thy lightnings, and destroy them!” (Vol. 
2, 9). While Dred’s significance has been the subject of much debate—Eric Sundquist 
observes, for instance, that Dred is inspired by the great insurrectionist Nat Turner, yet 
disappointingly “fail[s] to reeneact [Turner’s] dangerous revolt” (Sundquist 199)—these 
prophecies repeatedly anticipate “an awful coming day” (Stowe Vol. 2, 9). Stowe 
indicates through Dred that to begin a rebellion one must possess some degree of a state 
the “modern materialists” call insanity. Thus, new light is cast on the chiastic inversion 
offered by Clayton: “Somebody must brave this mad-dog cry—somebody must be 
willing to be odious.”   
Justine Murison has argued convincingly that Stowe demonstrates familiarity with 
psychological theories of her day, especially those focusing on “nervousness” and 
nervous “susceptibility,” as they intersected with perceptions of Christian revivalism and 
its emphasis on “ecstasy, rapture, and enthusiasm” (108). Murison suggests, moreover, 
that this may help scholars articulate how Dred departs from the now iconic 
sentimentalism of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Noting that Dred tends to be characterized as the 
more “militant” of the two, while nevertheless failing to be militant enough, Murison 
contends that to interpret the novel, finally, as a “‘fall’ back into sentimentality” obscures 
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the way Stowe appropriates “nervous states” as sites for radical political transformation 
(125). Murison maintains that Dred “borrows heartily from the medical explanations of 
revivalism,” while at the same time “reject[ing] the belief that any nervousness sparked 
by revivalism must be pathological” (109). In exploring Stowe’s use of a hydrophobia 
analogy without reference to colorphobia, I would add that Dred interrogates not merely 
a pathologization of political affect but also the reduction of political debate to medical or 
pseudo-medical nomenclature. Nervous feeling becomes useful to Stowe only insofar as 
it resists the rhetorical pitfalls of a clinical epistemology.  
However, Dred also departs from Stowe’s earlier work by investing in an 
affective locus averse to anything like lachrymose sentimentalism. Readers find that 
Stowe has no interest in expunging phobia from an abolitionist imaginary absolutely. On 
the contrary, the novel begins to revolve largely around aestheticizing phobia’s closest 
antebellum synonym: the feeling of “dread,” used repeatedly in case studies of 
hydrophobia to describe the telltale aversion to fluids.50 Throughout Dred, Stowe 
indicates that fear of a certain magnitude is essential to Dred’s revolutionary vision. 
Citing Nat Turner’s rebellion explicitly as evidence of the necessity of militant force, 
Dred cries out to Nina and Tom’s enslaved half-brother Harry: “What if we do die? What 
great matter is that?....Nat Turner—they killed him; but the fear of him almost drove 
them to set free their slaves!” (Vol. 2, 89). Emphasizing the vitality of fear to Turner’s 
revolt, Dred goes on, “A little more fear, and they would have done it.” Just after this 
                                                
50 As demonstrated above, the word dread was also used repeatedly in the literature on 
colorphobia and Negrophobia. For an early example, see an article titled “Colorphobia,” 
published in the Pennsylvania Freeman in 1839, which observes, “This newly coined 
word has recently been introduced, as most words are, by being needed. It signifies dread 
of color, as applied to the human species” (1). 
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moment, Dred passes into a semi-unconscious state, as though seized by divine prophecy: 
“Behold, it cometh! Behold the slain of the Lord shall be many!” Alarmed, Harry 
intervenes, “Dred! Dred! Dred!...come out of this—come out! It’s frightful!” (Vol. 2, 90). 
Yet the novel descends ever deeper into Dred’s prophetic consciousness—a mind the 
narrator later describes as so exceptional it beckoned serious “psychological study” (Vol. 
2, 291). Far from finding any relief from Dred’s “frightful” revelations, we discover that 
the terror Dred fosters is exactly where Stowe intends to keep us.  
In this sense, Stowe reverses the scene abolitionists repeatedly summoned in the 
appeal to colorphobia: rather than citing phobia as an exemplary feeling constitutive of 
proslavery, Stowe imagines her protagonist as a living personification of dread, an 
affective vessel foretelling imminent slave rebellion.51 At the same time, in shifting the 
terms of phobia’s political uses, Dred also irreparably disturbs the usual boundaries of the 
case study form phobia had been used to invoke. This disturbance comes through most 
explicitly in a passage linking Dred’s mind to the swamp he has made his home. “It is 
difficult to fathom,” the narrator observes, “the dark recesses of a mind so powerful and 
active as his, placed under a pressure of ignorance and social disability so tremendous” 
(Vol. 2, 274). Comparing these dark recesses to the Dismal Swamp, Stowe continues, 
                                                
51 As Lynn Veach Sadler notes, the novel’s title appears to have been Dread originally, 
spelled with an “a.” Inspired by one of Nat Turner’s conspirators, Stowe eventually 
changed the titled to Dred. As Levine notes, the timing is a bit off for Stowe to have 
named the character after Dred Scott (an idea multiple critics have offered), since the 
novel was published six months before the Supreme Court reached its decision in March 
1857, concluding “that African Americans had no legal rights in the United States and 
could never become citizens” (xiv). Levine writes further, “Though it seems unlikely that 
Stowe named her black revolutionary hero after Dred Scott…the fact is that the case 
began to be heard in the Supreme Court in early 1856, and there is much in Stowe’s 
prescient second novel that looks forward to these ominous developments of 1857” (xiv). 
As demonstrated above, Stowe found the name’s homonymic connection to the feeling of 
dread equally useful to her novel’s ambitions.    
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“The wild, dreary belt of swamp-land which girds in those states scathed by the fires of 
despotism is an apt emblem…of that darkly struggling, wildly vegetating swamp of 
human souls, cut off, like it, from the usages and improvements of cultivated life” (Vol. 
2, 274-5). A passage that may seem, at first, vaguely patronizing, it opens onto an active 
theorization of “social disability” as a political resource. Readers are invited to interpret 
Dred and the Dismal Swamp as enmeshed figures, symbolic of the psychology of 
enslavement, aspiring by virtue of their shared seclusion to a kind of allegory 
circumscribed within the novel. At the same time, the passage elsewhere pierces through 
the confines that would keep Dred and his swampy allegory safely contained. Elaborating 
on the aptness of the wetlands metaphor, Stowe’s narrator explains that the tendrils of 
Dred’s ecological surroundings run rampant: “In those desolate regions which he made 
his habitation, it is said that trees often, from the singularly unnatural and wildly 
stimulating properties of the slimy depths from which they spring, assume a goblin 
growth,” while underneath, “[a]ll sorts of vegetable monsters stretch their weird, fantastic 
forms” (Vol. 2, 274). Juxtaposing the ecological with her interest in political feeling, 
Stowe goes on:  
There is no principle so awful through all nature as the principle of 
growth. It is a mysterious and dread condition of existence, which, place it 
under what impediment or disadvantage you will, is constantly forcing on; 
and when unnatural pressure hinders it, develops in forms portentous and 
astonishing. (Vol. 2, 274) 
Here Stowe situates the goblin growth of swamp life not merely as analogous to the state 
of mind fostered by slavery but as indicative of a common biological phenomenon—a 
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“dread condition of existence.” This dread condition of existence gestures to a theory of 
biological irrepressibility: even in states of subjugation, life grows. In this defiant 
perseverance of subjugated life, organisms naturally take on a dreadful aspect—an 
affective presence that can be neither assuaged nor contained. Rather, life keeps 
encroaching, like so much congested swamp matter, on the solipsistic plots of the 
dominant order. In this way, Stowe liberates Dred’s significance in the novel from what 
might otherwise turn into an oversimplified relationship between the particular and the 
universal, the exemplary and the exemplified—which is to say, the hallmark of a case 
study epistemology.52 Stowe pictures in its place a spreading, mutating dread, irreducible 
to any allegorical personage. Describing its course of movement under slavery’s 
despotism, she puts it still more explicitly: “Beneath that fearful pressure, souls whose 
energy, well-directed, might have blessed mankind, start out in preternatural and fearful 
developments, whose strength is only a portent of dread” (Vol. 2, 275). In such scenes, a 
psychology of revolutionary dread grows lush, without recourse to taxonomy or the 
familiar confines of the medical case form.   
 
 
                                                
52 This also necessarily changes the relationship between the swamplands and the legal 
sphere Dred and his allies reject. In a compelling reading of Dred, Katherine Henry 
argues that Stowe emphasizes a “tension between the courtroom and the swamp, each one 
bringing into relief what is lacking in the other, and each one representing the other’s 
desire” (51). Thus, “If the swamp lacks the legal protections and legal legitimacy of the 
courtroom, the courtroom lacks the compassion and the capacity for human empathy of 
the swamp.” As this tension solidifies and the two become “mutually exclusive,” “the 
chance of a peaceful resolution to the problem of slavery is severely diminished” (51). 
Compelling as this reading is, I would argue that only the white Southerners of Dred 
enjoy the false security of seeing the two worlds as incommensurable. Rather than 
reading one as exterior to the other, I believe Stowe’s emphasis on the goblin growth of 
swamp life positions a burgeoning slave revolt as rapidly encroaching on the mechanisms 
of an unjust state. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 While Dred makes use of both the hydrophobia analogy and a psychology of 
dread, then, Stowe thus succeeds in disarticulating what each will signify. Throughout the 
novel, this disarticulation is motivated by a resistance to the rhetoric of insanity, by which 
good politics are mapped onto either normative psychologies or safe affective 
conventions. As to why Stowe chose to preserve the hydrophobia analogy at all, one 
additional reason might have been the well-known fact that slavery had not merely 
acquired a likeness to vicious dogs: rather, the slave system had, for the purpose of 
catching escaped slaves, notoriously trained dogs to be a part of its daily operations. In 
fact, Dred focuses extensively on the use of hunting dogs for these purposes, a practice 
accelerated by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which, in turn, became widely known as 
the Bloodhound Act. In one instance, readers find Dred kneeling over a body covered in 
blood. The narrator explains, “[A] party of negro-hunters, with dogs and guns, had 
chased this man....He succeeded in outrunning all but one dog, which sprang up, and 
fastening his fangs in his throat, laid him prostrate...Dred came up in time to kill the dog, 
but the wound, as appeared, had proved a mortal one” (218). While the dog described 
here was not, as far as we can tell, hydrophobic, the moment gives readers a sense of why 
Stowe continued to find the analogy to mad dogs valuable, even as she avoided the 
rhetoric of phobia that gave the analogy popular appeal. As the danger of violent dogs 
had long been associated with the specter of rabies, Stowe brings the analogy into 
proximity with the material world she depicts. In doing so, Stowe emphasizes, over and 
above the epistemological designs of diagnosis, what we might call a mad romance of 
likenesses: a “world,” she explains in a subsequent chapter, “where all things are 
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symbolic, bound together by mystical resemblances, and where one event is the archetype 
of thousands” (408).  
Stowe associated this infinite interplay of resemblances with a resistance to the 
precision of taxonomic nomenclature. To have crystallized the metaphor as diagnosis 
would have meant risking the dissolution of the allegory itself—to sacrifice an aesthetic 
premised on ever-shifting archetypal reciprocities for the weak satisfaction of designating 
illness. To exemplify what Stowe would have considered an ideal meditation on the 
hydrophobia metaphor in these terms, it may be worth looking briefly to another 
contemporary, who appears to have perceived the value of the metaphor similarly. In an 
entry in his Journal recorded November 29, 1853,53 Henry David Thoreau recounts a 
story Stowe would have found compelling. Recollecting a conversation with his friend 
George Minott, Thoreau tells of a dog who once tore through the region surrounding 
Concord, afflicted with “hydrophobia,” while Minott was living at the place Nathaniel 
Hawthorne inhabited at the date of the entry. Minott recalls first hearing some commotion 
outside, then discovering upon investigation that a couple of men were “punching at a 
strange dog” with long poles under a barn (522). At last, the dog escaped into an adjacent 
yard, where he drove two turkeys into a corner, “bit off the head of one,” then raced into 
a nearby meadow with its body (523). Several persons followed, crying “Mad dog” as a 
warning. A neighbor named Harry Hooper nevertheless failed to perceive the coming 
danger. The dog “leaped right upon his open breast and made a pass at his throat,” barely 
missing it. Minott shouted, “Why, you’re crazy, Harry; if he’d ‘a’ bitten ye, ‘t would ‘a’ 
killed ye.” The subject of the next encounter, a man named Fay, would not be so lucky. 
                                                
53 For a collection of Thoreau’s writings on dogs, see: Bonds of Affection: Thoreau on 
Dogs and Cats (2005). 
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The dog caught Fay at his left leg, bit him again in his right, then raced off again. By 
sundown it had bitten two cows, which soon after “died of hydrophobia” (524). He then 
attacked a goose. By midnight, the dog had reached the location of Thoreau’s friend 
Cato, a well-known free black resident of Concord to whom Thoreau famously refers in 
Walden and the Journal as “Black Cato.”54 Cato attacked and stunned the dog in that 
meeting, then departed, assuming it was dead. The next morning, while chopping wood, 
Cato found the dog still alive, “rear[ing] up at him once more” (525). After a brief 
standoff, Cato picked up a large stone and delivered a blow that finally killed it. “[L]est, 
he should run away again,” Thoreau writes, “[Cato] cut off his head and threw both head 
and body into the river.”55 A story possessing uncanny parallels with Stowe’s scene in 
Dred, the entry takes on new significance in light of the archive recovered in this study. 
Thoreau does not gesture explicitly to the possibility that Cato’s battle with the mad dog 
may serve as a kind of parable, prefiguring violent national conflict, yet for this reason 
Stowe might have considered the narrative a perfect exemplar of her aesthetic vision. 
Thoreau’s uncanny parallels with the rhetoric of racial phobia, appearing in antislavery 
writing with which he was well familiar, offer a fitting permutation of what Stowe calls a 
world of “mystical resemblances,” where prophecy is understood to inhere in a ubiquity 
of likenesses. In this cosmology—resonant with the historical mode Walter Benjamin 
                                                
54 For an excellent study devoted to Cato and other African American residents of 
Concord, see Elise Lemire’s Black Walden: Slavery and Its Aftermath in Concord, 
Massachusetts (2009). 
55 As for Fay, a physician named Dr. Heywood immediately “cut out the mangled flesh 
and made various applications.” Fay “cried like a baby,” but hydrophobia never came of 
the injury (525). While this essay is not particularly concerned with the issue of 
treatment, it is worth nothing that reports of successfully treated cases were common 
during the period, even as a number of major physicians considered the possibility of 
curing rabid hydrophobia almost completely impossible.  
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terms “constellation”—“all things are symbolic”: thus, any event has the capacity to stir 
archetypal reverberations “with thousands” of others. 
At the beginning of the last chapter, I stated that, in tracing this philological 
tradition in antislavery, I would do so with an interest in its connections to a deeper 
genealogy, this being the ubiquity of phobia’s rhetoric in progressive movements of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To conclude, I thus want to explore some 
of the continuities and disparities characterizing the evolution of phobia’s cultural 
capital—and skepticism about that cultural capital—over time. Since the antebellum 
iterations traced over the last two chapters, applications of phobia as a category of social 
analysis have continued to provoke controversy. In November 2012, the Associated Press 
went so far as to place a ban on using the terms homophobia and Islamophobia in print. 
Revisions to the AP Stylebook explained that phobia implies “uncontrollable fear, often a 
form of mental illness” and that its usage “in political or social contexts” should therefore 
be discouraged. Contacted by Politico Magazine, AP Deputy Standards Editor Dave 
Minthorn clarified further that the issue was one of exactitude. “Homophobia especially,” 
he explained. “It seems inaccurate. Instead, we would use something more neutral: anti-
gay, or some such, if we had reason to believe that was the case” (Byers). When a 
number of news organizations weighed in, many claiming the AP was merely “afraid” of 
“picking sides” (Aravosis), the AP insisted their motives could be boiled down to diction. 
Minthorn clarified further, “We want to be precise and accurate and neutral in our 
phrasing.”  
The AP controversy speaks to an anomalous development in vocabularies used to 
address systemic oppression, a partial history of which I have aimed to offer here. 
  199 
Belonging to a lexicon that relies mostly on –isms (e.g. racism; ethnocentrism), or 
prefixes conveying negation like anti- (e.g. anti-Semitism) or mis- (e.g. misogyny), 
phobia stands conspicuously apart. Not only do terms like colorphobia, Negrophobia, and 
their successors designate a subject, object, or sphere of prejudice; they specify, in 
addition, an affective source at the root of prejudice. While adjacent prefixes and suffixes 
may, in line with phobia, connote common affective registers like hate, aversion, or 
aggression, phobia remains the only major suffix to implicate, etymologically, a feeling 
as precise as fear, and not just fear, but a form of fear that exceeds reason to the point of 
pathology. If collective opposition to phobia took shape as a nascent structure of feeling 
in the antebellum period, we might conclude that it has since come into sharper relief, 
approaching something like a worldview or ideology.  
At the same time, important differences exist between the logic of the AP ban and 
abolitionist critique. Far from promoting neutrality, or what we might describe as a 
fetishized etymological purity, divested of affective weight, abolitionists interrogated the 
political implications of a hermeneutic premised on pathological fear. For some, doubts 
revolved around the solicitation of pity, implicit in the portrait of a diseased mental state. 
Elsewhere, resistance gestured to phobia’s dependence on a diagnostic hegemony casting 
its “unsparing beam” within every “cool grotto” of representational possibility. Taking 
both challenges together, the dilemma phobia crystallized was how to bring a 
psychological perspective to bear on the question of slavery, without oversimplifying 
slavery’s emotional scaffolding. For Stowe, the answer lay in reinventing the very affects 
antislavery writers had begun scapegoating, to imagine how aberrant and revolting 
psychologies might play a role in upending established relational modes. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, one of the dangers in the rhetoric of racial 
phobia was its easy consolidation into euphemism. What is perhaps most interesting 
about the antislavery literature explored above is that even as phobia began to undergo a 
kind of lexical sedimentation, we find simultaneously that a resistance to this decay into 
monotony kept resurfacing: an insistence on reactivating phobia’s critical charge through 
ever-compounding satire—or, in Stowe’s case, the allegorical play of a homonymic 
synonym personified. Indeed, in their mutual resistance to phobia’s fossilization, the 
representational strategies we find in Douglass’s The North Star, Bellew’s “A Consistent 
Negrophobist,” Stowe’s Dred, and elsewhere share a notable affinity. This affinity has 
something to do with the distance between the perceived emotion that had activated a 
new affective emphasis in antislavery circles—i.e. the colorphobia against which an 
antiphobic imagination had been mobilized—and the tone(s) with which certain 
abolitionists had engaged its rhetorical force. In her book Ugly Feelings, Sianne Ngai 
defines tone as a “global and hyperrelational concept of feeling that encompasses attitude: 
a literary text’s affective bearing, orientation, or ‘set toward’ its audience and world” 
(43). As an object of literary study, tone reminds us, that is, that regardless of whether a 
text identifies, unpacks, or otherwise investigates a particular affective phenomenon, it 
points readers, moreover, toward particular modes of feeling by virtue of its tone. In the 
case of a discourse that takes a particular psychological quandary for its target, in other 
words, a readership’s engagement with that psychological concept will always be at least 
doubly complex. In the example of colorphobia, we encounter what I have described 
above as a dynamic emotive assemblage, in which the specification of irrational fear is 
only part of the story—a story outfitted across antislavery newspapers with metaphor, 
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satire, and genre properties borrowed from a medical case formalism. Abolitionists such 
as Douglass, Bellew, and Stowe complicate this relationship still further by summoning 
phobia with an air of sarcasm or other unpredictable motive. In this, they share something 
in common with what Ngai has identified as the rhetorical power of indirect tonality. In a 
reading of Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man, Ngai explains that “Melville’s 
strategy” in using his novel to critique Wall Street is “not” to “plead more loudly for 
emotional attention,” but “rather” to resist any such heavy-handed method. In its place, 
Melville withholds overt tonal instruction, yet he does so to such an extent that “the 
response the novel produces…becomes, in spite of its negative status as an affective 
deficit or lack, something that generates an ugly feeling and can no longer be ignored” 
(84). While the abolitionists explored in this chapter do not exactly “withhold” at the 
level of tone, they open up new conversations by deploying a double-edged and 
multifaceted tonality, which at the same time circumvents the epithetical monotony of the 
terms they invoke.  
Perhaps one last example will illuminate better what this resistance to 
fossilization once made possible. An article titled “Prejudice against Color,” printed in 
The Colored American in 1840, offers an example of a satirical meditation on 
colorphobia interwoven with a sustained interrogation of race. Opening with an 
exclamation, “Prejudice against color!”, the piece launches a catalogue of interrogative 
rejoinders. “Pray tell us what color” the author goes on. 
Black? brown? copper color? yellow? tawny? or olive? Native Americans 
of all these colors everywhere experience hourly indignities at the hands 
of persons claiming to be white. Now, is all this for color’s sake? If so, 
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which of these colors excites such commotion in those sallow-skinned 
Americans who call themselves white? Is it black? When did they begin to 
be so horrified at black? Was it before black stocks came into fashion? 
black coats? black vests? black hats? black walking canes? black 
reticules? black umbrellas? black walnut tables?....How this American 
color-phobia would have lashed itself into a foam at the sight of the 
celebrated black goddess Diana of Ephesus! how it would have gnashed 
upon the old statue, and hacked away at it out of sheer spite at its color! 
A prolonged thought experiment, the passage questions the definitional cohesion of 
whiteness, while also performing, to extravagant ends, the generalizability of its 
prejudicial optic. Continuing, the piece insists on taking colorphobia at its word. 
Imagining “the exemplary havoc” the malady would wreak on “the most celebrated 
statues of antiquity,” the author reminds that “American colorphobia would be untrue to 
itself if it did not pitch battle with every black statue and bust that came in its way in 
going the rounds.”  
Couched in a “claim” to whiteness, rather than any real absence of pigment, 
colorphobia is summoned by the author in terms comparable to what art theorist David 
Batchelor has called “chromophobia,” a term used to suggest that Western cultural and 
intellectual history has long been characterized not merely by race prejudice but by a 
general “loathing of colour” (22). Taking this conceit to its logical conclusion, the author 
of “Prejudice against Color” insinuates that whiteness and colorphobia cannot, perhaps, 
be disentangled: to delineate one is to determine, conceptually at least, where the other 
would begin and end. At the same time, by making colorphobia the subject of a 
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performative satirical diatribe, the author infuses the concept with a sense of absurdity its 
rhetorical conjuration cannot finally escape. The impression with which one is left is that 
phobia’s analytic is neither adequate nor expendable—neither the point of the author’s 
provocation, nor tangential to it. Rather, the author faces colorphobia as a protean 
antagonist, caught between satire, metaphor, vernacular nomenclature, and caricatured 
interiority. Only in this dynamic state does the antagonism invoked at last begin to shake 
the foundations on which its dialectic has been premised, allegorizing a disease of the 
mind as shameful as it is dubious. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BEFORE HOMOPHOBIA: 
HORROR FEMINAE AND EARLY SEXUAL CONVERSION THERAPY 
AFTER WESTPHAL’S KONTRÄRE SEXUALEMPFINDUNG 
 
 
As we were sketching, rain began to fall, pattering on the galvanised iron roof….Beside 
the still waters, we kissed fiercely. Joseph pulled his thing out of his trousers and showed 
it to me. It was like a big, dessicated calzone. ‘Please touch it,’ he said, guiding my hand. 
The ridiculously large, round, thin-skinned lump of wrinkled flesh just lay there, 
indifferent to my touch and devoid of any sexual appeal whatsoever. 
 
- Yayoi Kusama, Infinity Net (2013)  
 
 
 A novel published by the Scottish writer John Davidson in 1895, titled A Full and 
True Account of the Wonderful Mission of Earl Lavender, tells the story of a protagonist 
who, inspired by Darwinian evolution, decides he must track down and mate with the 
world’s fittest woman. A mission that takes him on adventures across London, including 
a masochistic sojourn into an underground city where he is flagellated by a mysterious 
“Veiled Lady,” it also deteriorates regularly into banter between Lavender and his 
disciple, Lord Brumm. Repeatedly, their dialogue turns to Brumm’s comparative 
disinterest in women. Brumm confesses at one moment, “I hate women”; much offended, 
Lavender tries to convince his friend, “Nothing could be more unevolutionary” (101). In 
an addendum to the novel published by The Speaker: The Liberal Review in 1899, 
Davidson later gave Brumm a chance to defend his sentiments. “I do not hate women,” 
he explains. “I am called a misogynist; but I am properly a gynophobe. I fear women; and 
fear is a negative passion compatible with intelligence; whereas love and hate make 
judgment inept” (154). Lavender dismisses the distinction. “Misogyny or gynophobia,” 
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he replies, “it is all one to me; the thing is loathsome; it is the mark of an effete or an 
emasculated nature; the misogynist par excellence is the eunuch.” Later he continues, “I 
have only one thing to say to the misogynist—cease being a misogynist, or die 
commodiously. Nature is merciless and happy; it revels in the prophecy that beats in the 
germs of life.” To read in women the prophecy of life, Lavender thus determines, is the 
truest sign of manhood; to do otherwise, no matter the affect of one’s renunciation, is 
equivalent to social castration. 
 Equal parts inane and astute, Davidson’s dialogue captures how the rise of 
sexology and an evolving psychiatric profession in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century began to yield new appropriations of phobia, and how phobia, in turn, had begun 
to change how people thought of sex. What makes Brumm’s rhetorical stance intriguing, 
in other words, is not merely that he resists the hetero-evolutionary imperatives Lavender 
espouses, nor that he becomes, by virtue of his resistance, a model of discredited 
masculinity. In addition to all of this, Brumm identifies as a “gynophobe,” indicating that 
his sexual orientation may be boiled down at least partly to that state of “negative 
passion.” One knows moreover, from the novel, that this passion is not balanced by any 
positive desire, for men or anything else. Brumm declares in another passage, “I hate 
women; I hate men.” He goes on, “I have never all my life been on intimate terms with 
anyone who has not tried to use me for his or her own ends. My good nature always 
yields, and things go so far, that in order to recover my independence a rupture is 
regularly required” (208-9). If we apply Davidson’s subsequent rhetorical shift here, we 
may surmise that Brumm does not really hate all people; he has only learned to be 
intelligently phobic of them. Neither a creature of preference, nor of pure abdication, 
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Brumm maintains intercourse with humanity through an avowedly distant, paranoid 
vigilance. 
Davidson’s play with phobia and its discontinuities with hate help introduce an 
argument central to the last two chapters of this dissertation: in short, that sexology 
radically transformed phobia’s signifying potential in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. At the same time, the gynophobia wrought by sexology enjoyed a short lifespan, 
one quite distant from the term as it has circulated since. With the rise of second- and 
third-wave feminist theory in the twentieth century, gynophobia became, against 
Brumm’s distinction, a term largely synonymous with, or at least deeply imbricated in 
misogyny. This is not to say the two terms have enjoyed equal footing; rather, 
gynophobia has flickered in and out of feminist analysis, while misogyny has maintained 
greater centrality as an object of critique. Nevertheless, gynophobia has been taken up by 
some of feminism’s most prominent figures. Adrienne Rich’s “Disloyal to Civilization: 
Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia,” an essay published in Chrysalis: A Magazine of 
Women’s Culture in 1979, which spells the word with an “e,” offers one of the most 
influential examples of this usage.56 At the moment of gynophobia’s emergence as a 
                                                
56 An essay that explores writings by black and white women of the 1800s including 
Linda Brent (who published under the pen name Harriet Jacobs) and Lydia Maria Child, 
in order to account for complex formations of gender- and race-based violence in the 
context of U.S. slavery, “Disloyal to Civilization” undulates as an extended meditation on 
possibilities for woman-identified solidarity across racial barriers. In a moment of 
contemplative lyricism, Rich speaks to the relation between gynophobia and patriarchal 
dominance in concrete terms. As though improvising a vocabulary lesson, she writes, 
“Male-directed fragmentation: I am ugly if you are beautiful; you are ugly if I am 
beautiful. (Always the reference being, neither to me nor to you but to the man—black or 
white—who will judge us, find one of us wanting.) Internalized gynephobia: if I despise 
myself as woman I must despise you even more, for you are my rejected part, my 
antiself” (300). Beneath a fragmented feminism, Rich indicates, this gynophobia lurks. 
The insights or ambiguities conjured by Rich’s brief turn to a hermeneutics of 
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concept among late nineteenth-century psychiatrists, however, the term did not yet carry 
connotations of feminist activism. Rather, the term signaled an object of medical concern 
and curiosity: a deficiency in sexual proclivities among men for women, conceived of as 
a collective of potential partners. By the late 1880s and 1890s, gynophobia and 
comparable terms gesturing to a morbid fear of women became ways of recognizing and 
accounting for the diseased mentality characterizing certain perverted men, among them 
urnings, asexuals, inverts, and eventually the homosexual, to name just a handful.  
Gynophobia became not so much a synonym for the homosexual or any other 
singular type in these decades, but rather a means of understanding the homosexual’s 
failures alongside the failures of a wider category of men who did not enter into 
relationships with women. By bringing a pervasive emphasis on failure into focus, this 
chapter demonstrates that from the late 1860s to the end of the nineteenth century, the 
rise of sexology introduced something more complex than what has frequently been 
narrated as a proliferation of typologies and fetishistic cathexes divergent from 
heterosexual, cisgender coupling. While the period is often remembered as a pressure 
cooker for the making of sexual orientation writ large, the incitement to object choice 
was just one development among many in an age thick with invention. Scholars have 
begun accounting for some of the period’s alternatives to desire in recent years. Benjamin 
Kahan has demonstrated in Celibacies (2013), for instance, how celibacy emerged as its 
own form of modern deviance. Wary and weary of the eagerness with which some critics 
have treated celibacy as a mere “fig leaf for homosexuality” (3), Kahan proposes that 
                                                                                                                                            
gynophobia are not the immediate concern of this chapter. Nevertheless, Rich’s essay 
offers a portrait of gynophobia with which twenty-first century critics will be familiar 
and, therefore, a conception from which this chapter endeavors to separate itself, however 
temporarily, to discern earlier iterations. 
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such scholarship betrays a fallacious “expressive hypothesis.” An extension of what 
Michel Foucault famously called the repressive hypothesis, where sex is portrayed as 
always struggling to liberate itself from prudish expurgation, the expressive hypothesis 
describes a hermeneutic by which non-normative embodiments of gender and sexuality 
are read habitually as structures of occlusion, closeting an interiority that requires help 
speaking its name (5). Against this trend, Kahan asks what it would mean to read 
celibacy on its own terms, without recourse to subtext. With a resonant skepticism, 
Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings (2005) interrogates the tendency among scholars, writing in 
the legacy of “Barthes’s jouissance,” to neglect “disgust” or to read it as always 
“dialectically conjoined” and therefore subsumed within desire (332, 3). Building on 
these interventions, this chapter observes that in the late 1800s, prior to the triumph of 
psychoanalysis, writers and physicians began asking along similar lines what it would 
mean to read phobia, outside the strictures of object choice, as a motivator of sociality 
and sexual life. Beyond the bounds of drive and impulse, phobia appeared useful in its 
ability to cast a world of apparent attachments as one of aftershocks: a social field 
produced and demarcated by rampant, repercussive aversions. 
 To account for the way writers theorized phobia in these terms, this chapter is 
divided into two parts and a final coda. The first explores how phobia’s intersection with 
sexology evolved across various scholars, theories, and keywords. Looking to major 
figures including German neurologist Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal, German sexologist 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and British sexologists Havelock Ellis and John Addington 
Symonds, I suggest that affective states like fear, repugnance, and distaste acquired 
significance during this period for representing conditions of automatic resistance to the 
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concept of sexual selection, famously accounted for by Charles Darwin in his The 
Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, in 1871. Around the same time, 
Westphal sparked interest in a related concept he called “Contrary Sexual Feeling” (Die 
Konträre Sexualempfindung), which he used to account for “an inborn reversal” of 
“sexual feeling” that caused persons to be disinterested in the so-called opposite sex. A 
concept Foucault credits with marking the birth of the modern homosexual, contrary 
sexual feeling more precisely helped inaugurate an era fascinated with contrariness as an 
affective-sexual mode. As Krafft-Ebing, Ellis, Symonds, and others theorized conditions 
of sexual perversion, they obsessed over phenomena not only of attraction, but also of 
what we might call sexual unselection, or the means by which humans work themselves 
out of familiar evolutionary mechanisms, via sexualities premised primarily on negation. 
In this context, U.S. neurologist George Miller Beard, inspired by another of Westphal’s 
influential concepts, agoraphobie, appears to have been the first to catalogue gynophobia 
as a condition, spelling it “Gynephobia” in his work A Practical Treatise on Nervous 
Exhaustion (1880). A book that helped Beard popularize the term “neurasthenia” (the 
primary achievement for which he is remembered today), it also holds the distinction of 
presenting the longest list of phobias published in the U.S. since Rush, nearly one 
hundred years prior. As I demonstrate that phobia served, in Beard and elsewhere, as an 
alternative to the rhetoric of object choice, I observe also how it inspired the development 
of concepts like “gynomania,” to account for other orientations likewise irreducible to 
desire.  
 Following this brief history of phobia in the context of sexology, and related 
forays in neurology, I transition to an exploration of how gynophobia emerged in a U.S. 
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literary context. In 1885, freshly retired from his professorship at Harvard Medical 
School, physician and Fireside poet Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., published a final novel 
titled A Mortal Antipathy, in which he offered to the world of letters an imaginative case 
study of gynophobia. A letter Holmes sent to Beard in 1882, held in the Beard Collection 
at Yale University, shows that the two shared a brief correspondence. Expressing thanks 
to Beard for sending him some of his work, Holmes writes, “I also read it, every word of 
it and with much interest.” He explains further, “I have never given much attention to the 
wonderful phenomena occurring in the nervous system of certain persons,” but then 
confesses he has been struck with “curiosity” “whenever they have come in my way.” 
Toward the end he observes, “if I had more time [I] should perhaps try to learn more.”  
On the one hand, I admit in a close reading of A Mortal Antipathy that the novel 
could easily be interpreted as being a narrative about—or even as providing a theory 
for—homosexuality. In fact, in accounting for the cause, sufferings, and eventual cure of 
the condition, as they transpire across the life of protagonist Maurice Kirkwood, the plot 
seems almost like an experiment in what we would today call gay conversion therapy. As 
the novel opens, Maurice shows up in the fictional New England college town of 
Arrowhead Village, accompanied by a handsome Italian companion named Paolo whose 
job, we later discover, is to keep women away. When Dr. Butts learns that Maurice has 
been diagnosed by the British Royal Academy of Biological Sciences with gynophobia, 
the physician decides he must find a cure. Soon after, the novel’s would-be love interest 
Euthymia Tower saves Maurice from a burning house, thus ridding him of his condition 
once and for all. In advance of this moment, Maurice notes that finding a cure for the 
condition might cast “light” upon “certain peculiarities of human character often wrongly 
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interpreted as due to moral perversion” (223). And, indeed, once he is cured, Maurice and 
Euthymia quickly marry. If we resist a presentist interpretation, however, what makes 
Maurice truly mysterious is that his orientation seems to be driven primarily by an 
aversion to sexual interest. While the novel ultimately restores Maurice to the demands of 
a compulsory heterosexuality, to put it another way, Holmes may be said to investigate 
further, and more fundamentally, a culture of compulsory affinity. Holmes emphasizes 
this conceit when Maurice suggests, at one moment, that his predisposition might be 
considered the counterpoint to a concept Johann Wolfgang von Goethe famously 
aestheticized in 1809. In an autobiographical account of his disorder, Maurice devotes his 
life story to those “who know by their own experience that elective affinities have as their 
necessary counterpart, and, as it were, their polar opposites, currents not less strong of 
elective repulsions” (208). Thus, I read A Mortal Antipathy as an imaginative foray in a 
therapeutic model of re-circuiting sexual affect—one Holmes genuinely hoped might be 
adopted and adapted by physicians for future treatment—yet which reads phobia, rather 
than libido, as the queer rift in an otherwise fluid heterosexuality. The chapter concludes 
by exploring another major figure of the late nineteenth-century, British book and 
magazine illustrator Aubrey Beardsley, as a figure who made much of his career by 
attempting to chart a gynophobic aesthetic—one in dialogue with, but also actively 
divergent from the pathologizing rhetoric of fin-de-siècle sexology characteristic of 
Beard’s Nervous Exhaustion and Holmes’s A Mortal Antipathy.   
 
SEXUAL UNSELECTION AFTER THE DESCENT OF MAN 
 
As Ivan Crozier notes in his introduction to Havelock Ellis and John Addington 
Symonds’s Sexual Inversion, one of the most influential texts during the rise of sexology 
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was Darwin’s Descent of Man, in which the biologist supplemented his theory of natural 
selection with emphasis on the role of reproduction in the transformation of species over 
time (16). At this juncture, the hegemony of object choice, as a vital condition of the 
continuation and evolution of life, became entrenched in the life sciences and social 
sciences alike. For sexologists, the idea that evolution depended heavily on conditions of 
mate selection would become valuable as a concept for distinguishing normative desire 
(that which might successfully produce offspring) from perversion. Bad cathexes, in this 
context, could designate deviant proclivities toward people, as well as various inanimate 
things—in Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis, everything from footwear and aprons 
to handkerchiefs and fox pelts (169, 170; 174; 183). One of the great legacies of late 
nineteenth-century sexology commenced with a similar emphasis on mate selection: the 
categorization of subjects into heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual types, by which 
one’s likelihood to pursue reproductive ends could be predicted and stabilized through 
theories of unchanging predilection. Yet scholars have tended to overlook just how much 
interest sexologists took, simultaneously, in phenomena of detachment, where the 
evolutionary imperative to select appeared thwarted or completely absent. In place of 
choice, physicians repeatedly discovered affective conditions for sexual unselection: 
impediments to or impossibilities of attraction, around which a subject’s sexual life could 
primarily revolve.  
It is important to note from the outset that conditions for sexual unselection were 
not understood to be separate from early iterations and explorations of homosexuality. On 
the contrary, sexologists often understood same-sex attraction in exactly these terms: as 
driven by negative affect first, and positive desire only after the fact. This is not very 
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surprising, perhaps, insofar as homosexuality has a long tradition of being delegitimized 
on these grounds, as belonging to a state of pathological denial rather than any genuine 
expression of love or positive connection. I would argue, however, that in many such 
instances, the function of sexual unselection belonged to a wider terrain of inquiry 
interested not only in delegitimizing same-sex deviance, but also in giving pervasive 
negative feelings their due. Westphal’s enormously influential essay on contrary sexual 
feeling (a term originally theorized by his mentor Wilhelm Griesinger) may be credited 
with inaugurating this line of investigation both in Europe and the U.S. Using the term to 
account for instances where individuals felt no attraction for the opposite sex, Westphal 
specified that he did not mean the concept to be synonymous with any positive 
orientation directed elsewhere. “I have chosen the term…to express the fact,” he 
explains, “that the sexual drive as such is not always simultaneously involved” and that, 
instead, “it is the feeling of being alienated from one’s own sex according to one’s entire 
inner being.” The contrariness of the feeling to which he referred had less to do with 
deviant selection than it did a sexual state organized around contrariness itself: a state of 
alienation that had reached a threshold of ontological permanence.  
While contrary sexual feeling soon took on the positive valences Westphal 
avoided (hence Foucault’s gesture to it as a foundational moment for homosexuality), 
sexologists maintained an interest in the capacity for subjects to experience sex as a 
world rife with repulsion. It would be easy to chalk these feelings up to Victorian prudery 
and all of its discontents, but again we should observe that this explanation fails to 
recognize just how compelling and multifaceted physicians found sexual incapacities as 
objects in their own right. Krafft-Ebing’s magnum opus Psychopathia Sexualis, first 
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published in 1886, is an extraordinary case in point. Exploring a wide spectrum of 
affective negations, from utter dread to nonchalant distaste, Krafft-Ebing suggests from 
the text’s introduction that such dispositions may be said to originate in two strikingly 
common pathologies. The first he calls “Inhibition.” A condition by which “The erection 
centre may become functionally incapable,” it takes shape either as “an emotion (disgust, 
fear of contagion), or an idea of impotence,” thus making “the act with the person 
concerned of the opposite sex temporarily or absolutely impossible” (35). Accounting for 
a motley crew of bad spouses, fearers of germs, self-abusers, and vague others, the 
examples Krafft-Ebing offers appear linked by a nervous incapacity for hetero-
functionality. The second, a less tortured condition called “Anaesthesia,” exists instead 
wherever “organic impulses arising in the sexual organs, as well as all concepts, and 
visual, auditory, and olfactory sense-impressions fail to excite the individual sexually” 
(37). Here we have something closer to a complete disinterest in sex.  
As noted above, such conditions of sexual unselection could nevertheless appear 
compatible with other impulses or fantasies. Krafft-Ebing relates one such instance in a 
section devoted to masochism. “In reply to the question as to what he regarded as the 
most lustful act,” he explains, “the patient said: ‘It is my greatest delight to lie naked on 
the floor and have myself trod upon by girls wearing elegant boots,” a wish, he clarifies, 
which is “of course...possible only in brothels.” Krafft-Ebing goes on to clarify that to be 
trod upon, for the individual, was an end in itself and completely antithetical to foreplay. 
“The patient has not thoughts that impel to intercourse,” he writes, “at least, not in the 
sense of imissio penis in vagina,—an act that affords him no pleasure” (125-6). A later 
case, describing a man with a fetish for women’s shoes is depicted similarly. A fetish 
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originating in an incident in the individual’s childhood, where a “servant girl” “stroked 
his penis with her foot with her shoe on,” it developed into an orientation where nothing 
but shoes could interest him sexually, so that he used them frequently to masturbate. 
Krafft-Ebing is careful to emphasize, nevertheless, that the fetish is driven equally by 
systematic unselection: “Nothing else in a woman could excite him; the thought of coitus 
filled him with horror. Men did not interest him in any way.” In describing the 
individual’s subsequent effort to marry as an antidote to the fetish, Krafft-Ebing takes this 
significance of his unselective disposition further:  
Though devoid of the slightest feeling for the female sex, he determined 
on marriage, which seemed to him to be the only remedy….In spite of 
lively erections when he thought of his wife’s shoes, in attempts at 
cohabitation he was absolutely impotent; for his distaste for coitus, and for 
close intercourse in general, was far more powerful than the influence of 
the shoe-idea, which induced sexual excitement (178) 
A remarkable formulation, it suggests that the shoe functions not only as a desired object 
but also as a kind of barrier to an unwanted sex act, and that this latter obstructive 
function is the more crucial of the two. Indeed, when we discover, in following, that the 
doctor who treated the individual suggested he “hang a shoe up over his bed, and look at 
it fixedly during coitus, at the same time imagining his wife to be a shoe,” we must 
wonder how successful this could have been. To have worked within the schematic 
Krafft-Ebing imagines, the shoe’s presence would need not merely to excite the 
individual, but to extract him imaginatively from coitus itself, so to distract from the 
disinclinations otherwise at play. 
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In proceeding to account for same-sex predilections, Krafft-Ebing keeps negative 
passions in the balance. Describing a condition he calls acquired (as opposed to 
congenital) homosexuality, he presents the case history of a woman who develops her 
abhorrence for men relatively quickly after spending time with them as a railway worker, 
a job for which she had to “conceal” her sex with men’s clothing. “I took an 
unconquerable dislike to them,” she explains. “However, since I am of a very passionate 
nature and need to have some loving person on whom to depend, and to whom I can 
wholly surrender myself, I felt myself more and more powerfully drawn toward 
intelligent women and girls who were in sympathy with me” (195). Another case 
confesses in a section Krafft-Ebing titles “Effemination and Viraginity,” “I wish…to state 
that I cannot come to the determination to transform my sexual life by means of sexual 
intercourse with the opposite sex. The thought of such intercourse fills me with 
repugnance and disgust” (289). The same sentiments reappear in his section on 
“Androgyny or Gynandry,” used to designate cases of contrary sexuality “in whom not 
only the character and all the feelings are in accord with the abnormal sexual instinct, but 
also the skeletal form, the features, voice, etc.; so that the individual approaches the 
opposite sex anthropologically” (305). A “Miss X., aged 38,” “who produced a 
remarkable impression by reason of her attire, features, and conduct”—these including “a 
gentleman’s hat, her hair closely cut, eye-glasses, a gentleman’s cravat…and boots with 
high heels”—had never had, we are told, “inclination for persons of the opposite sex nor 
for those of her own sex.” This would apparently change in 1872, when she began to 
develop feelings for women, but even the details of her emergent sexual impulse take a 
complicated aspect. Her “repugnance for gentlemen and their society” persisted, while 
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her “associat[ions]” with “ladies” began to admit “a kind of love-relation.” “This 
predilection for women,” we learn further, “was decidedly more than mere friendship, 
since it expressed itself in tears, jealousy, etc.” (309). An erotic development where a 
repugnance for men remains stable, while admitting something like same-sex love, the 
latter nevertheless becomes legible less by way of sexual fulfillment than it does through 
expressions of undesirable feeling. In short, phenomena of sexual unselection captivated 
a sexological imagination in myriad forms and across a vast range of intensities.  
One of the most influential concepts to emerge in this literature was that of the 
horror feminae, or horror of women, attributed to men incapable of having sex with 
women. In Psychopathia Sexualis Krafft-Ebing interweaves the term seamlessly with 
accounts of same-sex sexuality, at moments treating them almost as two sides of the same 
coin. Regarding a case in the section on “Urnings,” we are told that the “sexual impulse 
to his own sex had existed from his earliest childhood, and was congenital. He had 
always had horror feminae, and had never been inclined to avail himself of the charms of 
women” (270). Another case, a Dr. G suffering from effemination, reported similarly that 
“If he happened to see a ballet, only the male dancers interested him. Since he could 
remember, he had had a horror feminae” (301). To account for parallel feelings in 
women, Krafft-Ebing used the gender neutral horror sexus alterius (89, 231). For men 
and women alike, he seems to have understood horror to be especially indicative of 
congenital, as opposed to acquired homosexuality. “The essential feature of this strange 
manifestation of the sexual life,” he explains, “is the want of sexual sensibility for the 
opposite sex, even to the extent of horror, while sexual inclination and impulse toward 
the same sex are present” (222). 
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 In Sexual Inversion, Ellis and Symonds added to the concept of horror feminae 
that of horror masculis, to describe a form of disgust pervasive among women. 
Describing the mental operations of “sexual inverts,” or persons whose gender traits do 
not coincide with their assigned biological sex, the two authors observe that such 
individuals not only avoid but tend to be seized with terror at the thought of sexual 
intimacy with the other gender. One is tempted to speculate Ellis may be speaking as an 
object of terror firsthand, insofar as his spouse Edith Lees openly preferred women, had 
affairs with women, and declined to sleep with him in bed.57 But in an interesting turn, 
Ellis and Symonds clarify that such an impulse should not seem all that surprising: “It is 
perhaps not difficult to account for the horror—much stronger than that normally felt 
towards a person of the same sex—with which the invert often regards the sexual organs 
of persons of the opposite sex.” They continue,  
  It cannot be said that the sexual organs of either sex under the influence of  
sexual excitement are aesthetically desirable; they only become 
emotionally desirable through the parallel excitement of the beholder. 
When the absence of parallel excitement is accompanied by the beholder 
                                                
57 As Jo-ann Wallace notes, our knowledge of Edith Lees is, in many ways, one-sided. 
“Following her death,” Wallace explains, “Havelock Ellis attempted to manage her 
posthumous reputation by issuing anthologies of her work and by devoting his own 
autobiography My Life (1940), to a detailed examination of their marriage. Edith Ellis 
herself never spoke openly about her longings or her lesbian relationships, and since 
Havelock destroyed most of her letters and other private papers after completing his 
autobiography, we must look to her fiction and lectures for evidence of her self-
understanding” (“How Wonderful to Die” 147). For more on Edith’s sexuality and 
writing, see another essay by Wallace titled “Edith Ellis, Sapphic Idealism, and The 
Lover’s Calendar,” published in Laura Doan and Jane Garrity’s Sapphic Modernities: 
Sexuality, Women, and National Culture in 2006. Also see Martha Vicinus’ “The History 
of Lesbian History,” published in Feminist Studies in 2012. 
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by the sense of unfamiliarity, all the conditions are present for the 
production of intense horror feminae or horror masculis (116) 
Far from being an immediate sign of pathology, aversion turns out to be the most natural 
response to genital proximity. Only a sense of reciprocal excitement—directed we may 
presume through secondary sexual characteristics or environmental factors—establishes 
conditions for the suppression of this initial horror, thus making an otherwise disturbing 
reproductive act palatable. Sexual inversion, being only an amplification of this intuitive 
response, reflects back onto all forms of attachment the necessity of a disavowal of 
horror, for any propagation of the species to proceed.  
A letter Symonds wrote to Ellis in 1892 shows that even as Symonds insisted to 
Ellis, in their early preparations for Sexual Inversion, that same-sex sexuality needed to 
be fundamentally depathologized, he was willing to retain the idea that horror was, for 
certain individuals, an important factor. Expressing some “doubt” as to “whether we are 
completely agreed as to the part played in the phenomenon by morbidity,” Symonds 
makes it his main objective in the letter to clarify, “I should be inclined to abolish the 
neuropathical hypothesis” (90-1). But he proceeds, “The only cases in which I should be 
inclined to accept the theory of psychopathy are those extreme ones in which there is a 
marked Horror Feminae.” In a letter designed to convince Ellis that same-sex attraction 
is “a matter of preference rather than of fixed physiological or morbid diathesis” (91), 
this leeway he lends horror is a curious allowance. For Ellis and Symonds alike, a horror 
of genital difference appeared, if not a particularly advantageous response to human 
anatomy, at least a very reasonable one. 
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BEARD’S MORBID FEARS 
 
Across these decades, the literature on phobia likewise began to flourish. Once 
again, Westphal played a pivotal role. The year following his essay on contrary sexual 
feeling, he provoked a sudden spike in new enumerations of phobia, across Europe and 
elsewhere, by introducing a concept he called agoraphobia (“Die Agoraphobie”), used to 
designate an acute dread of open spaces. A diagnosis that has remained in circulation 
ever since, it first presented itself to Westphal when he observed that certain patients of 
his felt completely “unable to walk over squares and through certain streets” and were 
“out of fear of such paths, restricted in the freedom of movement.” First observing the 
condition in three residents of Berlin—a Mr. C, aged 32; a Mr. N., aged 24; and a Mr. P., 
aged 26—Westphal found that the men experienced panic in the vicinity of open squares 
and empty urban corridors, as well as in crowds in which they found themselves alone. In 
such contexts, an escape route or familiar face was necessary to alleviate the resulting 
anxiety and reinstate security. 
David Trotter describes this moment, in a period he calls phobia’s belle époque, 
as the “invention” of agoraphobia, to account for the myriad ways in which agoraphobia 
was produced as an object of knowledge (466). Westphal’s term quickly sparked the 
proliferation of additional phobias, to explain other cases in which individuals found 
themselves inhibited from moving freely in space. Parisian physician Benjamin Ball 
coined the related “claustrophobia” in 1879, describing “a state of mind in which there 
was a morbid fear of closed spaces” (371). A few years prior, Antigona Raggi of Bologna 
had come up with a similar condition called “clithrophobia,” accounting for a “phrenzy” 
induced by “limited space” where the subject experiences, suddenly, “an invincible desire 
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to get out” (“Clithrophobia” 273).58 Illustrating the condition, Raggi described a case 
where an anonymous yet distinguished Italian painter, “[h]aving been shut up with his 
competitors in a gallery, and excited by the praise bestowed on his work,” stood without 
warning and “with a fixed stare” rushed for the door. Finding himself unable to open it, 
he noticed a raised window nearby, jumped out of it onto an adjacent roof, and continued 
to jump from roof to roof until finally access to the ground was discovered (274).59 By 
1884, some physicians were even talking of a condition they called claustrophilia, 
defined, despite its suffix, as “the fear of leaving a room or a house” (“The Doubting 
Malady”). A condition akin to agoraphobia, it was nevertheless defined less by what 
stood beyond familiar doors or other apertures than by the idea of crossing those 
thresholds. Sufferers tended to prefer “a very small bedroom,” finding even “the sight of 
an open door” completely “unsupportable.” 
The fascination with pathologies of spatial predilection began to overlap 
increasingly with the discourse on sexual deviance. Various reports show that a number 
of physicians understood agoraphobia, in particular, to be deeply linked to sexual 
pathology. A Dr. S. S. Purple, president of the New York Academy of Medicine, reported 
in 1878 that in many cases agoraphobia had been observed “to be traceable directly to 
sexual excess of some kind” (335). Another German neurologist, E. Cordes, whose term 
Platzangst served as a synonymous runner-up to agoraphobia during the period, counted 
“veneral excesses” alongside “disturbances of digestion” and “exaggerated intellectual 
                                                
58 “Clithrophobia.”  The London Reader: Of Literature, Science, Art and General 
Information (Jul. 20, 1878) 31.794: 273. 
59 For an early notice in an American periodical detailing Raggi’s classification of 
clithrophobia, see “Another Monomania,” published in The Doctor in November 1877, as 
well as The Clinic later that same month (252).  
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labors” as one of the disorder’s primary causes (“Clinical Psychiatry” 244). In a review 
of major contributions to the study of agoraphobia leading up to 1890, a Dr. C. W. 
Suckling of London notes a “marked potency of childbearing” in the development of 
“agoraphobia and allied fears,” attributing the cause to constitutive factors including 
“excessive lactation, frequent pregnancies, and sexual excess” (478). In the same article 
Suckling offers a corresponding case history, describing a forty-year old woman, M. H., 
who after having nine children and one miscarriage appears to have discovered the cause 
on her own. “She attributes her illness,” the doctor notes, “to having so many children, 
and to over-suckling” (480-1). 
In a series of articles for the Medical Record titled “Nervous Diseases connected 
with the Male Genital Function,” the U.S. neurologist George Miller Beard likewise 
suggested a relationship between agoraphobia and sexual dysfunction. For the first 
installment of the series, Beard tentatively speculated that “agoraphobia and [other] allied 
nervous affections” may all be “pretty directly under the influence of the genital system” 
(75). Evidence for such a hypothesis lay partly in Beard’s findings that conditions like 
agoraphobia tended to emerge “almost exclusively during the period of greatest sexual 
activity—between the ages of twenty and fifty—very rarely before fifteen or after fifty-
five or sixty.” The implication, he contends, is that “It is quite possible that simple 
activity, or a condition of readiness for activity of the genital organs, without abuse in 
any form, may, by reflex action, excite various nervous symptoms and disorders which 
disappear as the genital activity declines.” Such a relation finds further evidence in the 
second installment of the series, where Beard observes that “spermatorrhea” (a disorder 
characterized by involuntary seminal emission) frequently triggers exacerbations in 
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nervous conditions like agoraphobia, in patients where both conditions are present. 
“Many of my cases have this experience,” he writes. “[T]hey may go for a week or for 
two weeks without any trouble, when, either with or without any exciting cause, a volley 
is discharged, and for a day, or several days, they are nervous, irritable, neurasthenic, or 
[display] certain special symptoms” (555). Among these special symptoms, Beard names 
“sweating of the hands, agoraphobia, and aching of the loins.” 
Over time, Beard nevertheless grew dissatisfied with agoraphobia’s hegemony in 
neurological literature. At issue, he believed, was a lack of precision, which the 
elaboration of new phobias held the potential to rectify. A manuscript of a lecture 
delivered on hysteria at Long Island Hospital in June 1872, now held in the Beard 
Collection at Yale University, shows at an early moment the interest Beard took in 
phobia as a factor in nervous disorders. One of the staple features of Beard’s career, 
already visible in the manuscript, was his belief that life in the U.S. was especially 
susceptible to the cultivation of nervousness. Following this line of thought, the lecture 
begins by taking American physicians to task for shying away from the topic. Beard 
understood this neglect to be partly an issue of nervousness being “snubbed” by the 
medical profession (2). Equally problematic, however, was the inclination of American 
physicians to adopt all of their theories on mental illness from Europe. The mistake in the 
latter trend, Beard suggested, is that nervous disorders—classified in the lecture as 
“aneuric diseases”—could vary highly from civilization to civilization. For Beard no 
population had ever been more susceptible to nervous malfunction than that of the U.S. 
“Many of these aneuric diseases are enormously more frequent in America than in 
Europe,” he writes. “[I]n the United States these diseases have assumed both a 
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multiplicity and variety of phase that are paralleled in no other nation of recorded 
history” (4). Not only was this influx of nervous disease a matter of place, he goes on to 
explain. With the exception of hysteria, many of the conditions faced by Americans could 
be understood to have emerged for the first time in recent history: “They are, as I shall 
presently show, the fruit of civilization, the penalty of progress. Not only are these 
diseases peculiar to civilization; they are peculiar to modern in distinction from the 
ancient civilization and have developed during the last half century [emphasis Beard’s]” 
(5).60 Setting the geographical and historical stage for his lecture, Beard invites readers to 
contemplate the phobias he goes on to enumerate as a series of civilizational side effects.  
The lecture’s segment on phobia follows an extended definition and breakdown of 
the symptomatology of hysteria, which he maintains may afflict men and women alike. In 
detailing a diverse array of hysterical manifestations, Beard reaches the conclusion that 
the disorder is best understood as a “mocking bird among diseases,” which “may imitate 
the notes of any one or all the rest,” liable to produce sensations “of beating, of pounding, 
of throbbing, of rolling, of biting, of localized heat and cold in the extreme sensations of 
burning or freezing: to the sensations of increased size, as though the head or whole body 
were terribly hypertrophied,” and in some cases producing a “morbid sensation” that 
seems to inhabit the person as an independent “positive entity,” “roll[ing] about the body, 
changing with every motion, like an empty barrel or a ship at sea” (18). In conveying the 
capaciousness of hysteria thusly, Beard proceeds to the “allied affections,” which take 
                                                
60 At a subsequent moment, Beard goes so far as to compare his early forays in the 
treatment of nervous disorders to the colonization of the Americas. “My campaign 
against these nervous symptoms,” he writes, “was like the campaign of Cortez against the 
undisciplined myriads of Mexico, with the difference that Cortez was victorious, and I, at 
first, was not” (60).  
  225 
more definite forms, the first being neurasthenia, the second being an affection to which, 
he says, “I have given the generic name Phobia from φobos—meaning fear that amounts 
to a disease” (19). He goes on to explain, “To a degree, fear is normal, is physiological; 
simply an expression of the caution that is necessary to existence: but not infrequently it 
degenerates into disease and like hysteria indicates either bad organization or nervous 
impairment or both at once.” With this definition given, Beard goes on to divide the 
“genus” of phobia into two of its most common “species.” “Astraphobia” he uses to 
designate a fear of lightning and thunderstorms. Agoraphobia, attributed explicitly to 
Westphal, he takes to account for the fear of a specific place or “locality.”61  
Beard went on to adapt and publish the lecture two years later in Cases of 
Hysteria, Neurasthenia, Spinal Irritation, or Allied Affections (1974), with no more 
species of phobia there elaborated. Not until the publication of his greatly influential A 
Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion in 1880 did Beard test the idea that there were 
certain fears from which agoraphobia needed to be actively disentangled. In the treatise, 
Beard groups all such conditions under the title “Morbid Fear,” once again treating 
pathological fear as an allied affection of nervous disorders, or what he had come to call 
“neurasthenia,” synonymous with “nervous exhaustion.” Here, however, Beard specifies 
in greater detail the physiological conditions by which phobias emerge. He explains, 
Morbid fears are the result of various functional diseases of the nervous 
system, and imply a debility, a weakness, an incompetency and 
                                                
61 With the potential manifestations of agoraphobia elaborated, Beard also proceeds to 
account briefly for a condition that would not long after become known as “acrophobia.” 
“The fear of ascending a height sometimes amounts to a positive disease,” he explains 
(21). Outing himself as one who suffers from the condition, he writes, “There are 
individuals of whom I am chief, whom all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of 
them would not tempt to climb to the masthead or the top of a church spire.”  
  226 
inadequacy, as compared with the normal state of the individual. A 
healthy man fears; but when he is functionally diseased in his nervous 
system he is liable to fear all the more; to have the normal, necessary fear 
of his physiological condition descend into an abnormal pathological state 
simply from a lack of force in the disordered nervous system. The debility 
of the brain—the nerve impoverishment—renders it impossible to meet 
responsibility, just as paraplegia makes it difficult or impossible to walk; 
morbid fear is indeed but a psychical paralysis (50-1) 
With these physiological conditions for phobia elaborated, Beard goes on to make the 
strikingly categorical claim that “no symptom” of nervous disorder “is so likely to be 
overlooked, or slighted, or misinterpreted, or improperly named, as this one symptom of 
morbid fear” (52). In an effort to answer this general neglect of phobia, Beard launches 
into a list of phobias most commonly encountered, beginning once again with astraphobia 
and agoraphobia before elaborating upon nine others. 
 Finding agoraphobia “inadequate to express the many varieties of morbid fear 
which the expression fear of place covers,” Beard treats it as a subcategory of a more 
comprehensive category he calls topophobia, designating a general fear of places in all 
varieties. Counter to agoraphobia’s resistance to open public squares, he lists 
claustrophobia as that iteration of topophobia marked by an “inability to stay within 
doors” (58). In contrast to all of these, Beard uses the term Anthropophobia to indicate a 
fear of mankind or society specifically, irrespective of locale (60). In addition, Beard lists 
monophobia, meaning the “fear of being alone” (60); pathophobia, a synonym for 
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hypochondriasis62 (60); pantaphobia, meaning “fear of everything” (61); phobophobia, or 
the fear of fear itself (61); mysophobia, or “fear of contamination”;  and 
siderodromophobia, defined as a “morbid disinclination for work.” Following these 
definitions, Beard returns once more to the concept of Anthropophobia to describe a 
peculiar subset—a condition titled “Gynephobia,” defined as “Fear of woman” (67).  
The term enjoyed a brief surge in usage during the following decade. Medical 
textbooks including Edward Bermingham’s Encyclopaedic Index of Medicine and 
Surgery (1882), George Milbry Gould’s Dictionary of Medicine, Biology, and Allied 
Sciences (1894), and Theodore Kellogg’s Textbook on Mental Diseases (1897), list 
gynephobia as a legitimate pathology. Writing for the Dublin Journal of Medical Science, 
a J. Strahan went on to affirm the veracity of Beard’s nomenclature at length, writing of 
anthropophobia, defined as a “fear of mingling with men,” and gynaephobia [sic], 
defined as “fear of women, usually due to sexual exhaustion,” that both were marked by 
an “aversion of the eyes and hanging [of] the head” (351). While admitting that these are 
common in neurasthenia generally, he asserts they are “almost uniformly present in the 
sexual form,” being “an involuntary expression of inferiority.” Meditating further on the 
disposition, he continues,  
The man averting his look feels that his brain and nerve-force, for the 
moment at least, are inferior to the person’s whose gaze he is unable to 
meet. This symptom often puts the physician on the track of the complaint 
                                                
62 Pathophobia was an exception to Beard’s contention that many of the conditions with 
which he was concerned had arisen in a U.S. context only recently. Pathophobia he 
believed to be a “very old” disease, and that “through the increase in culture it is 
relatively diminishing; just like the forms of hysteria, epilepsy, and chorea, that were so 
common in the middle ages” (130). 
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at once….The inability to look one in the face also improves or gets worse 
with the general condition, so that it becomes a criterion of the progress of 
the patient. 
Even with these physiological correlates at hand, still other physicians considered 
gynophobia a very difficult condition to treat. A doctor in Baltimore, Marlyand, by the 
name of John J. Caldwell submitted a case study with the header, “Case 3. Gynephobia,” 
to the Therapeutic Gazette on December 15, 1880. “Mr.—’s case presents some 
interesting points,” he begins. “When in bed alone, his erections were sufficient, but in 
company with a woman he utterly failed to perform the act” (346). He then confesses, 
however, “I reported this case as a failure,” as all treatments—“Electricity, rest, cold 
bath, and the free use of damania utterly failed.” 
 As an identifiable pathological condition, gynophobia represented in the early 
decades of sexology something decidedly distinct from misogyny. As the concept began 
to circulate in U.S. periodicals, it belonged more to an experimental moment in 
discourses linking affective maladies and deficiencies with sexual aberration, joining a 
host of neologisms that flared up briefly and soon after fizzled out. Among these, one of 
the most provocative, appearing as an inversion of gynophobia, was an early concept 
gesturing to transgender subjectivity doctors called “gynomania,” defined in one account 
as a “passion,” akin in nature to monomania and kleptomania, which “some young people 
have for the dress and manner of the opposite sex.” The account proceeds by treating the 
condition as a pathological continuation of society’s general move toward androgyny, 
noting, “Young men have reached the limit of effeminacy when they have curled their 
hair, and parted it in the middle. There is no other safety valve for the escape of their pent 
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up womanhood; and he that would go further must adopt the entire dress and appearance 
of a woman.” Remarkable here is the transformation of gender into a substance or fluid, 
in need of a “safety valve,” by which womanhood might be imaginatively shut off. 
Indicating an obsession not with women per se, but with social conventions and excesses 
of femininity, as a cultural construct, gynomania appears to have occupied a strange 
middle ground between being conspicuously soaked in femininity and being perfectly 
awash in its social function, to the extent that one could become impervious to detection. 
“Startling as it may seem,” the author continues, 
there are men, some of them no longer young, who can no more refrain 
from skirts and bustles than the toper from his glass. Some time since a 
young man was arrested in the streets of a neighboring city, dressed like a 
fashionable lady. His slender form was rendered more so by the tightest of 
stays; his legs were bound together by a pulled-back skirt and bustle; his 
narrow feet were encased in high-heeled boots; his hair was crimped and 
frizzed; he was adorned with ear rings, breast pin, ruffles, and laces; he 
was accustomed to walk the streets midday, unsuspected by either sex. 
Although heavily punished by fines and imprisonment, he always returns 
at the earliest possible moment to his peculiar practices, unable to break 
away from this strange infatuation.  
Subject to fines, arrest, and imprisonment, even while being “unsuspected by either sex,” 
gynomaniacs appear to have threatened their environment less by way of any chaotic 
interruption of gender norms than through a mania so precise it threatened to go 
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unremarked. Equally central to the pathology described is a recidivism no amount of 
discipline successfully curtails.63 
An 1881 account by Edward Charles Spitzka, an influential neurologist and 
contemporary of Beard’s (famous today for testifying on behalf of Charles J. Guiteau’s 
insanity during the defendant’s trial for the assassination of James Garfield), links 
gynomania explicitly to the sexological literature being produced in Europe. Gynomania, 
he explains, has “received due consideration at the hands of eminent German and French 
alienists,” among them “Westphal, under the head of ‘Contraere Sexualempfindung” and 
Krafft-Ebing, in a very thorough paper dealing with all varieties of sexual perversion” 
(359). Defining the condition as a “degenerative psychosis,” by which “the patient feels 
himself inclined to assume the feminine dress and gestures, or goes so far as to feel 
himself a woman during the otherwise normally performed sexual act,” Spitzka proceeds 
to observe categorically, “They are all of them incurable.” However, in determining what 
physicians understood gynophobia to entail, gynomania may prove most significant as a 
                                                
63 A subsequent case history published in 1881 depicts a case of gynomania as a steady 
descent into madness. Having repressed the condition in order to marry and have 
children, the individual nevertheless soon after purchases a pair of French heels. “These 
boots he boldly wore upon the promenade in fine weather with pants elevated to show the 
heel,” the author explains. “In bad weather he was wont to put on these boots and button 
them in front of a long mirror, about once a week.” The person began wearing corsets 
rapidly afterward. From this moment forward, we are told, “he advanced step by step 
down the ladder, purchasing various articles of female attire, until at length he bought a 
black silk dress, which he had made to fit him very tightly, and in which he took great 
pride. Curls and switches, false hair, earrings and breast pins, all aided in feeding this 
peculiar fire. He would even sit for hours tightly laced, while a lady hair-dresser curled 
and frizzed his hair like a woman. At length he went so far as to walk the city streets and 
even attend church, wearing his new black silk dress caught up on one side so as to 
expose a white fluted skirt, beneath which his high-heeled French boots were visible. 
With heavily padded chest, tightly squeezed waist, enormous bustle, his hair tortured into 
fantastic forms, his ears in crew vices, and his feet crowded into the narrowest and most 
uncomfortable boots, he would walk for miles, or dance for hours, with great pleasure.”  
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pathology of fascination from which gynophobia did not, in fact, appear mutually 
exclusive. Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis illustrates as much in showing how 
analogous concepts could be comorbid in a singular case study. “I could not approach 
girls,” one case explains, 
I feared them, but they were not strange to me. They impressed me as 
being more like myself; I envied them. I would have denied myself all 
pleasures if, after my classes, at home I could have been a girl and thus 
have gone out. Crinoline and a smoothly-fitting glove were my ideals. 
With every lady’s gown I saw I fancies how I should feel in it,—i.e., as a 
lady. (205) 
Expressions of phobia and mania could, in such contexts, appear commensurable, even 
continuous. All of this existed, moreover, without there being any clear role for desire or 
sexual impulse to play. “I had no inclination toward men,” the individual proceeds. “But I 
remember that I was somewhat lovingly attached to a very handsome friend with a girl’s 
face and dark hair, though I think I had no other wish than that we both might be girls.” 
Of interest to physicians during this period were the infinite permutations an interplay of 
fascinations could take, which might yet discard or keep at bay all imperatives to mate 
selection, finding it at times impossible, finding it at other times entirely beside the point.  
 
HOMEOPATHIC GENDER IN A MORTAL ANTIPATHY 
 
Despite gynophobia’s apparent intractability, Oliver Wendell Holmes believed the 
diagnosis to be an important breakthrough and believed, moreover, that his novel might 
supplement other physicians with practical insights. Nevertheless, scholars have yet to 
explore A Mortal Antipathy in relation to this immediate context. Thus, in shifting to an 
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analysis of the novel, my goal will be to explore how Holmes wields gynophobia, as a 
nascent diagnosis, to frame a logic of sexual failure. Ultimately, such a line of inquiry 
compels us to ask what must happen for “womanliness” to be regarded not just as a 
subject of persistent fear, but also as a thing requiring desire—while also being the 
ultimate sign of one’s successful cure, insofar as it must materialize in proper relation to 
Maurice in order for him to be deemed well. It will be my argument that A Mortal 
Antipathy handles gender as both a material contaminant and a substantive form of 
psychiatric treatment, in order to negotiate the terms of a therapeutic model premised on 
converting sexual deficiency into healthy attraction. While Maurice’s gynophobia is 
triggered by the presence of women, that is, it will also turn out to have been solved by 
that presence. In studying this appropriation of gender as cause and cure, I will make two 
overarching arguments. The first is that Holmes effectively translates to the realm of 
neurology and psychiatric health a genre of medical treatment that had been popular for 
much of the nineteenth century: the theory of homeopathy, generally credited to Samuel 
Hahnemann beginning in 1796, which held that a disease could be treated with a diluted 
measure of the substance that first produced it. While Holmes comes closer, arguably, to 
what behavioral psychologists would later term “flooding,” a mode of treatment by which 
one is thrown into sudden, dramatic proximity with one’s phobic stimuli, the rationale of 
the conversion therapy proposed may be classed as belonging to a kind of homeopathic 
spectrum. Building on this argument, I go on to suggest that Holmes’s novel illustrates 
how early sexual conversion therapy in the U.S. depended not just on the isolation of 
sexual phobia for treatment, but moreover on a reinstatement of what we might today 
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identify as cisgender stability and continuity, tethered to expressions of socially 
sanctioned desire. 
A facetious article published in 1878, which went on to be widely circulated 
afterward, had already begun to play with the idea that sexology was translating matters 
of deviance to the terrain of old homeopathic equations.64 With a sarcasm that becomes 
increasingly evident as the article proceeds, the author begins, “It has been discovered of 
late years, that many habits and conditions of the body and mind are really diseases.” The 
piece goes on to fabricate the “very latest discovery”—one introduced by a 
“distinguished German homoeopathist” he names “Dr. Steinerkopf” whose latest 
publication is titled “Gynaia, its Symptoms and Treatment.” A disease affecting 
“effeminate” men, gynaia is said to involve, in most cases, timidity, excitability, 
aversions to “tobacco and dogs,” as well as a general aspect of “womanliness.” For its 
cure, Dr. Steinerkopf recommends, in true homeopathic fashion, “womanliness itself in 
extremely attenuated doses.” To “procur[e] the mother tincture,” the physician is said to 
have searched for a woman swimming by herself in the Atlantic Ocean. Upon 
discovering one such woman, the physician took a glass vase, “waited for ten minutes to 
elapse,” charged at the stranger, “scooped up a gallon of water” in her vicinity, and 
afterward prepared a serum from the “high dilution of girl” titled “Puella domestica, 
50th.” By this measure, did the imaginary doctor successfully discover gynaia’s cure. 
                                                
64 For its various instances of publication, see “A Doctor’s Diluted Delusion.”  
Burlington Weekly Free Press (August 09, 1878): 1; “Homoeopathic Doses of Lovely 
Woman.”  Obstetric Gazette (1879): 332; and other reprints in The Richmond and 
Louisville Medical Journal in 1878; Michigan Medical News in 1878; The Chicago 
Medical Times in 1879; St. Louis Clinical Record in 1879; New York Medical Journal in 
1889; Pacific Medical Journal in 1889; International Record of Medicine and General 
Practice Clinics in 1889; and multiple others. 
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A glib dismissal of psychiatry’s interest in gender, the “Gynaia” article 
nevertheless latches onto something strangely reminiscent in the new sexology for a 
mode of treatment elsewhere defunct. That is, in spite of itself, the article undoes 
positivist perceptions of gender at the exact moment psychiatrists were beginning to 
wield its binary logic for a range of taxonomic purposes. Indeed, what makes the 
presence of this pseudo-homeopathic rhetoric seem especially ironic in A Mortal 
Antipathy is that decades earlier Holmes had made one of his greatest contributions to the 
history of medicine by lambasting homeopathy as a genre of medical quackery, in his 
essay Homeopathy and Its Kindred Delusions in 1842. Organized around two lectures 
Holmes delivered to the Boston Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 
Homeopathy and Its Kindred Delusions endeavors, in no uncertain terms, to put an end to 
Hahnemann’s influence. One of Holmes’s primary objections has to do with what he calls 
the “first doctrine” of homeopathy, which inheres in the law “similia similibus curantur,” 
or the supposition that “like is cured by like” (41). Turning to this doctrine, Holmes takes 
issue with the strange parameters the rhetoric premised on “likeness” has been forced to 
obey. “[Y]ou will remember,” Holmes writes, “that this principle is, Like cures Like, and 
not that Same cures Same, that there is resemblance and not identity between the 
symptoms of the disease and those produced by the drug which cures it” (49). Holmes 
explains the caveat further: “For if Same cures Same, then every poison must be its own 
antidote; which is neither a part of [homeopathy’s] theory, nor [the] so-called experience” 
of its practitioners (49). The emphasis on likeness over sameness thus emerged, Holmes 
implies, only after it was proven that the dilution of an exact or identical causal agent 
consistently failed to cure a corresponding illness. Asserting the condition of likeness 
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over sameness allowed homeopathy to survive in the wake of these failures, with the 
logic that a diluted substance, once removed from the original offender, performed the 
special trick. The crisis this stipulation introduces, for Holmes, is that the tautological 
relation of a disease-causing agent to its cure, on which homeopathy had always rested, 
erodes the moment perfect identity is taken to be exceptionally ineffective. To expose the 
absurdity of the “likeness” loophole, Holmes turns at the end of the passage to one of 
homeopathy’s long-lasting colloquial legacies: the phrase originating in its prescription 
for hydrophobia, which held that only “the hair of the dog” that bites has the power, 
thereafter, to heal. “Oh no!” Holmes exclaims, satirizing the homeopathist’s stipulation: 
“it was not the hair of the same dog, but only of one very much like him!” (49).65 
I follow this thread in Holmes’s 1842 argument at length, in part, because it 
demonstrates how the physician brought a rather literary investigation of a 
representational paradox to bear on his career in medicine. His argument, essentially, is 
that homeopathy runs on faith in a warped analogy, stripped of all claims to genuine 
similitude. But the distinctions he draws between likeness and sameness become all the 
more interesting when we place them alongside the conceptual homeopathy used to treat 
gynophobia in A Mortal Antipathy, in which women are presumed, in the context of 
Maurice’s diagnosis and his therapy, alike enough to be interchangeable. Ultimately, 
Holmes’s point in his treatise on homeopathy is that apparent disparities between 
sameness and likeness as representational modes break down in the context of treatment, 
wherein a multiplicity of infection (in short, the threat of epidemic proportions) cannot be 
taken to mean a great diversity of content, requiring a great diversity of cures. Such a 
                                                
65 This is, indeed, where the hangover remedy metaphor originates, as a kind of vulgar 
homeopathy. 
  236 
conclusion, after all, would preclude any modicum of efficiency in practice. Rather, 
likeness (being of the same kind) and identity (being particular to the causational element 
in question) must, to some degree, be collapsed, in order for medical knowledge to be 
generalized. At the same time, Holmes harps on this mistake of homeopathy in order to 
conclude that neither sameness nor likeness makes sense as a circular answer connecting 
disease origin to disease resolution. Written far in advance of the microbial revolution, 
Holmes’s treatise rests not on a precise understanding of contagion, but instead on his 
attention to an absurdity of plot: the idea that one should solve one’s ailment simply by 
returning to and re-ingesting something akin to the agent that caused the ailment to 
unfold.  
Nevertheless, Holmes appears to have missed how close his novel premised on 
gynophobia comes to a comparable tautology. There is a risk, of course, in treating his 
approaches to infectious disease and psychiatric maladies on the same terms. What I am 
calling “conceptual homeopathy” is a world apart from actual homeopathy, diffuse and 
diverse as the practice was. At the same time, insofar as Holmes took issue with the 
practice on literary terms, as a failure of plot, the concept works well as a lens for 
considering a similar sequence that transpires over the course of the novel. (These echoes 
in sexology are what gave the satirical article on “Gynaia” its popularity coast-to-coast, 
after all.) The relationships between A Mortal Antipathy and Holmes’s medical thought 
become clearest once the novel is contextualized in terms of its genre dimensions. A 
Mortal Antipathy is generally studied as the last of three literary experiments Holmes 
undertook toward the end of his career, which he believed to be audaciously new in the 
world of letters. Referred to by critics as the “medicated novels,” a nickname Holmes 
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himself borrowed from a friend who “refused to read” them on account of their 
experimental subject matter, they show the author endeavoring to subject psychiatric 
phenomena to a literary sensibility (“A Second Preface” vii). The first, Elsie Venner: A 
Romance of Destiny, published in 1861, tells the story of a young neurotic heroine named 
Elsie whose mother was bitten during pregnancy by a rattlesnake. The consequence, we 
discover, is that Elsie’s personality is part-woman, part-snake. The second, The Guardian 
Angel, published in 1867, tells of a woman named Myrtle Hazard whose task, as Michael 
Weinstein notes, involves “ordering and harmonizing the diverse elements of her moral 
makeup,” attributed to a complex ancestry including Europeans, Native Americans, and 
witches (93). Published nearly twenty years later, A Mortal Antipathy concludes the 
experiment by turning to matters of sexual disorder. All three novels may be read as 
attempts by Holmes to connect the world of literature with evolving theories in medicine. 
In reflecting on an embarrassing stage adaptation of Elsie Venner in 1883, the physician 
clarified for readers in a new preface to the volume, “It is to the mind, and not to the 
senses, that such a story must appeal” (vii). Each novel functioned for Holmes as an 
imaginative case history, or what he elsewhere in the 1883 preface calls a “physiological 
romance,” through which he hoped truths about psychological disease might be 
discovered via the act of literary creation. 
To understand how Holmes intends readers to perceive phobia in A Mortal 
Antipathy, as a disease revolving around an object of fear that constitutes cause, trigger, 
and cure, it is necessary to follow the novel across the process of elimination by which 
Maurice’s precise problem is discovered. For the majority of the novel, Holmes uses the 
term antipathy in place of phobia. Readers are first introduced to the concept when a 
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snooping Dr. Butts asks Paolo why Maurice “keep[s] out of sight” (58). Paolo responds 
in Italian, “Una antipatia.” Thus begins a quest on the part of Dr. Butts and others to 
unveil the nature of Maurice’s antipathy. “Twenty-four hours later,” the narrator explains, 
“the story was all over the village that Maurice Kirkwood was the subject of a strange, 
mysterious, unheard-of antipathy to something, nobody knew what; and the whole 
neighborhood resolved itself into an unorganized committee of investigation” (59). The 
riddle lies primarily in Maurice’s domestic confinement. “What could an antipathy be 
that made a young man a recluse!” (58). Dr. Butts initially wonders. “Was it a dread of 
blue sky and open air, of the smell of flowers, or some electrical impression to which he 
was unnaturally sensitive?” Echoing contemporary accounts of agoraphobia and 
claustrophilia, the doctor’s speculations begin with these wide conceptions of an 
instinctual disinclination for open spaces. 
 Dr. Butts proceeds to cross possible antipathies off his list. Spiders, foods, and 
odors may all be objects of antipathy, or of an “instinctive elective dislike,” but these, he 
decides, cannot account for Maurice’s “singular mode of life” (62, 3). His first genuine 
hypothesis, then, is that Maurice might be afraid of dogs, a common condition of the day 
connected with hydrophobia. To test the hypothesis, Dr. Butts unleashes a massive 
Newfoundland dog in Maurice’s vicinity, only to observe Maurice greeting the dog with 
a pat on the head (63). Subsequently Maurice proves to be relatively unimpressed by 
thunder. Next, a person reporting a chance encounter observes that while talking, “A 
rabbit ran by us, and I watched…but he seemed pleased watching the creature” (70). 
Perhaps the most pivotal observation before the climactic reveal, however, is the decision 
that Maurice’s antipathy cannot be generalized to a total revulsion for social interaction. 
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“[H]ow could any conceivable antipathy be so comprehensive as to keep a young man 
aloof from all the world, and make a hermit of him?” (92). Dr. Butts asks himself in 
another passage. “He did not hate the human race; that was clear enough. He treated 
Paolo with great kindness, and the Italian was evidently much attached to him….It was 
not misanthropy, therefore, which kept him solitary.” In crossing off the totality of the 
human race and most animals, however, Dr. Butts finds himself only increasingly 
stupefied by Maurice’s behavior.   
 Finally, the disease is revealed to Dr. Butts, when he gains access to two papers 
documenting the illness. Importing the form of the sexological case study into the novel, 
Holmes devotes the eighteenth chapter to an autobiographical account of the disease, 
where we first learn that Maurice fears the presence of women. Holmes then devotes the 
nineteenth chapter to an interpretive report written by the British Royal Academy of 
Biological Sciences titled “ACCOUNT OF A CASE OF GYNOPHOBIA. WITH 
REMARKS” (230). A Mortal Antipathy in this way imitates the form of a psychiatric 
handbook partway through, offering a series of symptoms and conclusions with which 
one might make comparisons in similar cases. So impressed would a psychiatrist named 
Charles P. Obendorf be with Holmes’s case reports in 1943 that he decided to published, 
through Columbia University Press, a collection of excerpts from A Mortal Antipathy and 
the other “medicated novels” titled The Psychiatric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
which aimed to account for all of the ways in which Holmes had anticipated later 
psychoanalytic discoveries.  
 Maurice’s self-authored case history wastes no time in getting to the origin of his 
malady. Here readers first learn how the threat of female proximity became linked to the 
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inaugural event that brought his gynophobia into existence. Maurice recalls he was still 
an infant and was being held by his nurse near a second-story window when his cousin 
Laura, “with all the delighted eagerness of her youthful nature,” grabbed him excitedly 
and began tossing him up in the air (209). “The abrupt seizure frightened me,” he 
explains. “I sprang from her arms in my terror, and fell over the railing of the balcony.” 
Saving him from death, a thorn-bush below broke his fall; but the tumble and injuries 
inflicted caused the “dreadful experience” to be “burned deep” within his “memory.” 
“The sudden apparition of the girl, he continues, “the sense of being torn away from the 
protecting arms around me; the frantic effort to escape; the shriek that accompanied my 
fall through what must have seemed unmeasurable space; the cruel lacerations of the 
piercing and rending thorns,—all these fearful impressions blended in one paralyzing 
terror.” Across his childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood, the disease only 
worsened and solidified. Any proximity to women caused him to faint and his heart to 
stop, “until it became fully recognized that I was the unhappy subject of a mortal dread of 
woman” (213). In the committee’s report we are given the official diagnosis: “we shall 
have to apply the term Gynophobia, or Fear of Woman” (231).   
Situations in which proximity to women has caused Maurice to faint or brought 
him to the brink of heart failure appear in both documents. In these cases, it is reported 
that all “color” generally “faded” from Maurice’s cheeks (212), that he was left 
“unconscious” (210), and that he tended to awake only to find his pulse nearly 
extinguished. In the greatest analysis of A Mortal Antipathy to date, Jane Thrailkill has 
suggested that Maurice’s total incapacity, throughout the novel, to access and solve his 
psychological condition, originating in a prior traumatic event, offers a valuable 
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“prehistory to the Freudian conception of trauma, which would construe traumatic 
experience as a primarily psychic rather than physiological wound” (86). With the caveat 
that the specifics of Holmes’s approach to “embodied memory” is “not easily subsumed 
to Freudian terms” (111), Thrailkill nevertheless goes further, arguing that when it comes 
to the question of treatment what we finally end up with is something akin to the later 
logic of psychoanalysis, where narrative, as a medium of memory, persists as crucial to 
subjectivity, yet cannot be accessed by the subject as such. Narrative is fashioned, 
Thrailkill elaborates, “as that which may be unavailable to the unconscious mind of the 
person in possession of the memories, who relives [via the ongoing effects of trauma] 
rather than re-presents the past” (115). The autobiographical and medical case reports 
detailing Maurice’s gynophobia are, in this sense, analogous to his daily life, distinct only 
in terms of genre: each text functions to recapitulate Maurice’s foundational childhood 
injury.  
While I am convinced by this argument in part, I would modify Thrailkill’s 
emphasis on narrative to argue that Holmes indicates narrative explanation can go only so 
far when the pathology at issue is phobia. In such a context, the only option for cure 
might, in fact, be oppositional to narrative: the potency of unanticipated shock, where a 
substantive presence correlated with a subject’s ideational dread confronts that subject 
without explanation. The autobiographical report and case study do very little for 
Maurice, after all, insofar as he keeps them stashed away in a drawer for the majority of 
the plot. Such documents become valuable only to a literary readership capable of using 
them to comprehend conditions belonging, by contrast, to an oppositional medium of 
sudden collision, at which point womanliness, as a substantive presence, needs no 
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narrative to inflict its neurological impact. Of course, for gender to take on this 
significance, it must do so in tandem with narrative, where its status as substantive, or in 
terms of dosage, is inscribed into sequence—as cause and cure—and thus made subject to 
interpretation. But interpretation turns out to be secondary in importance to an underlying 
homeopathic equation at the heart of phobia’s disposition. It is less important, in other 
words, for Maurice to decipher his condition than for his state of negative passion to be 
mechanically, involuntarily transformed into positive desire. At such a juncture the right 
measure of a feared agent will have been the key to converting disinclination into purified 
attraction.   
Soon after the documents appear transcribed in A Mortal Antipathy, Euthymia 
saves Maurice from the burning house, thus unleashing the mechanism by which his 
affliction will be cured. Just as it seems Maurice will succumb to the flames, the narrator 
explains, “In a single instant he found himself rolled in a blanket and in the arms of—a 
woman!” (273). Euthymia carries Maurice to safety. Taking note of the scene, Dr. Butts 
intuits that the resulting jolt to Maurice’s physiology will be his greatest chance for 
recuperation. The narrator explains, “It was perfectly clear to Dr. Butts that if Maurice 
could [repeatedly] see the young woman to whom he owed his life” and, perhaps more 
importantly, the woman to whom he owed “the revolution in his nervous system which 
would be the beginning of a new existence,” such visits “would be of far more value as a 
restorative agency than any or all of the drugs in the pharmacopoeia” (277). The great 
solution thus materializes: that which had consistently brought Maurice to the brink of 
death will be also the wellspring of his delivery. This solution becomes manifest, as I 
have suggested, as a female similitude, which at once spans everyone from his cousin 
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Laura to passersby to Euthymia, yet also appears to vary in quantity and force, insofar as 
readers learn it is precisely the enormous “shock” of both experiences—a term used 
throughout the novel—that brings Maurice to an altered neurological state (211, 218, 
239, 304). Holmes goes so far as to imply that this female presence is, for all practical 
purposes, Maurice’s best available drug. Holmes thus leaves us with the miraculous 
immediacy of a conceptual homeopathy, by which an inceptive agent (the traumatic 
incident with Laura) is essentially imitated to produce the perfect cure. Equally important 
in this resolution, however, is the fact that Dr. Butts feels compelled to arrive at such a 
panacea not for any deviant proclivity, but rather to fix the wrong kind of solitude. The 
novel thus concludes by picturing a nascent conversion therapy, yet one in which we 
jump straight from disinclination—which is to say a conspicuous absence of desire—to 
affinity writ large, climactically restored.    
 
 
{CODA III} 
 
 
A LIVING CASE, A DYING ART:  
AUBREY BEARDSLEY’S GYNOPHOBIC AESTHETIC 
 
A Mortal Antipathy’s earnest elaboration of Maurice’s suffering begs the 
question: in the short time span of gynophobia’s modest popularity as a diagnosis, were 
there individuals who auto-internalized the condition as an accurate reflection of their 
interior orientation? In a tempting interpretation of A Mortal Antipathy, Charles Gibian 
has suggested that if Holmes had a real-life Maurice Kirkwood in mind, it might have 
been Holmes’s earlier contemporary Nathaniel Hawthorne. Discussing Holmes’s final 
conversation with Hawthorne in 1864, during which the former attempted to distract 
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Hawthorne from his declining health, Gibian observes, “the Holmes interview with 
Hawthorne has its parallel in his late novel A Mortal Antipathy, which focuses on a young 
man, in many respects a very close image of Hawthorne, whose medical problem is 
pathological self-seclusion” (306). Gibian goes further, suggesting that Holmes has for 
his double the charitable Dr. Butts, who in noticing Maurice’s reclusive tendencies felt, 
as the novel explains, a “natural desire to do all that his science and his knowledge of 
human nature could help him to do towards bring him into healthy relations with the 
world about him” (qtd. in Gibian 307). To be fair, Gibian resists making the gynophobia 
diagnosis outright. Yet while Gibian avoids speculation that Hawthorne’s reclusiveness 
was connected to a fear of women, he observes concurrently the feminine, even sexual 
impression Hawthorne made on Holmes. In a tribute to Hawthorne published in the 
Atlantic shortly after his death, Holmes recalls of their final conversation, with obvious 
affection, “There was the same backwardness and hesitancy which in his best days it was 
hard for him to overcome, so that talking with him was almost like lovemaking, and his 
shy, beautiful soul had to be wooed from its bashful pudency like an unschooled maiden” 
(99). We need only supplement Gibian’s speculation with the fact that Holmes briefly 
alludes to Hawthorne in his preface to A Mortal Antipathy, with insinuations that the 
novel is dedicated partly to the high literary moment of the early-to-mid 1800s, and the 
theory that Holmes based his gynophobe on Hawthorne certainly seems plausible. 
If we wanted to entertain the idea further, we could add that enough has been 
written on the resentment Hawthorne felt toward Fanny Fern and that “damned mob of 
scribbling women” taking over U.S. newspapers, as well as his peculiar and laborious 
friendship with Margaret Fuller to support the idea that Hawthorne’s experience of 
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gender was less than salubrious.66 However, this kind of riddle—was Hawthorne a 
gynophobe, or wasn’t he?—returns us to a central concern of this dissertation, which is 
whether an affect, pathological or ordinary, can be said to cohere in any meaningful sense 
before it is called into being by and as language. Moreover, it gets us no closer to 
answering the matter of whether gynophobia, or European correlates such as horror 
feminae, briefly served as an affect, identity category, or aesthetic sensibility individuals 
might have claimed for themselves in the 1880s and 1890s. In concluding this chapter, I 
want to suggest that one of the likeliest candidates for such an identification might be 
British book and magazine illustrator Aubrey Beardsley, a figure long treated as a pioneer 
of one of sexology’s parallel aesthetic phenomena, the so-called “decadent movement.”  
That Beardsley conceptualized his art in a sort of phobic register is perhaps one of 
the best known aspects of his legacy. Indeed, when John Davidson first published A Full 
and True Account of the Wonderful Mission of Earl Lavender—the novel referenced at 
the beginning of this chapter, which Davidson would later describe as documenting a 
case of gynophobia in the case of Lavender’s sidekick Lord Brumm—publisher Ward 
and Downey sought Beardsley to create Davidson’s frontispiece (Fig. 12). An illustration 
that has since sustained more interest than Davidson’s novel itself, Beardsley’s 
frontispiece shows the novel’s best-known plot point featuring a scene of underground 
flagellation, in which a woman in an ornate dress, decked in flowers, whips a kneeling 
                                                
66 Had Fuller lived to see the days of Westphal and Beard, she might have diagnosed him 
herself, though she might also have gone with the more comprehensive agoraphobia. In a 
review of Hawthorne’s Twice Told Tales in The Dial in 1842, Fuller derided his writing 
for its insularity of vision. Comparing the stories to “gleams of light on a noble tree 
which stands untouched and self-sufficing in its fullness of foliage on a distant slope,” 
and to “slight ripples wrinkling the smooth surface, but never stirring the quiet depths of 
a wood-embossed lake,” Fuller asserts that the stories might “promise more,” should their 
author find himself able to cross the threshold of “his study door” (130). 
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gentleman, naked down to a loosely draped bit of fabric at his hip. Evocatively, the man’s 
head hangs just beyond the parameters of the image, precluding viewers from identifying 
any affective response facially—whether dread, shame, pleasure, or some combination. 
Instead, the affective cues of the piece reside in the figure of the flagellating lady herself, 
who casually holds her dress up at her partially bared breasts, stares disdainfully at the 
subordinated individual below her, and rears the three-threaded instrument in her hand 
backward for a blow to come, poised to commence immediately following the moment 
depicted. On the one hand, Beardsley’s frontispiece clearly engages a kind of eroticism. 
Yet much like the flagellating women Davidson depicts in the novel, who insist their 
hobby is devoid of erotic undertones, inhering rather in the satisfaction of a purified 
sadism, the image orients the viewer’s interest toward the driving repudiation of the whip 
itself. As Murray Pittock writes, “Beardsley’s satirical grotesques” present “expressions 
of the anxiety of exclusion from the normal maturation and development of the human 
personality” (79). While the Lavender frontispiece proffers a rather lighthearted example 
of this anxiety, arguably, it nevertheless exemplifies well Beardsley’s preference for a 
sexuality “close to the metaphorical darkness which expressed his own fears.” That is, 
Beardsley gives us a sexuality “odd, deformed, deprived” (79), yet one in which viewers 
are invited to entertain, rather than pathologize, erotic spaces where the dominant 
orientation might be one of phobic anticipation. 
 In a favorite quote among critics, Beardsley professed openly in an 1896 
interview, “Of course, I have one aim, the grotesque. If I am not grotesque I am nothing.” 
The Earl Lavender frontispiece shows how this grotesqueness cut both ways for the 
artist: if Beardsley thought of himself and his aesthetic in terms of the grotesque, the 
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women he illustrated channel this same mood in the terror they inflict on neighboring 
figures, generally men. Nevertheless, Beardsley’s work has yet to be explored next to 
sexology’s late nineteenth-century interest in gynophobia or even phobia more broadly as 
a variable pathology. It is worth noting that Beardsley appears to have taken some early 
inspiration, in this regard, from the most iconic contributor to a grotesque imagination in 
U.S. letters, Edgar Allan Poe. In 1894, Beardsley created illustrations to accompany four 
of Poe’s stories in a book commissioned by Chicago publisher Herbert S. Stone and Co. 
(Fig. 13). Yet perhaps no work distills Beardsley’s career-long interest in an unfolding 
gynophobic aesthetic better than his illustrations for Oscar Wilde’s Salomé. Written and 
published originally in French in 1891, Salomé’s entry into English literature was a 
famously, laboriously joint effort, involving a translation by Wilde’s lover Lord Alfred 
Douglas, ten illustrations by Beardsley, and the skeptical oversight of Wilde himself. In 
concluding, I want to suggest that the dynamic developed by this threesome, including 
the diverse directions in which they took Wilde’s original text, provide a microcosm fit 
for exploring which forms of sexual deviance survived the explosive innovation of 
Victorian sexual science in the last decades of the century, as opposed to those that soon 
found themselves relegated to a spectral past. 
 The story of Salomé takes its inspiration from the demise of John the Baptist, as 
communicated in the Christian gospels, in the books of Matthew and Mark. Daughter of 
Herod II and Herodias, King and Queen of Judea in the first century C.E., Salomé earns 
notoriety in the New Testament as the agent of John the Baptist’s untimely death. In an 
act of retribution on behalf of her mother—whose marriage to Herod John the Baptist 
decried as unlawful—Salomé orchestrates the prophet’s execution. On Herod’s birthday, 
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the Princess offers the King the gift of a dance, with the caveat that he grant her an 
unspecified wish after the dance has concluded. Herod agrees, only to discover in 
succession that Herodias has convinced her daughter to request the decapitated head of 
John the Baptist on a platter. Regretfully, Herod grants the demand. Wilde’s Salomé 
follows this basic plot, while also taking liberties with the original New Testament 
accounts. Rather than picturing the eponymous Princess as a vessel for her mother’s 
wishes, Wilde depicts a clever and willful Salomé who concocts the plan to avenge her 
mother’s sullied reputation herself. 
Considered practically synonymous with the pronounced eroticism and 
bastardized Japonisme of the decadent movement today, Beardsley’s original illustrations 
did not sit so well with Wilde’s publisher John Lane on first perusal. As to why, the 
simplest answer (the lowest hanging fruit, one might say) is their bawdy display of 
genitalia. Yet, the nature of Beardsley’s perversity is striking precisely because it 
performs disinterest in desire as an erotic mode. An image titled Enter Herodias, for 
instance, shows Salomé’s mother, the Queen, standing defiantly topless in the company 
of three queer subordinates, one a slouching caricature of Wilde himself. In the original 
proof, an androgynous attendant at the Queen’s left-hand side appears to have caused the 
most trouble (Fig. 14). With long curly locks and a beauty mark on a high cheekbone, the 
attendant seems nearly a doppelgänger for the Queen herself from the neck up. Below, 
however, viewers discover the nude to be bedecked with a modest phallus and a pair of 
testes lightly dusted with pubic hair. In short, the illustration flaunts an ambiguity in 
gender identity for which Beardsley’s aesthetic became famous. The solution to the 
publisher’s reservations eventually took the form of a fig leaf tied around the attendant’s 
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waist (Fig. 15). Yet insofar as the youth retains the combination of undulating locks and a 
classic masculine form below the neck, we find that the gender variance characteristic of 
Beardsley’s figures was hardly an element he was willing to surrender. Instead, what has 
been “fixed” is the attendant’s stark disinterest in the Queen, despite staring directly at 
her breasts—a disinterest originally made evident in the attendant’s flaccid member. To 
put it another way, it is not the presence of a phallus, but rather the absence of an 
interested erection on the part of the Queen’s subordinate that has been effectively 
expurgated. Of this edit, Stephen Calloway has suggested that the spectacle of a 
“hermaphroditic” “page,” “unaroused by the splendid vision of the brazenly bare-
breasted queen,” struck Beardsley’s objectors as too “sexually tell-tale” in its 
implications (74). Still, we should hesitate to read in the androgynous figure any counter-
queer desire by contrast. As in the contemporary sexology explored in this chapter, the 
intolerable perversity resides more concretely in the image’s bald-faced flaccidity, 
suffusing the dynamic between Queen and attendant with a deviant ambivalence.  
Critics have tended to think of Salomé as a masterful representation of the femme 
fatale, an archetype generally defined as a dark seductress whose siren song draws 
unsuspecting men into her deadly snare. Yet what is perhaps most interesting about 
Wilde and Beardsley’s adaptation of the convention is the way Salomé’s motives—that 
is, why she wants John the Baptist, or Iokannan as he is called in Wilde’s play, dead—
resist easy interpretation. Salomé’s seduction plot, for instance, succeeds only vicariously 
and through a complex network of interpersonal motives. It is not Iokannan, her victim, 
that she seduces, but rather Herod. Moreover, Salomé’s machinations are less personal, 
arguably, than they are likewise vicarious, circuited through her mother, the Queen, 
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whose reputation Iokannan lambasts without rest. The singular exception to these 
vicarious displacements, in both Wilde and Beardsley’s representations, occurs in the 
play’s most brilliant and curious twist: Salomé’s feigned courtship of Iokannan, in which 
she expresses a combination of interest and disgust toward the prophet—provocations 
Iokannan categorically rejects in turn. Yet even here Salomé’s characterization seems 
almost inscrutable. The Princess effectively announces the duplicity of her advances 
when she describes Iokannan first as a “hideous” creature: the prophet’s eyes are like 
“black holes burned by torches”; his body is a “cold,” “wasted” “statue” (19). 
Meanwhile, Iokannan reciprocates her distaste. “Who is this woman who is looking at 
me?” he asks. “I will not have her look at me. Wherefore doth she look at me, with her 
golden eyes, under her gilded eyelids? I do not know who she is. I do not desire to know 
who she is. Bid her begone” (20). In this mutual abhorrence, their interaction takes shape. 
It is not until Salomé fully intuits the damage Iokannan plans to heap on her mother that 
she determines at last to balance her repugnance with a rhetoric of desire. In an exchange 
reminiscent of the three temptations of Christ, Salomé takes a new tone: “I am amorous 
of thy body, Iokannan!....Suffer me to touch thy body” (22). Yet with each rebuff on the 
part of the prophet, a new crack seems to spread in Salomé’s desiring veneer. “Back! 
daughter of Babylon!” Iokannan cries, and Salomé replies:  
Thy body is hideous. It is like the body of a leper. It is like a plastered wall 
where vipers have crawled; like a plastered wall where the scorpions have 
made their nest. It is like a whited sepulcher, full of loathsome things. It is 
horrible, thy body is horrible. (22) 
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The exchange continues in this way. Salomé claims to love Iokannan’s hair. He rebuffs 
the advance, and she divulges, “Thy hair is horrible.” It is only the desire to kiss the 
prophet that Salomé finally maintains in their dialogue—a prize she will claim toward the 
play’s conclusion once her opponent has been slain and decapitated.   
 What then should we make of this performative desire in Salomé, in terms of 
Wilde’s dialogue and Beardsley’s illustrations? It is widely observed in histories of 
Salomé’s sensational English publication that as far as Lord Alfred Douglas’s translation 
of the original French was concerned—a skill at which Douglas was notoriously lousy—
Wilde and his publisher soon found themselves with a disaster on their hands, in need of 
extensive overhaul. By contrast, Beardsley’s illustrations are often considered superior to 
the play itself, even as the compatibility of his vision and Wilde’s has been hotly debated. 
In arguing for a gynophobic aesthetic in Beardsley’s approach, I want to suggest that the 
sensibility emerges most powerfully in the divergence between the victorious monologue 
Wilde gives his heroine when at last she holds Iokannan’s head in her hands and 
Beardsley’s parallel illustrations. As Salomé stares into the decapitated prophet’s face, 
the monologue Wilde provides indulges in the darkest recesses of a petty vengeance at 
last exposed. “Ah! thou wouldst not suffer me to kiss thy mouth, Iokannan. Well! I will 
kiss it now,” Salomé tells the head.  
I will bite it with my teeth as one bites a ripe fruit. Yes, I will kiss thy 
mouth, Iokanaan. I said it; did I not say it?....But wherefore dost thou not 
look at me, Iokannan? Thine eyes that were so terrible, so full of rage and 
scorn, are shut now. Wherefore are they shut? Open thine eyes!....Art thou 
afraid of me, Iokannan, that thou wilt not look at me?...And thy tongue 
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that was like a red snake darting poison, it moves no more, it speaks no 
words, Iokannan, that scarlet viper that spat its venom upon me. It is 
strange, is it not?....Thou wouldst have none of me, Iokannan. Thou 
rejectedst me. Thou didst speak evil words against me. Thou didst bear 
thyself toward me as to a harlot, as to a woman that is a wanton, to me, 
Salome, daughter of Herodias, Princess of Judaea! Well, I still live, but 
thou art dead, and thy head belongs to me. (64) 
As the monologue continues, the dialogue implies that this wantonness may very well be 
at the heart of it all. “I am athirst for thy beauty,” the Princess cries. “….Neither the 
floods nor the great waters can quench my passion” (65). Yet this matter of Salomé being 
wantonly “thirsty” comes off as too on-the-nose—a deceptively satisfying disclosure, 
which hardly does the intrigue of the heroine justice. In essence, the interplay of 
repulsions that animate the play, to this point, here evaporate so rapidly one is left feeling 
almost indignant at the suggestion we are now meant to take the Princess at her word.  
 Beardsley’s illustrations maintain a certain fidelity to Salomé’s dense and 
inscrutable affect, by contrast. In this role, they also help cast Wilde’s play in a different 
light. If Wilde seems to resolve the question of motive too neatly in Salomé’s monologue, 
Beardsley retains in the illustrations depicting Salomé with the head of Iokannan the 
disturbing excesses elsewhere elaborated in her characterization. That is, Beardsley seizes 
Salomé’s diabolical triumph as an opportunity to bring the play’s combination of the 
grotesque and what we might describe as its camp celebration of paradox and 
extravagance to its apogee. Far from expressing a sense of self-satisfied vengeance, 
Salomé looks down at Iokannan’s head atop a platter in The Dancer’s Reward with a 
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vague open mouth, as though both fascinated and horrified by Iokannan’s unresponsive 
countenance (Fig. 17). With her right hand she pulls the head up by its hair, while the 
fingers on her left hand explore the blood pooling outward from his neck. Most iconic in 
the image is not so much what Salomé discloses in her disposition about the motive for 
Iokannan’s execution but rather the depiction’s overarching mood. The obscene beauty of 
Iokannan’s hair flowing into his blood, echoed in the billowing folds of Salomé’s 
melodramatic cape, draw the viewer into the disturbing carnality of an intoxicating terror. 
Here we have something akin to what Susan Sontag describes in her iconic essay “Notes 
on Camp” as camp’s quality of being a “decorative art, emphasizing texture, sensuous 
surface, and style at the expense of content” (Sontag). In short, Beardsley aestheticizes 
Salomé’s villainy to such a hyperbolic extent that the question of motive begins to appear 
superfluous. 
It is important to note that this decorative sensuality is exactly the thing that gave 
many of Beardsley’s critics pause as they reviewed the work. Some thought the artist was 
poking fun at Wilde. A review published by The Times on March 8, 1894, offered the 
following assessment: 
As for the illustrations by Mr. Aubrey Beardsley, we hardly know what to 
say of them. They are fantastic, grotesque, unintelligible for the most part, 
and, so far as they are intelligible, repulsive. They would seem to 
represent the manners of Judea as conceived by Mr. Oscar Wilde 
portrayed in the style of Japanese grotesque as conceived by a French 
decadent. The whole thing must be a joke, and it seems to us a very poor 
joke.  
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Another critic writing for the Saturday Review called Beardsley’s contribution a “derisive 
parody,” which blatantly put Wilde “on the rack.” “There are ten plates in the book, 
besides two ornamental borders,” the review went on to say, “and we know not one of 
these will help the serious seeker after dramatic truth. Mr. Beardsley laughs at Mr. 
Wilde.”67 These reviews pick up on Beardsley’s humor well enough; however, they seem 
to have missed the way Beardsley illustrates a grotesque comedy—a gothic iteration of a 
camp sensibility—already integral to Wilde’s play. Indeed, what Beardsley manages to 
preserve in spite of Wilde’s concluding indulgences, I would argue, is a pleasure that 
revels in a gynophobic horror. Beardsley conveys as much in the interplay between his 
second illustration of Salomé and Iokannan’s head and its devious title The Climax (Fig. 
18). At this moment in the text, Wilde’s drama concludes in a dark reversal of comedic 
expectations—a kind of anti-marriage, in which Salomé is at last united with the object of 
her desire, only now decapitated. Medusa-like, Salomé floats above the blood of 
Iokannan, which slinks in white pools against the black backdrop below. In Beardsley’s 
original drawing of the scene, Salomé speaks in Wilde’s original French, “J’ai baisé ta 
bouche, Iokannan. J’ai baisé ta bouche.” The translation appearing in English reads, “I 
have kissed thy mouth, Iokannan. I have kissed thy mouth.” Yet, we should note that the 
double entendre of the original French would have implied also the vernacular: “I have 
fucked thy mouth, Iokannan. I have fucked thy mouth.” Even so, Beardsley refuses us the 
scene of contact itself, showing us only the before and after. Indeed, the title, “The 
                                                
67 As Miriam J. Benkovitz notes, this question over whether Beardsley meant to poke fun 
at his collaborator was prompted largely by the caricatures of Wilde appearing in his 
illustrations. Benkovitz suggests these caricatures should be seen as “the playfulness of 
an impudent boy, one who found life a ‘great game’” (83). I would add that in this 
playfulness there’s a trace of admiration to be found, which has sometimes escaped 
scholarly recognition.  
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Climax,” would seem to be deliberately satirical on Beardsley’s part, since it is in an 
earlier (originally expurgated) illustration, The Toilette of Salomé, that the Princess 
appears to be masturbating (that is, reaching a climax of her own making) in the company 
of her doting, androgynous subordinates (Fig. 16). In The Climax, by contrast, we 
discover no suggestion of sexual pleasure, but rather Salome’s deadly power—what Erin 
Smith has called Beardsley’s interest in men’s terror of “female superiority”—at its 
height. Salomé’s literal suspension mid-air echoes the way Beardsley keeps a phobic 
orientation in play well beyond the pair’s fleeting, disillusioning consummation. What 
matters is not the kiss, but rather Salomé’s triumph. Her terror, transcending the 
realization of her objective, is preserved in Beardsley’s post-coitus representation: in 
promising onlookers in the past-tense, “I have fucked,” the Princess seems to promise 
equally a foreboding future, “And I will fuck again.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
Historically, of course, the legacy of Wilde’s eroticism (however oversimplified 
in popular memory) won out. Wilde has since become the Victorian poster-aesthete for a 
homosexual love that could not speak its name; meanwhile, Beardsley’s gynophobic 
sensibility would be hard-pressed to find a modern identity correlate. This matter of 
sexual alterity returns us to the broader theme of this chapter: taken together, how should 
Beard, Holmes, and Beardsley’s mutual interest in gynophobia (as pathology, as identity 
drama, and as an aesthetic) inform our understanding of sexuality in the 1880s and 1890s 
and the loss of various available orientations afterward? As I discuss in my reading of A 
Mortal Antipathy, Holmes illustrates, in spite of his stated mission, the crude uses of 
gender that went into defining femaleness as an object of phobia, as pathologies of sexual 
  256 
unselection were beginning to cohere in medical literature as conditions to be treated and 
solved. In presenting a homeopathic cure for Maurice’s sexual deficiency, Holmes also 
shows how prescriptions of “like for like” were beginning to be adopted for the treatment 
of a psychic state defined, ironically, by its very incapacity for liking: the sexual 
antipathy, or that failure of feeling for which a proliferation of inhibitions and 
disinclinations were enumerated by sexologists. This conceptual opposition between 
homeopathy and antipathy becomes all the more interesting when we find that by the end 
of the century Westphal’s contrary sexual feeling was being translated in new English 
editions of Psychopathia Sexualis as “antipathic sexual instinct,” while at the same time 
the term was becoming fully enmeshed with definitions of homosexuality. In concluding, 
I want to argue that homosexuality, as a newly cohering orientation and concept, 
provided an etymological cure of its own in this sense, reframing a concept that had 
originally been a question of unselection into a form of selection. This new iteration of 
sexual selection took on an air, simultaneously, of being a double affirmation: an 
affirmation not only of want, but of wanting sameness. To put it another way, 
homosexuality offered a homeopathic cure in language—a dose of “same-feeling” to 
borrow the literal meaning of homeopathy’s parts, homeo and pathos—for a state that had 
long stood out for consisting, rather, in a failure of desire to materialize.  
 Before our modern lexicon revolving around “homophobia” could emerge as 
such, this shift had to commence. After years of representing an iteration of deviance, by 
which individuals resisted the imperative to sexual selection, phobia began to be 
associated with mechanisms of repression and self-denial, intrinsically at odds with 
sexual progressivism. This irony should not be lost on historians of sexuality. Another 
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fleeting late Victorian contribution to the conversation may make the irony of phobia’s 
exile from deviance clearer still. In 1875, Harper’s Weekly published a caricature of a 
man suffering in his studio from a case of what the artist, Thomas Nast, dubs “homo-
phobia” (Fig. 19). Appearing nearly a century in advance of its later affiliation with gay 
liberation, this homo-phobia appears to attack its victim with a dread of being agreeable, 
which is to say a dread of affirming “sameness” of opinion with politicians or with the 
press. Depicting a studious, well-dressed professor surrounded on all sides by newspaper 
clippings, apparently snipped by a pair of scissors held open in his left hand, and pasted 
on his office walls, top-to-bottom, the illustration gives the impression we are being 
given access to the interior conflict pervading the professor’s mind. The clippings lead us 
in paradoxical directions: “We are infallible,” one headline reads, while another 
commands, “Let us find fault.” One poster shows President Ulysses S. Grant with rays of 
light shooting gloriously from his head; another depicts a sloppily dressed, cigar-smoking 
Grant as “Our Target.” The professor’s mother studies the scene with concern. “Nothing 
seems to please him,” she despairs, a sentiment the academic affirms in his unrelenting 
analysis of the documents closing in on him. What makes the image striking, then, is the 
way this earlier homo-phobia essentially plays upon a deviant sociality phobia was 
beginning to acquire in the transatlantic literature on sexology. In the following decades, 
gynophobia, horror feminae, and other such concepts made it possible to take this kind of 
deviance seriously. In this sense, we could say that Harper’s Weekly’s satirical homo-
phobia shows us, rather presciently, the ghost in the machine of modern homosexuality as 
it has evolved since: a deviant resistance to agreeability, historically subordinated to a 
compulsory affinity now oriented around gender agreement.  
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 As noted earlier in this chapter, a brief history of gynophobia shares much in 
common with Benjamin Kahan’s history of celibacy as a multifaceted and politically 
motivated orientation in its own right. Speaking to common misinterpretations that have 
shrouded celibacy in ulterior motives, in the context of queer theory especially, Kahan 
observes that the “indeterminacy” of identity celibacy permits “is precisely what makes 
celibacy such a suspect sexual identity—outside of ecclesiastical institutions (themselves 
seen as old-fashioned), celibacy fails to fit into modern frameworks of determined and 
determinate sexuality” (6). Kahan notes further, “In the rare instance where celibacy is 
understood as an identity (as opposed to being seen as an absence of sexuality), scholars 
usually understand it as a placeholder that does not have a particular content or a 
particular character the way that other sexualities do” (6). Similarly, gynophobia has a 
history of being interpreted as a form of repression lateral to and indicative of some other 
positive content, generally homosexuality. At the same time, these texts documenting 
diagnoses of and identifications with gynophobia add something new to the cutting-edge 
scholarship being done on celibacy and asexuality presently. On the one hand, in 
describing a sexuality that has none of the grandiosity of a deliberate ethic of restraint—
consisting rather in the banal immediacy of being regularly turned off—gynophobia 
attests to a diversity in scale as to how celibacies and asexualities inhabit and shape the 
public sphere. Moreover, gynophobia, as a feeling and aesthetic starkly discontinuous 
with misogyny in the 1880s and 1890s, invites us to imagine a feminist and queer politics 
that might have some use for a disposition that has long been demoted to a psychic 
reservoir of oppressive instincts. This disposition is not the same as queer antisociality, a 
la Lee Edelman and Leo Bersani per se; rather it describes a way of being social, almost 
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in spite of itself. This phobic sociality carries a potential to draw rifts through an under-
scrutinized ethic of compulsory affinity—an imperative that has long made possible, to 
give one example, the use of rhetorical appeals to the institution of heterosexual love to 
naturalize and ornament patriarchal power. Here resides the curious sympathy linking A 
Mortal Antipathy’s Maurice; Beardsley’s illustrations for Davidson’s Earl Lavender and 
Wilde’s Salomé; as well as the gynomaniacs in Krafft-Ebing and elsewhere who feared 
women, not for their strangeness but out of envy. In each, gynophobia challenges a 
compulsory heterosexuality most profoundly by, imagining a counterintuitive deviance 
rooted in “negative passion[s]”—a deviance defined not by its drive to consummation, 
but rather as suspension, diversion, and, most evocatively perhaps, a phobic orientation 
enmeshed with new permutations of gender variance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TOWARDS AN AGE OF MYSOPHOBIA: 
MICROCONTAMINATIONS IN SILAS WEIR MITCHELL’S “CAT FEAR” 
SURVEYS, MARK TWAIN’S THREE THOUSAND YEARS AMONG THE MICROBES, 
AND ZORA NEALE HURSTON’S THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 
 
Less and less frequently do we encounter people with the ability to tell a tale properly. 
More and more often there is embarrassment all around when the wish to hear a story is 
expressed. It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our 
possessions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences.  
One reason for this phenomenon is obvious: experience has fallen in value. And it looks 
as if it is continuing to fall into bottomlessness. 
- Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller” (1936) 
 
During the early hours of December 2, 1885, panic struck Newark, New Jersey. A 
large black dog, “foaming at the mouth,” was discovered tearing through the streets. 
Carnage lined its path. At least seven other dogs fell victim to its rampage. According to 
one witness, the dog even tried to break into someone’s house. As Forest and Stream 
reported, the dog “sprang upon a stoop,” “gnashed” at the door, bit off “a portion of the 
moulding” in its jaws, and minced the wood “to splinters” (381).68 By the joint efforts of 
an individual armed with a shotgun and another with an axe, the antagonist was finally 
put down. Still, the damage wrought by the tirade continued to unfold. A number of local 
dog owners in the vicinity put their pets down out of suspicion they might have been 
infected. The Mayor of Newark went further, authorizing local police to kill any dog 
running without a muzzle in public. Rumors spread that an underground “poisoning 
committee” had taken the liberty of poisoning other vulnerable dogs around town. Most 
                                                
68 “The Newark Dog Scare.” Forest and Stream, 10 Dec. 1885, p. 381.  
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alarming to the community, however, was yet another consequence. Before being killed, 
the offending canine had managed to bite six of Newark’s children. Another iteration of 
hydrophobia’s maddening riddle commenced: Were the children infected? Was the rabid 
poison working surreptitiously beneath their skin? Or perhaps the dog had never been 
rabid at all. Perhaps it had been seized by an unfortunate spell of violence, and the 
children would be just fine.  
 There was also a new bit of knowledge in the air. In the preceding weeks, the 
French physician Louis Pasteur claimed to have discovered a new antidote for 
hydrophobia: an inoculation, which, if administered after a rabid attack and before the 
manifestation of symptoms, could prevent the disease from commencing entirely. A local 
physician suggested that if funds could be gathered the children’s best chance would be 
to sail for Paris and to meet the physician himself. A cable was sent to Pasteur, asking 
whether he would be willing to see them. His reply was swift: “Si croyez danger envoyez 
enfantas immediatement.” The donations came, in the form of money as well as clothing 
appropriate to their transatlantic crossing. Ultimately, it was decided that four of the 
children had been wounded seriously enough to warrant the trip. Within a week of the 
attack they had become local celebrities. By December 9th, the New York Sun and New 
York World would publish pictures of all four: Eddie Ryan, Patsey Reynolds, Austin 
Fitzgerald, and Willie Lane (ages five, seven, ten, and thirteen respectively). By 
December 10th, just over a week following the attack, the boys had embarked for Le 
Havre, accompanied by Eddie’s young brother and mother (said to be eight months 
pregnant at the time), as well as a physician by the name of Dr. Billings. By the evening 
of December 21st, all four children had been inoculated in Pasteur’s personal laboratory. 
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By the 22nd, the good news had made it to the pages of the New York Times and New York 
Herald. As Bert Hansen has demonstrated in his detailed history of the event, at this 
juncture, via four unlikely heroes hailing from Newark, Pasteur’s reputation grew 
exponentially on the other side of the Atlantic. As Hansen puts it, the “sensation” 
effectively “catapult[ed]” Pasteur and the medical innovations he represented to 
“celebrity across North America” (374).  
 This is not to say the ordeal was without critics, or that previous conceptions of 
hydrophobia explored in this dissertation did not survive the Pasteurian turn. On 
December 10th, one editorial observed that the utter sensationalism of the affair would 
likely produce death by spurious insanity before they ever reached the French coast. “It 
would have…been far more humane to victims,” the writer maintains, if Pasteur’s system 
could have been communicated by cable and “followed out to the letter” on the families’ 
home turf (“Newark Dog Scare” 381). “The scheme of sending young children on a 
three-thousand mile journey, when they are already wild with fear,” the piece concludes, 
“will probably cause the death of several of them or cause them to become insane.” The 
next year, new accounts of spontaneous hydrophobia were still finding publishers. In 
April 1886, New York’s Medical News claimed a young physician by the name of Dr. 
Warner had died of “spurious hydrophobia” after suffering a bite from a small dog he 
saved from a wagon incident the previous Christmas. Nevertheless, an unprecedented 
transformation in medical knowledge, around rabies and the nature of contagious disease 
in general, had begun to take effect. Most importantly, Pasteur’s rabies vaccine had 
helped to fashion a microbial imagination, which is to say a way of picturing disease as 
the work of invisible agents, in the minds of U.S. medical and popular readerships alike.  
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 Pasteur’s vaccine reminds us that, independent of the archives I have aimed to 
recover in this dissertation, hydrophobia has long held a privileged place in the history of 
medicine. As Neil Pemberton and Michael Worboys note in their history of rabies in 
Britain, Pasteur’s discovery of a vaccine for the disease holds for many the “iconic 
status” of “being the world’s first modern, medical breakthrough” (2). In addition to 
inspiring subsequent vaccines based on the principles Pasteur laid forth, the advent of the 
rabies vaccine would contribute invaluably to the germ theory of disease, to the 
solidification of microbiology as a science, and to the eventual detection of viruses as a 
unique class of infectious agents in the 1890s. The vaccine’s introduction and the rise of 
Pasteurism generally are often therefore framed in terms of what Thomas Kuhn famously 
termed “scientific revolutions”: medicine could “no longer evade” the “anomalies”—in 
this case, a proliferation of microbial identifications—with which the “existing tradition 
of scientific practice” became saturated (Kuhn 6).69 Thus, even Bruno Latour admits in 
The Pasteurization of France (1988), a book intended to account for “science in action” 
as irreducible to the sudden arrival of individual genius, that his focus on Pasteur is 
motivated by the “radical, unchallengeable scientific revolution” in “medicine, biology, 
and hygiene” with which the physician is associated: “one that has profoundly 
transformed society and yet owes it very little” (8). While the rabies vaccine is just a part 
of the story Latour goes on to tell, readers may conclude from his interest in nonhuman 
agents of social transformation (an interest clearly advertised in his chapter titled “Strong 
Microbes and Weak Hygienists”) that even as Latour gives a plethora of actors their due, 
                                                
69 Such anomalies constitute, for Kuhn, “the tradition-shattering complements to the 
tradition-bound activity” of what he calls “normal science,” or science in its anterior 
state. 
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distributing agency far and wide, rabies remains for him an important node from which 
subsequent transformations in medicine would later proliferate.  
  At the same time, while scholars have explored the significance of the Pasteurian 
shift, in both its transatlantic and U.S. contexts, these histories have neglected the 
corresponding repercussions Pasteur’s vaccine had for the understanding of phobia as 
mental illness. The disease that had become practically synonymous with phobia in 
previous decades was now being recast as something quite separate. With an emphasis on 
the changes this previous relationship would undergo, this final chapter explores the 
phenomenon of disentanglement—of affective disassociation—that ensued. Specifically, 
I will make the argument that one emergent phobia of the late nineteenth century, first 
documented in a paper by U.S. neurologist William Hammond, becomes especially 
useful for understanding how the rise of microbiology influenced evolving conceptions of 
phobia: a dread of filth known as mysophobia. Denoting a dread of invisible 
contaminations and contagions facilitated by unwanted contact, mysophobia registered, 
sometimes implicitly, at other times explicitly, a new sociality of microbes, ubiquitous in 
the most quotidian engagements of civilized life. In dialogue with this mysophobia, a 
new body of medical, literary, and political texts began to emerge, dedicated to 
reconciling the ramifications of the microbe as an agent, at once a harbinger of death and 
suffering in myriad forms, while also being at the edge of perceptible life. To explore the 
influence of this concept in various scenes of knowledge production and creative 
expression, this chapter will begin by exploring transatlantic writing on an emergent 
symptomatology of mysophobia, then subsequently shift to explore related theories 
pertaining to phobia as a state of mind, especially Silas Weir Mitchell’s 1905 essay on 
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“cat fear,” titled “Of Ailurophobia and the Power to be Conscious of the Cat as Near, 
When Unseen and Unheard.” Toward the middle of this chapter, I shift to an exploration 
of microbiology’s influence on definitions and new permutations of phobia in Mark 
Twain’s Three Thousand Years among the Microbes (1905), Zora Neale Hurston’s Their 
Eyes Were Watching God (1937), and John Vassos’ collection of art deco plates, Phobia 
(1931). 
 
TIMOR CONTAMINATIONIS: 
TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTICISM OF MICROBIAL STEALTH 
 
 As a term, mysophobia’s emergence in a paper delivered by William A. 
Hammond before the New York Neurological Society in 1879 predated Pasteur’s rabies 
vaccine by a hair. Yet no phobia of the late nineteenth century is better suited to describe 
the ways in which the relationship between rabies and phobia began to shift following 
that medical breakthrough. Mysophobia gestured to a state of mind one physician by the 
name of Ira Russell would refer to in 1880 as “filth dread” (529). In multiple accounts, 
the diagnosis appears to have served, moreover, as an early classification for what 
psychiatrists now term obsessive compulsive disorder, or OCD. The case history Russell 
offers tells of an unmarried man, forty-seven years of age and a graduate of Harvard 
Medical School, who began to experience a new strain of nervous symptoms after an 
incident in which his brother “died suddenly in his arms,” under circumstances that 
remain ambiguous in the article (530). Because the case history offers an early moment at 
which these symptoms would find an intimate portrait, it is worth quoting from the study 
at length. Russell observes that, following this event, the patient “became melancholic, 
slept badly, was noted for indecision, imagined his hands were dirty, and began 
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constantly washing them” (530). These latter symptoms would become the most 
prominent feature of the patient’s malady. As Russell goes on to note, “He was fearful 
that everything he touched would contaminate and soil his hands; the chair, the door-
knob, in fact, everything that came in his way he carefully avoided touching with his 
hands.” The individual was at once conscious that his actions exceeded reason, yet “could 
not resist” the compulsion to wash himself when it arose. Russell goes on to document 
the man’s nightly “routine.” “Usually,” Russell explains,  
he would begin his preparations to retire about ten o’clock in the evening, 
and it would be two o’clock in the morning before he would be fairly in 
bed. Before he would begin to undress, his attendant must fill the wash 
bowl with water, as he dared not touch the stop-cock with his hands; then 
the water must be let off, the bowl washed and filled again for three times, 
then he would wash his hands three times, the bowl being filled anew each 
time. Than after the removal of each garment he must wash, finally he 
would wash his face, rinse his mouth, each, three times, say his prayers 
and retire, consuming three or four hours, and using twenty or more 
towels. (530) 
Eventually, the condition became known to friends to such a degree that the man was 
admitted to an insane asylum. Following this decision, the patient went on to experience a 
series of improvements and relapses, until at last, by the time of the article, he had begun 
to feel a stronger sense of “self-control” (532). As to why the condition had commenced, 
Russell offers relatively few insights. At one moment, he suggests that the condition 
exemplified a state of “melancholia,” in which the operative “fancy” was that the 
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individual had “committed” an “unpardonable sin.” Even so, Russell admits in following 
that, clearly enough, the immediate manifestation of the disease pertained not to “moral 
defilement,” but rather to “physical defilement” (533). As far as the patient’s history was 
known, in other words, we may conclude this man was no Lady Macbeth; rather, here 
existed an individual whose compulsion to wash was motivated, in some large portion, by 
a genuine dread of material filth.  
 The question Russell’s case history inspires is whether there’s anything to be 
made of the contemporaneity of the Harvard-trained physician’s mysophobia and the rise 
of the germ theory of disease, which was in rapid acceleration at the time his symptoms 
commenced. There are reasons to consider the possibility, in other words, that the rise of 
mysophobia—and the genealogy with obsessive compulsive disorder to which it 
gestures—is discovered in this literature to be properly historical, as a condition 
coterminous with a major sea change in medical science, and perhaps even a remarkable 
index of microbiology’s looming triumph. This is not to say reported cases of 
mysophobia from this period deal exclusively in a fear of germs. Another narrative, for 
instance, describes an “unmarried” man in his forties in St. Louis who could not be 
convinced he did not stink, and was convinced other people characterized him as having 
a repugnant odor, “despite washing his feet, arm-pits, and person elsewhere often” (Dean 
& Hughes 25).70 Yet even a case like this should not be hastily disentangled from grander 
changes in hygienic standards, with which the germ theory of disease was fundamentally 
imbricated. 
                                                
70 Dean, D.V., & C.H. Hughes.  “Arrested Prodromal Insanity with Auditory 
Hallucinations and Auto-Mysophobia.”  Alienist and Neurologist, vol. 2, no. 1, Jan. 1, 
1881, pp. 25-28.  
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 In fact, one of the most curious characteristics of the literature on mysophobia—
as well as a more capacious body of literature in which phobias of “touching” or being 
“contaminated” were considered—is that the language seems to evolve with and 
alongside the triumph of Pasteur’s successes in vaccination. Early on, the language 
patients used made regular use of the idea that their material worlds were laced with 
“poisons,” which they might absorb if not overly careful. Evidently, this hearkens back to 
an older discourse, prior to germ theory, in which “poison” was a much more capacious 
concept in considering disease causation. In an 1879 case reported in 1881, for instance, 
readers learn of a fifteen-year-old who began to wash himself “excessively”—in his 
mother’s words “excessively” “for boys”—and who justified the act by explaining he 
feared that “if he touches anything with his hands it will poison him.”71 (“Anything” later 
appears italicized in the text.) This language of being poisoned dominates the history: the 
carpet, his clothes, the paint all threaten to deposit sinister substances in his body 
imperceptibly. On the one hand, taking the boy’s concerns about the paint especially into 
consideration, the case conveys a sense of the body’s real susceptibility to what Mel 
Chen has termed “toxic animacies,” used to describe “queer bonds” premised on 
vulnerability, infection, and threat, which complicate boundaries of human subjectivity—
facile divides between the animate and inanimate, in particular (138). Yet, this language 
also speaks to shifting conceptions in medical science (and popular perceptions of that 
science) as to what kinds of agents enact these physically compromising states in the first 
place. In 1884, C.H. Hughes would report a comparable case, in which a “slender but 
somewhat delicate, auburn-haired” adolescent, fourteen years of age, distrusting his 
                                                
71 “Mysophobia.”  Medical and Surgical Reporter, vol. 45, no. 21, Nov. 19, 1881, pp. 
573-4. 
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parents’ use of the toxic insecticide “Paris green” to control potato bugs on their potato 
vines, developed an aversion to all things green: “The green wall-paper, table covers, 
book covers and carpets, were all regarded as poisonous, and his time was spent in 
avoiding these colors and in washing away imaginary contamination” (88).72 Hughes 
describes the condition accordingly as a comorbid “mysophobia,” “toxiphobia,” and 
“verdiphobia,” characteristic of a larger category of “morbid delusive aversion” he refers 
to as mania contaminationis. In an 1866 case, diagnosed retroactively by one physician 
as an instance of mysophobia, another woman reported a fearful fantasy in which she 
believed “every object” she touched “might have been contaminated by the froth from a 
rabid dog” (71). The author of this article, Professor A. Tamburini, hailing from Italy, 
describes the condition the individual faced as a misofobia, which had prior to 1879 been 
known as del dubbio con timore del contatto, or an “insanity of doubting with delirium of 
the sense of touch,” as coined by Legrand du Saulle (69).73 
 The 1866 narrative of the woman whose mysophobia stemmed from a dread of 
hydrophobia offers a rather conspicuously confirmative piece of evidence for the greater 
argument to which this chapter is speaking: the idea that both a fraught continuity with 
and a curious break from phobia’s historical associations with hydrophobia commenced 
with the rise of the germ theory of disease. On the one hand, the patient’s ailment was not 
so unlike what physicians had called spontaneous hydrophobia, by which the dread of 
rabies becomes a pathology in its own right. Yet her ailment also spoke to something 
                                                
72 C.H. Hughes.  “Prodromal Symptoms of Psychical Impairment.”  Alienist and 
Neurologist, vol. 5, no. 1, Jan. 1, 1884, pp. 85-91. 
73 See Professor A. Tamburini.  “On the Insanity of Doubting with Fear of Contact: Sulla 
Pazzia del Dubbio con Timore del Contatto (MISOFOBIA, RUPOFOBIA, etc.).”  Trans. 
Joseph Workman.  Alienist and Neurologist, vol. 5, no. 1, Jan. 1. 1884, pp. 52-79. 
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separate, in which a burgeoning cultural shift in intellectual understandings of the 
infectivity of rabid saliva caused her to be paranoid about the possibility of its invisible 
ubiquity. More and more, these germ-laden valences of mysophobia would be made 
explicitly in scientific literature documenting the disease. One of the best examples is a 
piece published in the Alienist and Neurologist by the previously mentioned C.H. Hughes 
in 1899, titled, “The Trepidations and Phobias of Cerebral Neuratonia: Timor 
Contaminationis (Fear of Contamination).”74 The piece describes conditions overlapping 
with mysophobia, which the author refers to as “phobia infectiones” and “phobia 
contagiosa.” In one example, Hughes tells of a young music teacher who began suffering, 
during a period of intense stress, from a fear she might contract diseases in everyday 
public encounters, from walking down the street and riding in street-cars to even the 
context of dining with a well-acquainted pupil’s family. As with many of the other cases 
referenced above, she describes as one of her most indefatigable symptoms the need to 
wash her hands, around twenty-five times daily.75 Yet the woman has also evidently 
comprehended the object of her fear as microbial in nature. In the case of visiting 
                                                
74 C.H. Hughes.  “THE TREPIDATIONS AND PHOBIAS OF CEREBRAL 
NEURATONIA: Timor Contaminationis (Fear of Contamination) PHOBIA 
CHIROGRAPHICA (FEAR OF WRITING LETTERS) PHOBIA INFECTIONES; 
PHOBIA CONTAGIOSA PHOBIA CONTAMINATIONIS (MYSOPHOBIA, OF 
HAMMOND).”  Alienist and Neurologist, vol. 20, no. 1, Jan. 1. 1899, pp. 82-85.  
75 It is important to note that mysophobia was often discussed in tandem with another 
disease a number of physicians began to observe in the late nineteenth century known as 
the “doubting malady” or “folie de doute.” Specifically, repetitive handwashing was 
taken to be a sign of doubt that one had washed one’s hands previously; hence, a 
subsequent ablution became necessary. (For one such article, see: Landon Carter Gray. 
“WHAT CASES OF INSANITY SHALL WE TREAT AT HOME?” The American 
Journal of the Medical Sciences vol. 97, no. 1, Jan. 1889, pp. 33-43.) The genealogies of 
both conditions continue to intersect today in conceptions of OCD. For my purposes here, 
however, I will focus primarily on situations where symptoms became associated with 
fears of contamination, rather than a compulsion to repeat a particular behavior or 
responsibility.  
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Hughes’ office for treatment, she explained to the physician that she had determined upon 
the safety of that environment by convincing herself that he had outfitted the space with 
the “germ-killers” necessary to sterilize it of potential contagions. In another comparable 
case, Hughes tells of a twenty-six-year old woman who, after reading an “article, in a 
newspaper or magazine, upon bacteria” became similarly convinced that “everything 
about her was infected with some sort of disease breeding germs” (85). Despite washing 
her hands repeatedly, she eventually became incapable of touching even her child, whom 
she feared she would infect with some unseen disease upon contact.76  
 Perhaps it is worth noting at this juncture that popular parlance has since traded 
mysophobia in for another well-known portmanteau—germophobia, which, while a very 
real and potentially debilitating condition, people also quite happily claim as a kind of 
identity category, which is to say, the state of being a germophobe. Thus, the longue 
durée of the pathology under consideration is to some extent rather obvious. In short, the 
ubiquity of the microbe, intuitively enough, has yielded over time a corresponding 
ubiquity of dread in humans, albeit along a sliding scale of severity. Yet the point I want 
to make here is that this “pathology” emerged with a particular kind of force in tandem 
with an irredeemably transformative break in the life sciences in the late nineteenth 
century, by which the nature of life and its (im)perceptibility exploded into 
unprecedented diversities of kind, scale, and multiplicity.  
 Perhaps no article registers this phenomenon better than a piece translated from 
the Journal de Medicine de Paris by a T.C.M., published by the Cincinnati Lancet and 
                                                
76 For another example in which mysophobia is defined explicitly in relation to a dread of 
contagion, see: Theodore Diller. “IMPERATIVE CONCEPTIONS AS A SYMPTOM 
OF NEURASTHENIA.” Medical News, vol. 68, no. 2, Jan. 11, 1896, pp. 38-41. 
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Clinic in 1894. This article begins by observing the pervasiveness of a disease broadly 
termed “pathophobia,” translating as an irrational dread that one suffers from a disease 
one does not actually have. Evidently, this broader category captures many of the 
connotations spontaneous hydrophobia had supplied the phobia suffix in the preceding 
century. Thus, we should not be surprised that such a case makes it into the article’s list 
of examples: an instance in which a woman bitten by a dog, who was not afterward 
vaccinated (for reasons that remain unclear in the account), could not shed her suspicion 
that she was succumbing to hydrophobia, even after it became obvious she was in the 
clear. What is most interesting in the article, however, is the way the author becomes 
preoccupied more capaciously with iterations of pathophobia in which the dread of a 
particular condition coincides with the doubt induced by possibilities of surreptitious 
infection and other invisible phenomena. Thus, the author mentions also a case of 
“syphilophobia,” which, following a one-night stand, continued to afflict its subject until, 
at last, he took his life. The author goes on to note cases of “spermatophobia,” referring 
to a dread of losing semen, in which patients became convinced their uncontrollable 
ejaculations signified a “dribbling away” of all their vital forces. By the end of the article, 
the author seems to get at the heart of a deeper cultural pulse, observing that “[o]ur 
bacteriologists and hygienists” have evidently made it their duty to “terrify the world 
with the specter of microbes,” “seeing them everywhere.” Across the article, we find that 
the associations between phobia as a pathology and infectivity as a threat began to take 
on, in the context of an emergent understanding of a microbial universe, a new set of 
relations. If phobia had consistently since its entry into Anglophone writing referred in 
part to the dread of concealed pathological phenomena, this relation took at the end of the 
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nineteenth century largely unprecedented valences, organized around a scalar disparity 
between a perceiving subject and an imperceptible populace of lethal antagonists.   
 Only by tracing these changes in the dread of disease and contagion, specifically, 
are we able to get a sense of why Pasteur’s vaccine should have had an impact on 
conceptions not just of rabies, but of phobia as well. As demonstrated above and in 
earlier parts of this dissertation, consensus on the nature of hydrophobia and its ideal 
treatment was hard to come by before Pasteur. In accounting for earlier approaches to 
disease treatment in The Pasteurization of France (1991), Latour emphasizes that 
physicians and hygienists entertained an unsustainable range of possibilities. Their 
“rhetoric,” Latour explains, was “made up of an accumulation of advice, precautions, 
recipes, opinions, statistics, remedies, regulations, anecdotes, case studies” (20). Thus, a 
glut of information was produced, which acted counterintuitively as a vacuum. The 
“absence” of a “focal point,” Latour emphasizes, essentially attenuated “all energies of 
the social movement translated by the hygienists” into “thin networks, all of them 
relatively equal in size and therefore doomed to extinction” (22). This plethora of 
unsustainable strategies, which correlated ultimately in hydrophobia’s notorious, as well 
as enigmatic deadliness, had a profound influence on the way phobia was conceptualized 
as an emotion—as well as the way emotion was envisioned, as a wider category of 
phenomenology, through phobia as an exemplar. In addition to bracketing off a sense of 
earlier, positive valences—phobia was nervous, hypochondriacal, climatological, 
poisonous, miasmatic, spontaneous, performative, lethal, linguistic, allegorical, gothic, 
satirical, sentimental, politically inimical, politically recuperable—microbiology’s 
historical break provides us equally with certain important negative parameters. Prior to 
  274 
Pasteur, hydrophobia belonged to scenes of knowledge production in which its microbial 
provocation, which is to say its material reducibility to omnipresent invisible agents, was 
inoperative at the level of language and possessed no substantial imaginative valences.  
  In order to elaborate on what these changes signified a bit further, before moving 
onto wider conceptions of phobia at the century’s end, I want to close this section with 
two pieces of visual media, which echo the discrepancies I am trying to get at. Observe, 
firstly, an image that circulated internationally, beginning in 1885, to illustrate Pasteur’s 
vaccination method. Titled “An Inoculation for Hydrophobia,” the picture shows Pasteur 
overlooking administration of his rabies vaccine to a young boy, implied to be Joseph 
Meister, the first individual Pasteur cured (Fig. 20). At the center of the picture is a 
needle in which the injectable substance, made from the spinal cords of rabid rabbits, 
appears contained. The boy holds his shirt open for the practicing physician, and we are 
left to presume that we are witnessing the scene at the moment of the needle’s puncture. 
The paradox of the image lies in its function as visually pedagogical, yet dependent upon 
a content that is effectively invisible—indeed, a virus that microscopes of the day were 
not yet advanced enough to reveal. When the image made its way to Harpers Weekly in 
1885, a corresponding article explained: “The person who has been bitten is inoculated 
under the skin by means of a Pravaz syringe containing sterilized liquid in which a small 
piece of [rabbit] marrow has been dissolved” (836). The article explains further that 
through a series of inoculations, each stronger than the one before, “the system becomes 
accustomed to it.” Most important in the picture, arguably, is that onlookers are intended 
to perceive that they are seeing hydrophobia accurately for the first time, in a state of 
controlled microbial extraction.  
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  Now consider an image published in Terre Haute, Indiana, by the Terre Haute 
Daily Union some thirty years earlier. Accompanied by a caption that reads, “Applying 
the Madstone to Arm of a Girl Who Was Bitten by a Rabid Dog,” the illustration shows a 
physician placing an object on a girl’s hand, while a crowd of adults gazes anxiously at 
the procedure from all sides (Fig. 21). One of many treatments attempted in the 
antebellum period, the madstone was not actually a rock but rather a hardened hairball 
taken from the intestinal tracts of deer. Commonly, madstones were boiled in milk, then 
immediately applied to the wound sustained from a rabid animal, so to extract all poison 
from one’s body. It was believed that the madstone stuck fast to an individual’s wound as 
long as there was poison present, then promptly loosened and fell off once the exchange 
was complete. Thus, if we have an illustration of hydrophobia in this image, it is in this 
implicit site of reverse transference: the absorption of a poison, a substance possessing 
powers to incite a particular madness, by way of the wound where it first found entry. 
The promise of the madstone was just one thin thread among many to which bitten 
patients and their family members desperately turned pre-1885, yet, in this very 
idiosyncracy, interchangeability, and desperation, the madstone image gives us a useful 
portrait of rabidity and phobia alike, as they infused one another with particular 
connotations of etiology and symptomatic progression before a stable cure, and with it an 
agential identity, at last materialized. When we look back to the iconic image of Pasteur 
injecting Joseph Meister with the spinal cords of rabid rabbits, we thus find a way of 
conceptualizing where phobia has moved: a phobia of the disease may still be operative, 
but it exists apart from rabid matter itself, which, in the boy’s case, has not yet yielded its 
special symptom, and in the rabbits’ case has long since become moot. Thus, the worst 
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possibilities of phobia exist, in the context of the experimental trial displayed, only as a 
yet untold futurity, which the intimacy of injection is designed to preempt. In these subtle 
disarticulations conveyed by the image, so are we witnessing the origins of a lexical 
disarticulation, by which these twin pathologies would begin to deviate toward separate 
afterlives.  
 
A PHOBIC CORRESPONDENCE: 
POWERS OF DETECTION IN SILAS WEIR MITCHELL’S “CAT FEAR” PAPERS 
 
 The next question we must ask is obvious. It seems intuitive enough to see in the 
discourse around mysophobia a provocative parallelism with new cultural understandings 
of disease introduced by microbiology, but to what extent did this really infuse phobia 
itself with a new epistemology? That is, beyond mysophobia, pathophobia, 
syphilophobia, spermatophobia, phobia infectiones, phobia contagiosa, timor 
contaminationis, mania contationes, and the like—all of which speak to one another in 
obvious ways—to what extent may other phobias, or the study of phobia at large, be said 
to have absorbed comparable connotations? The best early example of a major study of 
phobia, in which we might pursue these questions, is a study the celebrated Philadelphia 
physician and neurologist Silas Weir Mitchell conducted around the turn of the century. 
Today, Mitchell tends to be remembered primarily for two other associations, his coinage 
of the condition known as phantom limb syndrome, in which persons whose limbs have 
been amputated continue to feel pain and sensation in those no longer present body parts, 
as well as his dramatic failures in treating Charlotte Perkins Gilman in the late 1800s. 
This latter incident would later be immortalized in Gilman’s 1892 short story, “The 
Yellow Wall-Paper,” which dramatizes the misogyny and abuse of a treatment for 
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hysteria Mitchell had successfully promoted known as the “rest cure.” This approach to 
treating hysteria, on which much important scholarship has been written, recommended 
that women be confined to their rooms and prevented from doing anything—writing 
included, as Gilman’s story emphasizes—and is now believed by historians to have 
contributed to the early death of William Dean Howells’ daughter Winnie. However, in 
addition to these legacies, Mitchell committed himself by 1902 to a largely unstudied 
(and experimental method for measuring) phobia. The phobia to which he turned was the 
dread of cats, which he termed ailurophobia—a term that would also feature prominently 
in the essay that would eventually emerge from his research in 1905, titled “Of 
Ailurophobia and the Power to be Conscious of the Cat as Near, When Unseen and 
Unheard.”  
 Mitchell conducted his study with a one page survey, which inquired not just 
whether participants possessed an extreme dread of cats, but explored a range of 
potentially intersecting phenomena too. In its entirety, the survey consisted of eleven 
questions broken into two parts (Fig. 22). Part A made inquiries into the presence of 
ailurophobia in subjects—a condition Mitchell refers to in the survey as “antipathy to 
cats.” Using the first question to establish the presence or absence of the fear (“Have you 
any antipathy to cats?”), Mitchell took the next five to glean additional details, asking in 
2 and 3 what “feelings or symptoms” the antipathy entailed, in 4 whether big cats (for 
instance, a “tiger in a menagerie”) made a comparable impression, and in 5 and 6 whether 
any information could be recalled about the age and context in which the antipathy first 
became manifest. Part B took a plunge into deeper mysteries, asking in the first question 
whether participants had the power to sense the presence of a cat “when it is not in sight, 
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or known to be near.” The second section proceeded by soliciting evidence that such 
powers of detection were known to exist (Question 2), then asked subjects to specify 
whether such abilities were attributable to olfactory clues (“Is it the odour?”) or, in fact, 
subsisted in other phenomena (questions 3 and 4). As with the first section, Mitchell 
concluded by asking how long such powers had been evident. On surveys Mitchell sent 
to potential leads directly, he concluded with the instruction: “Please to answer A. & B. 
with their numbers. Kindly mention other cases with addresses. In dealing with this 
information I shall use no names.”  
 An impressive number of these surveys are preserved at the College of Physicians 
of Philadelphia (which also holds the largest collection of Mitchell’s surviving papers). 
These surveys suggest that Mitchell derived conclusions from three rather different types 
of responses. In the most straightforward of these submissions, some entered terse 
answers on survey forms Mitchell solicited individually. However, others encountered 
the survey as it appeared in print (Mitchell published it in multiple venues) and sent in 
responses willfully.77 Many of these replies abide by the format of the survey, yet are 
substantially longer than those Mitchell received on the form he circulated personally 
(Fig. 23). Still others ignored the parameters of the survey entirely, preferring to mail the 
physician narrative responses (Fig. 24). (Unsurprisingly, perhaps, these represent the 
most fascinating surviving responses, in that they take great liberties in speculating on the 
origins and nature of their malady.) Taking all of these into consideration, Mitchell would 
                                                
77 For an example of an ad soliciting responses, see a notice titled “Abnormal Fear of 
Cats,” published in the British Medical Journal, Vol. 119, in 1903. It reads, “Dr. S. Weir 
Mitchell, 1524 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, desires to hear of cases of fear of cats and of 
persons presumed to be affected variously by cats when the animal is not known to be in 
the room. On hearing of such cases Dr. Weir Mitchell will forward a set of questions to 
which he will desire careful replies” (180).   
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subsequently publish conclusions pertaining to three areas of interest. These may be 
categorized as the nature of a participant’s cat antipathy, the tendency of that antipathy to 
be comorbid with powers of detection, and biographical clues (age, family history, and 
environmental stimuli) surrounding onset for both conditions. 
 The symptoms reported by participants varied in severity from manageable 
disquietude to public screaming, crying, and fainting. One respondent, Gertrude Ward, 
enumerated a complex of symptoms in two parts. Answering questions A.2 and 3, she 
affirms “Yes,” that she is “subject to unusual feelings or symptoms in the presence of a 
cat,” then continues by dividing such symptoms into “(a) Subjective” and “(b) Objective” 
examples. Under “Subjective,” Ward lists, 
(1) Intense fear of being touched by the animal 
(2) Uncontrollable feeling that I must weep if animal is moving 
(3) Violent palpitations of heart 
(4) Hot flashes 
(5) Dyspnoea  
(6) Nausea—not constant 
Under “Objective,” she lists the additional ailments: 
(1) Involuntary start—accompanied by scream—sometimes suppressed 
(2) Tears in eyes—sometimes amounting to a “good cry”  
(3) Very perceptible tremor  
(4) Sudden changes of color  
(5) Panting and sighing respirations 
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While Ward’s response is much more elaborate and self-aware than was typical, she 
provides a good sense of the wide range of feelings and signs respondents tended to 
report. Ward’s division of symptoms into subjective and objective types illustrates further 
the threshold subjects tended to convey, separating visible irritations from a sense of 
interior, potentially invisible panic.  
Narrative responses sometimes took a different aspect, accounting for a sensibility 
of phobia as opposed to a series of afflictions. One particularly eloquent respondent 
named Frances A. Wakefield mailed in prosaic answers to the survey on July 29, 1903. 
Answering the inquiry about symptoms, she writes,  
It is difficult to describe the sensation. If a cat comes into a room where I 
am alone I feel as if cold water had been thrown over me, my teeth shut 
tightly. I cannot even call out, in fact for a minute I can hardly prevent an 
utter collapse. I think sometimes there must be an unreasoning fear at the 
foundation of these feelings; for in the open air, or in a room full of 
people, if the cat does not touch me, there is much less faintness. The 
touch of a cat always sends a chill over me (1-2) 
In contrast to the hot flashes noted by Ward, Wakefield emphasizes a sustained “chill.” 
This rush of “cold shivers” appears in at least one other account. Beyond her attention to 
bodily changes in temperature, however, what is perhaps most evocative and 
representative in Wakefield’s account is its focus on sharing the space of a room with a 
cat. This issue of cohabitation was, for many, the central trigger. One respondent 
explained to Mitchell, “My mind is completely occupied while a cat is in my presence for 
fear of it jumping on me. I have a sort of creepy crawly feeling which distracts my mind 
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to the explanation of all other thoughts as long as the cat is moving about in my 
presence.” Writing on behalf of a patient, an Albert M. Blodgett, M.D., of Boston 
explained how “the contact of the paws on the floor or carpet” caused the patient 
“distress.” Blodgett goes on, observing, “the purring of a cat in the room, or vicinity 
seems to her like the tremolo in a pipe organ.” In such instances, the doctor notes, “She 
cries, moans, and usually goes into retirement in another room until the paroxysm has 
subsided.”   
 Throughout the collected surveys, respondents link this dread of cohabitation 
consistently to unique powers of ambiguous sensorial or perhaps even extra-sensorial 
detection. The implication, suggested by Mitchell and concretely elaborated in the 
responses, is that ailurophobia tends to possess, for its dialectical double, an equally 
potent capacity for sensing feline proximity without the aid of sound, sight, touch, or in 
several cases even smell. One respondent, a Philadelphian named Mary, wrote to 
Mitchell on behalf of a cousin known for harboring such powers. The letter begins, “I 
hear you are hunting up cat stories & I want to tell you of a cousin of mine—a woman as 
strong minded, and self reliant as any one I have ever known—and apparently afraid of 
nothing, but with an absolute antipathy to a cat.” Mary proceeds to recount a story 
impressive for the strange skill to which it attests. “On one occasion,” Mary explains, 
we arrived in Montreal quite late at night—and on reaching the hotel were 
taken into a very long dining room, with lights only at the table where we 
were seated. [My cousin] suddenly turned ashy pale and exclaimed, ‘there 
is a cat in this room’—and in spite of the waiter’s assuring her he had not 
seen a cat since he had been there, and was quite sure there was none 
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there, she got paler and paler—and trembling all over, continued to say, 
‘there is—there is a cat here’—and after much searching a cat was found 
up in a corner, and at the extreme other end of this very long room. I have 
always thought this very strange but I saw it myself. 
While the cousin’s antipathy is carefully signposted, with reference to her skin turning 
“ashy pale” and physical “trembling,” the respondent emphasizes more the presence of 
these special capacities of perception. Ailurophobia seems to supplement such victims 
with an environmental knowledge and spatial accuracy to which neither Mary nor the 
waiter is privy.  
 A number of individuals wrote Mitchell to confirm this peculiar compatibility 
between phobia and detection. The editor of the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 
George B. Shattuck, wrote the doctor in 1902, explaining he had once observed a patient 
who “realized the presence of a cat in a room with great certainty, becoming pale, 
agitated and faint, and this even when the cat had not been seen and its presence was 
unsuspected by other people present.” A cat was at last discovered. While most of these 
narratives refer to enclosed spaces, another person named Minnetta E. Smith explained 
that her powers extended to outdoor encounters. “Have frequently had feelings that a cat 
must be near, and one has appeared within a few moments,” Smith explains. “When 
walking along the street have seized by husband’s arm and told him that a cat was near. 
Before long such an animal has been visible.”  
 One obstacle Mitchell encountered during the study was the difficulty of 
distinguishing whether such powers of detection lay in sensitivity to the scent of cats, 
asthmatic reactions, or an impression decidedly more mysterious. Minnetta Smith 
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ultimately attributes her ability to sense the presence of a cat to smell: “Whenever a cat is 
near me, whether visible or invisible, I can always smell it; the smell is suggestive of 
being smothered, or overpowered with ammonia.” Another respondent reportedly tested 
an ailurophobic family member for such powers by concealing a kitten in an apron before 
sitting down nearby. No discovery was made “until I opened the apron.” The respondent 
adds, “then the fun began.” The conclusion for this respondent and others was that a 
weak sense of smell correlated with a failure to detect a cat hidden from view. Still, a 
number of other respondents insisted that the power to sense a feline presence relied on 
something other than familiar olfactory perception.  
An attorney from Charlottesville, Virginia, named R. H. Wood, for instance, 
compares his feeling to an “electric shock.” To explain what he means, he distinguishes 
the sensation from any feeling produced by a bigger cat species. “The presence of a tiger 
does not have the same effect on me,” Wood notes. “It is nothing whatever of fear, but 
only a dread of having [cats] touch me and the least touch of a cat produces somewhat of 
a tingling feeling, I suppose rather like an electric shock.” Later he continues, 
I do not think the odor has anything to do with it, but I am rather inclined 
to think that it is more of a feeling of abhorrence at a sneaking, stealthy 
creature, as I know that what may be termed ‘oily, sneaking people’ 
produces a most unfavorable impression upon me, and I think, as stated 
above, the very presence of a cat produces more or less a feeling of 
electrical charge. 
Along these lines, another respondent states that his ability to detect cats has been 
described by others as a “sixth sense.” Still another, signed E. Day MacPherson, 
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describes the condition as magnetic, suggesting that a psychic antagonism to cats 
necessarily yields a force from the animal whenever proximity is close. While not all 
respondents expound as elaborately as Wood or McPherson, many likewise insist that 
odor has little to do with the sensations under investigation. Narrative evidence 
frequently concludes with disbelieving friends or loved ones checking a room to assure 
an ailurophobic person that no cat is, in fact, present, only to discover a cat or kitten 
curled up in a curtain, under bed sheets, or beneath a piece of furniture.  
 In the essay “Of Ailurophobia and the Power to Be Conscious of the Cat as Near, 
When Unseen and Unheard,” Mitchell appears to be most confident in this discovery: that 
many ailurophobic persons are, indeed, capable of detecting a cat without the aid of sight 
or sound, sometimes with but also sometimes without the aid of smell. From the 159 
replies he received to his initial inquiry, Mitchell concludes that “as concerns thirty-one 
persons I had evidence enough to make me sure” of such a capability. One point of 
interest in establishing this connection is the tendency of such a phobia to transcend 
diverse means of perception. Mitchell explains, 
In the first case sight of the cat informs; then there is fear, horror, disgust 
and more or less of the nervous symptoms already described. In the 
second set, those who are conscious of unseen cats, some sense other than 
sight or hearing gives the information, and then the symptoms are, as I 
have said, much the same as when the cat is seen. (7) 
The power of detection corresponds equally, in other words, to the power of an idea over 
the imagination. Certainty of presence trumps any certainty in terms of exact location, 
appearance, or perceived malice or intent to attack. 
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 In addition to the surveys we find in Mitchell’s collected papers, he quotes from 
an array of intriguing responses in his essay. In one case, a Dr. J.C.W. recalls he was 
attending a meeting of “a scientific society,” when suddenly the secretary of the society, 
who had been reading a report, stopped himself. Looking up, he explained, “I can’t go on. 
There must be a cat in the room” (11). Sure enough, not long after the gathered attendees 
began to search on his behalf, a “under the topmost seat in the amphiteatre was found a 
cat.” Another quoted report tells of the historical case of Revolutionary War General and 
signer of the Articles of Confederation Daniel Roberdeau, whose aversion was so well 
known precautions were regularly taken to clear cats from the vicinity of places where he 
was expected. One evening, upon being invited to dine with Chief Justice Thomas 
McKean’s residence, no sooner had General Roberdeau entered the residence that he 
informed those gathered, “There is a cat here.” When they explained it was impossible, 
he reasserted the fact and “retired to another room.” After a renewed search, a kitten was 
discovered in hiding behind a bookcase. It is said Roberdeau’s mother and aunts enjoyed 
these incidents to such an extent they regularly hid cats in his vicinity, at which point 
Roberdeau would immediately detect them. After a protracted sequence of these 
examples in his essay, Mitchell at last cuts them off, explaining, “I should overload my 
paper if I were to relate in detail the cases in which cats were concealed in order to test 
the disbelieved capacity to detect them when not in sight and in which the hidden cat was 
at once known to be near” (13). “One or two permit of doubt,” he continues, “others are 
unassailable.”  
 It is in this interest on the part of Mitchell and his respondents that we begin to 
sense something resonant with the literature on mysophobia and microbial dread 
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discussed above. What interests Mitchell is the idea that phobia describes not merely a 
state of extreme aversion, but also a hypersensitivity, which amounts more or less to a 
superpower—an ability to detect signifiers from an invisible world, which the average 
individual has no capacity to discern. Mitchell proceeds to account for the means by 
which his thirty-one special subjects reached their conclusion. Only four, he notes, 
attribute their power to “the odor of the animal.” He thus begins to speculate on other 
factors in play. “We must admit,” he proceeds, “that all animals and human beings emit 
emanations which are recognizable by many animals and are in wild creatures 
protectively valuable” (8). In turning to this matter of invisible emanations, Mitchell 
gives us a sense of how the rise of microbiology and the world of invisible agents it 
introduced had begun to change the way inscrutable affect was studied and interpreted. 
Ultimately, in a rather disappointing move, Mitchell backs off of his connection between 
phobia and enhanced detective capacities. In concluding, he decides it is quite possible 
that odor may be the dominant factor, and that those who deny its role are simply picking 
up on the smell of a cat so faintly it lies below the olfactory threshold that would make it 
conscious. Mitchell explains, 
It seems to me possible that either they smell the cat too slightly to be able 
to define the odor or else receive an olfactory impression of which they 
are not conscious as an odor, but only in the form of such symptoms as the 
visible cat would also evoke. (9) 
Nevertheless, Mitchell’s provocation stands. The idea he has introduced is his most 
compelling one. (No doubt this is why it remains an intriguing element of his title.) To 
correlate phobia with hypersensitivity is to suggest that certain pathologies of affect exist 
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because they constitute a heightened awareness of the invisible worlds in which humans 
find themselves on a daily basis. As with the literature on mysophobia, one implication is 
that from a post-Pasteurian optic phobia has survived human evolution as a seemingly 
irrational affect precisely because, in certain cases, it serves as a unique sensorial mode, 
laying claim to the features of an environment that might otherwise escape normative 
consciousness.  
 
CHOLERA COSMOLOGY: 
SCENES OF STORYTELLING IN TWAIN’S THREE THOUSAND YEARS AMONG THE 
MICROBES 
 
 These various changes in phobia’s signification, prompted by the rise of 
microbiology, find a provocative dramatization in Mark Twain’s unfinished 1905 
manuscript Three Thousand Years among the Microbes. Three Thousand Years tells the 
story of a man transformed by a magician into a “cholera germ,” and his three thousand 
years (three weeks, human-time) as such. Thus, the narrative appears before readers as a 
kind of “History,” first written, we learn, in the “Original Microbic,” and translated 
subsequently into English by Twain himself. In his preface as translator, Twain 
apologizes on behalf of the microbe, whose style (which the translator tells us he had no 
choice but to preserve) “is loose and wandering and garrulous and self-contented beyond 
anything I have encountered before”—all of this topped off with a “grammar” that 
“breaks the heart” (434). Despite these protestations, the cholera-germ turns out to be a 
rather entertaining narrator—the other germs refer to him affectionately as “Huck.” We 
follow Huck in a kind of travel narrative through the body (from the perspective of the 
germs, a veritable planet) of a “hoary and mouldering old bald-headed tramp” named 
Blitzowski, “shipped to America from Hungary because Hungary was tired of him” 
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(436). Blitzowski, it turns out, is a microbe’s paradise: “he is wonderfully ragged, 
incredibly dirty; he is malicious, malignant, vengeful, treacherous, he was born a thief, 
and will die one; he is unspeakably profane, his body is a sewer, a reek of decay, a 
charnel house, and contains swarming nations of all the different kinds of germ-vermin 
that have been invented for the contentment of man” (436). Thus Blitzowski, to the germs 
Huck befriends, is also a kind of god: “He is their world, their globe, lord of their 
universe, its jewel, its marvel, its miracle, its masterpiece” (436).78 The narrative is thus 
largely sustained by Huck’s play with the idea of a tramp topography. “Our tramp,” he 
goes on to say affectionately, clearly surrendered, Stockholm syndrome-style, to the 
microbes’ hero-worship of their host, “is mountainous, there are vast oceans in him, and 
lakes that are sea-like for size, there are many rivers (veins and arteries) which are fifteen 
miles across, and of a length so stupendous as to make the Mississippi and the Amazon 
trifling little Rhode Island brooks by comparison” (437). Hence, as Huck makes his 
travels, we learn also that Blitzowski houses many languages, nations, and creeds. The 
greatest dynasty, we learn early on is the “Pus lineage,” so well-respected that “many of 
our microbe nations have come to speak of pus and civilization as being substantially the 
same thing” (439). Huck’s previous career as a scientist (in his human form) makes him 
the perfect witness to relate all of these discoveries. All is information, so that by the end 
of his narrative he has effectively donned the cap of a Pasteur, a Darwin, a paleontologist, 
                                                
78 For his part, Huck finds himself split between human and germy tendencies with 
regard to Blitzowski. “When the soul of the cholera-germ possesses me,” he explains, “I 
am proud of him: I shout for him, I would die for him; but when the man-nature invades 
me I hold my nose. At such times it is impossible for me to respect this pulpy old 
sepulchre” (437).  
  289 
and anthropologist, with the apparent intent of bringing his reader into sympathy with the 
interior culture(s) Blitzowski’s body encloses.  
Beyond its regular descent into inane hilarity, Three Thousand Years operates 
from the perspective of a rather intuitive and potentially useful provocation: should the 
microbe, as a known agent, transform the way we think of agency writ large, as a force 
indexing something like subjectivity? Twain’s satire and existential quandary overlap in 
this perspectival thrust: what it would mean, the novel asks to uncertain ends, for one to 
inhabit or converse with the perspective of a germ, as an agent of a microscopic scale. In 
this respect alone, Twain is hardly original. The easy indulgences of scalar 
transformation—a la, honey, I’ve been shrunk to the size of x, y, or z—have a deep 
history in major works of eighteenth-century satire. Rather straightforwardly, Twain’s 
manuscript happily revels in these predecessors too. The most obvious precursor and 
allusion lies with Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726). Soon enough, Huck 
befriends a “Dot-Pyogenes” bacteria, “Head of the Pus-breeders,” named Lemuel 
Gulliver, “Lem” for short. It seems possible Twain might have taken additional 
inspiration from Tobias Smollet’s “The History of an Atom,” a novel of circulation or 
“It” narrative,” published in the mid-eighteenth century, which satirized English politics 
during the Seven-Years War from the perspective of an atom. A protagonist who happily 
bounced around from one human to the next, recording everything he saw, the atom 
shares a fair amount in common with Twain’s microbial Huck—not least because they 
both indulge in size-based pun making ad nauseam. (Ad nauseam is truly the right 
qualifier too, since, as I’ll discuss momentarily, both take particular pleasure in 
describing the grossest of bodily functions to which they are uniquely privy.) Thus, it is 
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worth asking whether Twain is really doing anything very new. The kernel of an idea, 
after all, seems to be the deeper tradition in satire of testing readerly sympathy to its 
extreme limits. Early on, Huck performs this matter of strained sympathies himself, 
explaining that upon his transformation he was not at first pleased, yet soon overcame 
that resistance. By way of his transformation, Huck explains, “I was become intensely, 
passionately, cholera-germanic; indeed, I out-natived the natives themselves…I loved all 
the germ-world—the Bacilli, the Bacteria, the Microbes, etc.—and took them to my heart 
with all the zeal they would allow; my patriotism was hotter than their own, more 
aggressive, more uncompromising; I was the germiest of the germy” (435). In this play 
with a promiscuity of identity, Twain adds his personal touch, but the conceit is not new: 
Huck’s willing identification becomes, through the looking glass of the novel’s glib 
prose, our permission to feel deeply ambivalent by contrast.  
Beyond these familiarities, however, Twain might very well be up to something 
new, inspired specifically by the microbe’s revelation as a particular kind of agent. The 
microbe is not mere infectious matter, after all, but rather represents for Twain a new 
ambiguity as to what counts as life, and with it consciousness, individuality, and destiny. 
It is by investigating these difficult ramifications of the microbe that Three Thousand 
Years finally begins to achieve something besides an unending string of puns. On the one 
hand, Huck expresses a certain optimism about the proliferation of life his new vantage 
point proffers. “To my exquisite organ of vision all this spacious landscape is alive—
alive and in energetic motion—unceasing motion—every detail of it!” he explains. 
“[W]ith my microbe-eye,” Huck goes on, 
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I could see every individual of the whirling billions of atoms that compose 
the speck. Nothing is ever at rest—wood, iron, water, everything is alive, 
everything is raging, whirling, whizzing, day and night and night and day, 
nothing is dead, there is no such thing as death, everything is full of 
bristling life, tremendous life (447)  
In such breathless meditations, Huck’s narrative seems to be gesturing toward something 
like wisdom, which perhaps only a perspectival shift of this variety could properly 
convey. This is not to say these moments of optimism shift entirely away from the theme 
of dubious sympathy noted above, or that they are without humor. In a similar passage, a 
yellow-fever germ named Benjamin Franklin teaches Huck that, as with life, 
individuality is everywhere and in everything. By way of Socratic back-and-forth, the 
cholera and yellow-fever germ impart this truth: 
“FRANKLIN,” I asked, “is it certain that each and every existing 
thing is an individual and alive—every plant, for instance?”  […] 
   “Yes,” he answered.  
 “And is each molecule that composes it an individual too, and 
alive?” 
   “Yes.” (452) 
Later, this theme of their conversation resumes. 
“Tell me, Franklin, is the ocean an individual, an animal, 
creature?” 
   “Sure.” 
   “Then water—any water—is an individual?” 
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   “Sure.” 
   “Suppose you remove a drop of it? Is what is left an individual?” 
   “Yes, and so is the drop.” 
   “Then you have two individuals.” 
   “Suppose you separate the hydrogen and the oxygen?” 
“Again you have two individuals. But you haven’t water, any 
more.” (453) 
Thus it is made clear enough that, whatever wisdom Twain intends to impart, it will not 
be unhampered by the absurdist conceit driving his plot. Nevertheless, there emerges 
something like a celebration of life’s infinite mutation, and the glut of a kind of 
Emersonian individuality and particularity to which that infinity might attest. On through 
the end of the manuscript, this remains one of Twain’s operative nodes—the promise, as 
stated in the earlier quote, that there is no such thing as death.  
 Yet this ubiquity of life carries with it a kind of terrible sublime, by which the 
inescapability of life and of individuality threaten to make all things equally meaningless. 
The most worthwhile of Huck’s speculations revolve around this centripetal concern. If 
all things are alive and individual, Huck wonders privately at another moment, who is to 
say human civilization itself is not, conversely, tantamount to disease? As Franklin 
concludes one of their conversations, advising his friend to rest assure “this fleeting stay 
is not the end!”, Huck remembers suddenly he is talking to an agent of yellow-fever. 
Thus he addresses his human readers with renewed solidarity: “You notice that? 
[Franklin] did not suspect that he, also, was engaged in gnawing torturing, defiling, 
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rotting, and murdering a fellow-creature—he and all the swarming billions of his race. 
None of them suspects it” (454). With a certain uneasiness, Huck continues, 
This is significant. It is suggestive—irresistibly suggestive—insistently 
suggestive. It hints at the possibility that the procession of known and 
listed devourers and persecutors is not complete. It suggests the 
possibility, and substantially the certainty, that man is himself a microbe, 
and his globe a blood-corpuscle drifting with its shining brethren of the 
Milky Way down a vein of the Master and Maker of all things (454)  
In this manner does Huck’s narrative begin to take a new direction. What might have 
remained safely allegorical, or at least something close to allegory, by which all of the 
cholera-germ’s meditations on microbial love, greed, and governmentality might have 
figured, albeit heavy-handedly, as representative of humanity, here open onto an 
alternative set of provocations. On the one hand, the point isn’t that we are to take Huck’s 
consciousness seriously per se. And yet, in a sense we are. As the narrative continues to 
unfold, the primary idea in play is precisely that everything Twain’s readers take for 
granted as their own, as the domain of human life, becomes unfathomably diffuse when 
translated to spectra premised on scalar variations. The point Twain keeps coming back 
to is the idea that something like consciousness is infinitely more vast, as well as 
infinitely more infinitesimal—and therefore also less precious—than is apparent to the 
human eye. 
 It is worth noting that one could discern something cosmic, even potentially 
comforting from Huck’s epiphany. Nevertheless, Three Thousand Years shows that it 
comes at a cost. The crisis Twain’s manuscript undergoes at this moment is that a 
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pervasive relation of scalar variability threatens to transform narrative itself into 
something more or less monotone—which is to say a realm of utter affinity, unmarked by 
meaningful differentiation. In so far as genuine allegory relies on this latter quality—a 
structure of difference across which resonances become manifest, essentially in spite of 
themselves—we find ourselves preemptively situated in Twain’s text, in a universe of 
infinitely nested equivalencies. To put it another way, what begins as a novel of 
disorientation is effectively transformed into one of obscene orientation. As the narrator 
observes in a later moment, if life is everywhere, concealing nested life from within, and 
therefore eclipsed by greater organisms from without, everything about life becomes 
reducible to the same sort of parasitical structure. “[T]he inexorable logic of the situation 
arrived, and announced itself. The inexorable logic of the situation was this: there being a 
Man, with a Microbe to infest him…it also follows, of a certainty, that below that infester 
there is yet another infester that infests him—and so on down and down and down till you 
strike the bottomest bottom of created life—if there is one, which is extremely doubtful” 
(527). Here, Twain, classic storyteller of the late nineteenth century—whether knowingly 
or stumblingly, it is difficult to say—opens onto a narrative crisis akin to what Walter 
Benjamin, a few decades later, would characterize as a swelling modernist dearth in a 
culture capable of telling a good story, or finding an audience to listen. This crisis arrives 
when information overwhelms a story’s capacity to signify beyond its own content. As 
Benjamin writes, the story worth telling “does not aim to convey the pure essence of the 
thing” as does “information” or a “report”; rather, the narrative essentially comes into 
being in the interchange between the story well told and a listener’s capacity to make it 
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something different, which is to say newly applicable beyond any glut of knowledge 
communicated. 
Benjamin is equally interested in the contributions of the novel, short story, and 
other print media as historical forces complicit in the storyteller’s decline, so there may 
seem to be a blatant artificiality in the way I have compared Benjamin’s concerns with 
the weirdness of Huck’s narration in Three Thousand Years. Yet this compatibility 
actually becomes thematized in one of Twain’s most interesting narrative choices: to set 
up a campfire-style scene, midway through the manuscript, in which Huck begins to tell 
stories of his human days on Earth to his dearest microbe friends. In these scenes of 
storytelling, I would argue, Twain makes an effort to reckon precisely with the problem 
he has introduced—to determine whether there’s any story to be made out of a text that 
has, to that point, resigned itself to around 50% pun-making, and 50% existential 
meditation on the infinite reducibility of “life.” Seated with Lem (Gulliver) and a 
consumption germ he has affectionately dubbed “Louis XIV,” Huck begins by divulging: 
“I was not always a cholera-germ” (475). In the reversal this disclosure puts into motion, 
Huck begins to tell the curious microbes of another planet beyond their own. The 
dialogue that follows consists of Huck trying to assure his friends of the veracity of his 
extra-Blitzowski experiences and their corresponding incredulousness. As though 
framing the narrative quandary we later find in Benjamin, Lem asks the cholera-germ, 
“Huck, have you spoken figuratively, or are we [to] take that statement on a scientific 
rating?” (475). Huck takes the risk: “Scientific” (476). In Copernican fashion, Huck 
upsets his friends’ cosmology; in return they mock what they call his “dream-stuff” 
(477). Huck protests, “You needn’t mock! I can enrich your knowledge-treasury as it was 
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never enriched before, if you will listen and reflect, instead of making fun of everything I 
say!” It is only by deciding that Huck’s fancies are the sign of a poetic gift that Louis 
XIV decides eventually they should let him tell his stories without accusing him of 
falsehood. “Let him alone!” Louis cries to Lem. “There’s neither right nor dignity in 
criticizing the fanciful creations of poesy by the standards of cold reason, Lem Gulliver, 
and you know it” (481). It is only by turning what Huck means to be information into the 
fantastic and figurative that his friends come to appreciate his stories.  
What to make of these bizarre reversals in the cholera-germ’s narrative? The 
structural move Twain is toying with clearly has something to do with Huck’s desire, in 
the wake of his epiphanies about life, its infinite nestedness, and its scalar 
unfathomabilities, to share his hard-won knowledge with someone at last. His hope is that 
Lem and Louis XIV, by communicating with a former human, might find some benefit 
from the same disorientations he has survived, just in the opposite direction. To his 
dismay, the germs will have nothing to do with his “facts,” and find their only 
satisfaction in a kind of Benjaminian refusal to let story time become a science lesson. On 
a grander scale, Twain is playing with the failures potentially intrinsic to his narrative’s 
central conceit. Insofar as the germs can only laugh at the idea that they are supposed to 
be impressed with the limitless scope of the world Huck describes, so does Twain seem 
to be admitting, more or less, that he is running out of ideas. How many times can one 
compare Blitzowski’s body parts to topographical features the microbes use for all of 
their microbial happenings? How many times can one make a pun pivoting around the 
personification of a disease? How many pus jokes can one make before one’s audience 
becomes exasperated? In portraying Huck’s failures to make his story suitable for Lem 
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and Louis XIV, Twain dramatizes and seems genuinely to worry over the motivating 
riddle at the heart of Three Thousand Years: does the microbial epiphany permanently 
alter what narrative can do?  
 Is my story as doomed as Huck’s?, Twain seems to ask. Yet I would argue that 
still another feature of the manuscript makes Twain’s experiment a success. It is the 
element to which Huck becomes essentially oblivious precisely because his sympathies 
have been so perfectly naturalized to his world. In short, the first thrust of Twain’s text is 
his strongest: his decision to write sympathetically from a perspective and world clearly 
designed to elicit repugnance and aversion. To put it another way, Three Thousand Years 
is nothing if not mysophobia’s worst nightmare, a disgusting descent into the bowels of 
the “sewer” that is Blitzowski’s pungent playground of organic multiplicity. For all of 
Huck’s apparent progress toward sympathy and unity, this dialectical other remains 
intact—Twain’s reader, who is regularly reminded just how gross the imaginary of Three 
Thousand Years is. Huck’s reminiscences of Earth eventually take us in this direction. 
When he tells his friends that Earth’s surface is three-fifths salt water, Lem and Louis 
XIV scoff. “What makes it salt?” the ask. Stumped, Huck searches for an analogy. “What 
makes your Great Lone Sea rancid?” Huck erupts, referring, we are left to presume, to 
Blitzowski’s bladder. With this retort Huck “score[s]” one on them, then explains to his 
reader, “You see, Science had been fussing for ages over the riddle of what supplies the 
waters of the Great Lone Sea; the riddle of whence they could come in such miraculous 
quantity was persistently and exasperatingly insolvable—just as was the case with 
earthscience in its effort to find the source of the sea’s salt-supply” (484). Here, without a 
trace of syntactic winking, Twain asks his reader to linger with the quandary of where 
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Blitzowski’s pee comes from, and it is in this move that Twain achieves his best effect. 
Through the façade of seeking sympathy over a microbe’s urine-based Great Lone Sea, 
Twain allows the novel’s stronger theme of aversion to slice through, catching readers in 
a game of where their narrative sympathies and aversions will be solicited 
simultaneously, and when they will be driven to allow one emotion to cut the other off 
definitively. In this triumph of aversion over the subordinated theme of life’s limitless 
identity with itself, Twain’s story becomes a story again. The story that triumphs is the 
narrative’s drive toward a phenomenology of mysophobia, driven against Huck’s 
incessant plea for sympathetic recognition.  
 
INFECTED ORALITY: 
PROHIBITION AND PATHOLOGY IN ZORA NEALE HURSTON’S THEIR EYES WERE 
WATCHING GOD 
 
 It would be going too far, perhaps, to say that Twain gives us anything politically 
recuperable by way of these affective upheavals. Yet the question of what the microbe 
does to narrative possibility has important political repercussions. In trying to get a sense 
of what happened, in the wake of Pasteur’s vaccine, to the rhetoric around sociopolitical 
intolerance and the hydrophobia analogy, specifically, we are driven to go still a bit 
further in the twentieth century, to a novel that has become the most famous for revolving 
around rabies as a plot device. While Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird is a close 
contender for this title, there is still a better candidate, which in sustaining the specter of 
rabid infection up through its last words makes it the only text to which one could 
possibly turn in concluding this study. This novel is, of course, Zora Neale Hurston’s 
1937 classic, inspired by her anthropological field work in the U.S. South, Their Eyes 
Were Watching God.  
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 Their Eyes Were Watching God occurs in the space of a conversation, delivered as 
a monologue by protagonist Janie Crawford who tells her closest friend Pheoby Watson 
the story of her life. Janie’s character is at once cool and transcendent, even as she defies 
the expectations of the communities and marriages through which she passes. The rabies 
plotline of Their Eyes Were Watching God emerges rather late in the novel, once 
protagonist Janie has already moved through two husbands and onto her third, “Tea 
Cake.” Nevertheless, the rabies plot becomes one of the novel’s most important 
protracted metaphors. When the historical 1928 Okeechobee hurricane rises, sweeping 
away Janie and Tea Cake’s community in the Everglades (a topography known 
colloquially as “the muck”)—a storm that nearly drowns the couple—a mad dog manages 
an attack during the chaos. Leaping from the spine of a cow struggling in the water, the 
dog tries first to reach Janie; then Tea Cake intervenes. “The dog raced down the back-
bone of the cow to the attack,” the narrative explains,  
and Janie screamed and slipped far back on the tail of the cow, just out of 
reach of the dog’s angry jaws. He wanted to plunge in after her but 
dreaded the water, somehow. Tea Cake rose out of the water at the cow’s 
rump and seized the dog by the neck. But he was a powerful dog and Tea 
Cake was over-tired. So he didn't kill the dog with one stroke as he had 
intended. But the dog couldn't free himself either. They fought and 
somehow he managed to bite Tea Cake high up on his cheek-bone once. 
Then Tea Cake finished him and sent him to the bottom to stay there. 
The hydrophobia (the dread of water “somehow”) thus serves as readers’ initial clue to 
what has transpired in the attack: Tea Cake has been bitten by a dog consumed with 
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rabies, and will potentially find himself infected as the novel ensues. That all of this 
transpires in the context of a hurricane adds a conspicuous dramatic irony to the scene—
the probable communication of hydrophobia has occurred in a catastrophe where water 
threatens to overwhelm Janie and Tea Cake on all sides. This spectacular interplay of a 
deadly hurricane on the surface of the plot and a surreptitious hydrophobia now traveling 
from beneath Tea Cake’s flesh becomes also the novel’s greatest dramatization of love-
as-sacrifice: in saving Janie from the attack, Tea Cake sentences himself to a near and 
miserable fate.  
 Hurston uses Tea Cake’s encounter with the mad dog and the manifestation of 
symptoms that follows to dramatize, in part, social hierarchies of access to medical 
knowledge and treatment that reach and interact with even the highly localized scenes of 
remote domesticity Hurston depicts. Tea Cake interprets his earliest symptoms as 
something essentially spiritual. Early during his onset of symptoms, Tea Cake wakes up 
in the middle of the night “with an enemy at his throat” (204). When Janie asks what is 
wrong, Tea Cake tells her, “Somethin’ got after me in mah sleep, Janie…Tried tuh choke 
me tuh death.” The next morning, when Tea Cake discovers he can no longer drink water 
without gagging, the prose channels his perceptions: “the demon was there before him, 
strangling, killing him quickly” (206). Just before seeking out the local doctor, Janie 
attempts to explain away the malady, speculating out loud, “Maybe it wuz uh witch ridin’ 
yuh, honey” (205). The doctor Janie tracks down, a Dr. Simmons, occupies an interesting 
role between intercessor of a more networked medical knowledge and a suspect regional 
isolation himself. The narrative explains, “The white doctor had been around so long that 
he was part of the muck” (206). Hurston conveys this in-betweenness in the dialect with 
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which he gives Janie his professional opinion: “Janie, I’m pretty sure that was a mad 
dawg bit yo’ husband. It’s too late to get hold of de dawg’s head. But de symptoms is all 
there.” Yet Dr. Simmons is also the source by which the Pasteurian shift on which this 
chapter is premised at last reaches Janie. Dr. Simmons tells Janie privately, “Some shots 
right after it happened would have fixed him right up.” They decide to try to find the anti-
rabies “serum” regardless, phoning Palm Beach first. When they learn there is none to be 
found there, they wire Miami as backup. These questions of regional isolation and 
metropolitan power dynamics, in which Janie and Tea Cake find themselves caught, will 
later be translated from questions of medical care to matters of law and incarceration.  
Before the serum can arrive, Hurston switches directions, however. The turn the 
plot takes appears designed to thematize medicine and law and their proximity to isolated 
regions concurrently—a move building on deep traditions in the fin-de-siécle 
development of a local color aesthetic in the U.S., exemplified in works such as Charles 
Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901). As Tea Cake’s symptoms progress, the 
novel initially dramatizes a sequence of symptoms that will seem familiar in the context 
of this dissertation, even as Hurston’s prose infuses it with new effects, detailing Tea 
Cake’s experience with moments of free indirect discourse. “Tea Cake was lying with his 
eyes closed and Janie hoped he was asleep. He wasn’t,” the narrative explains.  
A great fear had took hold of him. What was this thing that set his brains 
afire and grabbed at his throat with iron fingers? Where did it come from 
and why did it hang around him? He hoped it would stop before Janie 
noticed anything. He wanted to try to drink water again but he didn’t want 
her to see him fail. As soon as she got out of the kitchen he meant to go to 
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the bucket and drink right quick before anything had time to stop him. No 
need to worry Janie, until he couldn't help it. He heard her cleaning out the 
stove and saw her go out back to empty the ashes. He leaped at the bucket 
at once. But this time [] the sight of the water was enough. He was on the 
kitchen floor in great agony when she returned. (178-9) 
The passage is moving, in part, because once again Hurston uses the emergent plot 
development to give readers insight into Tea Cake’s adoration for Janie. However, the 
situation deteriorates further soon after. Tea Cake grows increasingly suspicious, until at 
last, in a protracted altercation, he raises a pistol to Janie’s breast. When Janie grabs a 
rifle behind her in return, he becomes further enraged. In another instance of free direct 
discourse, we get Janie’s perspective on the new danger facing her: “[I]f Tea Cake could 
have counted costs he would not have been there with the pistol in his hands. No 
knowledge of fear nor rifles nor anything else was there. He paid no more attention to the 
pointing gun than if it were Janie’s dog finger….The fiend in him must kill and Janie was 
the only thing living he saw” (216). At the same time, each pulls the trigger. Tea Cake’s 
bullet misses, landing in a joist above Janie’s head. Janie’s bullet hits and sends Tea Cake 
to the floor. When she leans down to hold him in his last moments, Tea Cake leans in 
and, as his last act, sinks his teeth into her forearm.  
 In the plot developments that follow we begin to get a sense of what Hurston 
might be intending by introducing hydrophobia as a dominant theme in the novel. More 
precisely, we begin to get a sense of how the theme provides her an avenue for 
contributing to evolving conceptions of fear in the context of anthropological debate. In 
the paragraph immediately following Tea Cake’s bite and death, the narrative continues: 
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“So that same day of Janie’s great sorrow she was in jail” (217). By the next paragraph, 
Janie is surveying the scene of her trial: “The court set and Janie saw the judge who had 
put on a great robe to listen about her and Tea Cake. And twelve more white men had 
stopped whatever they were doing to listen and pass on what happened between Janie and 
Tea Cake Woods, and as to whether things were done right or not” (217). Hurston takes 
care to highlight the unintelligibility of Janie’s life to the jurors, in racial and economic 
terms. The description of the scenario continues: “They wore good clothes and had the 
pinky color that comes of good food. They were nobody’s poor white folks. What need 
had they to leave their richness to come look on Janie in her overalls?” The greater 
question Hurston raises in the scene is this: what kind of legal structure secures an 
expedient distance between white male jurors and Janie’s daily well-being, yet 
nevertheless permits their judgment of an act, which will have no lasting effect on them 
one way or another? Taking in the scene, Janie realizes that before her stand still two 
additional white strangers, one who will urge the jurors to give her the death penalty—“to 
kill her”—and another from Palm Beach who was going to ask them to decide otherwise. 
What interests Hurston in this moment, it would appear, is the collision of largely 
separate cultural contexts at the nexus of what anthropologists had been commonly 
referring to in recent decades as a taboo, which in the context of a U.S. legal system had 
been translated to written law: in short, a wife murdering her husband.  
 The literature on taboos had begun in the preceding decades to be integrated with 
the evolving psychiatric literature on phobia. Specifically, a comparison of the two 
concepts, as forces conveying immediacies of prohibition, one socially stipulated and 
disciplined, the other individual and potentially concealed as interiority, had received 
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extensive contemplation in Sigmund Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1913). Interestingly, 
phobia, as a variable suffix, and taboo’s Anglophone transliteration from the word’s 
multiple variants in the South Pacific (via the posthumously published journal of James 
Cook), had both emerged and secured notable interest in the late 1700s. Phobia, as I have 
shown, became a concept that straddled medical, political, and otherwise popular 
appropriations in the antebellum period. Taboo would be variously theorized in the 
context of travel narratives and proto-anthropological texts, such as Herman Melville’s 
Typee (1836), before subsuming stronger associations with anthropology as a discipline 
later in the century. In a sense, one could therefore say that while phobia described an 
affect wielded to describe the social pathologies, primarily, of whites, taboo provided a 
growing discourse designed to racialize a comparable state of dread in non-Europeans. 
By the time of writing Totem and Taboo, which largely revolves around seeking 
generalities of human psychology across disparate nations, geographies, and creeds, via 
the all-purpose vantage point of the unconscious, Freud saw in the two terms a potent and 
evocative affinity. As we will see momentarily, this affinity would also build on the 
evolving literature pertaining to mysophobia, or the dread of contamination, which (as 
noted above) European psychologists had sometimes referred to interchangeably as délire 
de toucher.  
 Freud explores affinities between the concepts of phobia and taboo in the context 
of his greater effort to reflect on—and correct—the disciplinary divide between the study 
of illogical affect by anthropologists, among “savages,” and the study of the same 
structure in neurology and psychoanalysis among “neurotics.” On the one hand, the text 
thus relies on a number of assumptions regarding the exportability of psychoanalytic 
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diagnostics, which a number of scholars have explored at length (a tradition of critique 
that owes much of its early theorization to Fanon’s 1952 Black Skin, White Masks). At 
the same time, we should note that, in this way, Totem and Taboo also wields 
psychopathology as a leveling force, thus overturning a number of racial boundaries 
anthropological literature had long contributed to fortifying. Freud foregrounds the 
comparison between the two concepts, observing, “The first and most striking 
correspondence between the compulsion prohibitions of neurotics and taboo lies in the 
fact that the origin of these prohibitions is just as unmotivated and enigmatic” (23). From 
here, he goes on to locate a “touching phobia” as the foundation for prohibitions of all 
varieties. “As in the case of taboo,” Freud writes, “the nucleus of the neurotic prohibition 
is the act of touching, whence we derive the name touching phobia, or delire de toucher” 
(24). The logic of the prohibition begins, in other words, as a manner of inhabiting a 
given space and managing or defending against certain intimacies within that space. “The 
prohibition,” he writes further, “extends not only to direct contact with the body but also 
to the figurative use of the phrase as ‘to come into contact,’ or ‘be in touch with some one 
or something’” (24). Thus, what becomes manifest socially as taboo emanates from an 
earlier interior phobic disposition, only subsequently sanctioned by a larger group of 
individuals and sustained by that group over time.  
 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Freud traces this revulsion of contact to a prior instance 
of thwarted masturbation. “[P]sychoanalysis,” he explains, 
has made us familiar with the clinical history as well as the psychic 
mechanism of compulsion neurosis. Thus the history of a typical case of 
touching phobia reads as follows: In the very beginning, during the early 
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period of childhood, the person manifested a strong pleasure in touching 
himself, the object of which was much more specialized than one would 
be inclined to expect. Presently the carrying out of this very pleasurable 
act of touching was opposed by a prohibition from without. The 
prohibition was accepted because it was supported by strong inner forces; 
it proved to be stronger than the impulse which wanted to manifest itself 
through this act of touching. But due to the primitive psychic constitution 
of the child this prohibition did not succeed in abolishing the impulse. Its 
success lay in repressing the impulse (the pleasure of touching) and 
banishing it into the unconscious. Both the prohibition and the impulse 
remained; the impulse because it had only been repressed and not 
abolished, the prohibition, because if it had ceased the impulse would have 
broken through into consciousness and would have been carried out. (25-
6) 
The conclusions here preserve many of the ideas we find in Freud’s best known writing 
on phobia, the 1909 case of “Little Hans,” titled “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-
Old Boy.” In this study, Freud determines a connection between Hans’ phobia of horses 
and his obsession as a young child with his penis—an obsession with which he is 
beginning to associate discipline, shame, and competition with his father. What becomes 
interesting about the new permutations of this idea we find in Totem and Taboo is the 
way in which the psychological significance of phobia, understood to conceal a complex 
and irrational interior mechanism, becomes the term Freud settles upon for the purpose of 
reading the unconscious across anthropological accounts of taboo. In other words, 
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phobia, which Freud later goes onto associate with the feeling of “emotional 
ambivalence,” functions smoothly in this later text as a kind of missing link, deemed 
worthy of connecting a “savage” epistemology with the more familiar source material of 
his corpus, the ubiquitous mental breakdown of the bourgeois subject. 
 These questions become pertinent to Their Eyes Were Watching God, in part, 
because one of the questions Hurston’s text invites is whether the portrait of Janie she 
depicts is better understood as psychological—which is to say, written to solicit 
identification between protagonist and reader—or anthropological, in a kind of contrary 
insistence on cultural alterity. It is also possible, of course, that Hurston wants to make 
use of both frameworks. Yet there is still another material link connecting this reading of 
Their Eyes Were Watching God to the questions Freud raises. By way of a 1920 essay 
titled “The Methods of Ethnology,” we know what Hurston’s Columbia University 
professor and mentor Franz Boas thought of Freud’s interdisciplinary transgressions, a 
perspective that would have likely been made known to Hurston in some form. In short, 
Boas was not especially impressed. Published in the American Anthropologist, the essay 
concludes its interest in contemporary anthropological methodologies with a less than 
favorable review of Freud’s. While admitting that “some of the ideas underlying Freud’s 
psychoanalytic studies may be fruitfully applied to ethnological problems,” he decides 
that the point of Totem and Taboo in this regard is rather “one-sided” and therefore 
deficient to bringing any useful synthesis of the two disciplines to light. What is perhaps 
most interesting about Boas’ assessment of Freud’s text, considering the present study, is 
that, ultimately, he finds Freud’s primary interest in “repressed desires” to be especially 
ill-suited to the extent of the contexts they allegedly inform. He explains, “If, however, 
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we try to apply the whole theory of the influence of suppressed desires to the activities of 
man living under different social forms, I think we extend beyond their legitimate limits 
the inferences that may be drawn from the observation of normal and abnormal 
individual psychology” (320). Even more crucial to the critique that unfolds is Boas’ 
concern that the symbolic structures, on which Totem and Taboo rests, do not permit 
indigenous and other non-European epistemologies to participate in explicating social 
phenomena. At the same time, how this element in psychoanalysis might be fixed is 
gestured to only lightly. Boas writes,  
The results of symbolic interpretation depend primarily upon the 
subjective attitude of the investigator who arranges phenomena according 
to his leading concept. In order to prove the applicability of the symbolism 
of psychoanalysis, it would be necessary to show that a symbolic 
interpretation from other entirely different points of view would not be 
equally plausible, and that explanations that leave out symbolic 
significance or reduce it to a minimum, would not be adequate. (321) 
On the one hand, Boas here seems to gesture to the possibility of non-white symbolisms 
informing and helping to integrate psychoanalytic and anthropological perspectives. Yet, 
on the other hand, one could easily intuit from the passage that Boas’ irritability stems 
more from Freud’s more basic decision to infuse scientific writing with symbolism as a 
mode of interpretation. Here, we find an impasse akin to the one Twain invokes in Three 
Thousand Years: the problem of making room for allegory in the evolving terrain of 
twentieth-century sciences, which take life, consciousness, and social structures as their 
primary domains. More to the point of psychoanalysis, Freud’s dangerous provocation is 
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the idea that there might yet be new opportunities for developing scientific methods in 
which the interpretation of symbols (in dreams, quotidian experience, language, and 
affective introspection) is reciprocated with new and ever-unfolding symbolisms. 
 Turning to Hurston’s narrative, we find that answering these methodological 
quandaries may help us answer another matter in Hurston’s text that scholars have long 
debated: how the author perceived herself in relation to her subject matter. In terms of the 
trial, Janie is ultimately declared innocent. Thus, even as other African American 
witnesses doubt the ethical foundation of the white jurors—one reminds that things 
would be different if she had killed a white man—the event comes to stand in as the 
ultimate culmination of Janie’s mythical transcendence of an otherwise immense social 
adversity. That is, Janie’s exceptionality as a protagonist resides in her role as an ultimate 
taboo breaker—to the point of being immune, it would seem, to the law. Yet if nearly 
everything Janie touches seems to turn in her favor—even if, that is, her strongest 
character trait is a kind of inversion of a délire de toucher, invoked in her blithe 
unresponsiveness to both cultural and legal taboos—it nevertheless remains unclear what 
Hurston hopes to intend by staring through what she famously termed the “spy-glass of 
anthropology.” Ultimately, the hydrophobia theme persists as the narrative’s deepest 
structural dramatization of this greater question between outside and inside—between an 
educated elite in Harlem and an institutionally untethered heroine living in poverty in the 
Everglades, between the vantage point of a Columbia-trained intellectual and an 
epistemology of “the muck.” The hydrophobia theme metaphorizes this relationship 
precisely because its failed navigation by Janie and Tea Cake originates in their lack of 
access to privileged forms of knowledge production and medical treatment. Thus, the 
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novel shows us a material discrepancy between the real thing living under the surface and 
its production as symbolic experience (as well as a context in which these knowledges are 
reconciled, but only once it is too late). Of course, the other thing Tea Cake’s bite leaves 
behind, which remains an unresolved ambiguity up through the novel’s conclusion, is that 
Janie may yet have the transmitted virus lurking within her. In this sense, Tea Cake’s bite 
retroactively infects Their Eyes Were Watching God in its entirety, which, after all, takes 
shape autobiographically as Janie’s self-portrait, delivered orally to her friend Pheoby 
Watson, post-bite.  
 Microbiology and anthropology are not interchangeable sciences here, of course. 
However, their optics promise potentially to create comparable hermeneutics. Thus, the 
question might be posed: Is Janie’s lurking hydrophobia the analogue for the thing 
Hurston intends to tease out, the real stuff of life, which the symbolic order of “the muck” 
keeps mired in abstraction? What is most interesting about Hurston’s use of hydrophobia 
as a metaphor for this greater question is the way it builds on comparable debates over 
metaphor, medical knowledge, and politics that had animated so much of the antislavery 
print culture explored earlier in this dissertation. Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd 
Garrison, Samuel Cornish, Charles Lennox Remond, and Harriet Beecher Stowe had all 
grappled with a comparable dilemma, contesting the relationship between hydrophobia as 
metaphor and the idea of a real thing, from which structural oppression and a comorbid 
ignorance was perpetually unfolding. It is possible that Hurston might have had this very 
genealogy in mind. W.E.B. Du Bois’ magazine The Crisis (founded in 1910) continued to 
use the term Negrophobia intermittently. Moreover, while phobia no longer depended 
extensively for its signifying capacity on an analogy with hydrophobia, and while the 
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relationship between the two iterations of pathology was certainly dissolving, their 
metaphorical connection nevertheless continued to resurface occasionally. Thus an article 
in 1923 lambasts an epidemic of “xenophobia,” by dreaming of “a political Pasteur” who 
might emerge to “tell the world how to isolate and destroy the germ which shows itself in 
the indiscriminate hatred of other nationals or other races” (51). It is worth noting further 
that scholars including Rachel Blau DuPlessis have suggested as much—that Hurston 
wields the theme of rabidity for precisely this purpose, to provide an affective analogue 
to structural racism and white supremacy.  
However, I would argue that while this may be part of Hurston’s intent, there is 
still more going on. Ultimately, Hurston uses the hydrophobia plotline to disrupt a 
hierarchy of representation, evidenced in Boas’ critique of Freud’s symbolism, which 
would privilege a sterile, reductive realism, increasingly characteristic of Euro-American 
epistemologies at the turn of the century, above the dynamic symbolisms maintained in 
Southern African American knowledge production and oral circulation. Throughout the 
novel, this theme comes through in Hurston’s repeated description of “thought pictures” 
as crucial to the epistemology of Janie’s various communities. In one early passage, the 
novel describes how in Janie’s infancy her “Old Nanny” would rock her back and forth, 
while reminiscing: “Mind-pictures brought feelings, and feelings dragged out dramas 
from the hollows of her heart” (20). In a later scene, Hurston explains, “When the people 
sat around on the porch and passed around the pictures of their thoughts for the others to 
look at and see, it was nice. The fact that the thought pictures were always crayon 
enlargements of life made it even nicer to listen to” (60). On the one hand, these moments 
call attention to themselves as deeply anthropological. They give us a sense of Hurston’s 
  312 
methodology in recreating cultural alterity for her readers, as well as how Hurston views 
her subjects’ communications as premised on visualization (as opposed to linguistic 
precision, one is left to intuit), as well as embellishment, for the sake of meeting social 
expectations as to what a good story sounds like. Yet, as the novel concludes, it is this 
epistemology that Hurston privileges above all others in the text. Upon concluding her 
monologue to Pheoby, Janie thinks back on Tea Cake. “Of course he wasn’t dead,” the 
last paragraph explains. “He could never be dead until she herself had finished feeling 
and thinking. The kiss of his memory made pictures of love and light against the wall. 
Here was peace. She pulled in her horizon like a great fish-net. Pulled it from around the 
waist of the world and draped it over her shoulder. So much of life in its meshes! She 
called in her soul to come and see” (227). While, on the one hand, the novel continues to 
privilege the visual above other sensorial modes, to focus too much on this aspect would 
be to miss the point. What seems most remarkable in the thought pictures Hurston uses to 
conclude her novel is that here she insists finally on valuing metaphorical epistemologies 
above those largely beyond Janie’s realm of influence, even as she might be harboring a 
rabies virus preparing to do its deadly work. In this final move, Hurston asks us to keep 
hydrophobia alive as a metaphor in her novel, capable of signifying something more than 
the base literality of its microscopic agency. Of course, a number of scholars and cultural 
critics, including Susan Sontag, Timothy Mitchell, Sharon Snyder, and others, have 
warned against this move of making disease or disability into abstract signifiers. While 
these interventions urge useful caution, however, they potentially eclipse the disciplinary 
histories by which metaphor and allegory have in many ways been eradicated—perhaps 
inoculated is the word—from the public sphere. The history this dissertation traces—the 
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use of phobia as a political metaphor, aesthetic sensation, and repurposed affect to 
reconceptualize the relationship between fear, race, and sexuality in U.S. print media—
shows us a genealogy where the perpetual reactivation of metaphor served as a strategy 
for keeping progressive representation dynamic. Only by feeling backward through this 
genealogy, from the perspective of a contemporary rhetorical fashion at once ubiquitous 
and largely emptied of this earlier dynamism, are we able to reckon with the lack we have 
inherited. It is a lack we know well, but here its urgency surfaces in a sobering clarity of 
deprivation: the relegation of figurative epistemologies, or as Benjamin would have it 
storytelling itself, to outmoded obscurities. This seems to be the work Hurston’s novel 
persists in reanimating.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 This dissertation has not only been about the uses of metaphor in U.S. 
progressivism. It is also about a history by which phobia has been sequestered as a 
negative affect, in many traditions the negative affect, and the resistance of certain 
writers to this unilateral move, among them Douglass, Stowe, and Aubrey Beardsley. 
Hurston too shows a certain affinity with this resistance. At one moment, Their Eyes 
Were Watching God explains to readers: “Through indiscriminate suffering men know 
fear and fear is the most divine emotion. It is the stones for altars and the beginning of 
wisdom. Half gods are worshipped in wine and flowers. Real gods require blood” (144-
5). Along these lines, this dissertation has tried to trace a genealogy of phobia’s political 
recuperability. However, in concluding, I want to speculate on how this recuperability 
might be reconceptualized in an era when the link between phobia and rabidity is no 
longer as operative. In acknowledging this loss, we should consider briefly what it would 
mean to extend a resistance to an avowed eradication of fear as a political emotion, 
according to the valences the phobia metaphor has taken since these earlier uses.  
 In suggesting something along these lines as a concluding gesture, we might look 
to another foray in a phobic imagination to emerge in the 1930s, a series of art deco 
illustrations by John Vassos revolving around phobia’s myriad possible attachments. In 
1931, Vassos published the illustrations in the form of a limited-edition book, titled 
simply Phobia. Made up of 24 plates, the book presented a kind of modernist taxonomy, 
each plate corresponding to a particular phobia. These include depictions of 
mechanophobia, the fear of machinery, represented as a landscape of brutal cogs 
  315 
squashing humans in their teeth; batophobia, or the fear of falling objects, represented as 
a kind of urban vortex being assaulted by flaming asteroids shooting from the sky; as 
well as phagophobia, meaning a fear of swallowing, which shows an individual, sitting 
alone at a restaurant, who conjures a spectral image of himself choking to death, rising 
from the back of his neck, as though a forecast of his departed soul sweeping upward.79 
But perhaps one image captures the thematic nature of the series more than all others—
one called “monophobia,” meaning a fear of being alone, which pictures a composite 
juxtaposition of three scenes, one of a woman in bed looking up at a dark, alienating 
cosmos; one individual taking a gun from a drawer, apparently to take his life; and 
another standing alone on a barren planet with his hands to his ears. Most evocative about 
the appearance of this phobia in the greater series is the way an experience of isolation—
which registers at once a dread of isolation, but also the stigmatization of being by 
oneself—serves as a repeated theme throughout the collection. That is, while 
monophobia might describe the particular phobia of solitude, the theme of being caught 
in isolation—of being beyond empathy, the reach of others—runs through all of the 
collected images. Thus, mechanophobia contrasts one’s helplessness with the concerted 
intimacy of predatory gears; batophobia disperses its victims of aerial assault into 
opposite directions; and phagophobia depicts a scene of dining by oneself, another 
familiar fear, in which Vassos’ dread of swallowing seems implicated. In short, 
monophobia becomes the driving idea of phobia itself: the stigma of the pathology 
residing in a logic that positions phobia as the antithesis of intimacy, human sociality, and 
with it the experience of attachment writ large, as an antithetical phenomenology. This 
                                                
79 Each plate may be found at the following link: http://socks-
studio.com/2013/11/20/depicting-human-phobia-the-illustrations-of-john-vassos/ 
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latter point seems to be where the most evocative paradox of Phobia resides. The phobias 
collected describe states of isolating cathexis—that is, they are legible only by virtue of 
their fixations—yet these fixations comprise the structure of their ever-deepening 
isolation.  
Where hydrophobia dissolved as an analogy through which other phobias thrived, 
this monophobia seems to have ascended. In acknowledging this constitutive logic, we 
should be careful not to diminish the genuinely isolating experience of phobia. However, 
we should be willing to recognize equally where a stigmatization of solitude has 
contributed further to the diminishment of phobia as a usable feeling, and thus also an 
intensification of the solitude that has been taken as a sign of that pathology. This seems 
to be the primary provocation of contemporary progressive iterations of the phobia 
metaphor, as well: to be labeled as homophobic, transphobia, Islamophobia, or 
xenophobic, is to be interpreted as operating from an experience of pathological isolation, 
a deficiency in sociality, or some other failure to engage a public intimacy. Indeed, even 
the rhetoric of internalized homophobia reads phobia as a failure to engage an alternative 
structure of longing; thus, the solution to that shame manifests as a re-suturing of one’s 
social affect to an interior truth of desire, toward which one’s self is always inwardly 
leaning. On the one hand, this logical formulation is dangerous because it turns the 
experience of solitude into pathology, associating certain forms of sociality with 
normative manifestations of desire and affinity, while making no room for deviant 
iterations of queer belonging. Moreover, as suggested above, this rhetoric makes the 
crude move of categorically pathologizing certain affective dispositions, while 
sanctifying others as universally good. In addition to all of this, the contemporary rhetoric 
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of phobia has convinced us that the structural oppression of minorities formed around 
sexuality, gender identification, race, and religion is not also intimate. In this rhetorical 
neglect of the intimacy of violence, we discover an important continuity with the 
abolitionist writings considered in this dissertation. As the author of “Negro-Phobia Vs. 
Negro-Equality-Phobia reminds us, the origins of political disenfranchisement do not 
emerge solely in contexts of distance, anonymity, and fear. On the contrary, these 
structures depend for their foundation upon proximity, legibility, and forms of intimate 
belonging.  
Another plate in Vassos’ Phobia series may provide one useful means of 
rethinking future possibilities of repurposing phobia as a feeling beyond its conditions of 
historical lack (which is to say, the antislavery genealogy we have forgotten), as well as 
its limitations as a particular rhetoric of pathologization. This plate depicts the state at the 
center of this chapter—a case of mysophobia, defined in Vassos’ book as a “fear of dirt 
and contamination.” The depiction shows a woman with a scowl on her face, her hair 
pulled back in a bun, her legs crossed, and her arms folded. Twelve hands creep out of 
the left-hand corner of the image, reaching up at her with uncertain intentions. The dread 
she conceals facially appears depicted behind her: a spirit rushes from the scene toward 
the sky. Yet she remains seated. Here we find a couple of interesting ideas in play. On the 
one hand, the hands that reach up to touch the subject appear to be creatures of her 
imagination, in which her dread of touching an exterior world has become inverted into a 
dread of other people’s hands rushing up toward her. But through this inversion, we 
discover also a more genuine picture of phobia’s sociality than monophobia can give us: 
an insistence on phobia’s intrinsic participation in the making of the public sphere. This 
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seems to be more or less the insistence of the subject herself who does not budge as the 
hands threaten to contaminate her. In the state of confrontation she maintains, what has 
gone by the name of mysophobia seems to double as a scene of potential sexual assault. 
Far from being driven into the isolation characteristic of other plates in the collection, the 
irritated woman holds her ground. Indeed, the plate shares an uncanny resemblance to a 
popular gif of recent years, showing an angry woman on the log flume at Splash 
Mountain, Disney World, who looks directly into the ride’s camera, her visage stone-
cold, her arms folded, while a single word at last flashes onto the screen, reading: 
“NOPE.”80 Like this discontented heroine, riding the log flume of history, surrounded by 
a deeply suspect imperative to raise one’s arms and smile at all events in unison, Vassos’ 
mysophobe remains a perfect picture of disinclination. Hers is a politics of queer refusal, 
which shapes in its disposition toward the violent intimacy of hands encroaching toward 
her a new relational mode, a repurposing of phobic feeling, with which the hands will be 
forced to reckon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80 “Angry Splash Mountain Lady.” 
http://i0.kymcdn.com/photos/images/original/001/091/278/a51.gif 
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Figure 1 Nugent, Christopher.  An Essay on the Hydrophobia: To  
Which Is Prefixed the Case of a Person Who Was Bit by a  
Mad Dog.  London: James Leake & William Frederic, 1753. 
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Figure 2 “Kunophobia--The Church in Danger.” The Humorist: A 
Companion for the Christmas Fireside. London: 
Ackerman, 1831. 
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Figure 3 “Terrible Case of Hydrophobia.”  Frank Leslie’s  
Illustrated Newspaper.  Sept. 1868.  
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Figure 4 “A Rabid Woman.”  Frank Leslie’s Illustrated  
Newspaper.  August 1868. 
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Figure 5 “Poor Bessy.”  The Infants’ Annual, Or, A Mother’s Offering.  
Peabody & Co., 1832. 
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Figure 6 Affect Scales.  Benjamin Rush Correspondence.  
Rush Family Papers (Library Company of Philadelphia 
Collections) 
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Figure 7 “Church Reformophobia.” Figaro in London. Jan. 11, 1834. 
(Illustration by Robert Seymour.) Satirizes the Tithe War conflict, 
1831-1836. 
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Figure 8  “Illustration of “J.D.” (Jefferson Davis) as a Mad Dog, on a New  
York envelope, circa 1861-1865. (American Antiquarian Society 
Collections) 
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Figure 9 Bellew, Frank. “A Consistent Negrophobist.”  
Harper’s Weekly, 6 August 1862, p. 528.  
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Figure 10  Watson and the Shark (1778), John Singleton Copley 
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Figure 11 Humankind, Hezekiah.  “Colorphobia.”   
The Liberator, 22 Jun. 1849, p. 100. 
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Figure 12 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “Frontispiece.” A Full and  
True Account of the Wonderful Mission of Earl  
Lavender.  Ward & Downey, Limited, 1895. 
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Figure 13 Beardsley, Aubrey.  Illustration of Edgar Allan Poe’s  
“The Black Cat,” The Chapbook Semi-Monthly. Herbert S. 
Stone and Co., Chicago, 1894. 
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Figure  14 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “Unexpurgated Enter Herodias.”   
Salomé.  1894.  
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Figure 15 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “Revised Enter Herodias.”   
Salomé.  1894. 
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Figure 16 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “Unexpurgated The Toilette of  
Salomé.”  Salomé.  1894. 
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Figure 17 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “The Dancer’s Reward.”   
Salomé.  1894. 
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Figure 18 Beardsley, Aubrey.  “J’ai baisé ta  
bouche.”  Salomé.  1894. 
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Figure 19 “Homo-Phobia.”  Harper’s Weekly (June 10, 1875): 565.  
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Figure 20 “An Inoculation for Hydrophobia.” Harper’s  
Weekly vol. 29, no. 1513, 19 Dec. 1885, p. 836. 
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Figure 21 “Applying the Madstone to Arm of a Girl Who Was Bitten by a  
Rabid Dog.” Terre Haute Daily Union. May 14, 1858.  
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Figure  22 Mitchell, Silas Weir.  “Cat Fear Survey.”  1902-1903.  S. Weir  
Mitchell Personal Papers.  College of Physicians of Philadelphia.  
MSS 2/0241-03, Ser. 1 Oversized Folder.   
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 Figure 23 “Letter from Gertrude Ward to Silas Weir Mitchell.”  S.  
Weir Mitchell Personal Papers.  College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia.  MSS 2/0241-03, Ser. 1 Oversized Folder.   
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Figure 24 “Letter from George B. Shattuck to Silas Weir Mitchell.”   
S. Weir Mitchell Personal Papers.  College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia.  MSS 2/0241-03, Ser. 1 Oversized Folder.   
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APPENDIX II:  
 
“THE HAUNTED MAN” (1832), BY JOHN NEAL81 
 
 
 
[NOTE: One of the defining ambitions of this project has been to uncover a corpus,  
a collection of archives related by a phobic aesthetic, which scholars have neglected  
to acknowledge previously. To represent this element of the project, I include a transcription  
of one such story, which remains obscure and relatively difficult to access in libraries  
or online, “The Haunted Man,” by John Neal, published in The Atlantic Souvenir in 1832.  
In addition to being a good example of the phobic imagination this dissertation attempts 
to uncover in antebellum literature, the story is interesting for its allusion throughout  
to several famous case studies of hydrophobia in contemporary transatlantic medical  
print culture.] 
 
   
 
 SOME time in the fall of 1824, I happened to be in the southern part of England, 
where grapes grow in the open air, and every cottage roof is literally heaped with flowers 
at certain seasons of the year—now with white roses and now with the tri-coloured 
morning-glory, while the door-ways and windows are overhung with transparent vine 
leaves, through which the small panes, of three inches by four at the most, glitter and 
sparkle in the sunshine, like a swarm of happy insects after a shower, when the green 
leaves are all alive with their motion. I spent the greater part of a whole week in rambling 
about the neighbourhood and sketching whatever I saw that pleased me. One beautiful 
day—it was the Sabbath, not the Jewish, but the Christian Sabbath—happening to  be in a 
                                                
81 When I first discovered this story, I became somewhat dismayed in observing that, 
while John Neal was the only famous writer by this name in the United States known to 
have published work in The Atlantic Souvenir, the name above “The Haunted Man” in 
the 1832 edition had been spelled with a superfluous “e” as “Neale.” With the help of 
Amy Sopcak Joseph, I have at last put this mystery to rest. In perusing the cost book of 
Carey and Hart, for printing the 1832 edition of the Atlantic Souvenir (held at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania), we see that Neal’s name is spelled accurately, in the 
typewritten transcription. However, we also learn from the cost book that The Atlantic 
Souvenir was employing an engraver by the name of John Neagle during these same 
years. As these are the only two names that approximate the misspelling in the 1832 
edition, we may conclude that the story rightly belongs to the writer, John Neal. 
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church yard set thick with the armorial paneling of a multitude, who, if one might judge 
by the care taken of their titles and virtues here, had no very exalted notion of 
immortality elsewhere, and among whom were not a few of England’s haughtiest 
nobility, over whose magnificent records the children of the village were in the habit of 
playing marbles on holiday afternoons; and happening to forget myself so far as to pull 
out my sketch-book and pencil, without any regard to the day, for the purpose of trying a 
three-cornered view of the beautiful church, with its unpretending battlements, ponderous 
door-way, and grotesque embrasures, my attention was suddenly called off by the 
triumphant peal of an organ, the finest I ever heard in my life. Seized with a new feeling, 
and half ashamed of my employment, which smacked prodigiously of the cockney 
tourist, I shuffled my book into its place, and made my way directly to the church door, 
the organ pealing afar off, like a thunder-burst over still water,  
 
  ‘Sound the loud timbrels o’er Egypt’s dark sea! 
  Jehovah has triumph’d, his people are free!’ 
 
 I never shall forget the volume and sweetness—the heavy soar and intermingling 
chime of that organ. It was the chant of a liberated people—the overpowering anthem of 
a great multitude, men, women and children, suddenly lifting up their voices in the desert, 
on the pouring forth of pure water from the smitten rock. How I entered the church, and 
how I found the seat occupied, I knew not; what I say is the solemn truth, however 
strange it may appear; but the organ stopped, and, in looking up, I found all the eyes of 
the congregation fixed upon me, even those of the clergyman and the clerk, who were 
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directly facing me. What had I done; how came I where I was—in a pew carpeted with 
gorgeous cloth and carved with, what I had entirely overlooked before, a coronet? I felt 
sorry and perplexed, and might have been afraid to lift my eyes, but for my perfect 
innocence of all presumption. To my infinite relief the service began at last, and gave me 
an opportunity to get my breath and look about me. It was communion day. The vessels 
of gold and the vessels of silver were spread out before me, most of them with a 
counterpart of the very arms I had just perceived on the back of the pew emblazoned 
upon them, coronet and all. Of course they were the gift of our family, the occupants of 
the pew; the first fruits, it might be, of a princely heritage. I could have cried with 
vexation had I been a few years younger; but now I felt rather more inclined for a laugh, 
particularly when I called to mind my sketching attitude for the Sabbath-day, and the 
possibility that I had been observed by the congregation before I found my way into 
church. Zounds! I can see myself now. What must they have taken me for? Peradventure 
a job poet, or an amateur tragedian going through a rehearsal in a grave-yard, for a first 
appearance at the Adelphi or Bartholomew-fair. Meantime the service when on with all 
its grave simplicity and awakening changes; the organ rolled out once more, and then 
died away in a rich voluntary; and I was beginning to forget the strangeness of my 
situation, when a door opened softly behind me, a curtain was lifted, and a very dignified-
looking man entered, the sight of whose cold, pale, intellectual countenance brought me 
instantly to my recollection. He bowed, and seeing me about to rise, made a sign to me to 
be seated, knelt down upon a low cushion before us, covered his face with his hands, and 
took no further notice of any thing till the incident occurred which I am about to mention. 
While he sat with his head turned towards the preacher, I had an opportunity of studying 
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it and him, and, what was yet more delightful to me just then, of ascertaining how on 
earth I had got into the pew. The fact was, and I remembered it all now—the only wonder 
being how I should not have remembered it before; the fact was, that instead of making 
my way to the principal door of the church, I had gone up to a sort of private entrance in 
the rear, about which five or six persons were gathered, and waiting, as we do in this 
country, for a chance to creep in without disturbing the rest of the congregation, so I 
thought. As I drew night they all made way for me, and this very man opened the door 
with a low bow as if I had been waited for; and th next moment I found myself within the 
church, and every pew near me crowded except one, which I lost no time in taking 
possession of. He did not follow at the time nor did the others; and being dull of the 
music, I did not observe that, on passing the door, a fold of rich blue cloth fell into its 
place and concealed it, so that when I saw the people staring at me I looked up to find the 
door by which I had entered, and not being able to find it, I had nothing to do, of course, 
but stare at them in reply. And now, having satisfied myself upon a subject about which I 
confess I had begun to feel rather sensitive and sore, I fell to studying the character of the 
face before me. It was a very singular face, an extraordinary face; hardly a feature where 
it should be, or what it should be; and yet, take it altogether, one of the most intellectual, 
handsome and attractive faces I ever saw. The eyes were large and serene, the forehead 
high, and the mouth expressive enough; but there was a something, a haughty, cold, 
repulsive something, which came and went like a shadow from within, over the 
transparent breadth of his temples, and altered the bland expression of the mouth and 
eyes continually; more than once too, while I was looking at him, I saw his chin quiver; it 
was the largest and best chin I ever saw in my life, it reminded me of Napoleon’s, of Lord 
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Byron’s, and of the old fashioned sculpture, though it was rather out of proportion with 
his other features, and might have belonged to a seven feet Apollo Belvidere. But his 
teeth were like those of a she-wolf, and he had the nose of a bald-eagle. I am thus 
particular, merely to prove that I had my senses about me at the time; and that I have 
them now, although I should repeat the declaration, that, take him altogether, he was the 
handsomest man I ever saw. Perhaps I should have been able to finish the portrait, feature 
by feature, shadow by shadow—I a m sure I could with my portfolio before me; but in 
the very midst of the sitting, the consecrated elements were announced for distribution. 
The pew doors were flung open, that which I occupied among the rest; and the 
communicants began to gather about the supper-table. My attention was directed towards 
the clergyman. I liked his affectionate, earnest and solemn bearing, though it smacked of 
the national church, and was running over in my own mind the several distinguishing 
tones and styles that we have, whereby a man’s faith may be known with considerable 
certainty the moment he opens his mouth, when all at once I heard a sort o smothered cry, 
a loud gasping for breath, and, turning quickly, I had just time to see one of the golden 
cups flung on the pavement before me; the red wine running over the marble floor; the 
stranger standing up, face to face, with the frightened preacher; the cup lying at his feet as 
if crushed and tramples on; the windows and doors suddenly darkened with a mass of 
human creatures trying to escape; and the communicants clinging to each other and 
recoiling in breathless terror, from his uplifted arms and terrible countenance. Another 
cry, and the stranger lay extended his whole length upon the floor. In a moment the 
church was deserted. Not a living creature stood within the four walls except the 
preacher, the gray-headed sexton, four servants in a splendid livery who burst through the 
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door behind me when they heard the cry, a very aged man who kept raving about his poor 
mater, and myself. I would have stayed, but the clergyman begged me to go, as the 
unfortunate stranger was in the best hands. I saw that he was dreadfully agitated, and the 
more so when he understood, by my questions, that I was ignorant of the very name of 
the sufferer. “Then let me entreat you, sir,” said he, “as a man, as a gentleman, as a 
Christian, to keep the secret so far as you have it in your power. I know him, and his five 
domestics know him; but no other human creature does, I believe, in this part of the 
country.” I could not refuse, how could I? and without even communicating my own 
name, or making a merit of submission, I left the church. There was a good deal of talk 
that day at the tavern where I had put up, and the result of all I heard was—heard, I say, 
for I asked no questions, and rather avoided the subject—that although no two persons 
could agree upon the name of the stranger, the greatest unanimity prevailed upon two 
points: first, that he was a madman, probably out on his good behaviour, and well known 
to their curate, else he would not have been allowed to approach the table; and next, hat 
he was a man of high rank, if not of the highest. Indeed, some went so far as to say it was 
no other than poor Leopold himself; and one man declared to me in a whisper—pointing, 
as he spoke, to a portrait of the princh which hung side by side with that of the princess 
Charlotte, and laying his finger on the nose and I could not help acknowledging the 
resemblance there—that, between ourselves, he had seen Leopold so often that he could 
not be mistaken. I stared for I had seen Leopold too, and I thought he could be mistaken; 
but he added that he had not seen the stranger himself, he had only heard him described; 
nevertheless, in his own mind he was satisfied, satisfied that the prince of Saxe Coburg 
and the poor stranger were one and the same person. “Besides,” whispered he, “what 
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could be more natural—the sudden death of his wife and child.” “So many years ago?” 
said I. “Precisely,” said he, “and the state of his late majesty’s health, you know.” 
“Precisely,” said I; “these things always run in families. And here we parted.  
 Fifteen months after this, to a day, as I was loitering through the grounds at 
Versailles, a man passed me in a Spanish cloak, who stopped and looked at me for a 
moment, as if doubtful whether to speak to me or not, and then passed on. I gazed after 
him, and tried to recollect where I had seen him before; but, after a few moments, finding 
the image that I had half conjured up as he walked by me growing fainter and fainter, I 
abandoned the idea, and pursued my way to a part of the grounds where, at a prodigious 
cost, what is called an English garden had been laid out. There I encountered the stranger 
again. He stood still, directly fronting me, as I came round a little patch of stunted 
shrubbery; his cloak had fallen from his shoulders, and I had a fair opportunity of seeing 
his countenance. I knew him instantly; it was the stranger who, fifteen months before, 
had flung down the consecrated vessels, dashed to the earth the golden cup in the Lord’s 
house, and sunk upon the floor as if smitten by a thunder-bolt for the sacrilege. Instead of 
avoiding me now, as I should him, the moment he caught a view of my person, eh walked 
up to me, lifted his hat, and appeared to be just on the point of making me a very low 
bow, and then all at once he appeared to be in doubt, his cheerful step faltered, a shade of 
perplexity came up, as if out of the depth of his heart, over his fine countenance, and he 
stood for half a minute before he replaced his hat, which he did at last with a mighty 
aristocratic air as I lifted mine. Pitying his perplexity, and half ashamed of myself on 
account of the part I had played at our first interview; half afraid of him too, I hardly 
knew why, for he had every sign of good health about him now; and a little angry 
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moreover at the fashion of his bow; I would have passed on without caring to know more 
of my mysterious gentleman, or to interchange any further civilities: but, seeing my 
purpose, he put himself in my way, lifted his hat, and fixing his keen eyes on mine, while 
he bent his body courteously enough, he said to me, in a voice that thrilled through and 
through me, “You are the very man, sir.”  
 Lord help me! Though I, before I answered; here’s a pretty kettle of fish: 
entrapped by a madman where no human creature can help me. At last I got my breath, 
and was able to say, “I do not understand you, sir.”  
 “The very man! I beg your pardon, who are you, sir?” 
 My gorge began to rise. “Who the devil are you!” said I, “and by what right am I 
questioned by you after this fashion?”  
 “I beg ten thousand pardons,” cried my tormentor, “I see you are puzzled, and I 
cannot wonder at it; I’ll tell you why, sir, and you must forgive me. For two whole years 
you have haunted me, haunted me by night and by day, and yet I never heard your voice 
in my life, to my knowledge. I know you by sight—I am sure I know you, and yet, for the 
soul of me, I cannot tell where we have been acquainted, nor am I certain that I have ever 
seen you before.” As he said this he looked so unhappy, so puzzled, and so altogether 
worthy of compassion, that, entirely forgetting his behavior, the place, and my own 
apprehensions, I took both of his extended hands into mined, and, without losing a 
moment, proceeded to detail to him, step by step, as I saw by the changes of his 
countenance how he bore it, all that I knew, all that I had been told, and all that I 
conjectured of him. You may wonder at my courage, and had you stood a little way off 
and heard our conversation, without looking into his eyes or seeing the movement of his 
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handsome mouth and brilliant teeth, you would have wondered still more. When I spoke 
of the manner in which I was greeted by all eyes on taking possession of the pew, he 
smiled. When I dwelt for a moment on my consternation at seeing the carved coronet, his 
lip withered as if stung with some indignant thought. When I told him how utterly 
incapable I was of explaining how I got into the pew till I saw him lift up the heavy cloth, 
he appeared inclined to laugh; but the next moment, when I alluded to his behavior at the 
communion-table and to the outrage he had committed there, he shuddered from head to 
foot, and covered his face with his hands, and breathed for a moment or two with terrific 
energy and then, after I had got through on mentioning to him what people said he was at 
the tavern, he burst forth into a fit of loud joyous laughter, stopped suddenly short, and 
the tears came into his eyes. 
 “And what did you think of me?” said he, after I had finished.  
 I told him as plainly as language could speak it, for I knew—I was satisfied now 
that the man before me was no more mad than myself, whatever else he might be. 
 “Sir,” said he in reply, “I wonder at your courage; we must be better acquainted. I 
do not ask who you are, I do not even wish you to know who I am, in the outward 
ceremonials of life. Names are nothing. No matter who I am, or what my rank is; though 
at the time you saw me first, which I am astonished to find was only a year ago, instead 
of two years—”  
 “Fifteen months to a day,” said I; “I have just been through the calculation—” 
 “Well then, fifteen months to a day, at the time you saw me first, I was a visitor at 
Arundel, and the occupier of a prince’s pew in church, and, of course (with a bitter 
sneer), the companion of princes. Go with me; we will take a turn or two over these 
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absurdly contrived grounds, where the revenues of a nation have been wasted upon a toy-
shop and a baby-house, and then, if you have nothing to interfere with it, I shall be happy 
to offer you a plain dinner at my chambers; I do not say at my hotel, for mine is every 
body’s hotel who can pay for it.”  
 Well, not to delay the best part of the story—the end, after a long walk we dined 
together; and so we did the next day and the next and the net, until I had begun to feel the 
strongest admiration of this man’s powers, and the greatest curiosity to find him out. He 
lived a very retired life, saw no company, and was only known as Mr. Smith; and yet he 
was young—not over thirty-five, wealthy, handsome in spite of his nose, high-bred, and 
highly accomplished. Never did I see such strength of mind united with such brilliancy of 
imagination; such sober good sense united with such fervour of enthusiasm. 
 As last, after an intimacy of a whole month, during which I met him almost every 
day, having seen him grow suddenly pale—as pale as death, one afternoon as we were 
passing a fountain, he led me into a café, called for a private room furnished without 
mirrors, and having, to my surprise, pushed a sofa against the door, asked me if I had 
ever observed any thing strange in his behaviour since we had been acquainted. I hardly 
knew what to say, every thing he did was strange; and, after he had repeated the question, 
I told him so.  
 But instead of being displeased, he appeared pleased with my plain dealing. “We 
understand each other now,” said he. “I know what your opinion of me is, I feel sure—
quite sure; but before I proceed further, ‘to make assurance doubly sure,’ allow me to ask 
you if you think me a—a--,” tapping his forehead with his fore finger, “a—a--.”  
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 There was something so cheerful in his eye when he did this, so comical about his 
mouth and so unlike all I had ever seen before in him, that I laughed in his face.  
 “I am satisfied—and yet—yet—;” again his whole countenance altered, and his 
eyes were filled anew; “and yet, my dear fellow, I am a haunted man!” 
 I stared, and then he burst into another of those fits of uncontrollable laughter, 
which continued until the tears ran down his cheeks and fell, drop after drop. From the 
very tip end of that remarkable nose, which I never can get out of my head, upon the 
crimson velvet sofa, to which he was clinging with all his might, as if to steady himself in 
his paroxysm of mirth. I began to feel uneasy, to grow dignified, to fear that, of the two, I 
was more to be pitied than he, and after a while to wax wrath. But when he looked up, a 
minute afterwards, with that wo-begone piteous expression which he sometimes wore, I 
saw that he was a broken-hearted man. I knew that some unaccountable sorrow was 
eating him away at the core; I could see it in his eyes, I could hear it in his low breathing, 
and I forgave him. He observed the change in my aspect, I supposed; fopr he began that 
moment to tell me his story without another word of circumlocution or apology. “I must 
lay my case before you,” said he: “you deserve it. Some of your notions with regard to 
my strange malady are so comforting—so strengthening to the only hope I have left, that 
I must lay open my whole heart to you. You do not understand me, I see. The notions I 
allude to have been pilfered from you in our ordinary conversation, after a lounge 
through the hospitals and dissecting rooms. I do not ask of you to cleanse the foul bosom 
of that perilous stuff which makes other men mad; I have nothing to do with love, less 
with ambition; I am neither a guilty nor a disappointed man—you begin to breathe more 
freely I perceive—but I do ‘ask you to minister to a mind diseased,’ to ‘pluck from the 
  354 
memory a rooted sorrow,’ to bring ‘some sweet oblivious antidote’—I care not what, the 
phial of death would be welkcome to me if it could be administered by mistake; for, to 
tell oyu the truth, I have not the courage—courage men call it—to destroy myself; though 
there is not a day in the year, hardly an hour in the day, when death would not be 
welcome to me—any death.”  
 I believed him. There was that in every look, and that in every tone of his deep, 
quiet, smooth voice, which made belief a thing of necessity.  
He continued. “About fourteen years ago I was bitten by a dog”— 
I started, I suppose; for, to say the truth, I was completely thrown off my guard by 
the suddenness and strangeness of this communication. He dropped his eyes when they 
met mind, turned very pale, and then added— 
“A favourite spaniel of my mother’s a water spaniel not bigger than a large cat, 
poor Flora; and fourteen years ago.” As he said this, he tried to laugh, but the laugh died 
away with a convulsive motion of the eyes, and a slight quiver of the under lip. “And yet, 
sir, although, as you see, I have nothing on earth to fear, still I am a haunted man—
haunted by strange human faces bowing to me, and firmly persuaded that one day or 
other I shall die of hydrophobia, and be smothered between two feather-beds. Did you 
ever hear any thing so ridiculous?”  
“Never,” said I, wondering what would be the issue of all this. “But I should like 
to ask you one question—was the dog mad?”  
“Ah, I had forgotten the best part of the whole story,” and he laughed—“ha, ha, 
ha—we never knew; she ate and drank well to the last: I was drinking at the time she bit 
me—ha, ha, ha! But she was sickened and died soon after, and we had reason to believe 
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that a very decided case of hydrophobia occurred, among the hounds of a neighbor, 
where Flora had been visiting. You are astonished, of course, at my folly.”  
I knew not what to say. I began to have a very uncomfortable misgiving, not so 
much on the score of hydrophobia, as on that of partial derangement; when, all at once, it 
flashed into my mind that his reason for hurrying off so abruptly, when he happened to be 
walking near the fountain that plays in the garden of the palais-royal, and peradventure 
his frequent refusal to take wine after it was ordered and poured out, a thing I had 
observed that very day and often before, might proceed from his dread of liquids. A cold 
shiver ran through my veins at the bare idea—a thrill of horror. And there he say eyeing 
me, as if the very next word I spoke would be a matter of life and death to him. He began 
to be dreadfully agitated—and so indeed was I: for, after trying to rally my powers and 
change the current of conversation, I found it impossible; I had neither the courage nor 
the ability; I could not have breathed a light word for the next half hour, to save a fellow 
creature’s life. Other circumstances now crowded upon my recollection: his 
unwillingness ot sit in a draught of cold air, as he called it, though it came through a key-
hole; his trying to persuade me one day to shave without a glass, and never look into one 
for any purpose whatever, glasses being too effeminate for men, he said; his breaking out 
in a fit of ungovernable fury on our entering his room at the café, because a waiter, in 
opening the door, had let in the light of a dozen flashing mirrors upon us, which they 
were preparing to cover the walls with; his habit of looking away or shutting his eyes and 
swallowing his coffee by tea-spoonfuls and gulp after gulp; his strange reason for 
preferring chocolate—strange till now, because they made it so thick. Nay more—and 
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again my blood thrilled at the recollection—perhaps the poor fellow’s behavior in church, 
where I first saw him, was entirely owing to the same dreadful aversion to liquids! 
“You do not answer me; it cannot be possible that you have any fears on my 
account? Consider the length of time; the species of animal, for the water dog, you know, 
is never afflicted with hydrophobia; the doubtfulness, moreover, of her being in that way, 
apart from this fact, about which all naturalists concur, do they not?” 
What could I saw? In the first place, we have no proof with regard to any species 
of dog that would justify the position of poor Smith; for if they cannot originate the 
disease, they may communicate it, perhaps, as Newfoundland dogs do: naturalists do not 
even pretend to know anything about the subject. In the next place, what proof had he 
that the dof in question was a water dog; the size and the fact of its being a lap-dog or a 
family pet, were both unfavourable to the supposition. 
I referred him to books. “The devil take your books,” said he: “it was they and 
your infernal newspapers that first set me thinking of this frightful possibility. I read 
volumes and volumes in all the languages of Europe, and they left me more than half 
dead from their tenor. I met with cases well authenticated, beautifully authenticated, of 
symptoms appearing eighteen, twenty, and even thirty years after the bite, followed by 
death, sir, death. Dr. Bardsley, of Manchester,82 mentions a case of twelve years, you 
know; and the Dictionary of Medical Sciences another of ten years. From that moment I 
was no longer master of myself; I had forgotten the circumstance of the bite entirely, and 
should never have remembered it again, but for a death, reported in the newspapers, 
which could only be traced to an incident of three years’ standing. I applied, forthwith, to 
                                                
82 See an article titled “Hydrophobia Simulata.” The Medico-chirurgical Review and 
Journal of Medical Science, vol. 9. London: G. Hayden, 1826.  
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a most eminent physician, who prescribed liverwort and black-pepper; to a second, who 
gave me belladonna, hydrochlorine or oxymuriatic acid, opium, and the Lord knows 
what, in doses large enough to kill if they did not cure; to a third who insisted on bleeding 
me to death. At the end of which time I concluded to throw aside my books, read no more 
newspapers, and never allow another great man to prescribe for me while I breathed the 
breath of life.   
“And I have kept my resolution. You are the first to whom I have told my story: 
and you will be the last. No human creature but you; not even my brothers, and I have 
three entirely worthy of confidence; not even my poor wife, whom I have abandoned 
only because I love her too much to let her know the cause of my malady; ever did or 
ever shall know the true cause of my suffering and bereavement; for at times it is a 
bereavement, and a terrible one, as you saw that day in the little church, where my second 
paroxysm fell upon me, and let me stretched out upon the floor, without strength to move 
or even to cry out.”  
“The second?—and fifteen months ago?” said I; and a thought struck me: I 
trembled from head to foot, wondering, at the same time, why it had not struck me 
before; how could I be so stupid! “Will you allow me to ask you two or three questions?” 
said I. 
“Two or three hundred if you please: what are they?”  
“Have you ever had any symptoms to trouble you?”  
“Yes;” and his countenance fell. 
“What are they?” 
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“All of one sort: an aversion to liquids; a periodical fear of any thing and every 
thing in a swift motion, so that a fly touching my face would make me jump out of the 
chair. You wonder at me of course, and, to tell you the truth, I wonder at myself. You 
know, and I know, that my fears are childish, preposterous; that the cases I have referred 
to are impossible in the very nature of things.”  
He grew very earnest here; but I saw by his eagerness and trepidation that he was 
trying to persuade himself, not me, of the truth of what he said.  
“Impossible in the very nature of things; and yet they work with me by night and 
by day, wearing me to the grave and unfitting me for all the purposes of life. Twenty 
times a day when I am alone—for in the presence of others I live in continual terror of 
betraying myself—I go up to a mirror in the next room, for I allow of none, as you 
observe, in my own; and the detestable fashion here of building their wainscots of 
looking glasses and gold-leaf I cannot endure; or I put myself in the way of a current of 
air, merely to see if I can do so without uneasiness; and every night of my life I wake 
thirsty and feverish, and lying hour after hour longing, and yet dreading, to lift a glass of 
cold water to my parched lips. In the name of God, therefore, what am I to do?” 
“When did these symptoms first appear?” 
“About five years ago; nine years after the accident. Ah! your countenance 
brightens up! sure you have something more than a hope to comfort me with!” 
His tone of voice went to my heart; I could have fallen upon his neck as if he had 
been a younger brother suddenly snatched from death. “It is a pity,” said I, “that, having 
read so much, you did not read more.”  
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“Why so?—I was tired to death, and frightened to death, and have been so at 
intervals ever since; my fears pulling one way and common sense another.”  
“Will you put yourself under my care?” 
“No.” 
“Will you read a book or two?” 
“A medical book?—no never; I would as soon read one of your essays,” bowing. I 
laughed, of course, and so did he; what else could we do?  
“Have you any other symptoms?” continued I. 
“No.” 
“Then I will undertake your cure. The symptoms you mention are not by any 
means confined to hydrophobia; there, there, do not be agitated, hear me through; the 
dread of water is not a conclusive symptom, any more than aerophobia, a dread of air, or 
pantiphobia, a dread of everything.83 In point of fact there never is a dread of water; but, 
on the contrary, a desire of water. Fear of itself, the mere apprehension of such a death, is 
now generally known to be capable of producing all the symptoms that you are afflicted 
with.” 
He started from his chair, and demanded proof.  
“John Hunter84 mentions a case, and Barbantini85 another.” 
“Where, where?” 
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“In the Italian Journal of Physic and Chemistry, 1817, where the individual who 
had been bitten and was lying at the point of death under all the worst symptoms of 
hydrophobia, was restored by having the dog led into his chamber and shown to him in 
perfect health.”  
“I wont [sic] read the cases myself,” said he, “I wont, I wont, I have said so and 
I’ll stick to it: but I’ll tell you what I will do—if you will read them to me, by heaven” 
capering about the room like a madman, “I’ll build a temple to you!”  
“Yet more,” said I, “the symptoms you mention are not only insufficient to 
convict you of hydrophobia; but sufficient of themselves, and perfectly conclusive, to 
show that you are free from that awful distemper.” 
“How so?” 
“The length of time since you were first attacked and the long intervals; had you 
read more upon the subject, or less, you might have been cured long ago.” 
“Sir--doctor—my friend; I wont put myself under your care; but if you will make 
up a prescription, I’ll copy it; and if you’ll tell me what to do, I’ll do it.” 
“Agreed. Go home to your wife. Take your regular exercise, night and morning. 
Avoid strange faces”—he bowed here with the utmost gravity. “Go through a course of 
gymnastics in the open air. Have done with feeling your pulse, with medical books and 
cases reported in the newspapers; and, above all, copy the following prescription: 
“Pil. pan. pleb. vel domest. 4 un. 
Aq. font. frig. ad lib. 
Mel. com. 3 un. 
Sinap. alb. &c. &c. ad lib.” 
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He did so. We parted: and that day twelvemonth, after my return to Philadelphia, 
he wrote me to say, that he was the happiest fellow on the face of the earth perfectly 
cured of every thing in the world, except his wife, and so much of hydrophobia as 
consisted in the dread of water; for, in spite of my prescription, he had never been able, 
and was afraid he never should be able, to overcome his repugnance to that liquid, 
thought he had contrived a substitute for aq. font. frig. ad. lib. in vin. rub. ex Portu. 
vetust. opt. quant. suff. or the very best of old port wine, and a plenty of it. To be sure he 
was still a haunted man; but then he was only haunted with the ghost of a long buried 
dyspepsia.  
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